ORDER By an order dated 6-10-2005 passed by the learned Single Judge, this petition is referred to this Bench under Section 8 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961 for hearing and disposing of, as the question of law regarding limitation for taking cognizance under Section 468(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 arises for consideration. 2. Petitioners 1 and 2 who have been arrayed as accused 1 and 2 in C.C. No. 18073 of 1999 on the file of the VIII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore have filed this petition under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. to quash the proceedings in C.C. No. 18073 of 1999. 3. Before adverting to the contentions raised in this criminal petition, it is necessary to narrate the facts and judicial orders which had preceded filing of the complaint by the Registrar (Vigilance) on 25-2-1999 against the petitioners before the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore. Petitioners 1 and 2 in their capacity as Chairman and Secretary of Sri Kengal Credit Co-operative Society Limited had filed W.P. No. 16425 of 1992 for quashing the order stated to have been issued by the Assistant Executive Engineer No.1, B.D.A. Sub-Division (West) in No. BDNAEE 1(W)/42/92-93, dated 13-5-1992, referred to as Annexure-D to the writ petition. Along with the petition, petitioners had produced a copy of Annexure-D and has sought for dispensation of production of the original by filing I.A. No. 1 accompanied by the affidavit filed by the first petitioner. The petitioners had obtained an interim stay of Annexure-D. The first respondent (Bangalore Development Authority) filed an application for vacating the interim order of stay contending that Annexure-D is a forged document and petitioners had forged the same adding the following. "and to demolish the unauthorised structures therein". That on 30-6-1992 the said writ petition came to be dismissed as withdrawn". 4. On 11-8-1992 first respondent in W.P. No. 16425 of 1992 filed I.A. No. III under Section 340 of the Cr. P.C. praying the Court to take cognizance of the offence (forgery) committed by the petitioners in the said proceedings or in the alternative, to refer the matter to jurisdictional Magistrate to take action against the petitioners in accordance with law. This application was resisted by the petitioners. P.C. praying the Court to take cognizance of the offence (forgery) committed by the petitioners in the said proceedings or in the alternative, to refer the matter to jurisdictional Magistrate to take action against the petitioners in accordance with law. This application was resisted by the petitioners. The learned Single Judge, by order dated 3-8-1993 directed the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore to investigate and report as to whether Annexure-D has been forged and whether petitioners are responsible for the same. The learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, after holding a detailed enquiry, submitted a report on 4-11-1993 opining that there had been a prima facie case of forging the document, Annexure-D and also held that petitioners had produced a copy of the forged document as Annexure-D knowing that it was a forged document or had reasons to believe that it was a fraudulent document. After receipt of the report, the learned Single Judge, by order dated 18-2-1997 considering the nature and importance of the matter, referred the matter to the Division Bench under Sections 8 and 9 of the High Court Act. 5. The Division Bench of this Court heard the parties on I.A. No. III and by order dated 4-1-1999 accepted the enquiry report dated 3-11-1993 submitted by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. On consideration of the material on record and the enquiry report, this Court, prima facie, opined that the document-Annexure-D, a forged document was used by the petitioners in W.P. No. 16425 of 1992 with the dishonest intention to seek relief and the petitioners, prima facie, appear to have committed an offence of forgery punishable under Section 471 of the IPC; therefore, it is expedient in the interest of justice, the petitioners shall be prosecuted for the said offence before the competent Criminal Court and directed the Registrar (Vigilance) to lodge a complaint with the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore for taking necessary steps towards effective prosecution of the case against both petitioners in accordance with law. 6. In pursuance of the above directions, a complaint was lodged by the Registrar (Vigilance) against the petitioners before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore on 25-2-1999. As can be seen from the copy of order sheet, the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate took cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 471 of the IPC arid proceeded with the trial under Section 343 of the Cr. As can be seen from the copy of order sheet, the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate took cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 471 of the IPC arid proceeded with the trial under Section 343 of the Cr. P.C. On 20-9-1999 the VIII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore framed charge for an offence punishable under Section 471 of the IPC against petitioners 1 and 2. It is at this stage, petitioners have filed this criminal petition under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. for quashing the entire proceedings only on the ground that the complaint filed an 25-2-1999 is clearly barred by time. 7. It is contended that the charge against the petitioners 1 and 2 is that they had filed Annexure-D, a letter dated 18-5-1992 on 28-5-1992 in W.P. No. 16425 of 1992 before this Court with the fraudulent intention of snatching an interim order knowing or having reason to believe at that time that Annexure-D was a forged document and used the same as a genuine document. The maximum punishment imposable for an offence punishable under Section 471 of the IPC is imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or both. Section 468(1) of the Cr. P.C. bars the Court from taking cognizance of an offence after three years if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. The offence is alleged to have committed on 28-5-1992, this was known to the person aggrieved by the offence on 4-11-1993. Therefore, the complaint filed on 25-2-1999 for an offence punishable under Section 471 of the IPC for which the maximum punishment provided is imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years is clearly barred by limitation under Section 468(1) of the Cr. P.C. 8. It is also stated that copies of the document were furnished to the petitioners by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court on 31-7-1999 and the charge was framed on 20-9-1999 for an offence punishable under Section 471 of the IPC. In view of the bar of limitation, the proceedings in C.C. No. 18073 of 1999 on the file of VIII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore cannot be allowed to continue and continuation of the same will be without jurisdiction, it will be abuse of process of law. Therefore proceedings are liable to be quashed. 9. In view of the bar of limitation, the proceedings in C.C. No. 18073 of 1999 on the file of VIII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore cannot be allowed to continue and continuation of the same will be without jurisdiction, it will be abuse of process of law. Therefore proceedings are liable to be quashed. 9. Learned Counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the complaint filed on 25-2-1999 is clearly barred by time; that the offence is alleged to have been committed on 28-5-1992, this was known to the person aggrieved by the offence on 4-11-1993. The learned Counsel further submitted that this Court referred the matter to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. The offence alleged to have been committed on 28-5-1992 and well-within the knowledge of this Court. Further, the knowledge of the alleged offence of this Court could also be traced to the date on which the preliminary enquiry report was submitted by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. The learned Counsel further submitted that holding of a preliminary enquiry for filing the complaint under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Cr. P.C. as per the procedure contemplated under Section 340 of the Cr. P.C. is not peremptory. Even without such preliminary enquiry, the Court can form such an opinion, when it appears to the Court that an offence has been committed in relation to the proceedings in that Court. In support of this submission, learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied on a decision in Pritish v. State of Maharashtra and Others1. 10. In reply, the learned State Public Prosecutor submitted that the offence committed by the petitioners is punishable under Section 467 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the bar contained under Section 468(1) of Cr. P.C is not attracted. The learned State Public Prosecutor further submitted that the time taken by the Court for following the mandatory procedure contained under Section 340 of the Cr. P.C. before directing the Registrar (Vigilance) to lodge a complaint against the petitioners has to be excluded while computing the period of limitation. 11. In view of the above submissions, following points would arise for determination: (1) Whether the complaint filed by Registrar (Vigilance) on 25-2-1999 against the petitioners for an offence punishable under Section 471 of the IPC is barred by time? (2) Whether the time taken by the Court for compliance of mandatory procedure contemplated under Section 340 of the Cr. 11. In view of the above submissions, following points would arise for determination: (1) Whether the complaint filed by Registrar (Vigilance) on 25-2-1999 against the petitioners for an offence punishable under Section 471 of the IPC is barred by time? (2) Whether the time taken by the Court for compliance of mandatory procedure contemplated under Section 340 of the Cr. P.C. to give directions for lodging the complaint for the offences enumerated under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Cr. P.C. has to be excluded while computing the period of limitation? 12. Our findings on the points for determination and reasons thereon are as follows.- 13. Re: Point No. (1).-It is the contention of the petitioners that the maximum punishment for an offence punishable under Section 471 of the IPC is imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or both. This contention is apparently incorrect. Section 471 of the IPC reads thus: "471. Using as genuine a forged document (or electronic record).-Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine any document (or electronic record) which he knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document (or electronic record), shall be punished in the same manner as if he had forged such document (or electronic record)". It is relevant to state that the words "as if he had forged such document" occurring in the above section invariably refer to the documents enumerated under Sections 466 and 467 of the IPC. 14. In a decision in Gopalakrishna Menon and Another v. D. Raja Reddy and Another1, the Apex Court has held: "The offence which is made punishable under Section 467 is in respect of an offence described in Section 463. Once it is accepted that Section 463 defines forgery and Section 467, punishes forgery of a particular category, the provision in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of Cri. P.C. would immediately be attracted and on the basis that the offence punishable under Section 467 is an offence described in Section 463, in the absence of a complaint by the Court the prosecution would not be maintainable. P.C. would immediately be attracted and on the basis that the offence punishable under Section 467 is an offence described in Section 463, in the absence of a complaint by the Court the prosecution would not be maintainable. Consequently the prosecution of the persons who alleged to have produced the forged money receipt in Civil Court, for offences punishable under Sections 467 and 471 read with Section 34 on the basis of a private complaint and in the absence of a complaint from the appropriate Civil Court where the alleged fraudulent money receipts has been produced, would not be sustainable because if the prosecution is allowed to continue serious prejudice would be caused to them and they would be called upon to face a trial which would not be sustainable". 15. In a decision of State of Haryana v. Shiv Singh and Others\ the High Court of Punjab and Haryana has held: "No doubt the accused were not charge-sheeted under Section 467 of the IPC, but the second charge framed against them does speak about fraudulently forging of promissory notes and the forgery regarding Promissory note is provided under the provisions of Section 467 of the IPC, which provides imprisonment which may extend to 10 years, whereas Section 471 of the Indian Penal Code does not itself provide for any punishment". 16. In the instant case, the document which is alleged to have been forged (Annexure-D) is a letter dated 18-5-1992 addressed by the Assistant Executive Engineer, BDA,to the President, Nandini Layout, BDA Site Allottees Association (Regd.), Rajajinagar, Bangalore-l0. Therefore, the document squarely falls within the description of "the document purporting to be made by a public servant in his official capacity" as enumerated under Section 466 of the IPC. In view of what has been stated in the decisions cited supra, we hold that Annexure-D which is alleged to have been forged by the petitioners is a document made by a public servant in his official capacity and the offence of forgery of such document is punishable under Section 466 of the IPC. The punishment for an offence under Section 466 is imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. 17. The punishment for an offence under Section 466 is imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. 17. For these reasons, we hold that contention of the petitioners that an offence under Section 471 of the IPC is punishable with imprisonment for not exceeding two years and that the bar contained under Section 468(1) of the Cr. P.C. is attracted, cannot be accepted. In our view, offence is under Section 466 of the IPC. For this offence, maximum punishment being seven years and as no limitation is prescribed under Section 468(1) of the Cr. P.C. for the offences punishable above three years, taking cognizance in the present case is not barred. Therefore, we answer point No.1 in the negative. 18. Re: Point No. (2).-While narrating the facts and discussing point No. (1), we have stated that a complaint was filed by the Registrar (Vigilance) as per the directions given by the Division Bench of this Court by order dated 4-1-1999 passed on I.A. No. III in W.P. No. 16425 of 1992. The Division Bench has recorded a finding that Annexure-D in W.P. No. 16425 of 1992 is a forged document and the petitioners, prima facie, appear to have committed the offence of forgery punishable under Section 471 of the IPC in respect thereof. This Court has further held that it is expedient in the interest of justice that they shall be prosecuted for the said offence before the competent Criminal Court. 19. In a decision in Pritish's case, the Apex Court, considering the mandatory requirement of Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. has held: "8. Chapter XXVI of the Code contains provisions "as to offences affecting the administration of justice". Among the 12 sections subsumed therein we need consider only three. Section 340 consists of four sub-sections of which only the first sub-section is relevant for the purpose of this case. Chapter XXVI of the Code contains provisions "as to offences affecting the administration of justice". Among the 12 sections subsumed therein we need consider only three. Section 340 consists of four sub-sections of which only the first sub-section is relevant for the purpose of this case. Hence the said sub-section is extracted below: "When upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 195; which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary.- (a) record a finding to that effect; (b) make a complaint thereof in writing; (c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction; (d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and (e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate". 9. Reading of the sub-section makes it clear that the hub of this provision is formation of an opinion by the Court (before which proceedings were to be held) that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into an offence which appears to have been committed. In order to form such opinion the Court is empowered to hold a preliminary inquiry. It is not peremptory that such preliminary inquiry should be held. Even without such preliminary inquiry the Court can form such an opinion when it appears to the Court that an offence has been committed in relation to a proceeding in that Court. It is important to notice that even when the Court forms such an opinion it is not mandatory that the Court should make a complaint. This sub-section has conferred a power on the Court to do so. It does not mean that the Court should, as a matter of course, make a complaint. It is important to notice that even when the Court forms such an opinion it is not mandatory that the Court should make a complaint. This sub-section has conferred a power on the Court to do so. It does not mean that the Court should, as a matter of course, make a complaint. But once the Court decides to do so, then the Court should make a finding to the effect that on the fact situation it is expedient in the interest of justice that the offence should further be probed into. If the Court finds it necessary to conduct a preliminary inquiry to reach such a finding it is always open to the Court to do so, though absence of any such preliminary inquiry would not vitiate a finding reached by the Court regarding its opinion. It should again be remembered that the preliminary inquiry contemplated in the sub-section is not for finding whether any particular person is guilty or not. Far from that, the purpose of preliminary inquiry, even if the Court opts to conduct it, is only to decide whether it is expedient in the interest of justice to inquire into the offence which appears to have been committed". 20. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the decision cited supra, it is necessary for the Court to record a finding that it is expedient in the interest of justice before lodging a complaint in respect of the offences enumerated under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Cr. P.C. Further that the Court must be of the opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an enquiry should be made into the offence which appears to have been committed, though it is not peremptory that a preliminary enquiry should be held to form such an opinion. It is further held that even without such preliminary enquiry, the Court can form such an opinion when it appears to the Court that an offence has been committed in relation to the proceeding in that Court. 21. In the instant case, as can be seen from the order dated 4-1-1999 passed on I.A. No. III in W.P. No. 16425 of 1992, petitioners herein who were arrayed as opponents, had strongly opposed I.A. No. III. 21. In the instant case, as can be seen from the order dated 4-1-1999 passed on I.A. No. III in W.P. No. 16425 of 1992, petitioners herein who were arrayed as opponents, had strongly opposed I.A. No. III. In fact, petitioner 1 who was arrayed as opponent 2 in I.A. No. III, had filed his affidavit by way of objections opposing the application. Under these circumstances, the matter was referred to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate for preliminary enquiry. The Court, after receipt of the enquiry report from the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on 3-11-1993 and after considering the report, has formed an opinion that the document Annexure-D used by the petitioners with the dishonest intention to seek relief in W.P. No. 16425 of 1992 was a forged document and prima facie, petitioners appear to have committed an offence of forgery punishable under Section 471 of the IPC. The Court has further opined that it is expedient in the interest of justice that they shall be prosecuted for the said offence before the competent Criminal Court. For these reasons, the Court allowed I.A. No. III and directed the Registrar (Vigilance) to lodge a complaint against the petitioners herein, before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore. It is obvious that the Court, after receiving the application with a prayer to lodge a complaint for the commission of offences enumerated under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Cr. P.C., cannot automatically take recourse to Section 340 of the Cr. P.C., and given direction to lodge a complaint before the Competent Judicial Magistrate. It is a statutory mandate that the Court should form an opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an enquiry should be made into an offence which appears to have been committed. For these reasons, we hold that time spent for holding preliminary enquiry to form an opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that the complaint has to be lodged for enquiring into the offence which appears to have been committed, should be excluded while computing the period of limitation. Hence, we answer the point No. (2) in the affirmative. 22. The learned Counsel for the petitioners, relying on a decision in Iqbal Singh Marwah v Meenakshi Marwah and Another1, has contended that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of Cr. Hence, we answer the point No. (2) in the affirmative. 22. The learned Counsel for the petitioners, relying on a decision in Iqbal Singh Marwah v Meenakshi Marwah and Another1, has contended that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of Cr. P.C. would be attracted only when the offences enumerated under the said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in proceedings before the Court i.e., during the time when the document was in custodian legis. 23. We cannot accept this submission for more than one reason. Petitioners have not urged this ground in this criminal petition. These facts whether petitioners have committed forgery of document-Annexure-D; if so, whether it was committed before they produced it in W.P. No. 16425 of 1992 or during the time when the document was in custodian legis, are to be proved before the Trial Court which we cannot embark upon while deciding this petition filed under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. The determination of such facts would be a clear transgression of inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 24. In view of our findings on point Nos. (1) and (2), we hold that the complaint filed in C.C. No. 18073 of 1999 by the Registrar (Vigilance) on 25-2-1999 for an offence punishable under Section 471 of the IPC against the petitioners herein is not barred by time under Section 468(1) of the Cr. P.C. This criminal petition is devoid of merits. Therefore, we dismiss the petition.