JUDGMENT 1. - This is a second appeal filed by the defendant. The suit of the plaintiff-respondent seeking to set aside order of termination dated 9.7.1985 was decreed by the trial court vide judgment and decree dated 30.3.1993. This judgment and decree has since been affirmed by the learned first appellate court vide order dated 8.7.1999. 2. Before I may proceed to deal with the points raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, it will be appropriate to mention that the defendant-appellant filed no written statement nor led any evidence. At the first instance, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contends that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. As mentioned above, as no written statement was filed, the trial court framed no issue with regard to jurisdiction. In considered view of this court, the appellant should not be permitted to raise this issue after 17 years as the suit was filed in 1988. It will be too iniquitous at this stage to relegate the plaintiff to redress his grievance before a labour court or an industrial tribunal, as the case may be. If, perhaps, the defendants had filed reply and raised the question of civil court having no jurisdiction, it was possible that the plaintiff would have withdrawn his suit at that very stage and exerted his right before an appropriate forum. That apart, the present dispute did not relate to enforcement of any right under Industrial Disputes Act. 3. While deciding Special Appeal (Civil) No. 42/1996, Life Insurance Corporation of India & Anr. v. Ram Pal Singh, decided on 30.9.2005 , a Division Bench of this Court, in which I was one of the members, similar contentions based upon the same very judgments, as were relied in the said case, were repelled by observing as under: "In our considered opinion, if dispute is not an industrial dispute and it does not relate to enforcement of any right under the Industrial Disputes Act, remedy lies only in civil court and if dispute is an industrial dispute, but arising out of a right or liability created under General or Common law and not under the Act, jurisdiction of civil court is alternative and leaves a discretion for incumbent to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy." 4. The plaintiff, in this case had simply asked for setting aside order of termination primarily on the ground that plaintiff in this case had sought setting aside order terminating his service primarily on the ground that even though the order was punitive in nature, no enquiry was held nor he was heard in the matter. He was not claiming any relief that he might have been entitled to under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 5. Learned counsel also contends that the plaintiff was asked to quit during period of probation and, therefore, no inquiry was required to be conducted. The contention of the learned counsel appears to be attractive in the first blush but when examined in the context of the fact that while dismissing the petitioner from service, it was mentioned that he has lost confidence of the appellant corporation, the same pales into insignificance. If order of termination may be passed on such grounds as may reflect adversely on the work and conduct of an employee, the order would be punitive. It is too well settled that an employee has to be given full hearing in an enquiry that may be held against him, if the order is punitive in nature, even though he may be on probation. I find no merit in the appeal and thus dismiss the same, leaving however the parties to bear their own costs.Second appeal dismissed. *******