JUDGMENT :-Heard the Counsel. 2. On 28-10-1993, this Court made the following order : "In view of the substantial questions of law mentioned in Ground No. 10, the second appeal is admitted". The substantial questions of law specified under Ground No.10 are as hereunder: (a) When the defendant failed to give reply to the registered notice prior to the institution of the suit, will it not amount to admission to deny the suit claim later? (b) Whether the comparison of signature under Section 73 of the Evidence Act by the competent Court can be interfered with by the appellate Court on the sole ground that it is of lesser value without the appellate Court itself indulging in such verification? (c) Whether the lower appellate Court is right in rejecting the evidence of P.W.2 to P.WA and whether the reasons assigned therefor are in accordance with the settled law ? 3. Sri B. Adinarayana Rao, the learned Counsel representing the appellant would comment that the suit is based on a promissory note and the Court of first instance had arrived at the correct conclusion by decreeing the suit, but the appellate Court had erred in reversing the judgment and decree of the Court of first instance. The learned Counsel also would point out that the defendant failed to give reply to the registered notice prior to the institution of the suit. The learned Counsel also had drawn the attention of this Court to Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 and made an attempt to explain the scope and ambit thereof. The learned Counsel also would comment that though there was no whisper at all in the Court of first instance that the signature of the second attestor was introduced later, the appellate Court recorded certain findings at Para-9. Even otherwise, the learned Counsel would contend that inasmuch as evidence relating to the proof of execution of the promissory note being available, the decree made by the Court of first instance to be restored. 4. Per contra, Sri Raja Reddy, the learned Counsel representing the respondent would contend that on 25-11-1987 while returning the plaint under Query No.3, the Head Clerk specified "second attestor not signed on the pro note. An endorsement to that effect should be made on the pronote". 4. Per contra, Sri Raja Reddy, the learned Counsel representing the respondent would contend that on 25-11-1987 while returning the plaint under Query No.3, the Head Clerk specified "second attestor not signed on the pro note. An endorsement to that effect should be made on the pronote". The learned Counsel also pointed out that from this fact it is evident that the signature of the second attestor was introduced subsequently after the plaint was returned and the same would amount to material alteration on a negotiable instrument rendering the same void under Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881. The Counsel also would submit that apart from this aspect of the matter, certain discrepancies in the evidence relating to the place of execution and other circumstances which made the appellate Court to reverse the judgment and decree of the trial Court had been specifically pointed out. Hence the Counsel would contend that the second appeal is liable to be dismissed. 5. The appellant is the plaintiff and I aggrieved by the reversing judgment and decree made in A.S. No.100/90 on the file of District Judge, Guntur, the present second appeal is preferred. It is needless to say that the suit filed by the appellant plaintiff 0.S.No.1394/87 on the file of III Additional Munsif Magistrate, Guntur was decreed. The suit is for recovery of money. The parties hereinafter would be referred to as "plaintiff and "defendant" for the purpose of convenience. It is the case of the plaintiff that the defendant borrowed Rs. 4,000/- on 12-11-1984 for family necessity and executed a promissory note on the same day agreeing to repay the same with interest @24% per annum and in spite of repeated demands the defendant did not repay the amount and hence the plaintiff got issued a registered notice dated 17-11-1987 and the defendant had not given any reply even to the said notice. Hence the suit was filed. 6. The defendant filed a written statement pleading that there was no occasion to borrow any amount from the plaintiff and there was no occasion for him to execute any promissory note whatsoever and the plaintiff has no capacity to lend the amount. In view of certain misunderstanding the plaintiff brought into existence the suit pronote by forging the signature of the defendant. Hence it is a forged document. 7. In view of certain misunderstanding the plaintiff brought into existence the suit pronote by forging the signature of the defendant. Hence it is a forged document. 7. On the strength of the respective pleadings the Court of first instance settled the following Issues: 1. Whether the suit pronote is true, valid and binding on the defendant? 2. To what relief? On behalf of the plaintiff, P.W.1 to P.WA were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-4 were marked and on behalf of the defendant, D.W.1 and D.W.2 were examined. The Court of first instance on appreciation of the evidence available on record came to the conclusion that Ex.A-1, the suit 1t promissory note is true, valid and hidings and decreed the suit. The matter was carried by way of Appeal A.S. No.100/90 on the If file of District Judge, Guntur and the judgment and decree of the Court of first instance were reversed by the appellate e Court. Hence the second appeal. 8. The appellate Court framed the point for consideration at Para-8, recorded findings in detail commencing from Paras 9 to 14 and ultimately allowed the appeal with costs throughout. The learned Judge recorded that P.WA, the first attestor was of Vejendla while the promissory note was executed at Guntur and the plaintiff himself was not from Guntur. The unnaturality of the lending of the amount also had been pointed out. The discrepancy in the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.3 relating to the place of execution also had been pointed out specifically at Para-10. The learned Judge also observed that P.W.2 is none other than the brother-in-law of the plaintiff who had avoided identifying the defendant and had taken note of the relevant portion of the evidence of this witness and on appreciation of the whole evidence available on record came to the conclusion that EX.A.1 cannot be said to have been proved. No doubt certain other findings also had been recorded at Paras 12 and 13 and reliance also was placed on Murarilal v. State of MP., AIR 1980 SC 531 . 9. Apart from these discrepancies, from the record it appears that on 25-11-1987 the concerned Head Clerk had returned the plaint with certain queries and Query No.3 is as hereunder : "2nd attestor not signed on the pronote. 9. Apart from these discrepancies, from the record it appears that on 25-11-1987 the concerned Head Clerk had returned the plaint with certain queries and Query No.3 is as hereunder : "2nd attestor not signed on the pronote. An endorsement to that effect should be made in the pronote." It is true that the Head Clerk was not examined. It is also true that the said ground was not referred to nor \vas argued before the Court of first instance. In EX.A.1 the signature of the second attestor also can be seen. This aspect also was taken note of by the learned Judge and certain findings had been recorded in this regard at Para-9. It is no doubt true that it would have been just and proper on the part of the appellate Court to make an order of remand at that stage in the event of the appellate Court coming to the conclusion that the examination of the Head Clerk may be necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case. It is needless to say that the said alteration of introducing the signature of an attestor in a negotiable instrument would fall within the meaning of material alteration under Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881. Section 87 of the said Act dealing with the Effect of material alteration reads as hereunder : Any material alteration of a negotiable instrument renders the same void as against anyone who is a party thereto at the time of making such alteration and does not consent thereto, unless it was made in order to carry out the- common intention of the original parties; Alteration by indorsee - And any such alteration, if made by an indorsee, discharges his indorser from all liability to him in respect of the consideration thereof. The provisions of this section are subject to those of Sections 20, 49, 86 and 125. Had the learned appellate Court reversed the judgment and decree of the Court of first instance only on this ground, this Court without any hesitation would have made an order of remand. But this is only one of the circumstances. The evidence had been appreciated and improbabilities and absurdities had been pointed out commencing from Paras 10 to 14. Had the learned appellate Court reversed the judgment and decree of the Court of first instance only on this ground, this Court without any hesitation would have made an order of remand. But this is only one of the circumstances. The evidence had been appreciated and improbabilities and absurdities had been pointed out commencing from Paras 10 to 14. The mere fact that the defendant failed to give a reply to the registered notice prior to the institution of the suit by itself always cannot be a ground to believe the truth or otherwise of the case of the plaintiff. There may be several reasons why a party may not choose to give reply to a notice. Always it cannot be inferred that when a_ reply notice is not given, automatically it is to be taken that the case of the other party is true. This Court is not inclined to express any further opinion relating to this aspect. 10. In the light of the discrepancies which had been pointed out by the appellate Court, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the said findings. Accordingly the second appeal shall stand dismissed. No order as to costs.