JUDGMENT This second appeal is by the plaintiff in O.S. No. 77 of 1989 on the file of the Court of the First Additional Munsiff, Belgaum who had sought for specific performance of an agreement for sale of the suit schedule property - a vacant site measuring 40' x 60' located in Belgaum Town agreed to be conveyed for a consideration of Rs. 3,500/- under an agreement dated 16-3-1972 at which time, an advance of Rs. 1,500/- had been paid. 2. The agreement as such was not disputed by the defendant. The only defence put forth by the defendant was that the property having been located in an urban agglomeration, for conveying the property the owner was required to obtain prior permission from the authorities under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and though the defendant had made an attempt on two occasions for such purpose, the permission having been declined, the defendant was not in a position to execute the sale deed and therefore, prayed for dismissal of the suit. 3. Learned Judge of the Trial Court in the light of such pleadings framed the following issues.- (i) Whether the plaintiff proves that he was and is always ready and willing to perform his specific part of contract? (ii) Whether the defendant proves that there was legal hurdle to execute the sale deed? (iii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of specific performance of contract as prayed for? In the alternative, Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover the earnest money of Rs. 1,500/- from the defendant? (iv) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to compensation of Rs. 2,000/- by way of interest in case relief of specific performance of contract is refused? (v) What decree or order? answered the issue relating to the readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff against the plaintiff holding that the plaintiff had not made good his case of readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract under the agreement for the reason that the plaintiff has not evinced commensurate interest in pursuing the order of the Competent Authority in declining permission to the defendant for execution of the sale deed by filing an appeal etc. The learned Trial Judge also answered the second issue viz., the existence of a legal hurdle on the part of the defendant to execute the sale deed in favour of the defendant and consequently, held that the plaintiff was not entitled for the decree of specific performance and accordingly, while dismissing the suit, nevertheless held that the plaintiff was in the alternative, entitled for refund of the earnest money of Rs. 1,500/- from the defendant and having regard to the considerable lapse of time, ordered that the defendant was to pay another sum of Rs. 2,000/- while refunding the earnest money of Rs. 1,500/- and the sum of Rs. 2,000/- was by way of interest for the delayed refund etc. Accordingly, decreed the suit only for the sum of Rs. 3,500/- while rejecting the plea of specific performance. 4. Aggrieved plaintiff carried the matter in appeal. The lower Appellate Court on the grounds raised in the memorandum of appeal and the contentions urged, formulated the following seven points for determination: 1. Whether the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract? 2. Whether the sale deed could not be executed due to legal hurdle as contended by the defendant? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for specific performance of contract as prayed? 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for recovering earnest money of Rs. 1,500/- from the defendant? 6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for compensation of Rs. 2,000/- by way of interest? 7. Whether the impugned judgment and decree needs to be interfered with? 7. For what decree or order the parties are entitled? 5. 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for recovering earnest money of Rs. 1,500/- from the defendant? 6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for compensation of Rs. 2,000/- by way of interest? 7. Whether the impugned judgment and decree needs to be interfered with? 7. For what decree or order the parties are entitled? 5. What is of significance to be noted here is that the first point about the plaintiffs readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract, which had been issue 1 before the Trial Court and which had been answered against the plaintiff, came to be reversed and the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court answered this point in favour of the appellant-plaintiff and held that the plaintiff had made good his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the obligations under the agreement, but, nevertheless, the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court also found that there was a legal impediment for the defendant to execute the sale deed in the light of the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act and denial of permission under this Act in favour of the defendant and therefore, dismissed the appeal affirming the view taken by the learned Trial Judge both regarding the denial of relief of specific performance and also granting of decree for the sum of Rs. 3,500/-, for refund of the earnest money with interest etc. It is aggrieved by such twin failures, the present second appeal by the plaintiff. 6. 3,500/-, for refund of the earnest money with interest etc. It is aggrieved by such twin failures, the present second appeal by the plaintiff. 6. Sri Basavaraj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has contended that the lower Appellate Court in fact has committed an error in law in not decreeing the suit by taking note of the change in law; that the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976 had came to be repealed by the year 1999 in terms of the law made by the Parliament by Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 and Central Act 15 of 1999 which in fact was adopted by the Karnataka State on the 8th July, 1999; that in view of this change in law, the requirement of permission by the Competent Authority under the Act no more existed and the only legal impediment which the defendant had pleaded for executing the sale deed had disappeared and in the light of the changed legal position, the suit ought to have been decreed as that was the only resistance that had been put up by the defendant before the Courts below. The lower Appellate Court, it appears though had dismissed the appeal on 27th September, 2001, was oblivious of the change in the law and the judgment is also hit by the mistake as to the legal position in the understanding of the learned Appellate Judge as the learned Judge has proceeded to dispose of the appeal as though the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976 continued to prevail on the date of the judgment. In either view of the legal position, being not aware of the change in the law or not disposing the law as it prevailed on the date of the judgment, the judgment and the decree passed by the lower Appellate Court requires to be set aside such question being a substantial question of law. 7. However, having regard to the considerable lapse of time from the date of the agreement i.e., the year 1972 when the sale price had been agreed to be at Rs. 3,500/- in respect of the property and the present market value of the property in question, the equities will have to be worked out between the parties and the plaintiff will have to pay a revised sale consideration even if the suit is to be decreed for specific performance. 8. 3,500/- in respect of the property and the present market value of the property in question, the equities will have to be worked out between the parties and the plaintiff will have to pay a revised sale consideration even if the suit is to be decreed for specific performance. 8. At this stage, the learned Counsel for the appellant has made a concession in favour of the defendant that the appellant would not press for the relief of specific performance of the agreement if, the defendant is ready and willing to pay a reasonable compensation for giving up that right and also if the amount of Rs. 1,500/- and the interest part of Rs. 2,000/- is suitably modified and a decree is passed for such modified sum in favour of the plaintiff Learned Counsel has submitted that the plaintiff will be content if the judgment and decree of the Trial Court is modified into one of a decree for a sum of Rs. 75,000/- in favour of the plaintiff and would not press for decree for specific performance. 9. Sri Basavaraj, learned Counsel for the appellant has filed a memo today before the Court, to which is attached a fax message said to have been received by the learned Advocate who has appeared for the appellant before the lower Appellate Court indicating that the plaintiff may not be as much interested in purchasing the property as of now but, would be contend to seek for refund of money with interest at 18% p.a. from the date of the agreement till realisation plus the damages etc. Learned Counsel for the appellant submits that even on proper calculation, the amount would be of considerable sum but, the plaintiff-appellant would be content if the decree is for a sum of Rs. 75,000/- carrying future interest at 15% p.a. from this day unless the amount is paid to the plaintiff within three months from today. 10. Learned Counsel for the appellant submits that even on proper calculation, the amount would be of considerable sum but, the plaintiff-appellant would be content if the decree is for a sum of Rs. 75,000/- carrying future interest at 15% p.a. from this day unless the amount is paid to the plaintiff within three months from today. 10. Sri Vigneshwara S. Shastri, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-defendant would support the judgment and decree and submit that the judgment and decree as on the date when the Trial Court passed the same was quite valid in law; also that the reversal of the findings regarding the readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff by the learned Judge of the Appellate Court is not tenable and that even this finding should have been answered against the plaintiff; that the dismissal of the appeal is well-justified; and this Court can even reverse this finding of readiness and willingness in the second appeal for the purpose of sustaining the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court. 11. While the finding regarding readiness and willingness is a finding of fact which cannot be examined or modified by this Court in the exercise of Section 100 jurisdiction. The finding of law about the suit for specific performance being declined, being a finding both not sustainable under the current position in law and also being one rendered in ignorance of the correct state of law on the date of the judgment of the lower Appellate Court, the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court cannot be sustained and therefore, the submission of Sri Vigneshwara S. Shastri, learned Counsel for the respondent cannot be accepted. However, in view of the concession made by the learned Counsel for the appellant on behalf of the plaintiff and the memo filed and as I am of the view that this is a very fair quantification of amount of compensation that the plaintiff is entitled to not only in respect of the advance amount of Rs. However, in view of the concession made by the learned Counsel for the appellant on behalf of the plaintiff and the memo filed and as I am of the view that this is a very fair quantification of amount of compensation that the plaintiff is entitled to not only in respect of the advance amount of Rs. 1,500/- which the plaintiff had paid to the defendant under the agreement but also for giving up his right under the decree for specific performance of the agreement to which the plaintiff is entitled in terms of the discussion in this judgment, the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court is modified only to the extent of the decree in favour of the plaintiff for the sum of Rs. 3,500/being altered instead to a decree for payment of the sum of Rs. 75,000/in favour of the plaintiff as indicated above and with interest subject to the condition imposed, but, the other portion of the judgment and decree is left undisturbed. The appeal is allowed in part to the extent indicated above. Registry to draw a decree in terms of this judgment. No costs.