Judgment :- M. Thanikachalam, J. This is a suit for recovery of a sum of Rs.1,98,486.07 with subsequent interest thereon, against defendants 1 & 3 as well as for a preliminary decree, on the basis of the mortgage by deposit of title deed. 2. Brief facts leading to the claim: (a) The plaintiff granted to the first defendant financial accommodation for the purpose of his business by way of cash credit facility, fixing the maximum limit of Rs.50,000/-. The first defendant as collateral security deposited certified copy of title deed relating to the property described in Schedule 'A' to the plaint with the plaintiff s branch on 24.9.1986, with an intention to create an equitable mortgage. Subsequently on 12.11.1987, by submitting an affidavit, the first defendant confirmed that the original document was lost, certified copy alone was deposited. (b) Pursuant to the financial accommodation, the plaintiff lent and advanced money to the first defendant and the first defendant also then and there, not only acknowledged his liability, but also executed a promissory note on 12.1.1990 for Rs. 81,737.82, agreeing to repay the said amount with interest thereon, as and when demanded. Later, on 12.1.1990, he had also hypothecated the stock-in-trade stored at the business premises, which is described in Schedule 'B' to the plaint, in addition, hypothecating the machineries also described in Schedule 'C' to the plaint. Despite repeated demands, the first defendant failed to pay the amount. (c) On verification, it is found that defendants 2 & 3 have purchased the mortgaged immovable property in the year 1984, and on 12.11.1987, which were not disclosed by the first defendant, while creating equitable mortgage. Hence defendants 2 & 3 are impleaded as necessary parties, since they are interested in hypothecation. Hence the suit for recovery of the amount, as stated above. 3. The second defendant's case in brief: The suit filed by the plaintiff, without obtaining leave to file the suit, is liable to be dismissed, since the suit ought to have been filed, at the place, where the immovable property situate. This defendant had purchased an extent of 0. 45 cents comprised in Survey No. 170/8 from the first defendant on 20.8.1984, even before the alleged date of equitable mortgage. Therefore, the suit filed against this defendant, including the extent purchased by him, is not maintainable. This defendant had purchased an extent of 0. 45 cents comprised in Survey No. 170/8 from the first defendant on 20.8.1984, even before the alleged date of equitable mortgage. Therefore, the suit filed against this defendant, including the extent purchased by him, is not maintainable. The plaintiff ought to have obtained a regular mortgage deed, for the amount advanced to the first defendant, since the deposited certified copy of the title deed to the 'A' Schedule property, will not amount to creation of mortgage by deposit of title deed. Therefore, the alleged mortgage is invalid and this defendant or the property purchased by him, are not responsible or liable for the money said to have been advanced to the first defendant. Hence it is prayed, the suit may be dismissed with costs. 4. The third defendant's case in brief. As contemplated under Section 16 of the Civil Procedure Code, the plaintiff ought to have instituted the suit at the place, where the immovable property situate, not before this Court, that too, without obtaining leave to file the suit. The transactions between the plaintiff and the first defendant are not within the knowledge of this defendant. This defendant is a bonafide purchaser of the agricultural land, an extent of 1. 28 acres from the first defendant for a valuable consideration on 16.6.1987. Pursuant to the said sale, patta was also issued in favour of this defendant. When this defendant had purchased the property, he insisted the first defendant, to produce the original title deed, for which the first defendant answered, that he had lost the same some years ago and it could not be traced out. Thereafter, verifying the encumbrance certificate pertaining to the suit land, and unable to find any encumbrance regarding the suit mortgage, this defendant had purchased the property without the knowledge and notice of any prior encumbrance. Even as per the allegations, the plaintiff obtained the certified copy of the title deed in respect of the 'A' Schedule property only as collateral security and not with an intention to secure the same, as equitable mortgage. By depositing the certified copy of the title deed, there could be no valid equitable mortgage, which could be enforced in a Court of law. In this view, neither this defendant nor the property purchased by him are answerable to the suit claim. By depositing the certified copy of the title deed, there could be no valid equitable mortgage, which could be enforced in a Court of law. In this view, neither this defendant nor the property purchased by him are answerable to the suit claim. For the foregoing reasons, this defendant prays for dismissal of the suit. 5. Based upon the above pleadings, the following issues were framed for trial on 3.3.2004. 1. Whether this Court does not have jurisdiction to try this suit? 2. Whether the mortgage dated 24.9.1986 created by the first defendant in favour of the plaintiff over the suit property, is not binding on the second defendant and third defendant? 3. Whether the mortgage dated 24.9.1986 created by the first defendant, in favour of the plaintiff over the suit property is not binding on the third defendant? 4. To what relief is the plaintiff entitled to? Issues 2 to 3: 6. The suit is for recovery of a sum of Rs. 1, 98,486.07, from defendants 1 & 3 and in the event of their default to pay, for the sale of the mortgaged property and hypothecated assets, which are described in Schedule 'A' to 'C' of the plaint. The first defendant, who is the Principal borrower remained exparte. Therefore, there could be no difficulty, in granting a decree as prayed for against the first defendant for the suit claim if the claim is proved otherwise. But, the suit is not only for personal decree, but also seeking a preliminary decree in respect of 'A' Schedule property, immovable property, agricultural land, measuring an extent of 1.73 acres, comprised in Survey No. 170/8, situated at Vadakadumbadi Madurakkattuthangal Village, Chengalpattu Taluk. As far as 'B' & 'C' Schedule properties are concerned, defendants 2 & 3 are not interested. Their contest is only in respect of 'A' Schedule property. Therefore, there cannot be any difficulty for granting a decree against B and C Schedule properties also, as claimed by the plaintiff. 7. It is the specific case of the plaintiff, as seen from paragraph-4 of the plaint, that the first defendant by depositing ‘the title' deeds, relating to 'A' Schedule property, had created an equitable mortgage on 24.9.1986 to the entire extent viz., 1.73 acres. In this extent, the second defendant is interested only in an extent of 0. 45 cents, pursuant to the sale deed dated 20.8.1984. 8. In this extent, the second defendant is interested only in an extent of 0. 45 cents, pursuant to the sale deed dated 20.8.1984. 8. The date of equitable mortgage is 24.9.1986, whether it is valid or not, which I will discuss infra. Even before the said date, from the first defendant -the owner of the suit 'A' Schedule property, the second defendant had purchased an extent of 0. 45 cents, as disclosed in the E. C. i.e. Exhibit P3, though no sale deed has been filed, on behalf of the second defendant. This sale deed is not challenged, could not be challenged also. Thus it is made out on the date of the alleged creation of the equitable mortgage on 24.9.1986, the first defendant was not the owner of the entire extent viz., 1. 73 acres, out of an extent of 2.39 acres, and he must have been the owner of 1. 26 acres alone. Therefore, even assuming at present, that there was an equitable mortgage on 24.9.1986, certainly that will not bind the second defendant, regarding the extent purchased by him prior to mortgage. In this view, the plaintiff is not entitled to a preliminary decree, in respect of 'A' Schedule property, to the entire extent, and if at all the equitable mortgage is proved as valid one, he can get a preliminary decree, only in respect of 1. 28 acres, excluding the extent purchased by the second defendant, that too, subject to the findings, whether the third defendant is a bonafide purchaser or not, 9. Realising, that the first defendant had parted away 0.45 cents, even before the creation of the equitable mortgage, the learned counsel for the plaintiff also, fairly not urged, as if the plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary decree, in respect of 1.73 acres. In this view, the extent purchased by the second defendant, has to be excluded from 'A' Schedule property, and he also should be relieved from the suit. Probably realising this alone, no prayer has been sought for in the plaint, against the second defendant. But unfortunately, the extent purchased by him is included in the Schedule 'A' property, resulting his objection. In the light of the above discussion, excluding the 0.45 cents, we have to see, for the remaining extent, whether the plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary decree, on the basis of the alleged equitable mortgage. 10. But unfortunately, the extent purchased by him is included in the Schedule 'A' property, resulting his objection. In the light of the above discussion, excluding the 0.45 cents, we have to see, for the remaining extent, whether the plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary decree, on the basis of the alleged equitable mortgage. 10. Section 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act prescribes conditions, where and how a mortgage by deposit of title deed could be created. Undoubtedly, the essential ingredients that are required for an equitable mortgage are: (i) a debt; (ii) deposit of title deeds; and (iii) an intention on the part of the loanee to create an equitable mortgage by depositing the title deeds showing that shall be the security for the debt. It is the settled position, at present, that the debt may be an existing debt on the date of the deposit of title deed or a future debt also. For both kind of debts, in a notified area, the owner of the property could create an equitable mortgage by depositing the title deeds binding himself and the property, validly. 11. In para-4 of the plaint, it is said: “as collateral security for the Cash Credit facility, the first defendant deposited with the Plaintiff s branch on 24.9.1986, a certified copy of the title deeds relating to his property described in Schedule "A" to the Plaint with an intention to Create an equitable mortgage thereon". It is also conceded, as said above, only certified copy of the title deed alone was produced, while creating the alleged equitable mortgage. It is not the case of the plaintiff in the plaint that on the date of depositing certi­fied copy of the title deed, relating to 'A' Schedule property, there was compulsion on the part of the bank, to produce the original title deed, for which the first defendant repre­sented, that the original document was lost and that is why, the first defendant was con­strained to produce the certified copy of the document, supported by affidavit also. On the other hand, it is said in paragraph-4 itself that, "By a subsequent affidavit dated 12.11.1987, the first defendant confirmed that the original documents were lost and certified copy of documents were deposited consequently". On the other hand, it is said in paragraph-4 itself that, "By a subsequent affidavit dated 12.11.1987, the first defendant confirmed that the original documents were lost and certified copy of documents were deposited consequently". If it is the case, on 24.9.1986 itself, by affidavit or otherwise, original document was lost, then only the confirmation of the same by the subsequent affidavit dated 12.11.1987 would arise. In the absence of any such plea, the subsequent averment in the plaint, as indicated above, as if it was confirmed on 12.11.1987, appears to be an after thought, probably obtained by the bank, knowing fully well that the property was already sold, which I will discuss infra also. In view of the admitted position that original title deed was not deposited, it is to be seen, whether the deposit of certified copy of the title deed, relating to 'A' Schedule property, would amount to a mortgage by deposit of title deed. 12. The learned counsel for the plaintiff would submit, that even by depositing certified copy of the title deed, a valid equitable mortgage could be created, inviting my attention to a Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in Syndicate Bank v. Modern Tile and Clay Works 1980 KLT 550 . The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court has held as follows: "The essential pre-requisite for the use of a certified copy as a document of title is the loss of the original deed. Unless and until it is made out that the original is lost, a certified copy of a document cannot be considered to be a document of title for the purpose of Section 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act." A distinction has been made between the title deeds and the registration copy of the title deeds. As held by the Division Bench, certified copy of the document would come within the meaning of evidencing the title and certainly it will not come within the meaning of title deed by itself. As held by the Division Bench, certified copy of the document would come within the meaning of evidencing the title and certainly it will not come within the meaning of title deed by itself. Therefore, ordinarily even as held by the above said Division Bench, certified copy of the title deed cannot be taken, as of right as title deed to the property and if the certified copy of the title deed to the property has to be accepted, as title deed for the purpose of creating a mortgage by deposit of title deed, then it should be shown that the original was lost and therefore, the parties were compelled to produce the certified copies, in order to create an equitable mortgage. In case at the time of the alleged creation of the equitable mortgage, if it is not proved or the bank has not taken any precautionary steps to ascertain what happened to the original document, then receiving the certified copy of the document without any demur from the owner of the property, creating an equitable mortgage may not be possible, since there would be absence of intention to create a mortgage by deposit of title deeds. In this context, we have to see whether the original is lost, if so, what is the effect. 13. In the plaint, as indicated above, there is an averment, that the original document was lost. The third defendant also would admit in the written statement that when he requested the original title deed, at the time of his purchase, the first defendant represented to him, that he had lost the same some years ago and could not find it. Thus, as rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, there is material by way of pleadings (admission) as well as in the form of an affidavit, to show that the original document was lost and it is not available with the first defendant. If the above said averments are supported by the documents and when there is no evidence, that the original would not have been produced, then accepting the same, it could be construed that there was a mortgage by deposit of certified copies of the title deeds, considering the intention of the first defendant to create the same. If the above said averments are supported by the documents and when there is no evidence, that the original would not have been produced, then accepting the same, it could be construed that there was a mortgage by deposit of certified copies of the title deeds, considering the intention of the first defendant to create the same. On the other hand, if there are materials to prove that only title deeds should have been produced, and the first defendant should have represented falsely or otherwise at later stage to oblige the bank, then taking the above averments alone, concluding that there was a mortgage by deposit of title deed or the first defendant had created an equitable mortgage as understood in law, may not be possible. In this context, we have to see the evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff. 14. Admittedly, the plaintiff bank has not produced even the so called certified copy of the title deed said to have been produced by the first defendant, to prove that the first defen­dant had deposited the same on 24.9.1986, thereby created an equitable mortgage with intention to do the same. The submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiff that it is not necessary, to produce the title deed at the time of the trial, and if at all they have to produce only at the time of the execution or when the amount is discharged in my consid­ered opinion, is not well founded and accept­able. Production of original document is also a piece of evidence to prove the equitable mortgage, and for the non-production, even adverse inference could be drawn. Unless the document is produced, whether it is certified copy or the original, as the case may be, it may not be possible for the Court to ascertain whether the property described in the plaint was the subject matter of the title deed. In case, if the property described in the title deed' is different from the property described in the plaint, then question of creating an equitable mortgage with respect to 'A' Schedule property may not arise for consideration. Viewing this case from this angle, in my considered opinion, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to produce the title deed to prove the equitable mortgage, whether it is a certified copy or otherwise, when the suit is filed based on equitable mortgage. 15. Viewing this case from this angle, in my considered opinion, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to produce the title deed to prove the equitable mortgage, whether it is a certified copy or otherwise, when the suit is filed based on equitable mortgage. 15. The entry in the register maintained by the plaintiff-bank alone would not serve the purpose of proving the creation of equitable mortgage, that too in this case, when inconsistent evidence is available regarding the deposit of title deed. If the plaint averments are to be taken as correct, then the documents produced on behalf of the plaintiff also must read that the document, which was deposited with the plaintiff-bank was not the original, whereas only the certified copy of the title deed alone was produced. Exhibit P.1 is the xerox copy of the extract of the Register of Title Deeds maintained by the plaintiff-bank. In this document, under the heading 'Particulars of Title Deeds", description of property, survey numbers and extent are given, in addition stating what are all the documents filed, which reads: "Sale deed dated 20.3.1978, E.C. dated 1.1.1978 to 1.8.1986, Legal opinion dated 11.8.1986. " In the second page, it is said, "Mr. Kanniappa Gramani residing at Madras called at the bank on 24.9.1986, deposited the title deeds covered under Survey No. 170/87 and 171/13 to the extent of 1.73 acres deposited to create a mortgage .........” In Exhibit P.1, no where it is stated that the document deposited by the plaintiff, is the certified copy of the title deed. A plain reading would indicate, that the original document itself might have been produced, since it is said sale deed dated 20.3.1978. The fact that the first defendant would not have deposited cer­tified copy of the title deed with an intention to create equitable mortgage is evident from the oral evidence of P.W.2. It is admitted by P.W.1 that in Exhibit P.1, it is not mentioned, whether the sale deed dated 20.3.1978 said to have been deposited with the bank was origi­nal or copy. P.W.1 also is not certain, what was actually deposited, in the absence of the document, which is said to have been depos­ited by the first defendant. 16. P.W.2 is the signatory to Exhibit P.1. He would admit during chief examination itself, that Kanniappa Gramani has deposited the documents mentioned in page Nos. P.W.1 also is not certain, what was actually deposited, in the absence of the document, which is said to have been depos­ited by the first defendant. 16. P.W.2 is the signatory to Exhibit P.1. He would admit during chief examination itself, that Kanniappa Gramani has deposited the documents mentioned in page Nos. 64 and 65 of Exhibit P. 1, which refers sale deed alone, not the certified copy of the sale deed. It is elicited from P. W. 2 during the cross examination that "I remember to have seen the original documents and mentioned the details in the register", thereby showing what is stated in Exhibit P. I regarding the sale deed is the original sale deed, not the certified copy of the sale deed. It is also admitted by P. W. 2 that he knew the differences between the original and the certified copies. In this view, it cannot be said, without understanding the meaning for original and the certified copy, he has given evidence. Since P. W. 2 has categorically admitted, that original document alone was produced, or he had seen the original, it is not known, how a contra case is pleaded in the plaint, as if certified copy of the title deed was deposited. As already indicated above, whether it is a certified copy or the original, that document is also not produced for the perusal of the Court. In view of the above inconsistent evidence, for the nonproduction of the document, I should conclude that the first defendant would not have deposited either original title deed or registration copy, with an intention to create an equitable mortgage, which shall follow, the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree against 'A' Schedule property, since failed to prove the creation of equitable mortgage. 17. Aid is sought from Exhibit P.4, to prove not only the confirmation of the loss of original title deed, but also for the creation of equitable mortgage by deposit of certified copy of the title deed. No evidence is available to show, what are all the precautions taken by the plaintiff-bank on 24.9.1986 to ascertain about the availability or non-availability of the original title deed. On the other hand, as indicated, Exhibit P.1 would say, sale deed is produced, meaning original document, not copy. No evidence is available to show, what are all the precautions taken by the plaintiff-bank on 24.9.1986 to ascertain about the availability or non-availability of the original title deed. On the other hand, as indicated, Exhibit P.1 would say, sale deed is produced, meaning original document, not copy. Even on 24.9.1986, if the original had been lost, informed by the first defendant to the bank, the plaintiff-bank should have insisted the first defendant, to file an affidavit on that date itself. It is not known why no such procedure was adopted. Probably it may be because of the reason that the original sale deed should have been produced at that time as spoken by P.W.2, not with an intention to create mortgage, but for some other purpose. If it is the case of the plaintiff-bank that on 24.9.1986, original sale deed was produced, but the same was misplaced by the bank and therefore, a copy was obtained in addition to the affidavit confirming the equitable mortgage, the consideration would have been different. But contrary to Exhibit P.1, the plaintiff has taken specific stand that on 24.9.1986 itself, certified copy alone was given, which appears to be, in all probabilities improbable and highly unbelievable. The fact that the third defendant has also admitted in the written statement that the first defendant informed him, about the loss of original title deed will not come to the aid of the plaintiff, to prove that even on 24.9.1986 itself, he had lost the title deed. Assuming that he had represented so, unless it is proved, that the copy of the document was deposited on 24.9.1986, with an intention to create the equitable mortgage, a preliminary decree cannot be passed against 'A' Schedule property. In this context, we have to see what is the right claimed by the third defendant. 18. All is not well with the plaintiff bank, could be seen from Exhibits P.2 and P.3, as well as Exhibit D1. Exhibit P.2 is the Encumbrance Certificate for the 'A' Schedule property, dated 7.8.1986 for the period 1.7.1978 to 1.8.1986. Admittedly, and as seen from Exhibit P.3, on 20.8.1984, the second defendant had purchased an extent of 0.45 cents, in Survey No.170/8 under the document No. 2037/1984. This document was obtained on 5.1.1993 and the period covered under the document is between January 1980 and January 1993, covering the period of Exhibit P.2 also. Admittedly, and as seen from Exhibit P.3, on 20.8.1984, the second defendant had purchased an extent of 0.45 cents, in Survey No.170/8 under the document No. 2037/1984. This document was obtained on 5.1.1993 and the period covered under the document is between January 1980 and January 1993, covering the period of Exhibit P.2 also. Since Exhibit P. 2 is for the period ending August 1986, since the second defendant had purchased the said 0.45 cents on 20.8.1984, it should come in Exhibit P.2. It is not known, under what circumstances, the document dated 20.8.1984 is omitted in Exhibit P.2. The third defendant purchased the property to an extent of 1.28 acres in Survey No.170/8 on 16.6.1987 i.e. after the alleged creation of the equitable mortgage on 24.9.1986. In this view alone, the third defendant, being the subsequent purchaser is liable to pay the mortgage amount, appears to be the case of the plaintiff. 19. Only after 16.6.19 87, Exhibit P.4 affidavit came into existence on 12.11.1987. In my considered opinion, knowing fully well that the first defendant had sold the property given as collateral security, not creating any equitable mortgage, the bank should have obtained Exhibit P.4, from the first defendant, as if he had deposited the certified copy of the title deed and confirmed the equitable mortgage on 12.11.1987. If it is the case of the plaintiff, that on the date of the alleged equitable mortgage viz., 24.9.1986 or within one or two days thereafter, the first defendant had executed Exhibit P.4 that could be accepted as genuine. But, as pointed out, after the property was sold by the first defendant, in favour of the third defendant, only in order to defeat the right of the purchaser, the first defendant would have obliged the bank to give Exhibit P.4 and placing reliance upon this document, though it is admitted by D.1, the rights of the defendants cannot be defeated, holding as if, on 24.9.1986, an equitable mortgage was created by the first defendant, that too considering the absence of the date of equitable mortgage in Exhibit P.4. 20. 20. The submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiff, that the defendants have failed to produce their sale deeds, will not strengthen the case of the plaintiff, since it is the duty of the plaintiff, to prove that there was deposit of title deed, with an intention to create an equitable mortgage. The mere entry in Exhibit P. 1, in the absence of the documents mentioned therein also, as indicated above, would go to show, that no document has been deposited with the plaintiff-bank, that too, for the purpose of creating equitable mortgage. For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the plaintiff has miserably failed, to prove the mortgage by deposit of title deed and in this view, against the 'A' Schedule property, the plaintiff is not entitled to any preliminary decree, answering these two issues accordingly. Issue No.1 21. The plaint is valued at Rs.1,98,486.07. At present, for this money claim, this Court has no original jurisdiction. Admittedly, the subject matter of the suit viz., hypothecation is outside the jurisdiction of this Court, since the property is situated at Vadakadumbadi Madurakkattuthangal Village, Chengalpattu, Taluk. Therefore, it was contended on behalf of the defendants, that this Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit. At the time of filing of the suit, as seen from the records, as per the order in A.No. 102/1996 dated 8.1.1993, leave was granted to the plaintiff, to file the suit and the said leave is not revoked by filing an application or otherwise. Therefore, at this belated stage, it is not open to the defendants, to question the jurisdiction of this Court. The submission of the learned counsel for the defendants, even without moving an application to revoke the leave granted, Jurisdiction could be questioned, even at the time of the trial, because of the admitted position that the suit property is outside the original jurisdiction of this Court, this Court cannot have the jurisdiction, appears to be not well founded. 22. The submission of the learned counsel for the defendants, even without moving an application to revoke the leave granted, Jurisdiction could be questioned, even at the time of the trial, because of the admitted position that the suit property is outside the original jurisdiction of this Court, this Court cannot have the jurisdiction, appears to be not well founded. 22. In Audcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. Daluate 2001 (4) CTC 39, the Apex Court has held, suit simpliciter for specific performance of contract for sale of land, is suit for enforcement of contract and title of land is not the subject matter of such suit, and this being the position, with the leave of the Court, a suit could be filed on the original side under Clause 12 of Letters Patent Act. The principle so enunciated could be made applicable to the present case also. In this case, the subject matter is recovery of money and not with reference to title to 'A' Schedule property. It is the case of the plaintiff, that 'A' Schedule property was hypothecated with the plaintiff-bank by an equitable mortgage. Here, the Court is not expected to decide title to land and if at all the Court has to decide whether that land was mortgaged, with the plaintiff-bank. Therefore, in my considered opinion, obtaining leave, the suit filed by the plaintiff before the original side of this Court, is well maintainable. 23. The case of Thamiraparani Investments Pvt. Ltd. v. Meta Films Pvt. Ltd. 2006 (1) CTC 270 relied on by the learned counsel for the defendants, is factually not applicable to the present case. In the case involved in the above decision, the suit was aimed for the purpose of acquiring possession or safeguarding possession, since the suit was filed seeking permanent injunction. Therefore, the First Bench of this Court has held, on the basis of Audcon Electronics Private Limited (supra), if a suit is for determination of title of land or suit for possession of land, since it would directly affect title to, or possession of, land, the suit could be filed only in the Court in which jurisdiction, the land is situated. As said above, no relief touching the title to the 'A' Schedule Property is sought for in this case, except a preliminary decree, which is based upon the money transaction, for which it is said 'A'. As said above, no relief touching the title to the 'A' Schedule Property is sought for in this case, except a preliminary decree, which is based upon the money transaction, for which it is said 'A'. Schedule property was given as security. 24. In Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd. AIR 2005 SC 4446: 2005 (7) SCC 791 , the Apex Court has not considered the effect of Clause 12 of Letters Patent, whereas it has considered only Section 16 of C. P. C. and held that the suit should have been filed in a Court within whose jurisdiction the immovable property situates. But in our case, as said above, invoking Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, leave obtained and a Division Bench of this. Court has also held such cases could be tried by this Court alone. 25. In Southern Petrochemical Industries Corporation Ltd. v. Durga Iron Works & Ors., 1995 (2) CTC 602 , a Division Bench of this Court, has held that suit for recovery of money by enforcement of mortgage does not involve determination of title to land or decree for possession of land and such a suit is well maintainable before this Court, which is followed by another Division Bench of this Court in Central Bank of India v. Joseph 1997 (2) CTC 1 . In the case involved in the latter decision, a question has arisen, where a mortgage suit filed in the High Court by obtaining leave, because the cause of action partly arose within the High Court's territorial limit, though the mortgage Was outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, whether the City Civil Court had jurisdiction to try such suit, because of the monetary limit and in view of the further fact, the properties mortgaged are outside the territorial jurisdiction of the City Civil Court. It is held that the City Civil Court has no territorial jurisdiction. For the above reasons, it is concluded, that this Court has jurisdiction to try the suit. It is held that the City Civil Court has no territorial jurisdiction. For the above reasons, it is concluded, that this Court has jurisdiction to try the suit. The result, therefore is, there will be a decree in a sum of Rs.1,98,486.07 with interest thereon at 6% per annum from the date of plaint till the date of realisation in favour of the plaintiff, as against the first defendant and in respect of 'B' & 'C' Schedule properties alone, as prayed for, with costs; dismissing the claim of the plaintiff against defendants 2 & 3 and 'A' Schedule property, without costs. Time for payment three months. Ordered accordingly.