Judgment : Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondents. 2. This writ petition is filed against the order of the third respondent dated 27.10.2005 under which the third respondent has suspended the petitioner from service for the period of six months. 3. Thecase of the petitioner is that he was appointed as a Clerk on 16.5.1977 in the third respondent Society and worked as a Senior Clerk under the control of the Secretary and Board of Directors between the year 1997-1998. While he was working as a Senior Clerk, he was suspended from service by the third respondent on 31.12.1999 and subsequently on 11.2.2000, six charges were framed against him for which the petitioner has submitted his explanation on 14.2.2000. The third respondent, without conducting enquiry, has issued the second charge memo on 1.4.2000 making some more complaints. An enquiry was conducted in respect of charge memo dated 11.2.2000 in which the said 1.4.2000 charge was not included. On the basis of a report of the Enquiry Officer dated 30.10.2000 the second show cause notice was issued on 9.11.2000 for which the petitioner has submitted his explanation on 15.11.2000. Ultimately by an order dated 7.3.2001 the petitioner was dismissed from service. On the appeal filed by the petitioner against the said order, the first respondent by his order dated 29.6.2001 while allowing the appeal has remanded back the matter for fresh enquiry on the strength of the Criminal Court finding in favour of the petitioner by acquitting him. However, the enquiry report again submitted on 16.3.2002 without conducting the enquiry based on which the second show cause notice was given to the petitioner on 10.4.2002 as to why he should not be dismissed from service, not only relating to the charge memo dated 11.2.2000 but also the charge memo dated 1.4.2000. That order was challenged by the petitioner by filing of W.P. No. 20525 of 2002 and the said writ petition was admitted and stay was granted on 13.6.2002 which is pending. 4. In the meantime, there was an enquiry order passed by the second respondent under Section 81 (4) of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, the petitioner has received the enquiry notice on 11.8.2004 directing the petitioner to appear for the enquiry on 19.8.2004. No enquiry report was furnished to the petitioner. 4. In the meantime, there was an enquiry order passed by the second respondent under Section 81 (4) of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, the petitioner has received the enquiry notice on 11.8.2004 directing the petitioner to appear for the enquiry on 19.8.2004. No enquiry report was furnished to the petitioner. However, the report has been submitted, which is contrary to Section 81 (4) of the Act. The third respondent has issued another charge memo dated 12.5.2005 on the basis of the enquiry report under Section 81(4) of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act. Inspite of the fact that the petitioner has asked for the enquiry report, the said request was not complied with and therefore the petitioner was constrained to file the writ petition in W.P. No. 8383 of 2005 challenging the order of suspension dated 31.12.1999. The said writ petition was allowed by this Court by an order dated 22.9.2005 on the basis that the suspension order was against Section 76(1) of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, since the order has not specified the period of suspension. While passing the said order, the High Court has observed that the said order would not preclude the respondents if they are advised from proceeding further in accordance with the statutory provision. 5. Accordingto the petitioner, he was afterwards reinstated in service on 10.10.2005. Within 17 days from the date of reinstatement, the present impugned order came to be passed by the third respondent dated 27.10.2005, again suspending the petitioner for the reason that against the second show cause notice after the enquiry, the High Court has granted stay of the disciplinary proceedings in W.P. No. 20525 of 2002 and therefore, allowing the petitioner to continue in service is against the interest of the third respondent and hence, the petitioner was directed to be kept under temporary suspension from 27.10.2005 for a period of six months. It is challenging the said order, the present writ petition is filed. This Court, while admitting the writ petition has granted the stay of the order of suspension on 27.10.2005. The third respondent has filed the counter affidavit along with the petition to vacate the order of stay. According to the third respondent, the subject matter under challenge is touching the terms and conditions of employment, and therefore, it is an industrial dispute. The petitioner can only approach the Labour Court. The third respondent has filed the counter affidavit along with the petition to vacate the order of stay. According to the third respondent, the subject matter under challenge is touching the terms and conditions of employment, and therefore, it is an industrial dispute. The petitioner can only approach the Labour Court. The respondents would also state that the order of suspension passed by the third respondent will not be covered under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act. According to the third respondent, the Tamil Nadu Cooperative Societies Act, only authorises the Registrar and as far as the third respondent is concerned, it is only governed by its bye-laws. 6. It is also the case of the third respondent that the impugned order was passed only as per the direction of the High Court dated 22.9.2005 passed in W.P. No. 8313 of 2005 while setting aside the earlier order of suspension dated 31.12.1999 on the ground that it is not in conformity with Section 76(1) of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, since it has not mentioned about the period of suspension. That apart, the third respondents case is, inasmuch as the petitioner is an employee under third respondent, the third respondent employer has got an inherent right to keep the employee under suspension which cannot be taken as a power under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act. The suspension is only preventive and precautionary measure and it does not affect the petitioner. It is also the case of the third respondent that against the order of suspension, jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked. 7. Mr. G. Ethirajulu, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the impugned order of suspension is more of punitive rather than preventive in nature. A reference about the earlier order of suspension dated 31.12.1999 would show that the entire, proceedings is vitiated by mala fide attitude of the third respondent. He would also rely upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in P.V. Mahadevan v. M.D., Tamil Nadu Housing Board P.V. Mahadevan v. M.D., Tamil Nadu Housing Board P.V. Mahadevan v. M.D., Tamil Nadu Housing Board 2005(6) SCC 636 : 2005-III-LLJ-527 to show that allowing the respondents to proceed further with departmental proceedings at this distance of time will be prejudiced to the appellant. 8. On the other hand, Mr. 8. On the other hand, Mr. S. Seenivasagam learned counsel appearing for the third respondent would contend that it is not the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act which empowers the third respondent to proceed with the disciplinary enquiry against the petitioner, because, according to him, under the Act it is only the Registrar who alone is empowered and therefore, the third respondent is bound by its bye-laws. As per the bye-laws of the third respondent, the third respondent being the employer, has every right to place the petitioner under suspension. It is not open to the petitioner to approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. According to the learned counsel, at the most this can be treated as an industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act. He would place reliance upon the Full Bench judgment of this Court in P. Pitchumani v. Mgmt. of Sri Chakra Tyres Ltd. rep. by its Managing Director, 10, Jawa-har Road, Madurai P. Pitchumani v. Mgmt. of Sri Chakra Tyres Ltd. rep. by its Managing Director, 10, Jawa-har Road, Madurai P. Pitchumani v. Mgmt. of Sri Chakra Tyres Ltd. rep. by its Managing Director, 10, Jawa-har Road, Madurai (2004) 2 MLJ 687 : 2004 (3) CTC 1 to show that it is only the industrial dispute under Section 2(K) of the Act and therefore, it is open to the petitioner to approach the Labour Court and not by invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He also relied upon another judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in M. Theophilus Rajendra Kumar v. Director of Matriculation Schools 2005 (3) LLN 1167 to show that under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court cannot grant the interim stay of suspension order since it would amount to allowing the writ petition. 9. Accordingto him, the Co-operative Societies Act does not prescribe the service condition of the employees under the Co-operative Societies and therefore, the Act is not applicable. 10. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as also the learned counsel for the respondents and perused the entire papers. 11. 9. Accordingto him, the Co-operative Societies Act does not prescribe the service condition of the employees under the Co-operative Societies and therefore, the Act is not applicable. 10. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as also the learned counsel for the respondents and perused the entire papers. 11. A bare reading of the impugned order of suspension passed by the third respondent would show that the impugned order of suspension has been passed only due to the reason that the third respondent is not able to proceed with the departmental proceeding and pass final order because the High Court has granted order of stay against the second show cause notice in W.P.M.P. No.28396 of 2002 and in W.P.No.20525 of 2002. The other reason given for the impugned order is that this Court while setting aside the earlier order of suspension dated 31.12.1999 by its order dated 22.9.2005 has made certain observations which is as follows: “However, this order would not preclude the respondents, if they are advised, from proceeding further, in accordance with the statutory provision.” 12. Therefore, these are the two reasons given in the impugned order. It is admitted that the charges have been framed against the petitioner and the enquiry has been conducted and even the second show cause notice has been issued. 13. The grievance of the petitioner was that the enquiry report was not submitted to him and in those circumstances, he has approached this Court by filing a writ petition against the second show cause notice and the mere reason that this Court granted stay on 31.6.2002 does not mean that the third respondent is not entitled to approach this Court for the purpose of obtaining an appropriate order so as to enable the third respondent to pass final orders in the disciplinary proceedings. Without taking any such steps, the impugned order is passed stating as if the petitioner is placed under suspension for a period of six months from 27.10.2005. The reason given under the impugned order says that the suspension order is passed only due to the reason that the third respondent is unable to pass final orders in the disciplinary proceedings. 14. In the circumstances stated above, in my considered view, the impugned suspension order is more of a punishment rather than preventive in nature. The reason given under the impugned order says that the suspension order is passed only due to the reason that the third respondent is unable to pass final orders in the disciplinary proceedings. 14. In the circumstances stated above, in my considered view, the impugned suspension order is more of a punishment rather than preventive in nature. This I am emboldened to say because of the reason that it is the specific case of the third respondent in the counter affidavit as also the arguments of the learned counsel for the third respondent before this Court that in respect of disciplinary proceedings, the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act will not apply. In fact, the learned counsel for the third respondent would go to the extent of contending that Section 76 empowers only Registrar of Co-operative Societies and that cannot be a source for the third respondent for taking disciplinary action and the source of disciplinary action is only under the byelaw and therefore the relationship between the third respondent and the petitioner is that of the employer and workman and therefore, the Co-operative Societies Act will not apply and the remedy available is under the Industrial Disputes Act. While so, it is apparent that the third respondent cannot now say that the impugned order is passed under Section 76 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act. 15. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order is passed only as a matter of punishment and not preventive in its nature. I am of the considered view that the third respondent, who has taken a stand that the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act will not apply for the purpose of suspension of a Cooperative employee cannot be permitted to go back to say that the suspension will be valid under Section 76(1) of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act. For, the third respondent cannot be permitted to approbate or reprobate. There is one other reason of mala fide in this case. Admittedly, the petitioner was suspended by the third respondent on 31.12.1999 and one after another three charges were framed against him and enquiry was conducted and in one case the said charges were clubbed together while the enquiry was not conducted in respect of the said charges. All these things would show the calculated desire of the third respondent to do away with the petitioners service at any cost. All these things would show the calculated desire of the third respondent to do away with the petitioners service at any cost. Having failed in all the efforts due to the intervention of this Court, the third respondent who has chosen to take a stand that the Act is not applicable for the employees of the Co-operative Societies has now chosen to state as if the impugned order is passed by virtue of Section 76(1) of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act. 16. For all the above said reasons, in my considered view, the impugned order is liable to be set aside and accordingly, the same is set aside and the writ petition stands allowed with the cost of Rs. 2000/- to be paid by the third respondent to the High Court Legal Aid Authority. Consequently, connected W.P.M.P. and W.V.M.P. are also closed.