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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2006 DIGILAW 101 (MP)

Sanjay Jain v. Gulabchand Mallaiya

2006-01-17

S.R.WAGHMARE

body2006
JUDGMENT 1. By this petition the petitioner has impugned order dated 6.7.2005 (Annexure P-6) passed by Fifth Additional District Judge, Satna in civil Suit No.1-B/2002 rejecting the petitioner's/defendant's objection to the acceptance of a document filed by the defendant in the suit has been improperly stamped. 2. Facts of the case are that the respondent/plaintiff had filed a suit for recovery of Rs.1,10,500/- against the petitioner/defendant. The defendant/petitioner objected to the document on the basis of which recovery was being 'claimed stating that the document would either be covered under Art. 13 (c) or Art. 49 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and the proper stamp duty payable was Rs.200/- whereas the document was written on a stamp paper of Rs.1/- only thereby requiring impounding and that the document impugned was either a promissory note or a pill of exchange. Moreover, the counsel also contended that the document could not be impounded under section 39 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. However, the trial Court had rejected the contention of the petitioner/defendant. 3. The document is filed as Annexure P-5 in the petition and reads thus: ^^vkt fnu vkidk #i;k 1]00]000-00 vadu #i;k ,d yk[k vk;k lks tek fd;k eqn~nr ekg 12 ds okLrs ftldk C;kt is"koj pqdrh fd;k ekQZr lqjs"k ds"kjokuh ds fefr QkYxqu lqnh 1 lEor~ 2056 fnukad 7-3-2000** 4. Whereas counsel for the respondents/plaintiff on the other hand has contended that the alleged document is merely a receipt as bare reading of the document would demonstrate and properly stamped and there has been no infirmity in the order passed by the trial Court. Considering the definition of promissory note under section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 it reads thus: "4. "Promissory note" -- A "promissory note" is an instrument in writing (not being a bank-note or a currency-note) containing an unconditional undertaking signed by the maker, to pay a certain sum of money only to, or to the order of, a certain person, or to the bearer of the instrument." 5. According to the contention of the petitioner the document contains an unconditional undertaking to repay the amount of Rs.1,00.000/- after a period 12 months and hence could be termed as a promissory note and the stamp duty has to be calculated in accordance with Art. 49 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. 6. According to the contention of the petitioner the document contains an unconditional undertaking to repay the amount of Rs.1,00.000/- after a period 12 months and hence could be termed as a promissory note and the stamp duty has to be calculated in accordance with Art. 49 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. 6. So also the document can also be interpreted to be a bill of exchange as per section 5 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, since it is an unconditional order to pay after 12 months then the stamp duty would be levied under Art. 13 (c) of the Schedule I of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. 7. On perusal of the impugned document and its contents it is found that the documents states that "Rs.1,00,000/- in words Rupees on lacs had come and were deposited for a period of 12 months and the interest accrued was paid off through Suresh Kesharwani on Miti Falguni Sudi 1 Samvat 2056 dated 7.3.2000". 8. Counsel for the respondent/plaintiff has relied on the case of Sobhagmal Kesharimal Mahajan v. Ramnivas Murlidhar Mahajan and others [1961 MPLJ Short Note 37 page 293] whereby this Court had considered a document containing one anna stamp and was not decided and the question pertained whether the document was a bond or a receipt and since there was nothing in the operative part of the document which suggested that the writer had made an express promise to pay the amount although an implied promise to pay could be inferred by reference to the date of maturity mentioned. The Court had held that the document was a receipt and not a bond. Counsel had also relid on 1975 JLJ SN 106 [Ghasilal Champalal Kala v. Karan Singh] whereby this Court while considering the question whether the document was in Hindi and inadmissible due to being insufficiently stamped had held thus : "The mere fact that the amount mentioned in the document was payable after a certain period would not render the document a negotiable instrument. The language used in section 2 (2) of Indian Stamps Act, 1899 cannot be taken literally because it might include a document which is not for any purpose capable of being classified as a Bill of Exchange. Mere mention of date of payment does not make a 'receipt' to be a Bill of Exchange. The language used in section 2 (2) of Indian Stamps Act, 1899 cannot be taken literally because it might include a document which is not for any purpose capable of being classified as a Bill of Exchange. Mere mention of date of payment does not make a 'receipt' to be a Bill of Exchange. Moreover, as the document in question did not contain an order directing a certain person to pay a certain sum of money or to the order of a cetain person or to the bearer of the instrument, the document was not a "Bill of Exchange" as defined by Negotiable Instruments Act. Revision dismissed." Relying on 1977 MPLJ S. Note 58 Page 37 [Manoharlal v. Suganchand] the Court held that a document does not cease to be receipt merely because the document mentions due date of repayment since it acknowledged receipt of payment and did not contain order to pay money. It was held to be a receipt and not a Bill of Exchange. Further relying on 1979 MPLJ S. Note 3 Page 2 [Motilal v. Tarachand] the Court held that the document was a receipt and was not a Hundi. 9. Counsel for the petitioner however has countered that while interpreting the document the character of the document is to be seen with reference to the definition in the statute where the same confers to the definition or not. When tehre is an unequivocal statement made by the maker of the document to pay an amount and the demand is implicit in the document then it is inferable that it is a Bill of Exchange and in the present document the same is inferable that payment was to be made after a lapse of 12 months. Hence, the document had to be construed strictly according to the fiscal statute either to being a Bill of Exchange and then it would be regulated under Art. 13 (c), and if it could be inferred as a promissory note then it would be regulated under Art. 49 of the Article of Schedule I of the Indian Stamp Act. A liberal construction cannot be undertaken under the circumstances. 10. A liberal construction cannot be undertaken under the circumstances. 10. After careful scrutiny and consideration I find that where there is nothing in the operative part to suggest that the writer has made an express promise to pay and even if inference is to be implied by reference to the date of maturity it cannot be interpreted that the said document impugned is a promissory note or a Bill of Exchange. 11. The definition of a receipt under section 2 (23) of the Indian Stamp Act is as under: "(23) "Receipt" includes any note, memorandum or writing-- (a) whereby any money, or any bill of exchange, cheque or promissory note is acknowledged to have been received, or (b) whereby any other movable property is acknowledged to have been received in satisfaction of a debt, or (c) whereby any debt or demand, or any part of a debt or demand, is acknowledged to have been satisfied or discharged, or (d) which signifies or imports any such acknowledgment, and whether the same is or is not signed with the name of any person;" and the stamp duty is levied under Art. 53 of Schedule I. And since the impugned document docs not contain any promise to pay but merely refers to the definition of the amount and the interest which has been paid (Chukti Kiya). 12. The trial Court has also categorically observed that merely mention of depositing interest would not render the document a promissory note and it was merely a receipt since there was no promise to pay. Such observation and findings cannot be brushed aside. 13. And appreciating the same on the anvil of the judgment cited above there can be no scintilla of doubt that the document cannot be anything else but a receipt. I find no reason to disagree with the finding of the trial Court but concur with the same. The findings are impeccable and do no need any interference and hence the petition is dismissed. 14. No order as to costs.