ORDER Abhay M. Naik, J. This revision application has been preferred by the revisionist against the order dated 16-7-2001 passed by the Court of 1st Addl. District Judge. East Nimar, Khandwa in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 11/99 confirming thereby the order dated 5-9-1998 passed by the Court of 1st Civil Judge. Class-I, East Nimar, Khandwa in M.J.C. No. 8/86. The revisionist is found to have committed breach of an order of temporary injunction and his property is kept under attachment with a direction that in case, if, the possession of the disputed property is not restored by the revisionist, the property kept under attachment be auctioned and the possession of the disputed property be restored to the respondents through Court. Short facts leading to the revision application are that Prabodh Chand Jain and Choth Mal Jain were real brothers with Mool Chand Jain as their father. A compromise was entered into between the aforesaid two brothers and other members in Civil Appeal No. 1-A/62 in the Court of District Judge, East Nimar, Khandwa on 20-11-1962. This document is on record as Annexure No. 1. Half share was allotted to Prabodh Chand Jain whereas the remaining half share was allotted to Choth Mal Jain and members of his branch (it may be seen that partition was not effected by metes and bounds and actual delivery of possession pursuant to the said compromise was not made by Annexure No. 1), Prabodh Chand Jain and members of his branch executed a registered sale deed dated 7th June, 1967 in favour of the revisionist in respect of the portion allotted to them vide the aforesaid compromise. Ground floor portion of the aforesaid property was occupied by Punjab National Bank on rent. The revisionist is stated to have obtained possession on 7-6-1967 vide Annexure No. 3. The revisionist instituted Civil Suit No. 1-B/73 against the Punjab National Bank for recovery of rent which was decreed in his favour to the tune of Rs. 1998/- by the Court of Addl. District Judge, Khandwa on 20-2-1973 as contained in Annexure No. 3A. In Civil Suit No. 71-A/60 (giving rise to Civil Appeal No. 1A/62) an order was passed on 18-12-1974 restraining the revisionist from entering into the possession of the accommodation held by and to be vacated by Punjab National Bank, Khandwa either personally or through others on vacation thereof. District Judge, Khandwa on 20-2-1973 as contained in Annexure No. 3A. In Civil Suit No. 71-A/60 (giving rise to Civil Appeal No. 1A/62) an order was passed on 18-12-1974 restraining the revisionist from entering into the possession of the accommodation held by and to be vacated by Punjab National Bank, Khandwa either personally or through others on vacation thereof. The revisionist was further restrained from interfering into the possession till the final decision of the suit. Copy of this order is placed on record as Annexure No. 4 (it is important to note that in Annexure No. 4, presence of the revisionist through his counsel is duly recorded and a temporary injunction was issued expressly and specifically against him). An appeal was preferred by the revisionist against the order of temporary injunction which was dismissed on the ground that the temporary injunction having been passed u/s 151 of Civil Procedure Code, the Civil Misc. Appeal against the same was not maintainable. It is also relevant that a receiver was appointed by the Civil Court to obtain the possession of the Punjab National Bank and deliver it to the respondents. An Hotel in the name of 'NAIVEDHYAM HOTEL' was to be inaugurated and opened by the respondents and invitation cards were duly distributed for the same. It has been stated by the respondents that the revisionist in contravention of the order of temporary injunction forcibly occupied a part of the disputed premises by breaking the locks and started causing damage to it. The respondents thereafter submitted an application under Order 39, Rule 2-A, CPC for breach of the order of temporary injunction. It was registered as M.J.C. No. 8/86. Learned Trial Judge after recording the evidence found vide order dated 5-9-1998 (Annexure/12A) that the revisionist has committed a breach of the order of temporary injunction and is thus, guilty of the same. Accordingly, his immovable property was attached for a period of six months. It has been further directed that in case, if, the possession of the disputed property is not restored to the respondent, the property under attachment be auctioned and the possession of the disputed property be restored to the respondents through the Court. Aggrieved by the same the revisionist preferred Civil Misc. Appeal No. 11/99 which has been dismissed vide order dated 16-7-2001 (Annexure No. 1). Aggrieved by the same the revisionist preferred Civil Misc. Appeal No. 11/99 which has been dismissed vide order dated 16-7-2001 (Annexure No. 1). The orders contained in Annexure No. 12-A and Annexure No. 1 have been challenged in the present revision application. It would not be out of place to mention here that the original revisionist, namely Chhaganlal Jaiswal died during the pendency of revision application, and the same is being continued and prosecuted by his L.Rs. after due substitution. Shri Chetan Kotecha, Learned Counsel for the revisionist contended that the impugned orders are not sustainable in law mainly for the following reasons: (i) The revisionist was neither a plaintiff nor a defendant in Civil Suit No. 71A/60 and no temporary injunction could have been legally issued against him. Accordingly, it is contended that the order of temporary injunction was not binding on the revisionist. (ii) The order of temporary injunction came to an end on account of order of appointment of receiver on 31-6-1976. (iii) The order of temporary injunction having been passed u/s 151, Civil Procedure Code, the proceedings against him under Order 39, Rule 2-A of CPC for breach of such order are not maintainable. (iv) No breach of temporary injunction was committed by the revisionist and the Courts below have committed an illegality in giving a contrary finding. (v) Under Order 39, Rule 2-A, Civil Procedure Code, restoration of possession cannot be legally directed. (vi) After the death of Chhagan Lal on 1-9-2001, the proceeding under Order 39, Rule 2-A, CPC would stand vitiated automatically and cannot be legally continued against the legal representatives of the revisionist. Shri Pranay Verma, Learned Counsel for the respondent supported the impugned orders on the ground that the breach having been found to have been committed by the revisionist, the impugned orders dated 5-9-1998 and 16-7-2001 have been rightly passed. According to the Learned Counsel for the respondent no interference is warranted in the said orders in the absence of restoration of possession on the part of the revisionists. Considered the submissions and perused the record. It is true that an order of temporary injunction is to be normally issued against the parties to the suit. However, power of the Court to issue temporary injunction is not confined merely against the plaintiff or the defendant alone. Considered the submissions and perused the record. It is true that an order of temporary injunction is to be normally issued against the parties to the suit. However, power of the Court to issue temporary injunction is not confined merely against the plaintiff or the defendant alone. Such an order may be made against any person who is present before the Court and is, in the opinion of the Court, causes interference/obstruction in the exercise of lawful rights of the plaintiff. this Court in the case of Sitaram Sharma (Dr.) vs. Kishna, reported as 1984 MPWN 28 has upheld an order of temporary injunction against the person sought to be impleaded as defendant. It has been held by this Court that such a person is not stranger to the suit and injunction can be issued against him. The revisionist is admittedly, stated to be a purchaser from a party to Civil Suit No. 71A/60. He was present through his counsel Shri Y. M. Sharma when the order of temporary injunction was made against him on 18-12-1974. He was expressly and specifically restrained till disposal of the suit from entering into the possession of the accommodation held by and to be vacated by Punjab National Bank, Khandwa either personally or through others on vacation thereof. This order was also challenged by the revisionist in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 2/75 which was dismissed on 15-7-1980 as not maintainable. The revisionist did not challenge the order of temporary injunction though, the same was passed against him in specific language, that too, in his presence. Considering the aforesaid, the revisionist cannot be said to be stranger and the order of temporary injunction having been passed in his presence is obviously binding on him. Copy of the order of appointment of receiver dated 31-8-1976 is on record as Annexure No. 6. It may be seen that the order of temporary injunction was not disturbed at all by the learned Trial Judge. Scope of the order of temporary injunction and that of receivership is altogether different and merely on appointment of receiver it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that an order of temporary injunction came to an end automatically. The receiver was appointed on 31-8-1976 whereas the Civil Misc. Appeal preferred by the revisionist against the order of temporary injunction was dismissed on 15th July, 1980 i.e. much after the order of receivership. The receiver was appointed on 31-8-1976 whereas the Civil Misc. Appeal preferred by the revisionist against the order of temporary injunction was dismissed on 15th July, 1980 i.e. much after the order of receivership. Had the order of temporary injunction as per the contention of the Learned Counsel for the revisionist come to an end automatically, there would have been no necessity to continue with the challenge raised by the revisionist in the Civil Misc. Appeal. Thus, it is found that the order of temporary injunction was very much in force and the same was not vitiated to the issuance of the order of receivership. As regards the finding about breach of temporary injunction, it may be seen that both the Courts below after appreciating the evidence on record recorded for this purpose have arrived at a concurrent finding that the revisionist has forcibly occupied a part of the disputed property and has committed a breach thereby. This being a civil revision, it is not open for this Court to re-appreciate the evidence unless a perversity is established. It may be seen that there is no iota on record to prove that the Prabodh Chand Jain and the members of his branch were in actual physical possession of the subject premises in an exclusive manner. In the compromise order contained in Annexure No. 1, it is nowhere mentioned that the vendors of the revisionist were in actual physical possession of the said portion. The order of temporary injunction against the revisionist was passed on 18-12-1974 whereas a receipt contained in Annexure No. 16 is placed on record which reveals that the possession was obtained by the revisionist on 31-10-1975 from the Assistant Manager of the Punjab National Bank, Khandwa. This receipt obviously relates to the period subsequent to the restraint order dated 18-12-1974. In view of this, the finding of the learned Courts below cannot be treated as erroneous in any manner, more so, warranting interference. Shri Chetan Kotecha, Learned Counsel for the revisionist further contended that the relevant record was not available before the Court while passing the impugned orders. This submission is totally ridiculous. Both the Courts below after appreciating the material on record has given a concurrent finding that the revisionist has committed the breach of order of temporary injunction. Shri Chetan Kotecha, Learned Counsel for the revisionist further contended that the relevant record was not available before the Court while passing the impugned orders. This submission is totally ridiculous. Both the Courts below after appreciating the material on record has given a concurrent finding that the revisionist has committed the breach of order of temporary injunction. The revisionist, if so wished, could have easily produced before this Court the certified copies which he required to successfully challenge the correctness of the finding. This having not been done, the contention of the Learned Counsel for the revisionist about the absence of relevant record is not acceptable. This plea seems to have been taken only in order to prolong the case. Next contention of the revisionist that the order of temporary injunction was passed u/s 151, CPC and its breach could not have been taken cognizance of under Order 39, Rule 2-A of CPC is without any force. For the convenience, the said provision is reproduced below: 2-A. Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction -- (1) In the case of disobedience of any injunction granted or other order made under Rule 1 or Rule 2 or breach of any of the terms on which the injunction was granted or the order made, the Court granting the injunction or making the order, or any Court to which the suit or proceeding is transferred, may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding three months, unless in the meantime the Court directs his release. (2) No attachment made under this rule shall remain in force for more than one year, at the end of which time, if the disobedience or breach continues, the property attached may be sold and out of the proceeds, the Court may award such compensation as it thinks fit to the injured party and shall pay the balance, if any, to the party entitled thereto. From the perusal of the aforesaid, it is clear that the Court is well empowered to take cognizance of disobedience or breach of any injunction granted or other order made under Rule 1 or Rule 2 or breach of any of the terms on which the injunction is granted which obviously included an order of temporary injunction granted u/s 151 of Civil Procedure Code. My this view finds support from the decision of Rajasthan High Court in the case of Rattu vs. Mala and another, reported as AIR 1968 Rajasthan 212 wherein it has been held that: It is settled law that disobedience of an order of injunction is punishable under Rule 2(3) of Order 39 whether injunction is granted under Rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order 39 or u/s 151, Civil Procedure Code. Sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule 2 of Order 39, CPC have been omitted by Amendment Act, 1976. The insertion of Rule 2-A is intended to seek provision of disobedience or breach of injunction which were earlier available under sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule 2 of Order 39, Civil Procedure Code. Thus, it is not correct to say that the breach of an order of injunction issued u/s 151, CPC cannot be taken into cognizance under Order 39, Rule 2-A, Civil Procedure Code. It is further contended that restoration of possession could not have been legally directed under Order 39, Rule 2-A, Civil Procedure Code. I have given anxious consideration to this contention. Purpose of Order 39, Rule 2-A, CPC is to enforce the order of injunction. It is a provision which empowers a Court to execute the injunction order. This provision is similar to the provisions of Order 21, Rule 32, CPC which provides for execution of the decree for permanent injunction. The injunction given under Order 21, Rule 32, CPC is the same as provided in the aforesaid provision. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of The State of Bihar Vs. Rani Sonabati Kumari, has clearly held that: Though undoubtedly proceedings under Order 39, Rule 2(3) CPC have a punitive aspect - as is evident from the contemner being liable to be ordered to be detained in civil prison, they are in substance designed to effect the enforcement of or to execute the order. Rani Sonabati Kumari, has clearly held that: Though undoubtedly proceedings under Order 39, Rule 2(3) CPC have a punitive aspect - as is evident from the contemner being liable to be ordered to be detained in civil prison, they are in substance designed to effect the enforcement of or to execute the order. This is clearly brought out by their identity with the procedure prescribed by Order 21, Rule 32 of CPC for the execution of a decree for a permanent injunction. It may further be observed that the learned trial Court has not exactly directed for restoration of possession. On the other hand it has been directed that in case, that if, the possession taken over by the revisionist in utter disregard of the interim injunction is not restored, the property under attachment would be auctioned and the possession of the disputed property would be restored to the plaintiff through the Court. It is for the revisionist, to act obediently in consonance with the order of temporary injunction in order to protect his property under attachment. If he does not act accordingly, the law will take its own course and the property under attachment will be liable to be sold by auction. However, I do not find any illegality in the impugned order on the aforesaid objection, moreso, in the light of the legal position stated hereinabove. Lastly, it is contended by Shri Kotecha, Learned Counsel for the revisionist that the original revisionist who is stated to have committed breach has already died and the proceedings for breach of temporary injunction cannot be continued against his legal representatives. This submission, too, is fallacious because Chhagan Lal, the original revisionist is proved to have taken forcible possession in contravention of the order of temporary injunction. In spite of proceedings for breach of injunction order he did not choose to restore the possession to the plaintiffs. After his death, his estate is being represented by the present L.Rs. who have been substituted in his place. They have been continuing in the possession of the disputed property which was forcibly occupied by their predecessor in contravention of the order of temporary injunction. After his death, his estate is being represented by the present L.Rs. who have been substituted in his place. They have been continuing in the possession of the disputed property which was forcibly occupied by their predecessor in contravention of the order of temporary injunction. Since, the legal representatives did not hand over back the possession of the disputed property in pursuance of the order of temporary injunction and thereafter of the impugned order, the disobedience/breach will be treated to have continued and the provisions contained in Order 39, Rule 2-A, CPC can well be invoked against them. Thus, the breach and/or disobedience has been continued and the legal representatives of the original revisionist would remain liable unless they restore the possession of the disputed property to the plaintiff in pursuance of the order of temporary injunction. A contrary construction to Order 39, Rule 2-A. CPC would open the flood gates by encouraging the wrong doers to defeat the proceedings about breach of injunction order by taking shelter of the death of wrong doers and would allow them to reap the fruits of breach. So, this contention is also without any substance and is hereby repelled. As regards the observation of the Court that in case of failure on the part of the revisionist to restore the possession of the disputed property to the plaintiff, the same will be delivered through Court, it may be seen that Court has ample power u/s 151, CPC to direct restoration of possession which has been taken away from the plaintiff in utter violation of the order of temporary injunction. Court cannot be prevented by the technicalities from doing justice in exercise of its inherent power as stated hereinabove. Under Order 39, Rule 2-A, Civil Procedure Code, the punitive measure for the purpose of compelling a party to comply with the order of injunction may always be resorted to. The process as contemplated by the said direction may or may not ultimately be effective, but in any event, the Court is not powerless to grant relief of restoration of possession in exercise of its inherent powers. In the present case, the very object for which Order 39, Rule 2-A is enacted will be fulfilled by the impugned order and restoration of possession of the disputed property to the aggrieved party. In the present case, the very object for which Order 39, Rule 2-A is enacted will be fulfilled by the impugned order and restoration of possession of the disputed property to the aggrieved party. All that the Court is concerned is to prevent abuse of the process of Court which includes deliberate violation of the order of temporary injunction. Thus, there is no bar in invoking inherent powers u/s 151, CPC while dealing with the matter under Order 39, Rule 2-A, Civil Procedure Code. Thus, no illegality is found in the impugned order and the order directing delivery of possession cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. In the result, the revision application is hereby dismissed with cost quantified at Rs. 3000/- if, already certified. Final Result : Dismissed