JUDGMENT :- The defendant in O.S. Nos.741 and 742 of 1984, in the Court of I Additional Munsif Magistrate, Guntur, filed these two second appeals. During the pendency of the appeals, he died and his legal representatives were brought on record. 2. O.S. No.741 of 1984 was filed by the respondents in S.A. No.479 of 2004, for the relief of perpetual injunction, restraining the appellants and their men, from causing obstruction to use the common passage, marked as ABCD in the plaint schedule, for reaching their house from the bazaar. It was pleaded that the common passage is provided under a document, marked as Ex.A.2 dated 4-8-1934, for the common benefit of all the persons mentioned therein, and despite the same, the appellants have highhandedly prevented them from using the passage. The appellants, on the other hand, pleaded that the land covered by the passage is their exclusive property, and that the respondents do not have any right to use the same. 3. Respondents in S.A.No.480 of 1994 filed O.S. No.742 of 1984, against the appellants, seeking the relief of perpetual injunction, restraining the appellants from laying napa slabs in the suit· schedule property, which is said to be a vacant land of 55 sq. yards. It was alleged that the said land was also covered by Ex.A-2, and was shown as the exclusive property belonging to the respondents, and that the appellants had highhandedly tried to lay slabs, treating it as their exclusive property. This suit also was resisted by the appellants, and it was pleaded that the suit schedule property was under their use and occupation, for the last several years. 4. The suits were clubbed, and through a common judgment dated 3-8-1989, the trial Court dismissed them. Aggrieved thereby, the respondents filed A.S. Nos. 171 and 172 of 1989, respectively, in the Court of III Additional District Judge, Guntur. The appeals were allowed through common judgment dated 1-8-1994. Hence, these two second appeals. 5. Sri B. V.S. Shivarama Prasad, learned Counsel for the appellants, submits that the lower appellate Court based its finding, as regards the passage, on Ex.A-2, and that even according to the recitals therein, the respondents were entitled to use only 1/4th of the identified passage. The appeals were allowed through common judgment dated 1-8-1994. Hence, these two second appeals. 5. Sri B. V.S. Shivarama Prasad, learned Counsel for the appellants, submits that the lower appellate Court based its finding, as regards the passage, on Ex.A-2, and that even according to the recitals therein, the respondents were entitled to use only 1/4th of the identified passage. He contends that though the recitals exist in Ex.A-2, the respondents did not prove to the satisfaction of the Court, that the passage was being used, by the time the suit was filed. 6. As regards the relief of injunction, vis-a-vis the vacant land of 55 sq. yards, learned Counsel points out that the lower appellate Court totally ignored the evidence on record, which clearly demonstrates that the appellant had constructed a kitchen, toilet, etc., in it, and despite the same, the relief of perpetual injunction was granted. He submits that the lower appellate Court was not justified, in reversing the well considered judgment of the trial Court. 7. Sri Rajendra Prasad, learned Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that Ex.A-2, particularly clause 6 thereof, is clear in its purport, insofar as it not only had provided for the common rights of the parties thereto, but also the dimensions and particulars of the common passage. He contends that the trial Court was uncertain in its approach, insofar as it treated that the right claimed by the respondents was partly easementary and partly on the basis of a document. He further contends that the vacant site of 55 sq. yards is also the subject-matter of Ex.A-2, and once it was shown as the vacant land, the averment of the appellants that subsequent improvements have been carried on it, cannot be recognized in law. 8. On the basis of the pleadings before it, the trial Court framed individual issues in the two suits, and had undertaken common trial. On behalf of the respondents herein, PWs.1 to 4 were examined and Exs. A-l to A-3 were marked. On behalf of the appellants, DWs-l to 4 were examined and Exs.B-l to B-6 were marked. The trial Court appointed a Commissioner, and his report and other relevant documents were taken on file, as Exs.C-l to C-8. 9. The dispute in between the parties was in relation to two separate aspects, viz. A-l to A-3 were marked. On behalf of the appellants, DWs-l to 4 were examined and Exs.B-l to B-6 were marked. The trial Court appointed a Commissioner, and his report and other relevant documents were taken on file, as Exs.C-l to C-8. 9. The dispute in between the parties was in relation to two separate aspects, viz. a right to use the common passage, and the respective rights vis-a-vis the vacant land of 55 sq. yards. 10. It is not in dispute that the appellants and the respondents are parties to a document of the year 1934, which is marked as EX.A-2. The said document dealt with various aspects, including the right .0L the parties to use a common passage: Admittedly, the suit passage tallies in all respects, with the one, referred to in clause 6 of the document. 11. The trial Court expressed its uncertainty, about the basis of the right of the respondents. It expressed the view that the pleadings indicate, as though the right is based upon the easement, but in the evidence it was sought to be sustained on a document. From a perusal of the plaint, it is evident that the respondents never based their claim, on any easementary right. Having asserted that it is a common passage, they substantiated their plea, by marking EX.A-2. The lower appellate Court had copiously referred to this document, and held that the respondents have a right to use the common passage. This Court does not find any basis to interfere with the same. 12. Second Appeal No.479 of 1994 is accordingly dismissed. 13. The other facet of the dispute is an extent of 55 sq.yards. It is true that this piece of land was also dealt with, under Ex.A-2, and it was referred to, as a vacant site. But, the record discloses that the appellants herein pleaded and proved that they had constructed and brought about a kitchen and lavatory, on this site. Even assuming that the acts of the appellants in doing so are without any basis or right, the existence of such structures cannot be ignored. Once it had emerged that the land of 55 sq. yards is not a vacant land and, on the other hand, the appellants had put up certain structures therein, the suit for injunction simplicitor cannot be maintained, and the trial Court had rightly dismissed it. Once it had emerged that the land of 55 sq. yards is not a vacant land and, on the other hand, the appellants had put up certain structures therein, the suit for injunction simplicitor cannot be maintained, and the trial Court had rightly dismissed it. The decree granted by the lower appellate Court in the appeal preferred against it, cannot be sustained. At the most, the respondents can work out their remedies, by seeking the relief of declaration and other consequential reliefs. 14. Therefore, Second Appeal No.480 of 1994 is allowed, and the decree passed by the lower appellate Court in A.S.No.172 of 1989 is set aside. It shall, however, be open to the respondents, to file a suit for declaration and seek for other consequential reliefs. 15. There shall be no order as to costs.