Judgment :- Wife/petitioner filed this petition, for divorce under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (hereinafter called the Act) on the grounds of adultery, coupled with cruelty. 2. Facts necessary in brief, to dispose of the case, as narrated by the petitioner: (a) The marriage between the petitioner and the respondent was solemnised according to the Christian rites and customs on 11.12.1984 at Annai Velankanni, Besant Nagar, Chennai 600 090. At the time of the marriage, the petitioner and the respondent were the students of Madras Medical College. Since both of them fell in love, the marriage was conducted without the con­sent of their respective parents. (b) The respondent discontinued his studies in 1985, whereas the petitioner completed her course and started her general practice as Doctor in 1986. Out of their wedlock, the petitioner gave birth to two female chil­dren. Because of the unemployment of the respondent and his mingling with bad company, the petitioner's parents permitted them to live in the flat belonging to the mother of the petitioner. The respondent, who had started an export business was de­tained at Trivandrum under COFEPOSA for a period of 14 months for smuggling gold. Because of the promises given by the respondent to mend his ways, this petitioner with the help of her mother, bailed out the respondent on 21.4.1996. (c) The respondent was always suspicious of the petitioner's conduct and even went to the extent of checking whether the peti­tioner had male patients or if any medical representatives came to her clinic, which was however ignored by this petitioner. The respondent had developed a friendship with another detenu who had been released earlier than the respondent. The respondent entertained suspicion and felt that the peti­tioner had developed a relationship with that man, thereby causing mental cruelty. On 26.5.1996, the respondent attempted to strangulate the petitioner preceded by a petty quarrel, causing insecurity for her life and children, which resulted in this petitioner leaving her matrimonial home, reaching her parents' house. Thereafter, based upon some understandings on 5.6.1996, there was an agreement and pursuant to the same, the petitioner returned to the matrimonial home. Even thereafter, i.e. on 21.8.1987, the respondent physically as well as verbally assaulted and abused the petitioner, unable to bear the same, the petitioner was compelled to return to her parents' house. Thereafter, based upon some understandings on 5.6.1996, there was an agreement and pursuant to the same, the petitioner returned to the matrimonial home. Even thereafter, i.e. on 21.8.1987, the respondent physically as well as verbally assaulted and abused the petitioner, unable to bear the same, the petitioner was compelled to return to her parents' house. (d) The respondent took away the children from the petitioner and put them in a boarding school, at Ooty in order to give trouble to the petitioner. In order to secure the children, this petitioner filed an application, before this Court and obtained custody, wherein visiting rights also have been given to the respondent. When the respondent came to the house to see the children, he used to interact with the petitioner and in that course, he has also convinced the petitioner as if he was a changed person. Therefore, considering the future of the children, both began to live together from August 2000 at Indra Nagar. But the respondent, who had not changed his attitude, began accusing the petitioner and in fact in the month of November, he physically abused the petitioner in the presence of the children. (e) On 30.11.2000, the respondent began boasting that he had love affairs, with other lady doctors, informed further that one such affair is still going on. When the petitioner insisted for more particulars, the respondent hit the petitioner and forced her to go out of the house, for which a police complaint also has been given, followed by the return of the petitioner to the parental home. In spite of many chances being given to the respondent, to mend his ways, he continued to abuse and man handle the petitioner and under the said circumstances, she was forced to leave the matrimonial home on 3.12‑2000. The respondent's behaviour and conduct amount to cruelty and on the abovesaid grounds, the petitioner is entitled to a decree for divorce, on the ground of adultery coupled with cruelty. 3. The respondent's case in brief­: (a) The petitioner has not given, even one name or address about the adultery said to have been committed by this respondent naming anybody and in this view, the peti­tion filed under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act is not maintainable. 3. The respondent's case in brief­: (a) The petitioner has not given, even one name or address about the adultery said to have been committed by this respondent naming anybody and in this view, the peti­tion filed under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act is not maintainable. When the wife files a petition for dissolution of mar­riage, basing mainly on the ingredients of adultery, in the absence of specific allega­tions, regarding adultery, naming the per­son, with whom this respondent was living an adulterous life, the petition is not legally maintainable. (b) The petitioner and the respondent were college mates and because of the love developed between them, their marriage took place as admitted. This respondent, though discontinued the course, was running a clinic with the petitioner and other doctors. In the year 1953, this respondent started an Ex Port business and the turnover was Rs.80 lakhs. Though the petitioner was detained under the COFEPOSA, no criminal case is pending, against the respondent. When this respondent was detained, true, the mother of the petitioner originally helped the respondent to come out on bail, but later on, they withdrew their sureties with an intention to put the respondent in trouble, both mentally and physically. (c) This respondent has not abused the petitioner using vulgar language and he never ill‑treated her also. Padmakumar, co‑detenu of this respondent became friendly with the respondent's family. The petitioner had parted with so many things as ostensible among them are Rs.40,000/and two pairs of bangles. According to the petitioner, for her mental pleasure and calmness, which she derived when she spoke to Padmakumar, the telephone bill swelled to Rs.9,000/‑ and the time they ad the conversation is between 11.00 p. m. and 1.00 a.m. Padmakumar used to visit the parental house of the petitioner and the parents of the petitioner also encouraged the relationship between the petitioner and Padmakumar. When Padmakumar came to Madras, the petitioner took a room at Hotel Moubarys, T.T.K. Road and she visited him in the hotel several times. If necessary, the respondent will submit more details and particulars regarding the relationship of the petitioner and Padmakumar. Even now the petitioner is having close contact with Padmakumar by correspondence and phone calls. When the petitioner went to Madurai for training in July 2000, she met Padmakumar at Madurai. If necessary, the respondent will submit more details and particulars regarding the relationship of the petitioner and Padmakumar. Even now the petitioner is having close contact with Padmakumar by correspondence and phone calls. When the petitioner went to Madurai for training in July 2000, she met Padmakumar at Madurai. (d) The petitioner and the respondent last resided together on 27.1.1997 and thereafter, he did not have any sexual connection with the petitioner. On information on 28.9.2000, the respondent rushed to the Chennai Kaliappa Hospital to see the petitioner where she was admitted. The diagnosis was "incomplete abortion". Considering the future of the children, the respondent was prepared to lead a marital life with the petitioner forgetting the past. If the fact of abortion during the separation is known to relations and others, the children also will be mentally affected. Taking into consideration all these things, the respondent began to live with the petitioner only after 4.10.2000, since the separation on 27.1.1997. Suppressing the above facts, including the abortion, the petitioner has filed this application as if she was subjected to cruelty, though he had not spoken about the abortion. (e) This respondent never attempted to strangulate the petitioner nor assaulted physically or verbally at any point of time. At the request of the petitioner and the undertaking given by her, this respondent signed in the agreement in five papers. The petitioner quarrelled and left the matrimonial home only for the purpose of attending the clinic run by her father. The other allegations, in the petition are denied specifically. In view of the fact that this respondent has not committed any cruelty, the petitioner is not entitled to divorce on the ground of cruelty, coupled with adultery. Hence he prays, the petition may be dismissed with costs. 4. On the above pleadings, on 31.7.2001, the following issues were framed for trial. 1. Whether the petitioner is entitled for dissolution of marriage solemnized between her and the respondent on 11.12.1984 by decree of divorce for adultery and cruelty as alleged by the petitioner? 2. To what relief the petitioner is entitled to? Issue No. I 5. The petitioner originally belonged to Hindu Religion, whereas the respondent belongs to Christian Community. Both were doing their medical course as college mates, in the Madras Medical College elsewhere in 1984 or even prior to that. 2. To what relief the petitioner is entitled to? Issue No. I 5. The petitioner originally belonged to Hindu Religion, whereas the respondent belongs to Christian Community. Both were doing their medical course as college mates, in the Madras Medical College elsewhere in 1984 or even prior to that. Admittedly, both had love affairs of their choice and it seems they have decided to marry irrespective of the religion. But, retaining the religion as such, their marriage was not performed, whereas after conversion of the petitioner, as Christian, their marriage was solemnised on 11.12.1984, not in dispute. Both of them lived together happily or otherwise, without much problems till 27.1.1997 and gave birth to two female children also. On 28.1.1997, the petitioner left the matrimonial home for the reasons best known to the parties and thereafter, because of the intervention of well wishers or otherwise, there was reunion on and from 4.10.2000. The reunion also survived only for a short period and finally the petitioner left the matrimonial home on 3.12.2000. From the said date onwards, they are living separately, though they have married despite the objections of the parents, on their own, loving each other. At present, the two female children, of the parties, are with the petitioner and of course, the respondent is having visiting rights, which we are not very much concerned, in this case. 6. The petitioner, who loved the respondent and married him, against the wishes of her parents, who brought her to a better position, admitting her in medical college, is unable to continue the married life, with the respondent happily, resulting in this petition for divorce, on the ground of adultery coupled with cruelty. 7. The respondent opposes the application contending that he is not living in adultery with alone anybody and therefore, the relief sought for on the ground of adultery coupled with cruelty is not maintainable. The further defence of the respondent is that he never assaulted her physically or mentally causing physical or mental cruelty, as the case may be and in fact, he is willing to live with the petitioner even forgetting the arrogant attitude of the wife, for the welfare of the two female children, whose future is very much concerned. 8. The further defence of the respondent is that he never assaulted her physically or mentally causing physical or mental cruelty, as the case may be and in fact, he is willing to live with the petitioner even forgetting the arrogant attitude of the wife, for the welfare of the two female children, whose future is very much concerned. 8. Under the Act originally, wife is not entitled to maintain a petition for divorce on the ground of cruelty alone, whereas it should be coupled with adultery. This petition was filed on 9.2.2001 before the Divorce Act, 1869 was amended under Act 51 of 2001 with effect from 3.10.2001. Under the amended Act, a petition for divorce could be maintained either by the husband or the wife for dissolution of marriage on the ground of adultery or on the ground of cruelty and it is not necessary that both should be coupled with. Under Section 6 of the Act, all suits and proceedings in cases and matters matrimonial, when the Act came into force, shall be dealt with and decided by the Court as if the same was filed originally under this Act viz., amended Act. Therefore, at present, to maintain a petition for divorce by the wife, it is not necessary that there should be adultery coupled with cruelty. Realising this position, the petitioner has not let in any evidence regarding the adultery alleged against the husband, as alleged in para 7 of the petition. As rightly pointed out in the counter, except general accusation or allegations, no specific instance is pleaded naming the woman also with whom the respondent resided, leading to the conclusion that he should have led an adulterous life. Only after the filing of this petition on 9.2.2001, the amended Act came into force on 3.10.2001. Therefore, even in the absence of adultery pleaded, not proved, the petition could be decided for dissolution of marriage, on merit on the around of cruelty. 9. It is for the petitioner at the first instance to prove the cruelty, which are to be classified under two headings viz., physical and mental cruelty. To prove the physical cruelty, there are' allegations, and the interested oral testimony of PW1, which is sought to be supported by the another interested oral testimony of PW2, who is the mother of PW1. To prove the physical cruelty, there are' allegations, and the interested oral testimony of PW1, which is sought to be supported by the another interested oral testimony of PW2, who is the mother of PW1. We find no other evidence, such as, neighbours coming to the Court, speaking about the quarrel, which had taken place between the spouses, though inside the house, which came to light, when the petitioner left the matrimonial home etc., exposing the inside acts. However, if the oral evidence of PW1 regarding the physical violence suffered by her is supported by other attending circumstances. It could also be taken for consideration to grant the relief. 10. In deciding the cruelty, whether it is mental or physical the status of the parties in the society, their brought up, the family background, their educational qualifications, their image in the eyes of others, etc. should be generally remembered. For ordinary people, an accusing word or an utterance of wounding word, may not cause any mental cruelty since they might be accustomed because of their status and surroundings, whereas the same would cause mental cruelty to other section of the people depending upon their family background, way of living, the status they have commanded in the society, as indicated, even warranting different standard of assessment, but not discriminating. 11. Admittedly as disclosed in the counter filed by the respondent, also in some other petition (Ex.R4), the petitioner belongs to a reputed family, her father being a renowned Urologist, her junior paternal uncle being the DGP of Tamil Nadu Police and other relatives also being well educated, employed, having recognition in the society. In the ordinary course, if the petitioner had not married this respondent, who is a native of Sri Lanka, the parents of the petitioner would have settled her in a better position, because of their position and status, which they have commanded. However, the petitioner due to her age or be­ cause of the attraction she had over the respon­dent, went against the wishes of her parents her relatives and had even determined to leave the paternal home in order to marry the re­spondent that too after converting herself, into Christianity. It appears, even after the mar­riage, as reported, the petitioner and the re­spondent have faced many problems, in leading a normal life. It appears, even after the mar­riage, as reported, the petitioner and the re­spondent have faced many problems, in leading a normal life. Without the support of the petitioner's family members, the peti­tioner was, able to withstand all the fury and lived with the respondent for 13 years, detri­ment even to her future, which would go to show, the deep‑rooted affection she had with the respondent and even the attempt of the parents of the petitioner to separate the peti­tioner and the respondent also ended in vain as disclosed in Ex R4. When she was able to withstand all the fury and problems till 1997, she was unable to continue that joint living, with the husband after 1997. Therefore, a question would arise, why the petitioner, who had more or less deserted the family originally for the sake of‑her love, to marry the respon­dent, left the matrimonial home; and the an­swer should be, generally, because the deep‑rooted love is uprooted by the conduct of the respondent 'otherwise, there would not have been any necessity, for this petitioner to leave the matrimonial home, join the parental home, seeking protection under the wings of the parents. 12. At the age of 40, ordinarily she cannot have a fresh life also, though there may be exceptions. Since the petitioner had left the matrimonial home, despite all these facts, having two daughters, one is major at that time, then the reason must be unavoidable compulsion, and in my judgment that unavoidable compulsion must be the cruelty meted out by her at the hands of the respondent. On the abovesaid presumption and assumption, con­sidering the status of the petitioner alone, it may not be safe to say with certainty that only because of the cruelty inflicted by the respon­dent, the petitioner would have left the matri­monial home, whereas it requires legal proof also under law. If the legal proof is made available or shown to be available, then cou­pled with the above attending circumstances, the Court could say, with certainty and unhesi­tatingly that the petitioner suffered cruelty in the hands of the respondent and that is the reason why she left the matrimonial home, at this age, unmindful of the consequences. In this context we have to see the meaning for cruelty, as stated in the relevant provisions of law and as defined by the Courts. 13. In this context we have to see the meaning for cruelty, as stated in the relevant provisions of law and as defined by the Courts. 13. Section 10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act reads: "Any marriage solemnised, whether before or after the commencement of the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001, may, on a petition presented to the District Court either by the husband or the wife, be dissolved on the ground that since the solemnisation of the marriage the respondent: (i) *** (ii) *** (x) has treated the petitioner with such cru­elty as to cause a reasonable apprehension meaning, in the mind of the petitioner that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the respondent.� The legislators have not defined cruelty in the Act, consciously because of the fact, it cannot be defined with certainty, since the form of cruelty and sufferings thereon, may vary depending upon the person and the family status, as indicated above. 14. Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act empowers, either the husband or the wife to move a petition for divorce on the ground that the other party has, after the solemnisation of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty. 15. By reading these two provisions, we find some difference also. In the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, no expanded meaning is given, for cruelty, except saying, 'the other party treated the petitioner with cruelty'. On the other hand, the Divorce Act, 1869 would say that such cruelty must be as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner, that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the respondent. 16. While giving meaning to the word 'Cruelty' available in Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, the Courts have consistently held, that the cruelty must be of such a nature, the normal living may not be possible and it is not necessary that mental cruelty may cause injury to healthy life. Sometimes mental cruelty is far more damaging than physical cruelty, because of the fact mental cruelty continues to hurt all along, whereas the physical cruelty such as assault causing abrasion may disappear or vanish after sometime as per the sayings of Saint Thiruvalluvar Tamil meaning, "The injury resulting from a burn heals; but not the ugly scar that is caused by an offending word". 17. 17. In the Indian Penal Code, we can find some definition for cruelty under Section 498A, since that offence also relates to matrimonial cause. Aid can be sought for, from that definition also, which is given as explanation as follows: “cruelty" means- any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman." The amendment introduced in Section 10 of the Divorce Act appears, to be based upon the rulings of the Courts, under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act also. Though the above acts deal with the people of different religions, the fact remains, that all are human beings, subject to same kind of feelings, especially in the matrimonial causes. Therefore the law laid down by the Apex Court, under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, could be made applicable to this case also, as far as cruelty is concerned, subject to facts and circumstances of the case. 18. In Shoba Rani v. Madhukar Reddy AIR 1988 SC 121 , the Apex Court, has, given meaning for 'cruelty' and it reads: 'The word “cruelty" has not been defined and could not have been defined. It has been used in relation to human conduct or human behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. It is a course of conduct of one which is adversely affecting the other. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. There may be cases where the conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then the impact or the injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted." The Apex Court has also taken into account, the marked changes in the life around us and the way of living from house to house and held further: "There has been a marked change in the life around us. In matrimonial duties and responsibilities in particular, there is a sea change. They are of varying degrees from house to house or person to person. In matrimonial duties and responsibilities in particular, there is a sea change. They are of varying degrees from house to house or person to person. Therefore, when a spouse makes a complaint about the treatment of cruelty by the partner in life or relations, the Court should not search for standard of life. A set of facts stigmatised as cruelty in one case may be so in another case. The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions. It may also depend upon their culture and human values to which they attach importance. The Judges and lawyers, therefore, should not import their own notions of life. Judges may not go in parallel with them. There may be a generation gap between the Judges and the parties. It would be better if the Judges keep aside their customs and manners. It would be also better if Judges less depend upon precedents. " Thus concluding they have ruled: "The cruelty as a ground for dissolution of marriage if not admitted requires to be proved on the preponderance of probabilities as in civil cases and not beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases." Therefore, the Court cannot expect, meticulous particulars as well as arithmetic accuracy of evidence, in proving the cruelty alleged in the petition, since the cruelty is attributed to the behaviour of the respondent, which had taken place within four walls, when they were living as husband and wife. 19. A husband and wife in any family certainly will have some problems in the day‑to‑day life due to their avocation or even due to problems which had arisen in the family, causing some kind of irritation depending upon their sensitiveness. That kind of wear and tear should not be ordinarily taken into consideration as if that amounted to cruelty, paving way to snap the matrimonial relationship, causing damage to the matrimonial institutions. This aspect was liberally considered by the Apex Court in Savithri Pandey v. Prem Chand Pandey 2002 (2) SCC 73 , wherein, it is held: "Cruelty for the purpose of the Act means where one spouse has‑so treated the other and manifested such feelings towards her or him as to have inflicted bodily injury, or to have caused reasonable apprehension of bodily injury, suffering or to have injured health. Cruelty may be physical or mental. Cruelty may be physical or mental. Mental cruelty is the conduct of other spouse which causes mental suffering or fear to the matrimonial life of the other. "Cruelty", therefore, postulates a treatment of the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in his or her mind that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the other party. Cruelty, however, has to be distinguished from the ordinary wear and tear of family life. It cannot be decided on the basis of the sensitivity of the petitioner and has to be adjudged on the basis of the course of conduct which would, in general, be dangerous for a spouse to live with the other. " 20. In G.V.N. Kameswara Rao v. G. Jabilli (2002) 2 SCC 296 a criminal complaint was lodged before the police, alleging that the wife was beaten by the husband and his mother. The husband and his mother were called to police station and made to wait for more than 10 hours on false allegations, which was considered as 'cruelty' by the Apex Court. In para, 11 of the judgment, a decision rendered in N.G. Dasthane (Dr.) v. S. Dasthane AIR 1975 SC 1534 was also discussed, wherein, it is said as follows: "We do not propose to spend time on the trifles of their married life. Numerous inci­dents have been cited by the appellant as constituting cruelty but the simple trivialities which can truly be described as the rea­sonable wear and tear of married life have to be ignored. It is in the context of such trivialities that one says that spouses take each other for better or worse. In many marriages each party can, if it so wills, dis­cover many a cause for complaint but such grievances arise mostly from temperamen­tal disharmony. Such disharmony or in­ compatibility is not cruelty and will not furnish a cause for the dissolution of mar­riage. In many marriages each party can, if it so wills, dis­cover many a cause for complaint but such grievances arise mostly from temperamen­tal disharmony. Such disharmony or in­ compatibility is not cruelty and will not furnish a cause for the dissolution of mar­riage. We will, therefore, have regard only to, grave and weighty incidents and consider these to find what place they occupy on the marriage canvas." In the said judgment itself, viz., G.V.N. Kameswara Rao (supra), in para 15, a decision in V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat (1994) 1 SCC 337 is affirmed, which reads: "While arriving at such conclusion, regard must be had to the social status, educational level of the parties, the society they move in, the possibility or otherwise of the parties ever living together in case they are already living apart and all other relevant facts and circumstances which it is neither possible nor desirable to set out exhaustively. What is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in another case. It is a matter to be determined in each case having regard to the facts and circumstances of that case. If it is a case of accusations and allegations, regard must also be had to the context in which they were made. 21. In A. Jayachandra v. Aneel kaur (2005) 2 SCC 22 , the Apex Court had an occasion to consider, a love marriage between the co‑students in a medical college, as that of this case, and taking into account that the marriage has broken down irretrievably, whether a decree for divorce can be granted, though the irretrievable breaking of marriage is not one of statutory grounds on which the Court can direct dissolution of marriage. However, considering the relationship between the husband and wife, where there is no possibility of re union, the Apex Court has said, with a view do complete justice and shorten the agony parties engaged in long drawn legal battle, directed dissolution of marriage. 22. However, considering the relationship between the husband and wife, where there is no possibility of re union, the Apex Court has said, with a view do complete justice and shorten the agony parties engaged in long drawn legal battle, directed dissolution of marriage. 22. In the light of the above settled position law, by sufficient materials, if it is shown there was cruelty causing reasonable apprehension in the mind of petitioner, that it is possible for the petitioner to live with the respondent, dissolution of the marriage could granted, not only on the ground of cruelty, also as ruled by the Apex Court, taking consideration of the fact, the marriage, between these two, irretrievably has broken down, reaching the point of no return. 23. It is an admitted position that the respondent was detained twice under COFEPOSA. One Padmakumar was the co‑detenu along with respondent when he was in Trivandrum Jail. The said Padmakumar had been released earlier than the respondent. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent had felt that the Petitioner had developed relationship with that Padmakumar, followed by quarrel, even at­ tempting to strangulate her on 26.5.1996. To the abovesaid effect evidence has been given by PW1. The case so pleaded and spoken by PW1 is admitted by the respondent, which could be seen from Para 14 of the counter, which reads: "It is submitted that during the period of detention one of the persons detained under COFEPOSA along with the respondent by name Padmakumar M became friendly in mildest, the petitioner had parted with so many things as ostensible among them is Rs.40,000/- and two pairs of bangles, the telephone bill wherein the petitioner had spoken to Mr. Padmakumar according to her own statement for her mental pleasure and calmness which she derived when she spoke to the said Padmakumar is about nearly Rs.9,000/‑ and ‑the timing is between 11 p.m. to 1 a.m. It is submitted that the said Padmakumar used to visit the parental house of the petitioner encouraged the relationship between the petitioner and Padmakumar. Whenever the said Pad­makumar is at Madras he used to have lunch and dinner in the petitioner's house. Whenever the said Pad­makumar is at Madras he used to have lunch and dinner in the petitioner's house. When Padmakumar came to Madras for the first time, the petitioner booked a room at Hotel Moubrays TTK Road, Chennai for him along with a female staff nurse who is in MARC II clinic of the petitioner's father and visited him in the hotel several times. The respondent submits that he will submit more details and particulars regarding the relationship of the petitioner along with the said Padmakumar. The respondent does not want to divulge all the matters now taking into consideration the future of the children. If necessity arises for the respondent to file a petition for divorce, this respondent Will give more particulars that the petitioner is living in adultery. (emphasis supplied) 24. This is not for the first time, the abovesaid allegations are levelled by the respondent against the petitioner‑wife, and even in the previous occasion also, the same kind of allegations were levelled. After the dispute arose between the spouses, admittedly, the respondent took the children from the custody of the wife and admitted them in a school at Ooty. The petitioner, in order to get the custody of the children, had filed a petition before this Court in OP No.382 of 1997 in which the respondent had filed a detailed counter, which is Ex.R4, wherein also in Para 17, we find the same kind of allegations imputed more or less unchastely, questioning her fidelity as if she was having some kind of relationship with the said Padmakumar. The fact that the respondent has stated in this counter, that if necessity arises for him to file a petition for divorce he will give more Particulars that the petitioner is living in adultery would suggest, undoubtedly, that he had entertained not only suspicion about the conduct or morality of the wife, but he, also asserted in his own way, that the petitioner is living in adultery. But when he was cross‑examined with reference to the above allegations, he would state 'I never suspected that the petitioner had any relationship with the said Padmakumar. He has deposed further, that the statements made by him in the counter are not correct. If the allegations are levelled without any intention, to insult or hurt the feeling of the wife, it may not be twice, meaning repeatedly. He has deposed further, that the statements made by him in the counter are not correct. If the allegations are levelled without any intention, to insult or hurt the feeling of the wife, it may not be twice, meaning repeatedly. In the OP No.328 of 1997 as well as in this counter also, the respondent had asserted the relationship between the petitioner and Padmakumar, which would suggest, that he had not only doubted about fidelity and chastity of the wife, but also entertained a deep doubt unerasably and that is why, he has asserted that even he could give more particulars. The above allegations levelled by the respondent, which are sought to be disowned by him, at the time of the cross examination, as rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, certainly would amount to mental cruelty, considering her status and the family background and the love and affection, which she had with the respondent, which are shattered and shaken by him. 25. The learned counsel for the petitioner at this juncture inviting my attention to a case reported in Vijaykumar Rachandra Bhate v. Neela Vijaykumar Bhate 2003 (4) LW 609 would submit that the character assassination of the wife made by the husband in the written statement will certainly constitute mental cruelty for sustaining her claim for divorce under Section 10 of the Divorce Act. 26. In the case involved in the above decision, accusations made, were unconditionally withdrawn, by filing an application for amendment and the amendments were actually carried out. Because of the subsequent stand taken by the husband in that, case, withdrawing the averments regarding the character assassination, it was urged that those allegations must be considered to have never been on record and not available for being referred or relied upon for any purpose. Considering the above factual position, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held, that levelling disgusting accusations of unchastity and indecent familiarity with a person outside wedlock is a grave assault on the character of the wife and the allegations are per se cruel in nature, that would amount, the husband had treated the wife causing reasonable apprehension that it would be dangerous for her to live with the husband. In para 7 of the judgment, it is observed: "The question that requires to be answered first is as to whether the averments, accusations and character assassination of the wife by the appellant husband in the written statement constitutes mental cruelty for sustaining the claim for divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act. The position of law in this regard has come to be well‑settled and declared that levelling disgusting accusations of unchastity and indecent familiarity with a person outside wedlock and allegations of extra‑marital relationship is a grave assault on the character, honour, reputation, status as well as the health of the wife. Such aspersions of perfidiousness attributed to the wife, viewed in the context of an educated Indian wife and judged by Indian conditions and, standards would amount to worst form of insult and cruelty, sufficient by itself to substantiate cruelty in law, warranting the claim of the wife being allowed. That such allegations made in the written statement or suggested in the course of examination and by way of cross‑examination satisfy the requirement of law has also come to be firmly laid down by this Court. On going through the relevant portions of such allegations, we find that no exception could be taken to the findings recorded by the Family Court as well as the High Court. We find that they are of such quality, magnitude and consequence as to cause mental pain, agony and suffering amounting to the reformulated concept of cruelty in matrimonial law causing profound and lasting disruption and driving the wife to feel deeply hurt and reasonably apprehend that it would be dangerous for her to live with a husband who was taunting her like that and rendered the maintenance of matrimonial home impossible. " The above dictum is, squarely applicable to the present, case also in view of the accusations leveled by the respondent not only in this counter, but also in Ex.R4. 27. It is an admitted fact that on 28.9.2000, the petitioner Was admitted in Chennai Kaltappa Hospital for treatment and, discharged on 29.9.2000. In the petition it is averred that the petitioner and the respondent began living to­gether on and from August 2000 in the peti­tioner's mother's house, later alleging that the respondent reverted to his old days and began accusing the petitioner of having affairs. In the petition it is averred that the petitioner and the respondent began living to­gether on and from August 2000 in the peti­tioner's mother's house, later alleging that the respondent reverted to his old days and began accusing the petitioner of having affairs. As far as the fact that the petitioner has been ad­mitted in the hospital on 28.9.2000 is not specifically stated in the petition, though it would read, she rejoined the respondent in October 2000, thereby in a way, pleading that they were living for sometime together from August 2000 also. In the counter, the respondent has stated, even it could be said against the reality, that "the petitioner and the respondent last resided together on 27.1.1997. Thereafter, the respondent did not have any sexual connection with the petitioner", thereby meaning if the petitioner had conceived, he is not responsible and it must be due to adulterous life practised by the petitioner. In the discharge summary, Ex P7, it is stated "incomplete abortion". Taking advantage of this fact, in para 21 of the counter, the respondent would say impliedly that he is not at all responsible for the conceivement leading to abortion, whether it is factually correct or not. Further in para 22 of the counter, the respondent has stated "the respondent did not want the name of the petitioner to be spoiled", further asserting in para 23 "as already submitted that this respondent pardoned the petitioner and never spoke anything about abortion". 28. PW1 would state that from August 2000 both of them were living in the mother's house jointly and in the month of October, they have moved to a separate flat along with the children, not seriously challenged erasably. Therefore the averment in the counter that there was no connection between the petitioner and the respondent from 27.1.1997 to 4.10.2000 must be false, invented to impute unchastity to the petitioner. Therefore, assuming that there was incomplete abortion, the respondent must be the cause for the conceivement and screening the same, a case has been projected by the respondent, as if he had no sexual connection with the petitioner thereby impliedly saying that he is not the cause for the conceivement which certainly would amount to cruelty. 29. Therefore, assuming that there was incomplete abortion, the respondent must be the cause for the conceivement and screening the same, a case has been projected by the respondent, as if he had no sexual connection with the petitioner thereby impliedly saying that he is not the cause for the conceivement which certainly would amount to cruelty. 29. The above averments in the counter though disowned, when the respondent was in the box, that would suggest, the respondent had not only doubted about the morality of the petitioner, but also doubted about her chastity. If these allegations are read together with the averments found in para 14 of the counter, the irresistible conclusion that could be drawn by any Court of law must be, that the respondent had entertained a doubt about the chastity of the wife and this being the proved position, then compelling her to live with the respondent, refusing to dissolve the marriage would amount to further cruelty to her and in my judgment, that should be avoided granting dissolution of marriage, concluding, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, that the respondent had committed cruelty on the basis of the above allegations. 30. The pardon or excuse pleaded in the counter is not to have a fresh lease of life forgetting the misdeed of the petitioner, if any, whereas the respondent claims to be magnanimous to forgive the acts of the petitioner only for the benefit of the children, thereby still having doubt in his mind about the adulterous life (if any) of the petitioner with somebody. On the basis of the above two proved incidents, I conclude that the petitioner suffered mental cruelty by the utterance of the respondent/husband and therefore, on the ground of cruelty, the petitioner is entitled to get a divorce, since this gives reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it may not be safe for her to live with the respondent any more. 31. It is the specific case of the petitioner that on 26.5.1996, the respondent tried to strangulate her after a petty quarrel, which resulted in the petitioner leaving the matrimonial home, fearing for her life and the safety of the children. 31. It is the specific case of the petitioner that on 26.5.1996, the respondent tried to strangulate her after a petty quarrel, which resulted in the petitioner leaving the matrimonial home, fearing for her life and the safety of the children. Another incident reported is that when the petitioner insisted that the respondent should inform in detail about the person with whom the respondent is having affairs, he hit the petitioner, forced her out of the house, for which a police complaint was also given. It is further pleaded in para 8, that in spite of chances which were given to the respondent to mend himself, he continued to abuse and manhandle the petitioner and therefore, the behaviour of the respondent amounts to cruelty. True, in the counter, all the incidents are denied, but the fact that the petitioner went to the police station and gave a complaint, is admitted (vide para 20 of the counter). The petitioner and the respondent were living admittedly for some time in the flat owned by the petitioner's mother. When the house was locked, he broke open and entered into the premises is the case of the petitioner and not only that a suit has also been filed in O.S. No.779 of 2000 on the file of the City Civil Court for injunction. The suit is also admitted. The above facts are proved by satisfactory and convincing oral evidence of PW1 supported by PW2. PW2 being the mother of the petitioner would have received message from the daughter, which is quite natural. PW1 would state that on 25.6.1996, the respondent picked up a quarrel with her and tried to strangulate her and because of the conduct of the respondent, she had to rush to her parents' house for the safety of the children. The agreement thereafter, entered on 5.6.1996 also would suggest that the evidence given by PW1 regarding the physical violence lashed by the respondent against the petitioner must be true. PW1 has also stated that on 2.12.2000 also, there was physical violence in the presence of the children, which compelled her to go once again to her mother's place. Because of the ill‑treatment and unbearable torture given by the respondent alone, an educated woman having reputed family background was constrained and compelled even to go to police station to protect her. Because of the ill‑treatment and unbearable torture given by the respondent alone, an educated woman having reputed family background was constrained and compelled even to go to police station to protect her. The conduct of the respondent, as spoken to by PW1, which has to be accepted, should come within the meaning of even physical cruelty. Assuming that the physical cruelty is not made out, I do not find any reason to negative the claim of the petitioner regarding the mental cruelty, which is proved with all probabilities, supported by attending circumstances, thereby showing their marriage life has gone to the extent of point of no return or irretrievably broken down. In the light of the above discussion, the plaintiff is entitled for 'dissolution of marriage. Hence this issue is answered accordingly. Issue No. 2 The result, therefore is, the petition is allowed, without costs, dissolving the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent which was solemnised on 11.12.1984 by granting a decree nisi, granting six months time to make it absolute as contemplated under Section 16 of the Divorce Act. Petition allowed.