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Karnataka High Court · body

2006 DIGILAW 1048 (KAR)

EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION, BANGALORE v. RAKESH KULKARNI

2006-12-18

K.RAMANNA

body2006
ORDER All these four criminal appeals are filed by the Deputy Director of Employees' State Insurance Corporation, Bangalore, against. the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Presiding Officer, Special Court for Economic Offences, Bangalore, on 21-1-2002 in C.C. Nos. 582, 570, 569 and 581 of 1998 respectively, whereby the Court - below acquitted the respondents in all the aforesaid four cases for an offence punishable under Section 85(1)(a) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948. 2. Since the appellants and the respondents in all these four appeals are one and same even though allegations made in the complaint by the appellant/complainant against the respondents 1 and 2 is for a different purpose and so also the question of fact and law involved in these cases are same, therefore, in order to avoid repetition of facts and how, they were taken up together, heard and being disposed of by this common judgment. 3. The case of the appellant/ESI Corporation is that the respondent/accused 2 M/s. Cosmos Leather Exports Limited, is covered under Employees' State Insurance Act with effect from 16-2-1994 and on the basis of Form 1 dated 25-2-1995 a Code No. 53-13101-23 was allotted. Respondent Rakesh Kulkarni was the Manager and principal employer of the said factory i.e., accused 2 in terms of Section 2(17) of the ESI Act. The respondent/accused 1 had failed to pay the contribution collected from its employer along with its contribution in accordance with Section 39 of the ESI Act for the period from 1-9-1997 to 31-121997. Since no amount of contribution for the aforesaid period was paid by the respondents, notice in Form C-18 was issued on 20-4-1998 to the said factory, which was duly served on the factory and also on respondent 1 a show-cause notice was issued as to why action should not be taken under Section 25 of the ESI Act. As the contribution for the period from 31-10-1997 to 31-12-1997 has not been assessed by the Insurance Inspector on 3-3-1998. Inspite of the notice, the contribution has not been deposited or paid. Therefore, respondent 1 being the Principal employer (Manager) of the respondent 2/factory has violated the Regulation 31 read with Regulations 39 and 40 of the General Regulation of 1950 and the provisions of the ESI Act. Inspite of the notice, the contribution has not been deposited or paid. Therefore, respondent 1 being the Principal employer (Manager) of the respondent 2/factory has violated the Regulation 31 read with Regulations 39 and 40 of the General Regulation of 1950 and the provisions of the ESI Act. Therefore, a private complaint came to be filed under Section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 against respondents 1 and 2. After recording the evidence, the Trial Court acquitted the respondents on the ground that respondent 1 is not the principal employer and no prior notice was served on him to file a private complaint under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. for an offence punishable under Section 85Cl)(a) of the ESI Act. Likewise, other three criminal cases came to be filed for non-payment of the ESI Contribution for the period from January 1997 to March 1997, October 1996 to December 1996 and September 1997 to December 1997. Hence, these appeals. 4. Heard the arguments of the learned Counsel Smt. Geetha M.P. appearing for the appellant/ESI Corporation and Sri J. Kanikaraj, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent 1. 5. It is argued by the learned Counsel for the appellant/ESI Corporation in all these appeals that as on the date of inspection, respondent was working as a Manager i.e., principal employer and he failed to contribute the subscription amount collected out of the wages of its employees to the Department. When the Inspector of Insurance inspected the factory on 3-3-1998, found that though ESI contribution was deducted out of the salary of its employees-failed to deposit the same along with its contribution. Therefore, a private complaint came to be filed after complying with the mandatory provisions by issuing show-cause notice to respondents 1 and 2. It is argued by the learned Counsel for the appellant that before filing the charge-sheet, necessary sanction has been obtained from the Competent Authority i.e., the Joint Regional Director of ESI by the Corporation to sanction to prosecute in terms of Section 8(l)(a) of the ESI Act. Therefore, the Insurance Inspector of the Corporation is also a public servant in terms of Section 21 of the IPC read with Section 93 of the ESI Act. The Insurance Inspector was duly authorised to act, appear, make an application and to institute a criminal proceedings on behalf of the Corporation and to represent it before the Court. Therefore, the Insurance Inspector of the Corporation is also a public servant in terms of Section 21 of the IPC read with Section 93 of the ESI Act. The Insurance Inspector was duly authorised to act, appear, make an application and to institute a criminal proceedings on behalf of the Corporation and to represent it before the Court. Inspite of the notice issued, respondents 1 and 2 failed to deposit the contribution collected out of the salary of the employees along with its contribution. Hence, the respondents 1 and 2 have committed an offence punishable under Section 85(1)(a) of the ESI Act. 6. It is also argued by the learned Counsel for the appellant that under Section 2(17) of the ESI Act, respondent 1 was working as a Manager of respondent 2 being the principal employer and he is liable to be convicted for an offence under Section 85(1)(a) of the ESI Act and Section 2(17) of the ESI Act, which reads thus: "Principal employer" means.- "(i) in a factory, the owner or occupier of the factory and includes the managing agent of such owner or occupier, the legal representative of a deceased owner or occupier, and where a person has been named as the manager of the factory under the said Act". 7. Therefore, as on the date of commission of an offence, respondent 2 was working as the principal employer. Therefore, the findings recorded by the Trial Court that respondent 2 was not the principal employer and he was a paid servant is totally incorrect. After service of show-cause notice, a private complaint came to be filed for violation of Section 85(1)(a) of the ESI Act. It is argued that the Trial Court has not properly appreciated the evidence placed on record through respondents 1 and T the documents marked as Exs. P. 1 to P. 13. 8. In this behalf, learned Counsel for the appellant relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sheoratan Agarwal and Another v State of Madhya Pradesh 1, wherein, it has been held thus: "Essential Commodities Act (10 of 1955), Sections 3 and 10 Offences by companies Separate prosecution of person-in-charge or officer of company without prosecuting company - Is permissible". 9. It is argued that the person-in-charge of the factory shall be prosecuted and notice issued to the respondents was duly served. 9. It is argued that the person-in-charge of the factory shall be prosecuted and notice issued to the respondents was duly served. Hence, the findings recorded by the Trial Court in acquitting the respondents in the aforesaid four cases is liable to be set aside and respondent be convicted for the aforesaid offences. 10. On the other hand, learned Counsel appearing for respondents 1 and 2 submitted that respondent is a public servant during the relevant period and he was working as a Manager and he is a paid servant. Therefore, he will not become the principal employee or the owner of the factory. Therefore, even if any contribution has been deducted out of the wages paid to the employees working in the 2nd respondent/company, the Manager is not responsible for not depositing the ESI contribution deducted out of the salary of the employees along with its contribution. It is argued that no show-cause notice was served on the respondent 1. k3 per Ex. P. 5/inspection report, one RS. Khan is shown as the occupier and Manager is shown as Irshad Ahmed Khan. The name of the respondent has not been written in Ex. P. 5. The Trial Court is right in coming to the conclusion that respondent was neither an occupier nor a Manager. Therefore, the order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court after appreciation of the entire evidence placed on record does not require any interference. The Corporation was well-aware that one Irshad Ahmed Khan was the Manager but no notice was issued to him and it was issued in respect of one Rudolph Mascarenhas and the name of Director is shown as S.B. Shetty. It is also stated that notice has been issued to the company but not to the above said persons. Since respondent 1 is a paid servant, he is not liable to answer the charges levelled against him for an offence punishable under Section 85(1)(a) of the ESI Act. 11. It is also stated that notice has been issued to the company but not to the above said persons. Since respondent 1 is a paid servant, he is not liable to answer the charges levelled against him for an offence punishable under Section 85(1)(a) of the ESI Act. 11. In support of his contention, learned Counsel for the respondents relied upon a decision in the case of Employees' State Insurance Corporation, Chandigarh v Gurdial Singh and Others\wherein, it has been held thus: "Principal employer - Private limited company having its factory - Occupier of the factory duly named - Factory also having a manager - Held, clause (i) applicable and residuary clause (iii) thereby excluded - Directors of the company not covered by clause (i) and hence not personally liable to meet demand of contribution - Liability was of the company and in the event of there being an occupier, such occupier liable to meet the demand". 12. He also relied upon another decision in case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v Amrit Lal2, wherein, it has been held thus: "Appeal against acquittal by Municipality in a case filed on its behalf - Limitation - Municipal Corporation is not public servant under Section 21 of the IPC - Not entitled to benefit of extended limitation of6 months under Section 378(5)". 13. He has also relied upon a decision of the Delhi High Court in case of Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v Sardari Lal3, wherein, it has been held as under: "Employees' Provident Funds an Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, Section 14-AC - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 378(4) - Present application appeal against acquittal not having been filed by complainant, i.e., Inspector appointed under Section 13 of the Act, is not maintainable". 14. Having heard the arguments of the learned Counsel appearing on both sides, now I proceed to see whether the finding recorded by the Court below acquitting the respondents for an offence punishable under Section 85(1)(a) of the ESI Act is perverse, incorrect or illegal? 15. No doubt, the prosecution witnesses have deposed before the Court that as on the date of inspection, respondent 1 was working as a Manager and he was responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company. Ex. P. 1 i.e., account number allotted to the factory is not in dispute. 15. No doubt, the prosecution witnesses have deposed before the Court that as on the date of inspection, respondent 1 was working as a Manager and he was responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company. Ex. P. 1 i.e., account number allotted to the factory is not in dispute. But the respondent 1 being the Manager of the factory though deducted the contribution from its employees, failed to deposit the same for the period from October 1996 to August 1997 -amounting to Rs. 95,416.90 and failed to submit the quarterly returns. Ex. P. 2 is Form 2 renewal of licence in favour of respondent 2 and Ex. P. 2 is the contribution deducted out of the wages paid to the employees from October 1996 to December 1997. Ex. P. 5 is the observation made by the Inspector that he inspected the factory on 3-3-1998. Ex. P. 5 is the inspection report wherein, it has been clearly mentioned that one R.S. Khan is shown as the occupier of the respondent 2 and one Irshad Ahmed Khan is shown as the Manager. Whereas, Ex. P. 6 is the Employees' Registration Form issued by the Director of ESI wherein, the name of the respondent is mentioned as Manager. As could be seen from the records, notice was not issued to respondent 1 but it was issued to one Rudolph Mascarenhas. Therefore, as on the date of the inspection, respondent 1 was not an occupier and he was a paid servant. The name of respondent 1 is not written in Ex. P. 1 as admitted by P.W. 2 who deposed before the Court that accused 1 was the principal employer of accused 2/company. In view of the fact that in Ex. P. 5 name of the occupier is shown as R.S. Khan and name of the Manager is shown as Irshad Ahmed Khan and assuming for the sake of argument, respondent 1 was the Manager responsible for the contribution of the ESI amount along with its contribution but no show-cause notice has been issued to him, but it was issued to some other person i.e., Rudolph Mascarenhas. Therefore the Trial Court is rigid in coming to the consideration that the complaint filed against respondent 1 the then Manager of accused 2/factory is not at all maintainable. Therefore the Trial Court is rigid in coming to the consideration that the complaint filed against respondent 1 the then Manager of accused 2/factory is not at all maintainable. The evidence placed on record discloses that respondent 2 failed to pay contribution which was deducted out of the salary of its employees but the complaint filed against respondent 1 is not at all maintainable in view of the admitted facts that as on the date of filing of the complaint up to the date of inspection, the respondent 1 was not the Manager of the accused 2/factory and therefore, no notice has been served to the respondent 1. Considering the fact that no prior notice has been served on respondent 1 but it was served on the occupier and the respondent 2, the appeal is not at all maintainable and the same is liable to be dismissed. 16. Hence, viewed from any angle, I do not find any good reasons to interfere with the order passed by the Trial Court or to reverse the findings recorded by the Trial Court. Accordingly, all these appeals are dismissed.