Judgment Barin Ghosh and Ajay Kr.Tripathi JJ. 1. Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Sec.30 of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 authorizes preferring of an appeal to the High Court from an order of the Commissioner awarding compensation or disallowing a claim on that account in full or in part. Clause (aa) of Sub-section (1) of Sec.30 of the said Act authorizes an appeal to the High Court from the order passed by the Commissioner awarding interest or penalty in terms of the provisions of the said Act. The third proviso to subsection (1) of Sec.30 of the said Act provides that no appeal by an employer under Clause (a) shall lie unless the Memorandum of Appeal is accompanied by a certificate issued by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against. Therefore, the third proviso to sub-section (1) of Sec.30 of the Act applies in relation to an appeal preferred by an employer challenging the compensation as awarded. When the statute granted a right to appeal and at the same time imposed a condition, unless the condition is fulfilled, the right to appeal is lost. 2. In the instant case, the appeal was not preferred by the employer, but by the Insurance Company, who had assured the employer. In view of various pronouncements, as referred to in the judgment impugned, it is now not open for the appellant to contend that the Insurance Company will not step into the shoes of employer within the meaning of the third proviso to sub-section (1) of Sec.30 of the Act. Therefore, the appeal by the Insurance Company against awarding of compensation is maintainable only upon the Insurance Company submitting a certificate issued by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against along with the Memorandum of Appeal. In the instant case, admittedly, no such certificate was filed and, accordingly, the appeal was incompetent. 3. The third proviso to sub-section (1) of Sec.30 of the Act, however, does not apply to an appeal to be preferred against an order awarding interest or penalty under the Act. 4. In the instant case, while the award for compensation was passed, interest payable under the Act as well as the penalty had been separately quantified. 3. The third proviso to sub-section (1) of Sec.30 of the Act, however, does not apply to an appeal to be preferred against an order awarding interest or penalty under the Act. 4. In the instant case, while the award for compensation was passed, interest payable under the Act as well as the penalty had been separately quantified. There is no dispute that in the Memorandum of Appeal filed before this Court, although it was urged that the entire award must go for the reasons indicated in the grounds taken in the Memorandum of Appeal, it was also indicated that the appellant has no obligation to pay interest and penalty as awarded. Therefore, in so far as that ground is concerned, the appellant wanted to prefer an appeal in terms of the right conferred by clause (aa) of sub-section (1) of Sec.30 of the Act, to which the third proviso to subsection (1) of Sec.30 of the Act will not apply. 5. In those circumstances, the best course should have been to delete all the grounds in the appeal and to confine the appeal only to clause (aa) of sub-section (1) of Sec.30 of the Act and to make it absolutely clear that the appeal was not against the order awarding compensation but is only confined to the order awarding interest and penalty under the Act. 6. In those circumstances, we would interfere with the order under appeal and allow the same and set aside the order under appeal. 7. While, however, allowing the appeal we make it clear that the appeal registered as Misc. Appeal No. 322 of 1991 is only confined to clause (aa) of sub-section (1) of Sec.30 of the Act, i.e. the appellant has only challenged its liability to pay interest and penalty and that such challenge is on the footing that being an Insurance Company, the appellant is not obliged to pay interest or penalty, but in the appeal it shall not be urged that the original employer, who has not preferred any appeal is not liable to pay any interest or penalty.