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2006 DIGILAW 1047 (JHR)

Ram Badan Singh v. Kuldip Singh, Sambhu Singh, Baiga Singh And Rukmini Devi

2006-08-11

N.N.TIWARI

body2006
JUDGMENT Narendra Nath Tiwari, J. 1. This second appeal by the defendant No. 1-appellant-appellant is against the judgment and decree of affirmance dated 19 th June, 2004 passed by learned 3 rd Additional District Judge, Palamau dismissing the Title Appeal No. 32 of 2003 and upholding the judgment and decree passed by learned Sub Judge-III, Palamau in Title Suit No. 97 of 1994. 2. The plaintiff had filed the said suit for the relief praying declaration that the sale deed executed by defendant No. 2 in favour of the defendant No. 1 are void, fraudulent and not binding on the plaintiff and that the plaintiff has got right, title, interest and possession over the suit land. The plaintiffs case is that one Deni Singh was occupancy raiyat in respect of the said land along with his brother Khakhanu Singh. Khakhanu Singh died issueless in the state of jointness and the suit land devolved on the surviving brother Deni Singh. Deni Singh had no male issue and had only daughters. Plaintiff is the youngest daughter. The plaintiff managed the cultivation work from the very beginning and after death of Deni Singh, inherited the properties and has been in cultivating possession thereof. The defendant No. 2 was an issueless widow who was brought by the plaintiff to live with her for keeping watch over the standing crop on the suit land. The defendant No. 1 managed to obtain two collusive sale deeds executed by defendant No. 2, without payment of a single farthing, purportedly transferring the suit land. The defendant No. 1 had also fraudulently managed to obtain permission under Section 46 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act. 3. The defendant No. 1 contested the suit. His case was that Deni Singh married thrice. His first marriage was with Tileya Devi and out of the said wedlock two daughters were born Jageshwari and Maheshwari. After death of his first wife, Deni Singh married Dukhani and out of that wedlock, he had five daughters. The plaintiff and defendants No. 6 to 8 are the daughters born out of the said wedlock. After death of second wife, Deni Singh married Anar Kuar, defendant No. 2. It has been stated that the suit land was possessed by the defendant No. 2 when Deni Singh died. The plaintiff and defendants No. 6 to 8 are the daughters born out of the said wedlock. After death of second wife, Deni Singh married Anar Kuar, defendant No. 2. It has been stated that the suit land was possessed by the defendant No. 2 when Deni Singh died. The said defendant No. 2 sold the suit land to the defendant No. 1 after obtaining permission under Section 46 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act and on receipt of consideration amount by virtue of registered sale deed dated 13.01.1984 (Exhibit A) and 06.02.1984 (Exhibit A/1). It has been further stated that during his lifetime Deni Singh had got the land settled in the name of his wife, defendant No. 2 by the ex-landlord. Rent receipt was also issued by the ex-landlord in the name of defendant No. 2. The said defendant No. 2 remained in continuous possession of the land. Defendant No. 1 claimed that he is the owner and has got no indefeasible right, title, interest over the suit land. 4. On the basis of the said pleadings, learned Trial Court framed several issues. Both the parties led their evidences. After thorough discussion and consideration of the facts, evidences and materials on record, learned Trial Court held that the defendant No. 2, Anar Kuar had got no right, title over the suit land and the sale deeds executed in favour of the defendant No. 1 is not legal, valid and binding on the plaintiff and that the defendant No. 1 did not acquire any right, title over possession by virtue of the said colourable sale deeds. Learned Trial Court decided almost all the issues in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit. The defendant, thereafter, preferred appeal in the Court of the District Judge, Palamau at Daltonganj being Title Appeal No. 32 of 2003. The said appeal was heard and decided by the learned Additional District Judge-III, Daltonganj, Palamau. Learned Trial Court decided almost all the issues in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit. The defendant, thereafter, preferred appeal in the Court of the District Judge, Palamau at Daltonganj being Title Appeal No. 32 of 2003. The said appeal was heard and decided by the learned Additional District Judge-III, Daltonganj, Palamau. Learned Lower Appellate Court, in view of the grounds taken in the appeal, also, thoroughly, examined the facts, evidences and materials on record and came to the finding that the lands belonged to Deni Singh who was member of the Scheduled Tribe and the defendant No. 1 is not a member of the Scheduled Tribe and as such any transfer by a member of Scheduled Tribe in favour of a member who is not a Scheduled Tribe is not permissible in law and thus, the sale deeds executed by the defendant No. 2 in favour of the defendant No. 1 is void, fraudulent, sham and not binding on the plaintiff. The said sale deeds did not convey any right, title to the defendant No. 1. It has been further held that the plaintiff has been coming in cultivating possession of the land and she has got raiyati right over the land. Learned lower appellate Court has, thus, upheld the judgment and decree of learned Trial Court and dismissed the appeal. 5. Mr. Lalit Kumar Lal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, submitted that the learned Courts below have committed serious errors of law and of facts in decreeing the plaintiffs suit and dismissing the appeal of the defendant No. 1-appellant. Learned counsel submitted that admittedly the suit land belongs to a-member of the Scheduled Tribe and the plaintiff being the daughter of Deni Singh the suit filed by her for declaration of right, title and possession in respect of a property was not maintainable without impleading the Deputy Commissioner, who is a necessary party in view of the amendment brought in Order I Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure by Bihar Regulation, I of 1969. Learned counsel submitted that though the said point was not raised either in the suit or in the appeal, the same being a pure question of law can be raised even at the second appellate stage. Learned counsel submitted that the said point is a substantial question of law, which requires to be decided by this Court. Learned counsel submitted that though the said point was not raised either in the suit or in the appeal, the same being a pure question of law can be raised even at the second appellate stage. Learned counsel submitted that the said point is a substantial question of law, which requires to be decided by this Court. Learned counsel next submitted that the Court below has also not considered that the plaintiff is the daughter of Deni Singh and under the Tribal customary law a daughter has no right of inheritance and as such she has no right, title over the suit land and the suit should not have been decreed in her favour. Learned counsel, next, submitted that though the defendant No. 1 was a legally married wife as she lived with Deni Singh for several years and there is a presumption of a valid marriage in view of the long cohabitation of the said defendant No. 2 with Deni Singh, yet the Courts below did not appreciate the same and denied the claim of the defendant No. 1 on an erroneous consideration of the provisions of law. Learned counsel submitted that the defendant No. 2 was also given settlement by the ex-landlord and she was recognized as raiyat even by the State of Bihar as the rent receipts were granted to her. 6. After hearing the learned counsel and carefully perusing the records, I find that the defendant No. 1 in his written statement had not taken objection of non-joinder of Deputy Commissioner as a defendant. It is admitted position that amendment was made in Order I Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure under Bihar Regulation 1 of 1969 which provides that in suits for declaration of title or possession relating to immovable properties of member of the Scheduled Tribe as specified in Part III to the schedule to the Constitution, the Deputy Commissioner, concerned, shall also be joined as a defendant. In the instant suit, the plaintiff has sought declaration that the sale deeds executed by defendant No. 2 in favour of defendant No. 1 are void, fraudulent and not binding upon the plaintiff and for declaration of right, title and interest was an ancillary relief following thereafter. The said sale deeds (Exhibits A and A/1) were executed against the defendant No. 1 who is admittedly not a member of the Scheduled Tribe. The said sale deeds (Exhibits A and A/1) were executed against the defendant No. 1 who is admittedly not a member of the Scheduled Tribe. In view of the said relief prayed for in the suit, the suit cannot be said to be bad for non-joinder of Deputy Commissioner at the second appellate stage. So far as the effect of another relief is concerned, i.e., for declaration of right, title of the plaintiff in respect of the suit land, the same was clouded by the impugned sale deeds. Once the said sale deeds are held to be void, the plaintiff gets full relief against the defendants and even no further declaration is required. At any rate, the suit praying for declaration of the sale deeds is not bad for non joinder of the Deputy Commissioner is not required for seeking such declaration. If the point urged by the learned counsel for the appellant raises a question of law, the same has no relevance with the first relief prayed for in the suit and as such the same cannot be said to be a substantial question of law. In Govind Raju v. Maramman , the Supreme Court, while reiterating the principle laid down in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari ; Thiagrajan v. Shri Venugopalaswamay B. Koil held that a point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law, but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be substantial, a "question of law" must be debatable , not previously settled by law of the land and must have a bearing on the decision of the case in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law involved in the case, there must be first an affidavit for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable finding of facts arrived at by the Court of facts and it must be necessary to decide the question of law for just and proper decision of the Court. In the instant case the objection of non-joinder of the Deputy Commissioner was not taken in the pleadings by the defendant-appellant and the said question never emerged before the Courts below for arriving at the findings. In the instant case the objection of non-joinder of the Deputy Commissioner was not taken in the pleadings by the defendant-appellant and the said question never emerged before the Courts below for arriving at the findings. The question of non-joinder of the Deputy Commissioner in the suit has no relevance with regard to the relief for declaration in respect of the impugned sale deeds executed in the name of the person who is not a member of the Scheduled Tribe. In my considered view, the question raised by the learned counsel for the appellant having no bearing on the decision of the main relief sought in the suit is not a substantial question of law. Since the two Courts of facts declared the impugned sale deed executed in favour of the defendant No. 1 as void and not binding on the plaintiff, the other questions raised by the appellants counsel regarding the alleged settlement in favour of defendant No. 2 as well as the status of relationship between the defendant No. 2 with Deni Singh being the factual disputes between the parties also do not give rise to any substantial question of law to be framed in this second appeal. This appeal is, accordingly; dismissed.