JUDGMENT B.S. Reddy, C.J. 1. Being aggrieved by the impugned common judgment and order dated 11th May, 2004 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in WP (C) No. 4169/2000 and WP (C) No. 8019/2001 whereby and whereunder Writ Petition (C) 8019/2001 filed by the 5th Respondent herein has been allowed and the WP (C) No. 4169/2000 preferred by the Appellant has been dismissed. The learned Single Judge set aside the order passed by the authorities appointing the Appellant as Gaonbura of Titka Garia Gaon under Sariha mouza. 2. In order to appreciate as to whether the judgment under appeal suffers from any infirmity requiring our interference, few relevant facts leading to the filing of this appeal may have to be noticed. 3. The Appellant as well as the Respondent No. 5 applied for being appointed to the office of the Gaonbura of Titka Garia Gaon, Mouza-Sariha in the District of Barpeta. An advertisement was issued on 11.11.1998 by the Sub Divisional Office, Bajali Sub Division for selection and appointment of Gaonbura in response to which, the Appellant as well as the Respondent No. 5 submitted their applications. Interviews were held on 25.6.1999. The Sub Divisional Officer, Bajali Sub Division appointed the Respondent No. 5 as Gaonbura. 4. Being aggrieved by the order of appointment, the Appellant herein preferred Appeal No. 1/2000 before the Deputy Commissioner, Barpeta which was heard and allowed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner by duly setting aside the appointment of the Respondent No. 5 to the office of the Gaonbura and accordingly directed the Appellant herein to be appointed as Gaonbura in place of the Respondent No. 5. The Respondent No. 5 challenged the decision of the First Appellant authority in Second Appeal No. 36/2000 before the Commissioner, Lower Assam Division, Guwahati. The Second appeal preferred by the Respondent No. 5 made the same fate as that of the First appeal preferred by him. The 5th Respondent in Writ petition (C) No. 8019/2001 challenged the order dated 5.8.2001 passed by the Commissioner, Lower Assam Division, Guwahati in Second Appeal No. 36/2000. The Second appeal preferred by the Respondent No. 5 made the same fate as that of the First appeal preferred by him. The 5th Respondent in Writ petition (C) No. 8019/2001 challenged the order dated 5.8.2001 passed by the Commissioner, Lower Assam Division, Guwahati in Second Appeal No. 36/2000. The learned Single Judge having held that the First and the Second appellate authorities erred in imposing decision of theirs instead referring the matter to the selection committee for reconsideration, however, in the circumstances, arrived at a conclusion not to interfere with the decision of the 'Selection committee' and accordingly set aside the order passed by the appellate authorities. 5. In this Writ appeal, the learned Senior counsel Mr. N. Dutta has submitted that the learned Single judge committed an error in interfering with the concurrent findings and the decisions of the statutory appellate authorities in as much as such a course is impermissible in law. The learned Senior counsel submitted that it is well within the jurisdiction of the appellate authorities to reconsider and reassess the merits of each of the candidates and substitute their findings for that of primary authority. The appellate authorities have not committed any error in reversing the orders of the primary authority. It was further submitted that the writ Appellant being a family member of former Gaonbura is entitled to some weightage in the matter of appointment to the office of the Gaonbura. 6. Mr. P.K. Tiwari, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent No. 5 submits that the claim of the Appellant on the ground of being the nephew of the erstwhile Gaonbura cannot supersede the claim of the most suitable person having intrinsic qualities requiring of a Gaonbura. The claim of the family member of a Gaonbura cannot be considered on any preferential basis as the same is impermissible in law. It was also contended that the expression employed in executive instructions claim of the family of Gaonbura cannot be extended to include nearby distant relatives of Gaonbura. The Appellant claims to be the nephew of the former Gaonbura and therefore cannot be considered to be a family member. It was also contended that the expression employed in executive instructions claim of the family of Gaonbura cannot be extended to include nearby distant relatives of Gaonbura. The Appellant claims to be the nephew of the former Gaonbura and therefore cannot be considered to be a family member. The learned Counsel strenuously contended that the appellate authorities committed serious jurisdictional error in arrogating themselves the power to assess comparative merits of the Appellant and the Respondent No. 5 and committed error in proceeding to consider their fitness and suitability for appointment to the office of the Gaonbura. According to the learned Counsel, the said function is of the selection committee and not of the appellate authorities. 7. We have considered the rival submissions carefully and perused the orders of the appellate authorities as well as the impugned judgment under appeal. 8. The appointment and dismissal of Gaonburas is regulated by the executive instructions issued by the Government under the provisions of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886. The executive instruction 162(A) provides for appointment and dismissal of Gaonburas. The power of appointment, suspension and dismissal of Gaonburas, in case of Sadar Sub-Division is conferred upon the Deputy Commissioner or the Sub Divisional Officer (Sadar) and in case of outlying Sub Divisions by the Sub Divisional Officers. The executive instructions mandate that in the matter of appointment of Gaobura, the following factors shall be taken into consideration: (1) Claim of the family of the Gaonbura. (2) The views of the Mouzadar. (3) The suitability of the person for the post. Gaonburas shall be entitled to the protection provided under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. 9. 162.(B) of the Executive Instructions provides an appeal against the order of appointment, suspension and dismissal of a Gaonbura by the Sub Divisional Officer (Sadar) and the Sub Divisional Officers of the outlying Sub Divisions within the period of 60 days. The provision reads as under: 162.(B) An appeal against the order of appointment, suspension and dismissal of a Gaonbura by the Sub Divisional Officer (Sadar) and the Sub Divisional Officers of the outlying Sub-Divisions shall lie to the Deputy Commissioner within a period of 60 days from the date on which the Appellant receives a copy of the order. 10. The provision reads as under: 162.(B) An appeal against the order of appointment, suspension and dismissal of a Gaonbura by the Sub Divisional Officer (Sadar) and the Sub Divisional Officers of the outlying Sub-Divisions shall lie to the Deputy Commissioner within a period of 60 days from the date on which the Appellant receives a copy of the order. 10. 162.(C) of the executive instructions provides for Second appeal from the order of the Deputy Commissioner to the Commissioner of the Division and the Commissioner may-(a) confirm or set aside the order, (b) remit the case to the Deputy Commissioner, directing for such further action or inquiry as he considers proper in the circumstances of the case. 11. 162.(D) provides a petition for review of the order of the Commissioner of Division to the State Government. 12. A plain reading of the executive instruction 162(B) makes it abundantly clear that the appellate authorities power is in no manner circumscribed or restricted whatsoever requiring disposal of an appeal in a particular manner or restricting the appeal to be preferred on limited grounds. In our considered opinion, the power of the appellate authorities under executive instruction 162(B) is as wide as that of the appointing authority under 162(A) of the instructions. The appellate authority can as well, do all that the original authority could do under 162(A) of the instructions. It may modify, vary or set aside the order under appeal or remit the matter for fresh consideration by the original authority. It is entitled to summon the records, reevaluate and assess the evidence and materials available on record and substitute the findings for that of the original authority. 13. Relying on stray observations made by this Court in Narendra Nath Kalita v. State of Assam(1992) 1 GLR 89, the learned Counsel for the 5th Respondent submitted that the powers of the appellate authorities are not exactly coextensive with that of the original authority and therefore re-appreciation or reassessment in order to interfere with the order of appointment made by the original authority is impermissible in law. In our considered opinion, no such proposition or principle in law as suggested, has been laid down by this Court in the said decision. In our considered opinion, no such proposition or principle in law as suggested, has been laid down by this Court in the said decision. This Court while adverting to the contentions that the appellate authority has been given the 'unbridled and unguided' power, made an observation that the scope for interference by the appellate authority or the reviewing authority is not specified in instructions, "this would not imply either that their powers are exactly co-extensive with that of the original authority or that these authorities have unbridled and unguided powers." None can be heard in saying that in a system governed by the Rule of law and constructionalism, any authority could claim 'unbridled and unguided 'power. This Court rightly repelled that contention and in that process made some observations which are required to be appreciated in their proper context. This Court held that the appellate, second appellate or the reviewing authorities as the case may be are bound by the three criterias of factors indicated in the executive instruction No. 162-A i.e. (a) the claims of the family of the late Gaonbura, (b) the views of the Mouzadar and (c) the suitability of the person for the post. This Court in clear and categorical terms inter alia held as follows: The appellate and the reviewing authority can decide the appeal or review petition only in the light of these factors and of no other factors. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner tried to argue that the appellate authority has power to conduct independent interview of the candidates. We do not think that there is any basis for accepting such a view. Of course, they have the power to assess the result of the interview on the basis of the proceeding of the selection committee made available to them. They have also the power to examine independently the claims of the family of the late Gaobura. Equally the view of the Mouzadar may or may not have been correctly understood by the original authority and/or the appellate or reviewing authority has the power to correct the error. It may be pointed out that the appellate or reviewing authority would not have the benefit of experience in the interview and to that extent they will be in a disadvantageous position. It may be pointed out that the appellate or reviewing authority would not have the benefit of experience in the interview and to that extent they will be in a disadvantageous position. Necessarily the higher authorities have to respect the objective result of the interview conducted by the selection committee, while retaining the power to correct any errors which may have been committed by the original authority in regard to the criteria indicated in the Instruction 162-A. 14. The observations so made, in our considered opinion, in no manner restrict the power of the appellate authority whatsoever in hearing and disposing of the appeals both on the question of facts and law. This Court did not lay down anything contrary to well established principles in law as regards the nature and scope of appellate jurisdiction which always includes the power to rehear the matter on merits. It needs no restatement that an appeal is a continuous proceeding of the original one. We do not find any provision requiring the constitution of any selection committee as such by the appellate authority. May be in order to ensure transparency and accountability in the matter of appointment of Gaonburas, the appointing authority may have evolved some methodology for selecting suitable candidates by properly applying the three criterias of factors indicated in the Executive instruction 162-A. We reiterate as what has been held by this Court in Narendra Nath Kalita (Supra) that the appellate, second appellate and the reviewing authorities are entitled and clothed with necessary powers to examine independently the claim of the competing candidates including the claim of family member of former/erstwhile Gaonbura. All those authorities are endowed with powers and jurisdiction to correct errors of whatsoever nature of the inferior authorities. The appellate authorities are entitled to re appreciate and reassess the whole process of appointment and in exercise of their discretion may vary, modify and/or set aside the orders of the appointing authority. The question as to whether such power has been properly exercised or not, may have to be gone into in each case. The orders of the appellate authorities if vitiated for any reason whatsoever, can always be corrected by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 15. The question as to whether such power has been properly exercised or not, may have to be gone into in each case. The orders of the appellate authorities if vitiated for any reason whatsoever, can always be corrected by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 15. Now, we shall proceed to consider the question as to in what manner the claims of the family of the Gaonbura are required to be considered by the authority. We have already referred to the instructions which mandate that in the matter of appointment of Gaonbura, the claim of the family of the Gaonbura, the views of the Mouzadar and the suitability of the person for the post are required to be taken into consideration by the appointing authority. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the office of the Gaonbura is not a hereditary one. No family member of Gaonbura as a matter of right can claim for being appointed as Gaonbura, but at the same time, the executive instructions which remain unchallenged provide and mandate that the claim of the family of the Gaonbura is one of the factors to be taken into consideration along with other factors. If the selection procedure devised by the appointing authority provides for awarding some marks for the views of the Mouzadar as well as the suitability of the person for the post, the claim of the family of the Gaonbura cannot be ignored by refusing to award any marks. Some marks may have to be assigned towards the claim of the family of the Gaonbura. In our considered opinion, all things being equal, the claim of the family member of the Gaonbura may have to be preferred, but not at the costs of the suitability of the person for the post. 16. The expression 'family' is not defined in the executive instructions, and the claims are not restricted to that of the legal representatives or lineal descendants of Gaonbuas. The authorities may be for good reason employed the expression 'family' and not restricted it to legal representatives or descendants of Gaonburas. It may be advisable for the authority to issue appropriate instructions as to who could be considered as the members of the family of the Gaonburas. Lack of clarity in this regard in the executive instructions may give rise to avoidable litigation. It may be advisable for the authority to issue appropriate instructions as to who could be considered as the members of the family of the Gaonburas. Lack of clarity in this regard in the executive instructions may give rise to avoidable litigation. We hope and trust that the matter shall receive due attention of the government for doing the needful in the matter. 17. That so far the case in hand is concerned, we are not inclined to give restricted meaning to the expression 'family' used in the executive instructions as suggested. A nephew in the given context of the rural environment cannot be said to be not a member of the family. The decisions upon which reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the 5th Respondent, in the context of compassionate appointment into service cannot be gainfully adopted for interpreting the word 'family' occurring in the expression 'claim of the family of the Gaonburas'. Since the preferential right in the matter of appointment of the Gaonbura is not restricted to sons, daughters and lineal descendants, we cannot hold that the claim of a nephew of a Gaonbura cannot be treated as a claim of the family. 18. Now, we shall proceed to examine the order of the Second appellate authority which has been set aside by the learned Single Judge in the light of our understanding of the nature and the scope of the executive instructions. The second appellate authority noted that the former Gaonbura Shri Holkiram Das having resigned from the office of the Gaonbura due to his old age, recommended the case of the appellate by duly considering him as a member of his family. That so far as the views of the Mouzadar is concerned, he has certified that both the Appellant and the Respondent No. 5 to be of good character. Even the Mouzadar also noted that the Appellant is the nephew of former Gaonbura. 19. So far as the suitability aspect is concerned, the 5th Respondent has never been evaluated to be No. 1 amongst the competing candidates. The Circle officer in his report observed that the 5th Respondent lacks proper knowledge for the post of Gaonbura, but at the same time awarded more number of marks to the 5th Respondent as against the Appellant. The contradiction has been noticed by the Second appellate authority. The Circle officer in his report observed that the 5th Respondent lacks proper knowledge for the post of Gaonbura, but at the same time awarded more number of marks to the 5th Respondent as against the Appellant. The contradiction has been noticed by the Second appellate authority. It is under those circumstances, the second appellate authority concluded that the Appellant being the nephew of former Gaonbura is entitled to some weightage and accordingly held that non awarding of marks though there is a column provided for awarding of marks towards the claim of family member of Gaonburas to be bad in law. On an over all assessment of merits of the Appellant and the Respondent No. 5, the second appellate authority having taken all the three factors cumulatively into consideration directed the appointment of the Appellant as Gaonbura and accordingly confirmed the order passed by the First appellate authority. 20. In our considered opinion, the Second appellate authority did not commit any error in arriving such conclusion. Neither the Second appellate authority nor the First appellate authority exceeded their jurisdiction in making an over all assessment of merits of the competing candidates for being appointed to the office of the Gaonbura. The appellate authority did not go beyond the executive instructions in evaluating the merits of the candidates since they have applied the three relevant factors alone namely, (1) The claims of the family of the late Gaonbura (2) The views of the Mouzadar and (3) The suitability of the person for the post and no extraneous factors have been taken into consideration. This Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India normally does not interfere with such concurrent finding of facts and substitute its own opinion for that of the authorities. The findings and conclusions drawn by the appellate authorities do not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record requiring any interference of this Court in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction. The findings and conclusions drawn by no stretch of imagination could be characterized as perverse. 21. For the aforesaid reasons, we find it difficult to sustain the impugned judgment under appeal. 22. The Writ appeal is accordingly allowed resulting in restoration of the order passed by the Second appellate authority directing appointment of the Appellant as Gaonbura. There shall be an order accordingly. 21. For the aforesaid reasons, we find it difficult to sustain the impugned judgment under appeal. 22. The Writ appeal is accordingly allowed resulting in restoration of the order passed by the Second appellate authority directing appointment of the Appellant as Gaonbura. There shall be an order accordingly. We make no order as to costs. Appeal allowed