JUDGMENT :-Inasmuch as both these appeals arise out of a common judgment and as common questions of law and fact are involved, they can be disposed of together. 2. O.S. No.17 of 1992 was filed on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Nagarkumool, seeking the relief of declaration of title and for consequential injunction. The first defendant in the said suit filed O.S. No.10 of 1992 on the file of the self-same Court seeking the identical reliefs as against the plaintiffs 1 to 3 in O.S. No.17 of 1992. Thus, the plaintiffs 1 to 3 in O.S. No.17 of 1992 are the defendants in O.S. No.10 of 1992 and vice versa. A common trial was conducted by the learned Subordinate Judge in both the suits and at the culmination of trial, eventually, the suit, O.S. No.17 of 1992, ended in dismissal and O.S. No.10 of 1992 ended in a decree. Assailing the said judgments and decrees, two appeals came to be filed in AS. No.46 of 1995 as against the judgment in O.S. No.17 of 1992 and AS. No.47 of 1995 as against the judgment in O.S. No.10 of 1992 on the file of the II Additional District Judge, Mahaboobnagar. The learned II Additional District Judge, after having heard either side, eventually dismissed both the appeals. The plaintiffs in O.S. No.17 of 1992 are now seeking to file the S.A No.851 of 2006 and the plaintiffs in O.S. No.10 of 1992 are now seeking to file S.ANo.877 of 2006. 3. Having regard to the nature of the relief sought for, it may appear apparently that the facts in issue in both the suits are pure questions of fact. However, Sri B. Narasimha Sarma, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants, represents that the only substantial question of law that arises in these two appeals is, as to whether the judgments and decrees are vitiated in having not considered the relevant admissions made by the defendants in O.S.No.17 of 1992 in another proceeding, while being examined as witnesses therein, or not. 4. The facts lie in a narrow compass. The land in dispute in O.S. No.17 of 1992 is covered by Sy.No.149 admeasuring Acs.9.31 guntas and the land in dispute in O.S. No.1 0 of 1992 is covered by the same Sy.No.149 admeasuring Acs.9.31 guntas. 4. The facts lie in a narrow compass. The land in dispute in O.S. No.17 of 1992 is covered by Sy.No.149 admeasuring Acs.9.31 guntas and the land in dispute in O.S. No.1 0 of 1992 is covered by the same Sy.No.149 admeasuring Acs.9.31 guntas. Thus, both the extents put together make up Acs.19.22 guntas situate adjacent to each other on east-west direction in Allapur Village. While it is the case of the plaintiffs in O.S. No.17 of 1992 that they all constitute a joint family and the entire extent of Acs.19.22 guntas of land covered by Sy.No.149 belonged to the father of the first plaintiff, by name, Venkat Reddy alias Venkaiah and that the names of the fathers of the defendants were wrongly mutated in the revenue records as possessors thereof and the father of the first defendant himself admitted that they had no concern with the said land; it is the case of the plaintiffs in 0.S.No.10 of 1992 that their fathers Chinna Bucha Reddy and Pedda Bucha Reddy were the protected tenants of the disputed land and they were granted ownership certificate on 5-3-1954 by the Deputy Collector, Nagarkurnool, and since then they were the owners and their names were mutated in the revenue records. 5. In view of the above competing claims where both parties claim the relief of declaration of title, a common trial was conducted as aforesaid on a joint memo filed by both the Counsel. The plaintiffs, who filed the suit, O.S. No.17 of 1992, have been treated for convenience sake as plaintiffs and the plaintiffs in the other suit, O.S. No.10 of 1992, have been treated as the defendants in the suit. The plaintiffs strongly relied upon an admission said to have been made by the first defendant while deposing in connection with O.S. No.73 of 1980 on the file of the District Munsif, Nagarkurnool as P.W.1. The deposition has been marked as Ex.A1. The Court below extracted the admissions in EX.A1 inter alia in its judgment. For brevity and better understanding, they may be extracted hereunder thus : "The land bearing Sy.No.l49 was never in possession of my father or mine. Myself and my father are not concerned about that land." 6. The father of the first defendant also examined in the said suit as P.W.5 and his deposition has been marked in this case as EX.A2. Myself and my father are not concerned about that land." 6. The father of the first defendant also examined in the said suit as P.W.5 and his deposition has been marked in this case as EX.A2. He is said to have been made another admission as under : The land Sy.No.l49 extents about Acs.20.00 stands in my name and in the name of my elder brother, but the possession is with the defendants." 7. The defendants in O.S. No.73 of 1980 are said to have been the plaintiffs in the instant case. Inasmuch as the defendants claim occupancy rights and certificate having been granted in the names of their fathers, as the owners, but the real owners is admittedly the father of the first plaintiff. In that view of the matter, it is the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants that both the judgments are vitiated in having not considered these two admissions. Admittedly, the deponent in EX.A 1 and the deponent in Ex.A2 are alive. One of them is the party to the suit, obviously. Having regard to the above facts, it is to be seen as to whether any illegality or error of jurisdiction that has been committed by both the Courts below. 8. Inasmuch as Exs.A 1 and A2 are the certified copies of the depositions of the witnesses, who deposed in O.S. No.73 of 1980, the provisions of Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act are germane in the context and shall be adverted to at the outset. 9. Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act reads as under : "33. 8. Inasmuch as Exs.A 1 and A2 are the certified copies of the depositions of the witnesses, who deposed in O.S. No.73 of 1980, the provisions of Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act are germane in the context and shall be adverted to at the outset. 9. Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act reads as under : "33. Relevancy of certain evidence for proving, in subsequent proceeding, the truth of facts therein stated.-Evidence given by a witness in a judicial proceeding or before any person authorized by law to take it, is relevant for the purpose of proving, in a subsequent judicial proceeding, or in a later stage of the same judicial proceeding, the truth of the facts which it states, when the witness is dead or cannot be found, or is incapable of giving evidence, or is kept out of the way by the adverse party, or if his presence cannot be obtained without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, the Court considers unreasonable Provided- that the proceeding was between the same parties or their representatives in interest; that the adverse party in the first proceeding had the right and opportunity to cross-examine; that the questions in issue were substantially the same in the first as in the second proceeding." From a mere glance at the said provision it is obvious that the evidence given, by a witness in a judicial proceeding becomes relevant for the purpose of proving the same in another judicial proceeding about the truth of the facts contained inter alia therein, only when the witness is dead or cannot be found or is incapable of giving evidence or is kept out of the way by the adverse party or his presence cannot be obtained without an amount of delay or expense. In addition to that the proceeding must be in between the same parties and that the adverse party in the first proceeding must have had the right and opportunity to cross-examine and that the question involved in both the proceedings are substantially the same. When these conditions enjoined under Section 33 are not specified (sic satisfied), the deposition of a witness given in a previous proceeding becomes irrelevant in the subsequent proceeding. When these conditions enjoined under Section 33 are not specified (sic satisfied), the deposition of a witness given in a previous proceeding becomes irrelevant in the subsequent proceeding. The deponents of Exs.A1 and A2 are alive and it is nobodys case that deponents to Exs.A1 and A2 are either dead or kept out of the way by the adverse party or cannot be found or are incapable of giving evidence or their presence cannot be obtained without any amount of delay or expense. None of the tests enumerated hereinabove is satisfied in the instant case. Therefore, Exs.A 1 and A2 become quite irrelevant. 10. In order to surmount the said problem, the learned Counsel for the appellants seeks to rely upon Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act, which defines the expression "admission". As per the said section, an admission is a statement either made in oral or in writing or contained in an electronic form, but that statement shall suggest any inference about any fact in issue or a relevant fact made by any of the persons, but under the circumstances enumerated in Sections 18 to 23 and such an admission is relevant. None of the Sections 18 to 23 squarely covers the situation obtaining in the instant case. The learned Counsel seeks to contend that because Section 23 in a negative form includes two instances where the admissions in civil case is not relevant, all other situations which are not covered by those two situations would automatically become relevant. I am afraid, I ca not countenance the said contention precisely for the reason that it is against the clear mandate contained in Section 5 of the Evidence Act. Section 5 of the Evidence Act reads as under : "5. Evidence may be given of facts in issue and relevant facts.-Evidence may be given in any suit or proceeding of the existence or non-existence of every fact in issue and of such other facts as are hereinafter declared to be relevant, and of no others." 11. A perusal of the said section shows that evidence in any suit may be given about the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue or other facts, which are connected to the facts in issue, which are declared as relevant by the act and of no others. The expression of no others gains any amount of significance. A perusal of the said section shows that evidence in any suit may be given about the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue or other facts, which are connected to the facts in issue, which are declared as relevant by the act and of no others. The expression of no others gains any amount of significance. In my considered view, that clearly excludes any other facts, which are not covered by one or other section from Sections 6 to 55. In other words, that expression mandates that a fact becomes relevant only when it is covered by one or the other of Sections 6 to 55 alone and if that fact is not covered by anyone of those sections it becomes irrelevant. Having regard to the above clear position of law, the contention of the learned Counsel that Section 23 covers the situation obtaining in the instant case and makes admissions contained in Exs.A1 and A2 as relevant, merits no consideration. That apart, in view of specific provision contained in Section 33, which makes the evidence of a witness given in a previous proceeding as relevant only in the situations enumerated inter alia therein. Therefore, Section 33 makes the deposition of a witness given in a previous proceeding, when it is not covered by any of those situations contained in Section 33, as irrelevant. The problem can be seen from a different dimension. The depositions in Exs.A1 andA2 are obviously the previous statements of a witness, since they have been given in a different case preceding the proceeding in which they deposed as witnesses. The use of a previous statement is limited. It can be used to confront a witness when examined on oath under Section 145 or corroborate the evidence of a witness under Section 157 or to impeach the credit of a witness under Section 155 of the Indian Evidence Act but it is not a substantive piece of evidence. 12. In Bharath Singh v. Bhagirathi, AIR 1966 SC 405 , the Apex Court laid down the law succinctly thus : "Admissions have to be clear if they are to be used against the person making them Admissions are substantive evidence by themselves, in view of Sections 17 and 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, though they are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted. We are of opinion that the admissions duly proved are admissible evidence irrespective of whether the party making them appeared in the witness box or not and whether that party when appearing as witness was confronted with those statements in case it made a statement contrary to those admissions. The purpose of contradicting the witness under Section 145 of the Evidence Act is very much different from the purpose of proving the admission. Admission is substantive evidence of the fact admitted while a previous statement used to contradict a witness does not become substantive evidence and merely serves the purpose of throwing doubt on the veracity of the witness. What weight is to be attached to an admission made by a party is a matter different from its use as admissible evidence." 13. The said judgment has been followed by the Apex Court in its later judgment in Bishwanath Prasad v. Dwaraka Prasad, AIR 1974 SC 117 , wherein it was held thus : "There is no merit even in the contention that because these three statements - Exs.G, G-2 and H - had not been put to the first plaintiff when he was in the witness box or to the eighth defendant although he had discreetly kept away from giving evidence, they cannot be used against him. Counsel drew our attention to Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. There is a cardinal distinction between a party who is the author of a prior statement and a witness who is examined and is sought to be discredited by use of his prior statement. In the former case an admission by a party in substantive evidence if it fulfils the requirements of Section 21 of the Evidence Act; in the latter case a prior statement is used to discredit the credibility of the witness and does not become substantive evidence. In the former there is no necessary requirement of the statement containing the admission having to be put to the party because it is evidence proprio vigore; in the latter case the Court cannot be invited to disbelieve a witness on the strength of a prior contradictory; statement unless it has been put to him, as required by Section 145 of the Evidence Act. This distinction has been clearly brought out in the ruling in Bharat Singhs case (supra). 14. This distinction has been clearly brought out in the ruling in Bharat Singhs case (supra). 14. From the above, it is obvious that that admission is a substantive evidence of the fact admitted by a party to the proceeding when it fulfils the requirements of Section 21, but is not conclusive. On the other hand a previous statement can be used either to corroborate or to contradict a witness and in the event it is used to contradict a witness such contradictory portion does not become substantive evidence but it can be used only to test the veracity of that witness. A clear distinction is discernable between a party who is the author of a prior statement and a witness who is examined and is sought to be discredited by use of his prior statement. An admission of a party becomes substantive evidence if it fulfils the requirement of Section 21 of the Indian Evidence Act and the prior statement used to discredit the credibility of a witness does not become substantive evidence. In the former case, there is no necessary requirement of the statement containing the admission need to be put to the party because it is evidence proprio vigore and in the latter case the· Court cannot be invited to disbelieve a witness on the strength of a prior contradiction of the statement unless it has been put to him in accordance with the procedure contained in Section 145 of the Evidence Act. This distinction shall have to be borne in mind. 15. Here in the instant case EX.A1 contains an admission of a party to the suit, unlike in EX.A2 which albeit contains an admission but the maker thereof is not a party to the suit. The admission contained in the EX.A 1 in one way attracts provisions of Section 21, but even then it becomes relevant only when the person who made the said admission is dead or when the said admission consists of a statement of the existence of any state of mind or body relevant or an issue made at or about the time when such state of mind or body existed and is accompanied by conduct rendering itself falsehood improbable or can be proved if it is relevant otherwise than an admission. 16. The conditions enjoined under Section 21 are not squarely attracted in this case. 16. The conditions enjoined under Section 21 are not squarely attracted in this case. Either Section 21 or Section 33 cannot be pressed into service and on the other hand both the provisions make Exs.A1 and A2 as quite irrelevant. Therefore, the so-called admissions contained in Exs.A 1 and A2 are of no avail to the appellants. 17. The point now sought to be raised by the learned Counsel may appear patently as a pure question of law, but position seems to be no more res integra. A question of law, which has been a settled proposition of law covered by a precedent, is no substantial question of law for the purpose of admitting a second appeal in accordance with Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The point now germane for determination is obviously a point which comes within the domain of a question of law. It is not a question of fact to be decided or determined; but since it is no more res integra, it cannot be treated for the purpose of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure as a substantial question of law as laid down by the Apex Court in Rajeswari v. Puran Indosia. 18. For the above reasons, I am of the considered view that no substantial question of law is involved in these two appeals and therefore they cannot be admitted. Both the appeals are therefore, dismissed at the threshold. But, under the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. 19. This second appeals having been set down for being mentioned this Wednesday the Fifteenth day of November, Two thousand and Six for seeking to reconsidering the order dated 15-9-2006 and upon perusing the order of the Court dated 15-9-2006 and upon hearing the arguments of the above said Counsel. JUDGMENT : Heard learned Counsel for the appellants. It is represented that no further arguments need to be addressed. Hence, closed.