JUDGMENT KIRAN ANAND LALL, J. 1. This is regular second appeal filed by the plaintiff-appellant against the judgment and decree dated 15.10.1987, vide which the lower appellate Court dismissed his suit, after setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 2. Before the trial Court, the case of appellant was that he had worked as Conductor, under the General Manager, Punjab Roadways Ludhiana Depot, upto 26.7.1982. On the basis of a regular departmental inquiry, held against him, his services were terminated by the competent authority vide order dated 26.7.1982. He challenged this order, pleading that the charge- sheet issued to him was vague and inadequate. The appointment of the inquiry officer was not proper. Proceedings in the inquiry were not conducted, in accordance with the rules. The inquiry officer was not competent to conduct the inquiry. The appellant was not given reasonable opportunity for production of his defence, and he was not even allowed to make his own statement. He further pleaded that he was ill but still the inquiry officer did not adjourn the inquiry and recorded evidence in his absence. It was, therefore, claimed that the order of termination was bad in law and as such, was liable to be set aside. 3. The trial Court decreed the suit, declaring the termination order based on the inquiry, as null and void and also held the appellant entitled to all the service benefits including seniority, pay, increments and allowances attached to the post of Conductor. Liberty was, however, granted to the respondents to take any action against the appellant, if they so desired, after holding a fresh inquiry. 4. In first appeal, the lower appellate court held, after re-appraisal of dote evidence) that during the raid conducted on Bus No.1383, on 26.1.1982, the appellant was found to have received full fare from 32 passengers but had not issued valid tickets to any of them. He had, instead handed over the old, i.e. already sold, tickets to 30 passengers, and to the remaining 2, he had not handed over/issued any ticket. During inquiry, charge-sheet Ex.Pl, was served on him. Regular departmental inquiry was initiated and charge-sheet, Ex.Pl, was served upon him. He filed reply to the charge-sheet on 3.3.1982, controverting all the allegations. However, on the date of hearing fixed for recording evidence viz.18.5.1982, he did not appear and absented. During inquiry, charge-sheet Ex.Pl, was served on him. Regular departmental inquiry was initiated and charge-sheet, Ex.Pl, was served upon him. He filed reply to the charge-sheet on 3.3.1982, controverting all the allegations. However, on the date of hearing fixed for recording evidence viz.18.5.1982, he did not appear and absented. Accordingly, the inquiry officer proceeded against him ex-parte and recorded the evidence of witnesses who were present. Even on the adjourned date of hearing viz. 21.5.1982, he did not participate in the inquiry. The inquiry officer, thereafter, submitted his report to the competent authority, and on the basis of that report, services of the appellant were terminated vide the impugned order dated 26.7.1982. 5. The substantial question of law involved in this case is, “As to whether non-recording of plea to the charge-sheet, by the Inquiry Officer would vitiate the inquiry?” 6. Learned counsel for the appellant referred to Rule 8 (9) of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1970, which runs as under: “If the Government employee who has not admitted any of the articles of charge in his written statement of defence or has not submitted any written statement of the defence, appears before the inquiring authority such authority shall ask him whether he is guilty or has any defence to make and if he pleads guilty to any of the articles of the charges, the inquiring authority shall record the plea, sign the record and obtain the signatures of the Government employee thereon. “ 7. In the case in hand, the inquiry officer had not orally asked the appellant as to whether he was admitting the charge levelled against him or wanted to contest. But, this omission on the part of the inquiry officer, would not, to my mind, make any difference, in view of the fact that he had already filed a written reply, denying the correctness of the charge framed against him. The charge-sheet dated 27.1.1982, Ex.Pl, issued to him pertained to the non-issuance of tickets to two passengers and issuance of old tickets to 30 passengers, though he had charged full fare from all of them. He filed his written reply thereto, Ex.P2, on 3.3.1982, wherein he denied the allegations and added that the raiding party had not properly checked the vehicle. He filed his written reply thereto, Ex.P2, on 3.3.1982, wherein he denied the allegations and added that the raiding party had not properly checked the vehicle. While referring to the allegation of issuance of old tickets, he pleaded that the Inspectors might well have collected those from the passengers on some other day, in order to implicate him in a false case. According to him, the inspectors had enmity with him, as he had not been able to oblige them. This plea, it is material to note, was not taken up by him, at any stage, before any of the three courts including this court. Learned counsel could not show, during arguments, as to in what manner the non-recording of his plea to the charge-sheet by the inquiry officer, had caused any prejudice to him. That being the position, it cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said that non-recording of plea, to the charge-sheet, by the inquiry officer, had, in the instant case, vitiated the inquiry. 8. The other points raised by learned counsel for the appellant are that the inquiry officer did not grant him the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. Besides, statements of passengers were also not recorded during the inquiry. 9. Well, it was not the case of the appellant, at any stage, that he was not informed about the date of hearing fixed in the inquiry, for recording of evidence. In fact, his own case is that on the date fixed for evidence, he had come to attend the inquiry at 4.00 p.m., and he could not appear before the inquiry officer prior to that, as he was ill. The latter had already proceeded against him ex-parte and recorded the statements of three inspectors viz. Ajit Singh, Sat Paul, and Gurbachan Singh. When he appeared before the inquiry officer at 4.00 p.m., he had brought to his notice the reason of his being late. Learned Assistant Advocate General rightly drew the attention of this court towards the fact that since no medical certificate or any other document was sent produced by the appellant to substantiate his plea of illness, the inquiry officer was well within his rights to have taken ex-parte proceedings against him. The appellant had not appeared before the inquiry officer even on the adjourned date of hearing viz. The appellant had not appeared before the inquiry officer even on the adjourned date of hearing viz. 21.5.1982,inspite of the fact that he was duly informed about that by the inquiry officer on 18.5.1982, when he had appeared before him at 4.00 p.m. That being so, the appellant could not be heard to say that he had not been given any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses or to lead his own evidence. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon 2002 (1) RSJ 618 K. Raghuram Babu v. Director General of Railway Protection Force, New Delhi, wherein it was held that the right to cross-examine, is a valuable right and no evidence shall be admissible unless the witness is permitted to be cross examined. But, this judgment does not apply to the facts of this case as it is not the case of the appellant that he was not aware of the date of hearing fixed in the inquiry, for recording evidence. The fact that he had appeared on 18.5.1982 before the inquiry officer but at 4.00 p.m, is clearly indicative of the fact that he was well aware of the date fixed in the inquiry, for the purpose. Therefore, he could have availed of his right of cross- examination of witnesses if he had appeared before the inquiry officer at the time when inquiry was held. But, he did not, nor did he send produce any medical certificate etc. in support of his plea of illness. He also never made any prayer for recall of witnesses, for cross-examination. It cannot, therefore, be said that right to cross-examine the witnesses of the department, was not granted, or was denied, to him. The other two judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant are 2003 (3) RSJ 373 Satnam Singh vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Amritsar, and 1985 (2) SLR 116 State of Haryana v. Mohan Singh. But, these, too have no applicability to the facts of the present case. In Satnam Singh’s case the cash available with the Conductor was not checked. He was still in the process of issuing tickets and no passenger had got down from the bus where the bus was checked. But, these, too have no applicability to the facts of the present case. In Satnam Singh’s case the cash available with the Conductor was not checked. He was still in the process of issuing tickets and no passenger had got down from the bus where the bus was checked. And, in Mohan Singh’s case (supra), the evidence of the department consisted of the solitary statement of the Chief Inspector who had neither recorded the statements of passengers alleged to have paid fare nor checked the cash in the hand of the Conductor. This is not the position in the present case, where the raiding party had counted! checked the cash available with the appellant (Conductor) and found that he had charged fare from as many as 32 passengers but had not issued tickets/ valid tickets to any of them. Besides, there was not one but three members of the rank of Inspectors in the raiding party, and all three of them, were not only examined during the inquiry but they had supported also the case of the department. 11. For the reasons stated above, I do not find any merit in this appeal which shall, therefore, stand dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs.