ORDER I.A. Ansari, J. 1. Since both the Civil Revision Petitions have raised questions of law, which are closely inter-connected, both these revision petitions, on the request made by the learned Counsel for the parties, have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. 2. The facts giving rise to present revision petition may, in brief, be set out as under: (i) In Civil Revision Petition No. 11/2005, having obtained a decree, when the opposite party herein, which is a bank, put, as a decree holder, the said decree into execution, Execution (M) Case No. 8/2004 arose, in the said execution proceeding, an application was made, under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by the petitioner herein, who la the Judgment-debtor, objecting to the execution of the decree on the ground that on coming into force of the Tripura Public Demand Recovery Act, 2000 (in short, the said Act), the decree has been rendered inexecutable, for the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts stands ousted by the said Act in respect of recovery of money due to the bank, This was objected to by the decree holder-opposite party. By order, dated 3-3-2005, the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) No. 2, West Tripura, Agartala, has rejected the objection petition filed by the judgment-debtor. It is the order dated 3-3-2005, aforementioned, which stands impugned, in Civil Revision Petition No. 11/2005, by the judgment-debtor. (ii) In Civil Revision Petition No. 12/2005, the petitioner herein, which is a bank, instituted, as plaintiff, Money Suit No. 34/2002 for realization of a sum of Rs. 99,713.78 from opposite party as defendant. The defendant appeared in the suit and contested the suit by filing written statement. When the suit was pending or recording evidence, the defendant filed an application seeking dismissal of the suit on the ground that with the coming into force of the Tripura Public Demand Recovery Act, 2000 (in short, the said Act), the Civil Court's jurisdiction stands ousted in respect of money due to the bank and, hence, the suit cannot be allowed to proceed. Though the bank, as the plaintiff, filed its objection to the prayer for dismissal of the suit made by the petitioner, the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) No. 2, Agartala, passed an Order, on 17-9-2003, dismissing the suit on the ground that since the suit relates to public demand, the civil suit in the face of the provisions of the said Act, is not maintainable. It is this order, dated 17-9-2003, which stands impugned, in Civil Revision Petition No. 12/2005, by the bank. 3. In short, while in CRP No. 11/2005, the learned Court below has held the bank's suit barred by the provisions of the said Act, it, on the other hand, held that notwithstanding the provisions of the said Act, a decree, already obtained by the bank, is executable. 4. I have heard Mr. S. Saha, learned Counsel, for the plaintiff-petitioner in CRP No. 12/2005, I have heard Mr. D.B. Sengupta, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the Judgment-debtor-petitioner in Civil Revision Petition No. 11/2005, and Mr. S. Saha, learned Counsel for the Decree-Holder-Opposite Party in Civil Revision Petition No. 12/2005, and Mr. S. Deb, learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the Defendant-Opposite Party in CRP No. 12/2005. 5. Presenting the case on behalf of the bank, which is the plaintiff-petitioner in CRP No. 12/2005 and Decree-Holder-Opposite Party in CRP No. 11/2005, Mr. S. Saha, learned Counsel, has submitted that the learned Court below has committed serious error of jurisdiction in holding that the suit, instituted by the bank, is not maintainable inasmuch as the said Act has ousted the Jurisdiction of the Civil Court. For the purpose of coming to this conclusion, the learned Court below relies, points out Mr. Saha, on the provisions of Section 38 of the said Act. The reliance, so placed on Section 38, is, according to Mr. Saha, wholly incorrect inasmuch as neither Section 38 nor any other provisions of the said Act have, expressly or by implication, ousted the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts so far as the demand for recovery of dues of financial institutions, such as, the present banks, are concerned. In support of his submission that the Civil Court's jurisdiction cannot be taken to have been barred under the said Act, Mr. In support of his submission that the Civil Court's jurisdiction cannot be taken to have been barred under the said Act, Mr. Saha places reliance on Bhatia International v. Buld Trading S. A. [2002] 2 SCR 411, ITI Limited v. Siemens Public Communications Network Limited [2002] 3 SCR 1122 Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya v. Anil Panjwani [2003] 3 SCR 1149 and Unique Butyle Tube Industries Private Limited v. Uttar Pradesh Financial Corporation [2002] SUPP 5 SCR 666. Mr. Saha. learned Counsel for the bank, further contends that the learned Court below correctly held that the execution of the decree, already obtained by the bank, is not barred with the coming into force of the said Act. 6. Resisting the above submissions made on behalf of the banks, Mr. Debnath and Mr. Deb have submitted to the effect, inter alia, that the scheme of the said Act and particularly, the provisions of Section 38 thereof make it clear that the Civil Courts have been debarred from entertaining any suit or proceeding for recovery of the dues of a bank in the State of Tripura and that all such recoveries have to be only in accordance with the mechanism and procedure, which the said Act has introduced, Refer-ring to the decision of the Apex Court in Dhulabhai etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. [1968] 3 SCR 662, which has been followed in Church of North India v. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai and Ors. reported in (2005) 10 SCC 760, Mr. Debnath submits that in the light of these two authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court, it becomes abundantly clear that when an enactment creates a complete mechanism for determination of a lis between the parties, the civil Court's jurisdiction to deal with such matters stand ousted. In the case at hand, points out the learned Counsel for the judgment-debtors, when the provisions have been made in the said Act abating suits for recovery of dues of banks, the decree, obtained in a suit, cannot be enforced or executed against the judgment-debtor nor can a suit be brought against a debtor by a person, who, but for the provisions of the said Act, would have had the right to sue for recovery of dues in the Civil Courts. Pointing to the provisions of Section 38, Mr. Pointing to the provisions of Section 38, Mr. Deb submits that Section 38 clearly states that on coming into force of the said Act, all suits, to which the provisions of the said Act apply, shall stand abated and, hence, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the bank's suit could not have been allowed to proceed, when the suit already stood abated, for, abatement, according to Mr. Deb, kills the right to sue and when the right to sue does not survive, the decree, insists Mr. Deb, could not have been executed. In support of this submission, Mr. Deb relies on Bibi Rahmani Khatoon v. Harkoo Gope AIR 1981 SC 1550 and Mahendra Saree Emporium v. G. V. Srinivasa Murthi AIR 2004 SC 4289 . 7. Reading to the submissions made by Mr. Sengupta and Mr. Deb, Mr. S. Saha, learned Counsel for the bank, submits that if the provisions of Section 38 are properly analyzed, it will clearly transpire that even after coming into force of the civil Courts, of competent jurisdiction or by taking recourse to provisions of the said Act. In the case at hand, contends Mr. Saha, since the bank, as decree holder, has chosen to proceed with the decree, which it has already obtained in the civil suits, the execution of such a decree cannot be treated to have been barred under the said Act nor can the bank's suit, contends Mr. Saha, be treated to have abated with the coming into force of the said Act. 8. In the light of the rival submissions made before me on behalf of the parties, it clearly emerges that in the present revision petitions, there are three fundamental questions, which have arisen for consideration by this Court, namely, (i) what principles govern exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil Courts in a matter, which is, otherwise, within the jurisdiction and domain of the civil Courts; (ii) whether suits for recovery of dues, instituted by a bank, stand abated and barred by the provisions of the said Act and (iii) whether provisions for abatement of pending suits, in an enactment, such as the present one, would necessarily abate execution of the decrees, which have already been obtained by banks in civil suits? 9. 9. While considering the questions posed above, it may be noted that a Constitution Bench, in Dhulabhai AIR 1969 SC 78 (supra), having taken into consideration various authorities, summarized the principles for determination of the question as to when a civil Court's jurisdiction can be inferred to have been barred. The relevant observations made in this regard, in Dhulabhai (supra) read as follows (Para 32): ...The result of this inquiry into the diverse views expressed in this Court may be stated as follows: (1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the Civil Courts jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do that the civil Courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil Court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. (3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals. (4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals. (4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit. (5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected a suit lies. (6) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry. (7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply. 10. From the principles governing exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil Courts, as summarized, in Dhlabhai [1968] 3 SCR 662 (supra), what transpires is that exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Courts is not to be readily inferred unless the other conditions, which have been laid down, in Dhulabhai (supra), are found satisfied. What is also important to note from the decision, in Dhulabhai (supra), is that when there is no express ouster of the jurisdiction of the civil Courts, it is incumbent upon the Court to examine the scheme of the particular statute to determine the legislative intendment thereof and also to ascertain if the statute creates special right or a liability and provides for determination of such right or liability and, further, whether all questions, which may arise with regard to the rights and liabilities of the parties concerned, are determinable under the statute and whether the statute is a self-contained one. 11. 11. In Church of North India (supra), the Apex Court, having taken into consideration a number of authorities, including Dhulabhai [1968] 3 SCR 662 (supra), held that the question as regards ouster of jurisdiction of a civil Court must be answered having regard to the scheme of the statute and also the object, which the statute seeks to achieve. 12. What emerges from the above discussion is that it is no longer res integra that unless civil Courts jurisdiction is specifically or expressly barred by a statute, the ouster of jurisdiction of the civil Courts cannot be readily inferred and the answer to the question as to whether the jurisdiction of the civil Courts has been ousted or not has to be gathered by determining the legislative intendment of the statute concerned and for this purpose, the Court must take into account the entire scheme of the statute, there being always a strong presumption that the civil Court has jurisdiction to decide all the questions of civil nature. If, therefore, there be, having regard to the scheme of a statute, an inference of exclusion of civil Courts jurisdiction by the statute, it would become the unquestionable duty of the Courts to determine if the ouster of jurisdiction is absolute or partial. (See also ITI Ltd. v.Siemens Public Communications Network Ltd. [2002] 3 SCR 1122 ). 13. In the light of the decisions cited above, which lay down the principles governing determination of exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil Courts when I examine the said Act. what attracts the eyes, most prominently, is that Section 2(b) of the said Act defines bank. There is no dispute that the decree holders, in the present revision petitions, are banks within the meaning of the said Act, which defines 'public demand' too. It may be noted that Section 2(j) of the said Act defines 'public demand' to mean, inter alia, any money payable to the Central or State Government or a corporation or a bank or a Government company in repayment of a loan, advance or grant or payment of interest, cost or other dues in cash or in kind under an agreement including an agreement of hire purchase or lease or under any law for the time being in force or under order of any Court or Tribunal. Section 3(1) states that a 'public demand', which has not been paid on the due date, shall become an arrear of 'public demand' and the person, responsible for the payment, shall become a defaulter. Section 3(2) empowers the State Government, Corporations, Government companies or banks to authorize officers to deal with matters relating to 'public demand' payable to them and such officers are to be known as Public Demand Recovery Officer (PDRO). Chapter II of the Act deals with the arrear of 'public demand' and issue of certificates. A combined reading of Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, contained in Chapter II, shows that if there is any arrear of 'public demand', the PDRO concerned may send to the Certificate Officer, having local jurisdiction, a written requisition and, on receipt of such requisition, the Certificate Officer, if satisfied that the demand is recoverable, may sign a certificate in such a form as may be prescribed stating that the demand is due from the defaulter and shall cause the certificate to be filed in his office and when a certificate is so filed, the Certificate Officer shall cause to be served, on the certificate debtor, a notice in such form as may be prescribed and also a copy of the certificate. When service is complete, the Certificate debtor may, within 30 days from the date of service of notice, present to the Certificate Officer, in whose office the original certificate is filed, a petition, in such form as may be prescribed, signed and verified by him, denying his liability, in whole or in part or explaining the circumstances to plead that he is not a willful defaulter. The Certificate Officer shall, then, hear such petition, take evidence, if necessary, and determine whether the certificate debtor is liable for the whole or any part of the amount for which the certificate was signed or whether he is a willful defaulter and may set aside or modify the certificate accordingly. After the decision, such a certificate, with or without modification, which the Certificate Officer may give, shall be treated as 'final certificate'. Section 2(d) defines Certificate Officer to mean a Collector, a Sub-Divisional Officer and any other officer appointed by the State Government to perform the functions of a Certificate Officer under the said Act. After the decision, such a certificate, with or without modification, which the Certificate Officer may give, shall be treated as 'final certificate'. Section 2(d) defines Certificate Officer to mean a Collector, a Sub-Divisional Officer and any other officer appointed by the State Government to perform the functions of a Certificate Officer under the said Act. Chapter III contains the scheme for execution of the certificates and while providing for execution of a certificate, it also provides for attachment and sale of the properties of the certificate debtor by auction. Provisions have also been made, under Section 29 for setting aside such sale if no objection is raised in this regard and also for confirmation of sale under Section 22. Section 35, which falls in Chapter IV, provides for appeal by the person, who may be aggrieved by an order of the Certificate Officer. Section 38, which forms the fulcrum of controversy, in these two civil revision petitions, is extremely relevant and is, therefore, reproduced as under: SECTION 38 All suits of the nature for recovery of money falling within the definition of public demand pending in any civil Court immediately before coming into force of this Act shall abate so however that such abatement shall be without prejudice to the right of the State Government, Corporation, Government Company or bank, as the case may be, to recover such demand in accordance with the provisions of this Act or any other law for the time being in force. 14. A careful examination and analysis of the various provisions contained in the said Act and the scheme of the recovery of 'public demand', clearly reveals, as indicated above, that the Act lays down a complete scheme for the recovery of the dues of, amongst others, banks from any person, who has defaulted in making payment of the dues of the bank. As the statute also lays down a complete mechanism of not only recovery of dues by putting into auction, if necessary, debtor's property, but also for setting aside sales, which may take place by auction, or confirmation of such sale and when the provisions have been further made for appeal against any order of the Certificate Officer, there can be no escape from conclusion, unless any of the provisions in the said Act indicates otherwise, that the said Act contains a self-contained code for realization of the dues of institutions, such as, banks and this self-contained scheme is to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Courts, which, in such a matter, can have, ordinarily, no role to play. The inference that the scheme of recovery of 'public demand' is to the exclusion of the civil Courts' jurisdiction gets reinforced from the Statement of Object and Reasons of the said Act, which reads as follows: There is at present no comprehensive State law for recovery of public demand which has been defined to mean any loan payable to a Government, a Corporation, a Bank or a Company in repayment of a loan, advance or grant or payment of interest, cost or other dues. The provisions contained in Chapter VII of the TLR & LR Act have not been found to be comprehensive enough to take into its sweep all sorts of public demand, particularly money payable to banks and other financial institutions. 2. It has been experienced that there is a sharp decline in the credit flow in the State in the recent past. The credit deposit ratio in the State as on 30-9-1999 is only 34% as against 60% at the national level. One of the important factors further in the low recovery position of the bank loan which was only 8.62% as on 30-9-1999. The banks, in such situation, may be constrained to switch over to security oriented lending which would adversely affect the credit linked development programme in the State. The other financial institutions also are facing similar problems in the absence of suitable laws and exclusive forums for speedy recovery of loans. Proceedings in the civil Courts for recovery of loans have proved to be very expensive and time consuming. The recovery position in respect of other public demands payable to the Government is also very disappointing. The other financial institutions also are facing similar problems in the absence of suitable laws and exclusive forums for speedy recovery of loans. Proceedings in the civil Courts for recovery of loans have proved to be very expensive and time consuming. The recovery position in respect of other public demands payable to the Government is also very disappointing. All these are bound to seriously affect the resource position of the State. 3. The proposed Bill envisages suitable and exclusive mechanism for speedy recovery of all sorts of public demand and for the purpose contains suitable provisions to overcome the procedural delays. It also contains provisions which may have good deterrent effect on the defaulters. The law will enable the financial institutions to keep the loan document alive and save the loan from becoming non-performing assets. 4. The Bill seeks to achieve the aforesaid purposes. 15. The statement of the object and reasons of the said Act clearly reveals that as the Legislature found that the proceedings in civil Courts, for recovery of dues, have been proving very expensive and also time consuming, the Legislature has enacted the said Act providing therein a suitable and exclusive mechanism for inexpensive and speedy recovery of all sorts of 'public demand' so as to overcome the procedural delays, which are, normally, experienced in the civil Courts. When such is the object of the said Act and when the scheme of the Act, as indicated hereinbefore, is to exclude the jurisdiction of the civil Courts, no right to sue, in any civil Court, for recovery of 'public demand' can be, ordinarily, inferred in favour of institutions, such as, a bank, unless Section 38, as contended on behalf of the parties, gives clear indication that notwithstanding the fact that the legislative intent was to create an exclusive mechanism for recovery of all sorts of 'public demand' so as to make such recovery speedier, the jurisdiction of the civil Courts is still not ousted. It is in this backdrop that Section 38, now, needs to be examined and analyzed. 16. Abatement kills the right to sue and has the effect of unceremoniously terminating the pending legal proceedings without adjudication of merits. It has to be strictly construed and applied only to such cases to which its applicability is undoubtedly attracted. It is in this backdrop that Section 38, now, needs to be examined and analyzed. 16. Abatement kills the right to sue and has the effect of unceremoniously terminating the pending legal proceedings without adjudication of merits. It has to be strictly construed and applied only to such cases to which its applicability is undoubtedly attracted. Excepting where an otherwise legislative intention is expressly or by necessary implication deducible, a provision for abatement of pending proceedings shall abate only such proceedings as were pending on that day and at that stage and not the original proceedings which had already stood concluded but were reopened 'by a superior forum for the purpose of examining legality or propriety thereof. (See Bibi Rahmani Khatoon v. Harkoo Gope AIR 1981 SC 1550 and Mahendra Saree Emporium v. G. V. Srinivasa Murthi AIR 2004 SC 4289 (supra)). 17. A cautious reading of the provisions contained in Section 38 shows that this Section, in no uncertain words, clarifies that all suits for recovery of 'public demand', pending in any civil Court, on coming into force of the said Act, shall stand abated. Thus, unless, concluded otherwise, a pending suit for recovery of 'public demand' shall stand abated in terms of the scheme of the said Act. 18. The question, therefore, which, now, arises is as to whether this abatement is absolute or qualified? For the purpose of reaching a correct conclusion in this regard, the meaning to be attributed to the expression 'so however', used under the said Act, shows that the abatement of the suit is not absolute and unqualified. Far from this, the expression 'so however' means that the suit shall abate to the extent as indicated in Section 38 itself and the indication is that the suit shall abate in such a manner that such abatement shall be without prejudice to the rights of the State Government, Corporation, Government Company or bank, as the case may be, to recover such 'public demand' in accordance with the provisions of the said Act or any other law for the time being in force. This, in turn, means that the recovery of the 'public demand' has to be made either under the provisions of the said Act or under any other law for the time being in force. 19. This, in turn, means that the recovery of the 'public demand' has to be made either under the provisions of the said Act or under any other law for the time being in force. 19. The question, now, is as to whether the expression 'any other law for the time being in force' would not mean and include civil suits for recovery of 'public demand'. While considering this aspect of the case, the question, which needs to be answered is this : is it the legislative intent that notwithstanding the fact that civil suits for recovery of 'public demand' shall stand abated on coming into force of the said Act, the right to recover 'public demand' by taking recourse to the jurisdiction of the civil Courts shall nevertheless remain open? An interpretation, which gives a positive answer to the question so posed, would be most unreasonable and highly irrational, for, there is no meaning in abating pending suits and yet give the banks or financial institutions the right to recover their dues by instituting civil suits. To put it differently, when the legislature chose to kill, on coming into force of the said Act, the right to sue in the civil Courts, there could have been no rational cause for the legislature to, again, vest in the creditors, such as, a bank, the right to realize their dues by taking recourse to civil suits. An interpretation, therefore, which would defeat the scheme of the enactment, must be eschewed. Reminded us the Apex Court in Assessing Authority-cum-Excise and Taxation Officer, Gurgaon and Anr. v. East India Cotton Mfg. Co. Ltd. Faridabad reported in [1982] 1 SCR 55, thus : "Now it is a well-settled rule of interpretation that a statute must be construed according to its plain language and neither should any thing be added nor subtracted unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that the legislature clearly so intended. It was said more than seven decades ago by Lord Mersey in Thompson v. Gold and Company 1910 AC 409 :103 LT 81 : It is a strong thing to read into an Act of Parliament words which are not there and in the absence of clear necessity, it is a wrong thing to do. It was said more than seven decades ago by Lord Mersey in Thompson v. Gold and Company 1910 AC 409 :103 LT 81 : It is a strong thing to read into an Act of Parliament words which are not there and in the absence of clear necessity, it is a wrong thing to do. Lord Loreborn, L. C. also observed in Vickers, Sons and Maxim Limited v. Evans 1910 AC 444 : 103 LT 292 : We are not entitled to read word into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself." 20. What logically follows from the above discussion is that if, notwithstanding the fact that Section38 abates the pending suits, the right to sue, in the civil Court, for recovery of debts has still remained open under the said Act is concerned to, the result would be that while those suits, which are pending, would stand abated, but with regard to the dues in respect whereof, no suit has been instituted, it would remain open to the bank to recover such dues by instituting civil suits. Such an interpretation, if attributed to Section 38, would not be reconcilable with the scheme of the Act and would also defeat the very legislative intendment behind the said Act. There can, therefore, be no escape from the conclusion that on coming into force of said Act, not only that the suits, which were pending for recovery of 'public demand', would stand abated, but that no suit can, in future, be instituted for recovery of public demand in any civil Court. The remedy of the bodies, such as, a bank, is to either recover their dues under the provisions of the said Act or under the provisions of any enactment other than civil suits and any other enactment would obviously include the TLR & LR Act, 1960. I may pause here to point out that though Section 38 is a transitory provision, this Section does give a clear indication of the legislative intendment with regard to the jurisdiction of the civil Courts. The scheme of the said Act, when examined, as a whole, shows that the scheme is, if I may reiterate, a sell-contained complete scheme for recovery of public demand. The scheme of the said Act, when examined, as a whole, shows that the scheme is, if I may reiterate, a sell-contained complete scheme for recovery of public demand. Section 38 does not alter the situation and merely provides for bringing an end to the suits, which were pending on the date of the coming into force of the said Act with the right reserved in favour of the creditors that they shall have the right to recover their dues not only under the provisions of the said Act, but also under the provisions of any other Act, if in force. Any other provisions being, however, provisions other than civil suits. Viewed thus, it is clear that the order, dated 17-9-2003, which stands impugned in CRP No. 12/2005 and whereby the learned Court below has held the bank's suit as having abated and not maintainable, needs no interference. 21. Having come to the conclusion that the right to sue in the civil Courts would not survive on coming into force of the said Act as far as recovery of public demand by banks is concerned, the question, which, naturally, arises, now, is this : whether the decrees, which have already been obtained by instituting civil suits, shall be treated as having become infrucutous and inexecutable? It is rudimentary principle of interpretation of statute that the words, occurring in a statute, are to be attributed their ordinary meaning. A suit will not, ordinarily, include, unless provided otherwise, execution proceedings. When the legislature has chosen to abate only suits and not execution of the decrees already obtained, Section 38 cannot be stretched to mean that execution proceedings would also be rendered infructuous and inexecutable on coming into force of the said Act. Had the legislative intendment been to set at naught even the decrees, which have already been obtained for recovery of public demand, nothing could have stopped the legislature from incorporating provisions, in the Act, making decrees, already obtained, inexecutable or from laying down, under the Act, that not only suits, but even decrees shall stand abated on coming into force of the Act. Not making of any such provision leads to an irresistible inference that the decrees, already obtained, for recovery of public demand, shall not become inexecutable on coming into force of the said Act. Not making of any such provision leads to an irresistible inference that the decrees, already obtained, for recovery of public demand, shall not become inexecutable on coming into force of the said Act. It is worth pointing out that when the legislature had intended to make suitable and exclusive mechanism for speedy recovery of all sorts of 'public demand', it would be unreasonable to interfere, In the absence of any provisions showing to the contrary, that the decrees, which banks might have had obtained, would be set at naught by the legislature and thereby give rise to a fresh de-bate on the question as to whether a due Is pending and payable by a creditor or not. In this regard, it is also worth noticing that If a proceeding is initiated for recovery of public demand under the said Act, nothing can stop the debtor from raising the question, under Section 8, that he is not liable to make payment. Such denial would call for a fresh decision into the question as to whether the person. who is alleged to be a debtor, is or is not a willful defaulter within the meaning of Section 8. Such interpretation would do violence to the scheme of the said Act, which aims at providing an exclusive mechanism for recovery of public demand expeditiously and at the least possible expenses. There can, therefore, be no escape from conclusion that the impugned order, dated 3-3-2005, which stands impugned in CRP No. 11/2005 and whereby the decree has been held to be still executable, needs no interference. 22. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, both the revision petitions fail and the impugned orders, dated 3-3-2005, and 17-9-2003, are not interfered with. The revision petitions, therefore fail and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. 23. With the above observations and directions, the revision petitions shall stand disposed of with costs.