P. LAKSHMANA REDDY, J. ( 1 ) AS both the appeals and the four criminal revision cases arose out of a single case of defamation tried as C. C. No. 645 of 1996 on the file of XV Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, I consider it convenient to dispose of all these matters by this common judgment. ( 2 ) THE facts leading to these cases before this Court, in brief, are as follows:-One Margadarshi Marketing Private Limited represented by its director M. Balakotaiah, filed a private complaint under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against four persons i. e. , 1. A. B. K. Prasad, Editor-in-Chief, Vaartha, 2. Girish Sanghi, Printer and Publisher, Vaartha daily, 3. Y. Kasipathy, Reporter, Vaartha and 4. A. B. K. Publications Limited, a Public Limited Company, arraying them as A1 to A4. In the said complaint, it is alleged that margadarsi group is a part of reputed Eenadu-Margadarsi Group founded by Sri. Ramoji Rao, Chief Editor of the Telugu daily "eenadu" and English daily "newstime". It engaged in publishing, television broadcasting, chit funds and variety of other businesses. Eenadu-Margadarsi Group which has acquired an enviable reputation for honesty, integrity, reliability and forthrightness, with a view to promote sale and export of handicrafts, started a handicrafts division in the name and style of Kalanjali in the year 1994. The said kalanjali has stocks worth Rs. 1,79,87,199/- as on 31-8-1996 and its turnover was Rs. 38. 06 lakh per month on an average during the year 1994-95 and 1995-96. Since the commencement of its business kalanjali earned an enviable reputation for the range and quality and goods stocked by it, it is leading showroom in the State for handicrafts and attracts buyers not only from Hyderabad but also from those, who visits from various parts of India and the world. It has been widely recognized by not only buyers but also suppliers. It has been carrying on business strictly in accordance with law and it never indulged in any dubious deeds or circumvented any procedure prescribed by law. The products marketed by Kalanjali are genuine and original and there is no single complaint over the quality or genuineness of the products so far. While so, on 10-7-1992, Kalanjali purchased one idol of parvathi made in brass from Swamimalai Icon Manufacturing co-operative Cottage Industrial Society Limited, Thanjavur District, tamilanadu, for a consideration of Rs. The products marketed by Kalanjali are genuine and original and there is no single complaint over the quality or genuineness of the products so far. While so, on 10-7-1992, Kalanjali purchased one idol of parvathi made in brass from Swamimalai Icon Manufacturing co-operative Cottage Industrial Society Limited, Thanjavur District, tamilanadu, for a consideration of Rs. 18,000/- less 5% discount and tax thereon. On the said date, it also purchased from the said suppliers one brass casted lamp lady for a consideration of rs. 16,000/- less 5% discount and tax thereon. One Mr. C. R. Mills of beela Place, East Kurrajong, NSW - 2758 placed a purchase order no. 028, dated 18-9-1995 for the purchase of the brass Parvathi for delivery in Australia, at a price of Rs. 33,800/- exclusive of packing, forwarding and freight charges. Similarly, one Sri Sudarshan Rao akkineni of USA placed purchase order No. 037 dated 31-01-1996 for the brass casted lamp lady apart from other items for delivery at USA at a price of Rs. 27,000/- exclusive of packing, forwarding and freight charges. Kalanjali raised invoices on 20-9-1995 and 7-2-1996 respectively in the names of the said two purchasers and completed pre-shipment documentation on 17-10-1995 and 1-3-1996 respectively, and delivered the consignment to Inland container Depot on 03-10-1995 as per shipping Bill No. 2099, dated 03-10-1995 and dated 28-3-1996 respectively through M/s. Seagull shipping Services (M. S. and Company ). Thereafter, Kalanjali came to know through its shipping and forwarding Agent that the Customs authorities in order to satisfy themselves that the consignments sought to be exported is in accordance with the Antiquities and Art treasures Act, referred the matter to the Archeological Survey of india (A. S. I) where it is under consideration. Kalanjali followed up the matter with local Customs office, through its Assistant Manager, s, Madhusudan Rao, on a number of occasions and also contacted a. S. I, Hyderabad, only to be informed that exporters should not meet them since the matter was referred to A. S. I, New Delhi. Kalanjali addressed letters dated 6-2-1996 and 27-2-1996 to A. S. I for clearance of the consignments and also addressed letters to the local Customs office on 26-6-1996 and 2-7-1996. The shipping agents also pursued the matter. Kalanjali addressed letters dated 6-2-1996 and 27-2-1996 to A. S. I for clearance of the consignments and also addressed letters to the local Customs office on 26-6-1996 and 2-7-1996. The shipping agents also pursued the matter. The Assistant Commissioner of Customs sent a telegram dated 7-6-1996 to the Director General of Archeological Survey of india at New Delhi marking a copy to the clearing House Agent of the shipping and Forwarding Agent of M/s. M. S and Company and subsequently, the complainant also addressed a letter on 7-6-1996 to the Director General of the Archeological Survey of India, New Delhi. But due to inaction on the part of the concerned authority, the consignments were not cleared and the matter is pending with A. S. I and the Customs Department for clearance. While so, on 11-8-1996, a news item was published in page no. 1 of Vartha daily under the caption "apuroopa KALA khandalanu VIDESALAKU TARALISTUNNA KALANJALI" along with a colour photograph of Kalanjali. The said news is per se defamatory and tends to lower the reputation of the establishment and the Group to which Kalanjali belongs in the estimation of the readers. ( 3 ) THE accused have positioned the impugned news item prominently on the first page as box item along with a colour photograph to sensationalize the news item and in that news item it was stated that kalanjali belongs to Sri Ramoji Rao, the Chief Editor of a local newspaper. In the news item contained in Para-1 there is clear imputation that "back door methods" of "smugglers" have been resorted to. The said imputation is false and viciously defamatory. Kalanjali never resorted to back door methods or any other questionable methods to send any art pieces abroad. In the normal course of trade Kalanjali handicrafts customers, some of whom are foreigners or residents of abroad, when requested, undertakes to forward the items sold to the customers abroad. The said brass figures were purchased by the customers and have been exported at their request along with necessary papers submitted to the customs authorities The whole procedure followed by Kalanjali was straight forward, transparent and in accordance with law and it is wholly false and defamatory to allege that back door methods of smugglers are being resorted to. The said brass figures were purchased by the customers and have been exported at their request along with necessary papers submitted to the customs authorities The whole procedure followed by Kalanjali was straight forward, transparent and in accordance with law and it is wholly false and defamatory to allege that back door methods of smugglers are being resorted to. Further, as averred in Para-2 of the news item to the effect that the metal used in those two items have antique value running into lakh of rupees, which is wholly false and defamatory. The manufacturer, M/s. Swamimalai Icon Manufacturing co-operative Cottage Industrial Society Limited in its certificate dated 7-6-1996 has stated clearly that the two Icons are manufactured by its member Sri S. Rajagopal only on 7-5-1992 and are not real antiques and that they are only antique coloured and the metal of which the icon was made up, was clearly mentioned in the invoices. The value of the Icons is nowhere near "lakh of rupees" and the said imputation in the news item is false to the core. ( 4 ) FURTHER, the third Para of the news item also contains false and mischievous allegations. No paintings sought to be exported by kalanjali were intercepted as alleged in the said news item. The news item goes on to assert, in a clear reference to Mr. Ramoji Rao, that attempts are being made to suppress the whole affair since the seller of the idols is extremely influential, politically also and that the seller of the items worth lakh of rupees is also silent when their export was prevented, fearing that if the present affair is probed deeply, it may result in many similar activities of the past coming into limelight. ( 5 ) THIS allegation in the news item is false, baseless and mischievously invented by the accused in a calculated attempt to malign the reputation of Kalanjali and it has been following up with the Customs and Archeological departments to get the consignment cleared for export. Another false allegation is made in Para-3 of the news item that in furtherance of this design, the then Assistant Commissioner of customs Mr. Krishna Rao was got transferred as he wanted to initiate legal action expeditiously and that his successor in office Mr. P. N. Rao "is favourable to the seller of the idols" and "further enquiry is being delayed". Krishna Rao was got transferred as he wanted to initiate legal action expeditiously and that his successor in office Mr. P. N. Rao "is favourable to the seller of the idols" and "further enquiry is being delayed". These allegations are totally false and defamatory. The innuendoes in the last three paragraphs, which form the concluding section of the news item are totally false and damaging to sri Ramoji Rao as it creates an impression that the complainant is indulging in clandestine export of antiques worth crores of rupees and that Kalanjali is manufacturing fake antiques and cheating customers. The overall adverse impression is sought to be heightened by a call for a CBI investigation. A perusal of the news item leads a reader to the irresistible conclusion that Kalanjali has resorted to dishonourable means to illegally export valuable antiques. Many customers of kalanjali have contacted the Managing Director and other officials of the company and expressed their doubts, which have been occasioned solely by the news item and they also said that the news items is damaging and disparaging. The accused have published the said news items with the deliberate intention of harming reputation of the complainant though they had full knowledge of the harm that will be caused by the publication. The accused designed to communicate wholly false imputations to the public at large, calculated to injure and disparage the complainants reputation and good will in the business. ( 6 ) THE headline, caption, positioning, prominence, language, colour, layout and content of the news item was deliberately calculated to aggravate the damage to the reputation and credibility of Kalanjali and lower it in the eyes of general public and their valued customers. Some unnamed sources are quoted to cover up the concocted and fabricated story. The accused started rival newspaper Vaartha, which has failed to pose any challenge to Eenadu or effect its circulation and having failed in their efforts, they have maliciously embarked on vilification of Sri Ramoji Rao and his group to which the complainant belongs. On behalf of both complainant and Sri Ramoji Rao, a lawyers notice dated 17-8-1996 was issued to the accused calling upon them to pay damages of Rs. 1,00,00, 000/- and the said notice was duly served on all the accused who got issued a reply dated 23-8-1996, through their legal and administrative advisor. On behalf of both complainant and Sri Ramoji Rao, a lawyers notice dated 17-8-1996 was issued to the accused calling upon them to pay damages of Rs. 1,00,00, 000/- and the said notice was duly served on all the accused who got issued a reply dated 23-8-1996, through their legal and administrative advisor. In the said reply it was falsely alleged that the impugned publication is only a statement of facts and that it does not either refer to the complainant or Sri Ramoji Rao except to the extent of stating that attempts by kalanjali to export two metal idols and paintings have been detained by customs authorities. In the reply there is a reference news item dated 8-8-1996 published in Eenadu which is not at all relevant and the said news item generally deals with smuggling of artifacts and the same cannot be compared with the impugned publication which is solely aimed at Kalanjali and Sri Ramoji Rao. A1 as the Editor, A2 as the Printer and Publisher, A3 as the author and A4 as the owner of the newspaper vaartha had the common object and intention to defame Kalanjali and Sri Ramoji Rao and in furtherance of their object and intention, have deliberately caused the publication of the libelous news item and as such all the accused have committed the offence of defamation punishable under section 500 of the Indian Penal Code. Further, A2 and A4, with the abetment of the A1 and A3 have printed the defamatory matter and thus committed the offence punishable under Section 501 IPC. Further, A2 and A4, with the abetment of Al and A3 sold the defamatory matter and thus committed the offence punishable under section 502 IPC. All the accused are liable for punishment for the offences committed by them under Sections 499, 500, 501 and 502 IPC. After recording the sworn statement of the complainant, the learned Magistrate took the case on file under Sections 500, 501 and 502 IPC against A1 to A4 and issued process to them. After appearance of the accused, the learned Magistrate furnished all the copies of documents proposed to be relied on by the prosecution and examined them under Section 251 Cr. P. C. , for which all the four accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. After appearance of the accused, the learned Magistrate furnished all the copies of documents proposed to be relied on by the prosecution and examined them under Section 251 Cr. P. C. , for which all the four accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. ( 7 ) THE learned Magistrate conducted trial, during which the prosecution examined one M. Balakotaiah, who presented the complaint, as P. W. 1 besides examining five witnesses as P. Ws. 2 to 6 and exhibited Exs. P. 1 to P. 29. After the prosecution evidence was closed, the learned Magistrate examined all the accused under Section 313 Cr. P. C. , wherein all the accused who are representing through their counsel specifically denied the incriminating evidence found against the accused. A3 examined himself as D. W. 1 on behalf of the accused, but no documents have been filed. ( 8 ) AFTER hearing the arguments on both sides and also considering the entire evidence on record and also the decisions cited on behalf of both sides, the learned Magistrate found that the news items published in Vaartha, amounts to defamatory to the complainant and as A1 is editor in Chief, A2 is Printer and Publisher, they are liable for the offences punishable under Sections 500, 501 and 502 IPC and A3 being an author of the item is liable for punishment under Section 500 ipc and A4 is representing A2, and he is only publisher, hence, he is liable for the offence punishable under section 502 IPC only. ( 9 ) THE learned Magistrate questioned the accused about the quantum of sentence wherein it was represented on behalf of the accused that lenient view may be taken regarding quantum of sentence. The learned Magistrate convicted A1 and A2 for the offence punishable under Sections 500, 501 and 502 IPC and sentenced them to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for six months on each count and further sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/- for each count. A3 is convicted for the offence punishable under Section 500 ipc and he is sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of six months and further sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/ -. A2 representing A4 is convicted for the offence under Section 502 ipc and is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. A3 is convicted for the offence punishable under Section 500 ipc and he is sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of six months and further sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/ -. A2 representing A4 is convicted for the offence under Section 502 ipc and is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default, to undergo simple Imprisonment for a period of three months. Aggrieved by the said conviction and sentence, A1 and A3 preferred one joint appeal, while A2 and A4 filed separate joint appeal before the Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, who numbered those appeals as Criminal Appeal Nos. 34 and 35 of 1999 respectively. ( 10 ) THE learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge, after due hearing of both the appeals, pronounced common judgment dated 21-2-2003. The learned Judge partly allowed the Criminal Appeal No. 34 of 1999 setting aside the conviction and sentence of A1 for the offences punishable under Sections 501 and 502 IPC and partly dismissed the appeal confirming the conviction of both A1 and A3 for the offence punishable under Section 500 IPC, but modified the sentence to one of fine of Rs. 2,000/- each and set aside the sentence of imprisonment of six months in respect of both A1 and A3. Similarly, the learned Judge partly allowed the Crl. A. No. 35 of 1999 setting aside the conviction and sentence of A2 for the offences punishable under Sections 500 and 502 IPC and partly dismissed the appeal confirming the conviction of A2 for the offence under Section 501 IPC and also confirmed the conviction and sentence of A4 for the offence punishable under Section 502 IPC, but modified the sentence of A2 confining the sentence to fine amount of Rs. 2,000/- each and by setting aside the sentence of imprisonment. Aggrieved by the acquittal of A1 of the offences punishable under Section 501 and 502 IPC, the complainant filed Criminal appeal No. 583 of 2003 and aggrieved by the acquittal of A2 for the offence punishable under Section 500 and 502 IPC filed another appeal in Criminal Appeal No. 586 of 2003 on the file of this Court. Further, the complainant filed Crl. R. C. No. 809 of 2003, seeking enhancement of sentence of imprisonment imposed against A1 and a3 for the offence punishable under Section 500 IPC, and the filed separate Crl. Further, the complainant filed Crl. R. C. No. 809 of 2003, seeking enhancement of sentence of imprisonment imposed against A1 and a3 for the offence punishable under Section 500 IPC, and the filed separate Crl. R. C. No. 859 of 2003, seeking enhancement of sentence of a2 and A4 also for the offences for which they are convicted. The accused-A1 and A3 filed Crl. R. C. No. 861 of 2003 challenging the conviction and sentence for the offence punishable under Section 500 ipc. A2 and A4 filed separate Crl. R. C. No. 737 of 2003 challenging their conviction and sentence for the offences punishable under section 501 and 502 IPC respectively. Thus, all these six cases are filed challenging the common judgment dated 21-2-2003 passed in crl. A. Nos. 34 and 35 of 1999 on the file of the Metropolitan Sessions judge, Hyderabad. ( 11 ) IN the grounds of appeal filed in Crl. A. Nos. 583 and 586 of 2003, the complainant contended that the learned Metropolitan sessions Judge erred in setting aside the conviction recorded by the trial Court against A1 for the offences punishable under Sections 501 and 502 IPC and erred in setting aside the conviction and sentence against A2 for the offence punishable under Section 500 and 502 IPC. The learned Judge failed to see that though the complainant in the legal notice Ex. 26 dated 17-8-1996 specifically stated that the impugned publication was totally false to their knowledge and it is malicious and it was deliberately published with premeditated intention viciously defaming Sri Ramoji Rao and Kalanjali, the accused in their common reply Ex. P. 27 have not even denied the said statement. The learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge ought to have appreciated that in Para-20 of the complaint it is specifically pleaded that the accused had full knowledge of the harm that will be caused by the publication and in Para-22 it is stated that the imputations in the news item are totally false to the knowledge of the accused and the evidence adduced by the complainant on this aspect was not rebutted. ( 12 ) THE learned Judge ought to have seen that in Para-23 of the complaint it is specifically stated that the accused have started the rival newspaper Vaartha and having failed in their efforts to pose any challenge to Eenadu the accused have maliciously embarked on vilification of Sri Ramoji Rao and his group to which the complainant belongs. The learned Judge ought to have seen that it was pleaded in para-25 of the complaint about the common object and intention to defame Kalanjali and Ramoji Rao and in furtherance of their common object and intention, have deliberately caused the publication of the libelous news item. The learned Judge ought to have appreciated that p. W. 1 in his evidence attributed motive, knowledge and object to all the accused on which there was no cross-examination. The learned judge erred in observing that Section 501 applies to the case of printer alone and Section 502 applies to the owner of the publication or seller alone,. The learned Judge ought to have seen that the complainant conclusively established that the accused had prior knowledge of the publication, had common intention and object to defame Kalanjali by publishing the impugned publication and as such A1 is also liable for the offences punishable under Sections 501 and 502 IPC and A2 is also liable for the offence punishable under Section 500 IPC. ( 13 ) IN the grounds filed in the two Criminal Revision Cases nos. 809 and 859 of 2003, the complainant contended that the learned metropolitan Sessions Judge ought to have seen that throughout the proceedings the accused attempted to justify the publication without adducing any evidence to claim the benefit of exceptions I and IX to section 499 IPC, and in the reply Ex. P. 27 they did not deny the specific allegations made against them in Ex. P. 26. The learned metropolitan Sessions Judge failed to appreciate that the impugned publication is nothing but yellow journalism warranting conviction and imposition of maximum sentence of imprisonment and erred in observing that there is no malice in the publication of the material. The learned Judge erred in alleged absence of malice as mitigating circumstance to set aside the sentence of imprisonment. The learned metropolitan Sessions Judge failed to appreciate that the impugned publication is nothing but yellow journalism warranting conviction and imposition of maximum sentence of imprisonment and erred in observing that there is no malice in the publication of the material. The learned Judge erred in alleged absence of malice as mitigating circumstance to set aside the sentence of imprisonment. The learned judge ought to have seen that the accused failed to show any restraint and published the news item without any good faith recklessly quoting some unnamed sources to cover up a concocted and fabricated story. The learned Judge ought to have seen that mere imposition of fine in the present case only encourages the accused to continue the offence as it enlarges the sale of the newspapers. The complainant relied on decisions reported in RAM KUMAR SHUKLA v. THE STATE, 1962 (1) Crl. L. J. 122 in support of its contention that the sentence imposed against A1 to A4 are to be enhanced in order to send them to prison. ( 14 ) THE grounds on which two Crl. R. C. Nos. 861 and 737 of 2003 filed on behalf of A1 and A3, and A2 and A4 respectively are almost common. They contended in those grounds of revisions that the learned Judge failed to see that the complaint filed by P. W. 1 is not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 199 Cr. P. C. Kalanjali being only a shop is neither a company, nor an association or a group of persons as specified in explanation 2 of Section 499 IPC. The learned Judge erred in holding that the complainant company comes within the purview of the expression aggrieved person within the meaning of Section 199 (1) Cr. P. C. The learned Judge failed to see that the impugned news item Ex. P. 21 is not defamatory either in its form or contents and what is written therein are only statement of facts made after due verification by its author A3 and published in good faith and for public good. The learned Judge erred in placing reliance on the highly interested and discrepant testimony of PWs. 1 to 6. The learned Judge should have seen that there are clear indications that Exs. P. 6, P. 28 and P. 29 were manipulated. The learned Judge erred in placing reliance on the highly interested and discrepant testimony of PWs. 1 to 6. The learned Judge should have seen that there are clear indications that Exs. P. 6, P. 28 and P. 29 were manipulated. The learned Judge failed to notice that P. W. 3 and P. W. 4 were not shown the icons and it is not possible for any one to say that the icons seized by the customs authorities are all the icons purchased under Exs. P. 6 and P. 28. The learned Judge should have seen that the icons were not released by the customs authorities even after several years. The learned Judge failed to show that the Delhi High Court did not give any finding but only gave an opportunity to the complainant to demonstrate before the concerned. The learned Judge should have seen that the revision petitioners-accused are fully protected by exception I and IX to section 499 IPC and the learned Judge did not give any valid and convincing reasons for rejecting the evidence of D. W. 1. The learned judge should have seen that the statement Ex. 21 had a rational basis, as they were detained by the customs authorities for several months and A3 made enquiries from several sources. The learned Judge erred in observing that D. W. 1 should have produced the bureau diary and investigation note pad to prove his plea of making enquiries. The learned Judge erred in ignoring the admissions made by the prosecution witnesses about the factual aspects mentioned in Ex. P. 21. The learned Judge erred in thinking that verification can only be from the officers and employees of the complainants company and not from other sources. The learned Judge failed to see that normally the identity of the source of the news item will not be disclosed for various reasons. The learned Judge should have seen that from the mere circumstances that the norms and parameters prescribed by the press council are not followed, it cannot be inferred that there was absence of good faith. Having observed that there was no malice or ill will shown to be existing behind the publication, the learned Judge should have held that the publication was made in good faith and for public good. Having observed that there was no malice or ill will shown to be existing behind the publication, the learned Judge should have held that the publication was made in good faith and for public good. The learned Judge should have seen that A1 was the chief Editor of the News Paper and the presumption contained under section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act is not attracted insofar as A1 is concerned. The learned Judge failed to notice that there is no evidence or proof that A1 had knowledge of the publication. The learned Jugde failed to notice that there is no evidence or proof that A1 had knowledge of the publication and no witness has stated that A1 had knowledge of the publication and that what was stated in the notice Ex. P. 6 and in the complaint is not proof of the fact. The learned Judge erred in assuming that A1 was in control of the selection of the matter published in the newspaper. ( 15 ) THERE will be several sub editors who will be in control of the selection of the news items and their names will not be published in the declaration. During the course of hearing, the learned Senior Counsel for the revision petitioners-accused Sri C. Padmanabha Reddy reiterated the contentions raised in the grounds of revision. He submitted that the complainant viz. Margadarshi Marketing Private Limited by itself is not defamed as the name of the complainant is nowhere found in the article Rx. P-21 published in the newspaper, dated 11. 08. 1996 and the article contains only Kalanjali owned by Sri Ramoji Rao and that the metropolitan Sessions Judge found that Ramoji Rao is not the complainant. Kalanjali is neither company nor an association nor collection of persons and it is only a shop and it has no reputation apart from its trading activity and as per complaint, Kalanjali is handicrafts division of Margadarshi Marketing Private Limited and therefore the question of defaming the shop does not arise and hence the complaint itself is not maintainable as the company which is running Kalanjali is not defamed. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the complaint should have been filed by Kalanjali represented by Margadarshi Private Limited and the public does not know that Kalanjali belongs to Margadarshi Private Limted. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the complaint should have been filed by Kalanjali represented by Margadarshi Private Limited and the public does not know that Kalanjali belongs to Margadarshi Private Limted. On the other hand, Ramoji Rao is the owner of Kalanjali and the said Ramoji rao did not complain about any defamation and hence the complaint ought to have been dismissed as not maintainable. The learned Senior counsel further contended that the article is not per se defamatory as admittedly the customs authorities seized two icons on 03. 10. 1995 and sent to the Archaeological Survey of India for verification as long back as on 03. 10. 1995 and since then those icons are not released not only by the date of publication dated 11. 08. 1996 but also even till today and the said fact has been published and there is nothing defamatory in the said article. In the alternative the learned counsel submitted that even otherwise the accused are protected under exceptions (1) and (9) of Section 499 I. P. C. and hence the Court below ought to have found all the accused not guilty of the charges framed against them. ( 16 ) SO far as A-1 is concerned, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that he is Editor-in-Chief and there is no specific allegation to the effect that the article was published with the knowledge of the chief Editor and hence he cannot be made an accused and that the court below heavily relied upon the notice and its reply and that the courts cannot decide the matter on pleadings viz. the notice and its reply and that there is no allegation of knowledge attributed to a-1 in the complaint and only general allegations are made and no evidence has been adduced to prove knowledge to the Editor-in-Chief and therefore the Metropolitan Sessions Judge grossly erred in recording the conviction against A-1 for the offence punishable under section 500 I. P. C. The learned counsel submitted that as seen from ex:p-21 article no opinion was expressed regarding the nature of icons seized whether they are antiquities or not. The learned counsel further submitted that PW-3 stated that he manufactured those two icons but those icons are admittedly under the custody of archaeological Survey of India allthrough since the date of seizure and basing on the bill Ex. P-28 shown to him, PW-3 gave evidence. The learned counsel further submitted that PW-3 stated that he manufactured those two icons but those icons are admittedly under the custody of archaeological Survey of India allthrough since the date of seizure and basing on the bill Ex. P-28 shown to him, PW-3 gave evidence. There is no guarantee that the icons seized by the customs authorities are the icons purchased under Ex. P-28 and therefore the evidence of pw-3 who gave evidence without seeing the icons seized is of no value and his evidence ought not to have been relied upon. He further submitted that similarly PW-4 issued certificates without seeing icons seized and therefore his evidence also ought to have been eschewed. He further submitted that as per the admissions of PW-5 even the eanadu newspaper daily controlled by Ramoji Rao published news item concerning about smuggling of icons of antiquities and that the present article is also published in good faith in the interest of public and to create awareness among the people about the value of antiquities and therefore exceptions 1 and 9 of Section 499 I. P. C. are very much applicable to the present article. Regarding A-2, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that A-2 is the Chairman and Managing Director of A-4 Company viz. A. B. K. Publications Limited and he cannot be prosecuted. ( 17 ) THE learned Senior Counsel Sri E. Ayyappu Reddy appearing on behalf of the revision petitioners/appellants/complainant reiterated the contentions raised in the grounds of appeal and also revision cases filed on behalf of the complainant. He submitted that there was no need for the complainant to sell antiquities showing them as non-antiquities because antiquities fetch huge amount, whereas non-antiquities fetch less amount and that as per the evidence antiquity touch is given to idols by using chemicals and sold such articles as artistic pieces of brass icons and while so, the accused without making any enquiries published the article with headlines "apurupa kalakhandalanu Videshalaku Tharalistunna Kalanjali" even without putting the question mark and that so far the archaeological department did not declare that they are antiquities not mere icons, but the accused have declared it as antiquities with the intention to defame the complainant and that such publication is in violation of Rule 8 of press Council Rules and the norms of journalistic conduct. The accused did not make any enquiry with Kalanjali before publishing such news with photo of Kalanjali. Even after issue of notice Ex. P-26 dated 17. 08. 1996, the accused did not publish even that notice and it ought to have been published at least, if they had no intention to defame the complainant. It is their duty to publish the denial by the complainant. Three accused together issued common reply Ex. P-27 and in that reply neither A-1 nor A-2 denied knowledge and instead all of them tried to justify their publication and this conduct of accused indicates the common object of all the accused to defame the complainant. The learned counsel relied upon the following decisions:1. Cassidy Vs. Daily Mirror Newspapers, Limited, 1929 (2) Kings Bench Division 331 2. Mohammad Nazir Vs. Emporer, A. I. R. 1928 Allahabad 321 3. Ram Kumar Shukla Vs. State, 1962 (1) Crl. LJ. 122 4. Chaman Lal s. The State of Punjab, AIR 1970 SC 1372 5. K. M. Mathew Vs. K. A. Abraham and others, (2002) 6 Supreme Court Cases 1480 6. G. Chandrasekhara Pillai Vs. K. Karthikeyan, AIR 1964 Kerala 277 7. M. Sivarama Murthy and another Vs. K. S. N. Babu and another, 2000 (1) ALD (Crl.) 86 (AP)8. Sewakram Sobhani v. Karanjiya, Chief Editor, Weekly and Others, air 1981 SC 1514 9. Sukra Mahto Vs. Basudeo Kumar Mahto and another, AIR 1971 SC 1567 10. In Re : S. K. Sundaram, AIR 2001 SC 2374 11. John Thomas Vs. Dr. K. Jagadeesan, (2001) 6 SCC 30 12. Jose Vs. Thankappan and others, 1965 MLJ 298 ( 18 ) THE learned counsel further submitted that though the point for consideration is whether the article published is defamatory or not and the complainant adduced evidence to show that it is per se defamatory, the accused did not adduce any evidence to contradict the same and that the accused did not examine the so called persons from whom A-3 said to have gathered information in order to establish good faith. The accused did not even examine Krishna Rao who said to have given information to A-3. The burden is on the accused to prove the good faith. In this regard the learned counsel relied upon the decision in John Thomas Vs. Dr. K. Jagadeesan (11 ASUPRA ). The accused did not even examine Krishna Rao who said to have given information to A-3. The burden is on the accused to prove the good faith. In this regard the learned counsel relied upon the decision in John Thomas Vs. Dr. K. Jagadeesan (11 ASUPRA ). He further submitted that DW-1 (A-3) made several admissions, which show that he did not take due care and caution and that DW-1 does not know as to what is antiquity of 100 years old and he did not read the antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972. He further submitted that no paintings sent by Kalanjali were detained by customs authorities at any time and yet it is mentioned in the article that the paintings sent by Kalanjali were also detained and that without any basis the accused published the same. He further submitted that both the Courts below have given concurrent findings to the effect that the article published is per se defamatory and both the Courts below have given sound reasons in support of their findings and therefore this Court in exercise of revisional powers cannot interfere with such findings supported by valid reasons. The learned counsel further submitted that the appellate Court grossly erred in setting aside the sentence of imprisonment and confining it to one of fine and that this is a clear case where deterrent punishment is to be awarded and hence this court is required to set aside that portion of the judgment of the appellate Court and to restore the sentence of imprisonment imposed by the trial Court. He further submitted that the appellate Judge erred in setting aside the conviction and sentence recorded against A-1 and a-2 for the offences punishable under Sections 501 and 502 I. P. C. and also erred in setting aside the conviction and sentence imposed against a-2 for the offence punishable under Sections 500 and 502 I. P. C. The learned senior counsel submitted that there was no justification for the appellate Court to interfere with the conviction and sentence recorded by the trial Court and that the judgment of the trial Court is to be restored in toto by allowing the appeals and revisions filed on behalf of the complainant. The learned counsel relied upon the decision in ram Kumar Shukla Vs. State (3 SUPRA) and Chaman Lal Vs. The State of Punjab (5 SUPRA ). The learned counsel relied upon the decision in ram Kumar Shukla Vs. State (3 SUPRA) and Chaman Lal Vs. The State of Punjab (5 SUPRA ). During the course of reply the learned Senior Cousel Sri C. Padmanabha Reddy submitted that the allegation against Ramoji Rao cannot be taken into consideration as Ramoji Rao did not file complaint as observed by the trial Court and the said finding of the trial Court has become final and therefore the accusations against ramoji Rao are not relevant in these appeals and revisions. He reiterated that Kalanjali is not a group of persons and it is a shop and it has no reputation. He further submitted that the findings of the expert committee regarding antiquity or otherwise of the idols are yet to come and under those circumstances it cannot be concluded that there was any malice on the part of the accused in publishing the article. He reiterated that exceptions 1 and 9 of Section 499 I. P. C. are very much applicable to the facts of this case. ( 19 ) THE learned counsel for the accused relied upon the following decisions: 1. K. M. Mathew Vs. State of Kerala and another, AIR 1992 SC 2206 2. Harbajan Singh Vs. State of Punjab and another, AIR 1966 SC 97 3. Haji C. H. Mohammad Koya Vs. T. K. S. M. A. Muthukoya, AIR 1979 SC 154 4. M. Sivaramamurthy and another Vs. K. S. N. Babu and another, 2000 (1) ALT (Crl.) 494 5. Girish Sanghi and another Vs. State of A. P. , 2002 (2) ALD (Crl.) 478 (AP)6. D. Rama Subba Rcddy Vs. P. V. S. Rama Das and another, 1970 Crl. L. J. 83 7. Baburao Shankarrao Chavan Vs. Shaikh Biban Baban pahelwan and another, 1984 Crl. L. J. 350 the points that arise for determination in these cases are:1) Whether the news item dated 11. 08. 1996 is per se defamatory? 2) If so, whether the exception Nos. 1 and 9 given under Section 499 I. P. C. come to the aid of accused in this case? 3) Whether the present complainant-Margadarshi marketing Private Limited is entitled to file a complaint alleging defamation in respect of the news item dated 11. 08. 1996? 4) Whether A-1 who is the Editor-in-Chief can be made liable for publication of such article? 3) Whether the present complainant-Margadarshi marketing Private Limited is entitled to file a complaint alleging defamation in respect of the news item dated 11. 08. 1996? 4) Whether A-1 who is the Editor-in-Chief can be made liable for publication of such article? 5) Whether A-2 who is the Chairman and managing Director of ABK Publications can be made liable for publication of such article? 6) Whether the learned Metropolitan Sessions judge erred in convicting the accused 1 and 3 for the offence punishable under Section 500 i. P. C. ? 7) Whether the acquittal of A-1 and A-3 for the offences punishable under Sections 501 and 502 I. P. C. is liable to be set aside? 8) Whether the acquittal of A-2 for the offences punishable under Sections 500 and 502 I. P. C. is liable to be set aside? 9) Whether the learned Metropolitan Sessions judge erred in setting aside the sentence of imprisonment imposed against A-1 to A-3 by the trial Court? 10) To what result? ( 20 ) THE trial Court and the first appellate Court elaborately considered the news item dated 11. 08. 1996 with reference to the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution and also the evidence of DW-1 (A-3) and held that the new items is per se defamatory. Both the Courts below gave concurrent findings and the reason therefore. More particularly the appellate Court gave elaborate reasons in support of the conclusion that the news item is per se defamatory. The powers of this Court under Section 397 Cr. P. C. are not as wide as that of appellate Court. This Court cannot interfere with the concurrent findings of the trial Court and first appellate Court, unless it is found that the appreciation of the evidence by the Courts below is perverse or that the Courts below did not consider the evidence on record before coming to the conclusion. Here in the instant case, both the Courts below considered the news item and also the contentions raised on behalf of the accused and came to the conclusion that the news item is per se defamatory. The first appellate court viz. Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad answered all the contentions raised on behalf of the accused and the very same contentions are raised before this Court. Both the Courts below considered the decisions cited on behalf of both sides. The first appellate court viz. Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad answered all the contentions raised on behalf of the accused and the very same contentions are raised before this Court. Both the Courts below considered the decisions cited on behalf of both sides. It is not disputed that the news item dated 11. 08. 1996 is published in Vartha Daily in the first page as box item with the photo of Kalanjali and also with the caption "apurupa Kalakhandalanu videshalaku Tharalistunna Kalanjali". The very caption itself indicates that the publisher concluded that kalanjali resorted to clandestine export of the art pieces of antique value. Admittedly the two icons sought to be exported by Kalanjali are not yet declared as kalakhandalu much less apurupa Kalakhandalu. The matter is still pending before the Archaeological Survey of India, New Delhi. As the customs authorities entertained a doubt that those two icons sought to be exported by Kalanjali are having antique value, they referred the matter to the Archaeological department who in turn forwarded those two icons to the Archaeological Survey of India, New Delhi. When the Director of the Archaeological Survey of India, New Delhi gave its opinion that those two icons are having antique value, the complainant herein challenged the same before the Delhi High Court and the Delhi High Court set aside the orders of the said Director and gave direction to the Archaeological Survey of India, New Delhi to constitute an expert committee and to give opportunity to the complainant to demonstrate that those icons are not antiques. The matter is still pending for decision whether the said two icons sought to be exported by Kalanjali are antiques viz. more than 100 years old icons. While so, it is stated in the news item that Kalanjali is clandestinely exporting antiques. Further in the news item it is stated that though the two icons have been seized and not released since a long time, the Kalanjali did not take any steps to get them released. As seen from the voluminous evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution it is clear that the complainant has been taking all necessary steps and pursuing the matter with the Archaeological survey of India, New Delhi to get early decision in the matter. As seen from the voluminous evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution it is clear that the complainant has been taking all necessary steps and pursuing the matter with the Archaeological survey of India, New Delhi to get early decision in the matter. DW-1 himself admitted in his evidence that Kalanjali has followed up the matter for clearance of the two idols with the authorities as spoken by pws. 1, 2 and 5. Further, the news item contained imputations to the effect that Kalanjali is not pursing the matter apprehending that their previous clandestine exports would come to light. There is absolutely no basis for such conclusion. Further, it is mentioned that some antique paintings also seized which is factually incorrect. The accused could not produce any material to show that any paintings of kalanjali were seized. DW-1 stated that he gathered such information from the customs authorities, but he failed to disclose the names of those persons from whom he gathered such information. Therefore, it is clear that DW-1 published the article, which is defamatory to the complainant who owns Kalanjali without proper enquiries. The learned appellate Judge considered each and every imputations made in the news item one by one and held that the news item is per se defamatory. The learned appellate Judge observed that a reading of ex. P-21 does not give an impression that it is a simple news item containing a factual report of stalling of export of the two idols and on the other hand, the said stalling of export is reported in such a manner so as to give an impression that it is part of smuggling activity indulged in by Kalanjali since a long time like other smugglers and the specific reference to Kalanjali and the general statements pertaining to the smuggling activities occurring elsewhere in the country are contextually interwined in Ex. P-21 in such a manner that it necessarily give an impression to the reader that Kalanjali is also indulging in such back door methods and trying to export antiquities and because of that the export of the two idols was stalled and kalanjali made attempts to suppress the whole affair for fear of exposure of similar other exports previously done. It has further gone to the extent of alleging that one Mr. Krishna Rao, Assistant commissioner was transferred because he was not amicable and his successor Mr. It has further gone to the extent of alleging that one Mr. Krishna Rao, Assistant commissioner was transferred because he was not amicable and his successor Mr. P. N. Rao delayed further enquiry. For the said reasons, the learned appellate Judge rejected the contentions of the accused that there was no insinuation whatsoever in Ex. P-21 about Kalanjali or its owners. I do not find any perversity in the interpretation given by the learned Judge to the article Ex. P-21. On the other hand, I entirely agree with the observations made by the learned appellate judge. Had the news item been confined itself to the fact of seizure of the two icons suspecting it to be antiques by the customs authorities and referring the same to the archaeological department and from there to the Archaeological Survey of India, New Delhi, it would not have amounted to defamation. But, taking undue advantage of withholding of clearance by the customs department and the archaeological Survey of India, New Delhi for export of the two idols, the news item was published making insinuations and innuendos as if Kalanjali is clandestinely moving antiques and other cultural wealth of the State worth lakhs of rupees out of the country. Therefore, it cannot be said that the news item is not per se defamatory to the complainant. Hence, I do not find any reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of the trial Court and appellate court in this regard. Hence, this point is found against the accused. Therefore, it cannot be said that the news item is not per se defamatory to the complainant. Hence, I do not find any reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of the trial Court and appellate court in this regard. Hence, this point is found against the accused. ( 21 ) THE learned counsel for the accused contended that even if it is assumed that the new item is per se defamatory, it does not attract section 499 I. P. C. as the news item was published in good faith for protection of public interests, in view of exceptions 1 and 9 contained in Section 499 I. P. C. It is true that even if the news item cause damage to the reputation of the complainant, if the said news item contained truth and the same was published, it does not amount to defamation punishable under Section 499 I. P. C. in view of first exception given under Section 499 I. P. C. Similarly, if the imputations are made in good faith for protection of the interest of the person making it, or of any person, or for the public good, does not amount to defamation punishable under Section 499 I. P. C. in view of exception 9 given under Section 499 I. P. C. The learned counsel for the complainant contended that the burden is on the accused to prove that the news item falls under exceptions 1 and 9 given under Section 499 i. P. C. It cannot be disputed that the burden is on the accused to prove that the news item falls under any of the exceptions contained in section 499 I. P. C. But, the learned counsel for the accused contended that the burden is not of such a nature that the exception should be proved beyond reasonable doubt and that it is enough if the accused are able to prove the same by preponderance of probabilities. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied upon the full bench decision of the Apex Court in HARBAJAN SINGHs case (15 SUPRA) wherein the Apex Court held that where the burden of an issue lies upon the accused, he is not required to discharge that burden by leading evidence to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt, though the test prescribed while deciding whether the prosecution has discharged its onus to prove the guilt of the accused is that: the prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and the same test cannot be applied to the case of an accused person. The apex Court held that where an accused person is called upon to prove that his case falls under an exception, law treats the onus as discharged if the accused person succeeds "in proving a preponderance of probability," and as soon as the preponderance of probability is proved, the burden shifts to the prosecution which has still to discharge, its original onus. Their Lordships therein observed that where an accused person pleads an exception he must justify his plea, but the degree and character of proof which he is expected to furnish in support of the plea, cannot be equated with the degree and character of proof expected from the prosecution which is required to prove its case and that the onus on the accused may well be compared to the onus on a party in civil proceedings, just as in civil proceedings. That is also a case relating to defamation wherein the accused invoked the aid of Exception 9 to Section 499 I. P. C. Their Lordships in the cited case considered as to what is meant by good faith, which is found in Exception 9. The Apex Court in paragraph 19 of the judgment observed as follows:"that takes us to the question as to what the requirement of the good faith means. Good faith is defined by Section 52 of the Code. Nothing, says Section 52, is said to be done or believed in good faith, which is done or believed without due care and attention. Good faith is defined by Section 52 of the Code. Nothing, says Section 52, is said to be done or believed in good faith, which is done or believed without due care and attention. It will be recalled that under the General Clauses Act "a thing shall be deemed to be done in good faith where it is in fact done honestly whether it is done negligently or not," The element of honesty which is introduced by the definition prescribed by the General clauses Act is not introduced by the definition of the Code and we are governed by the definition prescribed by S. 52 of the Code. So, in considering the question as to whether the appellant acted in good faith in publishing his impugned statement, we have to enquire whether he acted with due care and attention. There is no doubt that the mere plea that the accused believed that what he stated was true by itself, will not sustain his case of good faith, under the Ninth exception. Simple belief or actual belief by itself is not enough. The appellant must show that the belief in his impugned statement had a rational basis and was not just a blind simple belief. That is where the element of due care and attention plays an important role. If it appears that before making the statement the accused did not show due care and attention, that would defeat his plea of good faith. " so in the instant case, it has to be seen whether the accused in this case succeeded to discharge their onus of proving the Exceptions 1 and 9. So far as Exception 1 is concerned, it must be shown that the contents of the news item are true. Here in the instant case, as already observed supra that the news item gives an impression that the two icons sought to be exported are antiques and that Kalanjali indulged in clandestine exports of valuable antiques to the foreign countries. As observed supra, that the authorities concerned did not so far declare that the said two icons are having antique value. Therefore, it cannot be said that the contents of news item are true. The fact of seizure of articles suspecting them to be antiques is not in dispute. As observed supra, that the authorities concerned did not so far declare that the said two icons are having antique value. Therefore, it cannot be said that the contents of news item are true. The fact of seizure of articles suspecting them to be antiques is not in dispute. But, merely because the seizure is true, it cannot be said that the seized articles are antiques whose export is prohibited under law. The matter is still under enquiry. Therefore, it cannot be said that Exception 1 comes to the aid of accused in this case. Coming to Ninth Exception making an imputation is not defamation, provided imputation is made in good faith for the protection of the interest of the public good. Good faith has been defined in Section 52 of the Indian Penal Code and it reads as follows: "good Faith":- Nothing is said to be done or believed in "good faith" which is done or believed without due care and attention. " ( 22 ) THE burden is on the accused to prove that they believed it as true and published the same in the interests of public. The accused have to further prove that they have taken due care and attention before believing the imputation as true. Here in the instant case, no witness has been examined on behalf of the accused except examination of accused No. 3 himself as DW-1. He simply stated that the customs officials have informed him but he did not examine none of the officers who said to have given him information regarding the nature of the icons sought to be exported by Kalanjali. He admitted that he did not even see the two icons, which were seized by the customs authorities. He did not examine any experts who had seen the icons to speak about the nature of the icons. Admittedly he did not enquire any person connected to Kalanjali to know the source from which Kalanjali secured those two icons for the purpose of sale to foreigners. The journalist who is interested in investigation has to make enquiries regarding the source from where Kalanajali secured those icons. Even that elementary investigation was not done by A-3. ( 23 ) IT is the case of the complainant that they purchased two idols viz. The journalist who is interested in investigation has to make enquiries regarding the source from where Kalanajali secured those icons. Even that elementary investigation was not done by A-3. ( 23 ) IT is the case of the complainant that they purchased two idols viz. one idol of parvathi made in brass from Swamimalai Icon manufacturing Co-operative Cottage Industrial Society Limited, thanjavur District, Tamilanadu, for a consideration of Rs. 18,000/-and one brass casted lamp lady for a consideration of Rs. 16,000/- and they produced the bills issued by the vendors along with the invoices. So the elementary duty of the investigating journalists is to make enquiry with Swamimalai Icon Manufacturing Co-operative Cottage industrial Society Limited, Thanjavur District, Tamilanadu. But, no such efforts have been made by A-3. From the fact of mere seizure of two icons, for the purpose of referring the same to the Archaeological department to know whether those idols are having any antique value, a-3 is not supposed to believe that those two idols are of antique value and Kalanjali is engaged in export of such antiques. Both the courts below have discussed the same at length and found that A-3 did not make proper enquiries and he did not take any due care and attention before publishing the news item which causes damage to the reputation of Kalanjali. Both the Courts below held that the accused failed to prove that the news item is true and they published the same in good faith and in the public interest. I do not find any perversity in the findings given by the Courts below in this regard. I entirely agree that the accused failed to prove that the contents of news item are true and the said news item was published in good faith and in the public good. ( 24 ) THE learned counsel for the accused contended that the prosecution failed to prove any malice or illwill on the part of the accused against the complainant beyond reasonable doubt and that in fact the appellate Court also found that malice or illwill is not proved and therefore it cannot be said that the news item was not published in good faith. It: is true that there is no sufficient evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that there was malice or illwill on the part of the accused to publish such a news item. It: is true that there is no sufficient evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that there was malice or illwill on the part of the accused to publish such a news item. Had there been no incident of seizure and the accused had created a false story, it can be said that the accused with malicious intention, in order to damage the business of the complainant published such a news item. But, in the instant case, it is true that the customs authorities suspected the icons sought to be exported as antiques and they referred the matter to the archaeological department who in turn referred the same to the archaeological Survey of India, New Delhi and that as per the directions of the Delhi High Court an expert committee is appointed. Under those circumstances, it cannot be said that the prosecution proved any malice or ill will on the part of the accused against the complainant. It is also true that the appellate Court also found that the prosecution failed to prove the malice or ill will on the part of the accused. But, in the absence of malice or ill will, it cannot be concluded that the accused published the news item in good faith and for the public good. The law is well settled that the absence of malice is not sufficient to prove the good faith. The accused has to prove that they took due care and caution before publishing the news. As already found supra, no evidence has been adduced on behalf of the accused to prove that proper enquiries have been made before publishing the new item which is detrimental to the interests of the complainant. The learned appellate Judge elaborately discussed the evidence on record and found that the evidence of DW-1 cannot be believed in this regard and held that the accused failed to prove good faith. I find no reason to interfere with such findings of the Courts. below. Hence, I find no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the accused. Thus, this point is found against the accused. I find no reason to interfere with such findings of the Courts. below. Hence, I find no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the accused. Thus, this point is found against the accused. ( 25 ) THE learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused challenged the very maintainability of the complaint on the ground that the name of margadarshi Private Limited is nowhere mentioned in the article and that the name of Kalanjali and Ramoji Rao alone are mentioned therein and Ramoji Rao has not filed any complaint for defamation and Kalanjali is only a shop and not a group of persons or association. Section 199 Cr. P. C. deals with prosecution for defamation. As per the said section, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code viz. Sections 500, 501 and 502 IPC except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence. The purport of the words"some person aggrieved by the offence" used in Section 199 Cr. P. C. fell for consideration before the Apex Court in JOHN THOMASs case (11 SUPRA ). In the said decision the Apex Court held that the collocation of the words "by some persons aggrieved" in Section 199 definitely indicates that the complainant need not necessarily be the defamed person himself. Whether the complainant has reason to feel hurt on account of the publication is a matter to be determined by the court depending upon the facts of each case. If a company is described as engaging itself in nefarious activities, its impact would certainly fall on every Director of the company and hence he can legitimately feel the pinch of it. It is further observed by the Apex court that if a firm is described in a publication as carrying on offensive trade, every working partner of the firm can reasonably be expected to feel aggrieved by it. "here in the instant case, it is in the evidence that Kalanjali is one of the divisions of the firm margadarshi Private Limited. In other words, Margadarshi Private Limited is doing business of selling icons under the name and style of Kalanjali. Merely because kalanjali by itself is not a firm or association of individuals, it cannot be said that the owner of kalanjali viz. In other words, Margadarshi Private Limited is doing business of selling icons under the name and style of Kalanjali. Merely because kalanjali by itself is not a firm or association of individuals, it cannot be said that the owner of kalanjali viz. Margadarshi Private Limited is not a person aggrieved of the defamatory article relating to the shop kalanjali. As the complainant herein is the person running the shop kalanjali, which is referred to in the publication, the complainant is entitled to initiate prosecution for defamation under Section -199 cr. P. C. I do not find any force in the contentions raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the accused in this regard. Thus, this point is held accordingly. ( 26 ) IT is not disputed that A-1 was described as Editor-in-Chief and not as Editor or editor and publisher. The learned counsel contended that there is no specific averment in the complaint to the effect that the editor-in-Chief had knowledge about the news item and that no specific evidence is also adduced in that regard and therefore it cannot be presumed that A-1 had knowledge. He submitted that no presumption under Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books act, 1867 can be drawn against the Chief Editor and that the Courts below erred in drawing presumption against A-1 who is Chief Editor of Vartha and hence the conviction and sentence imposed against A-1 is liable to be set aside. The learned counsel for the accused invited my attention to the decision of the Apex Court in HAJI C. H. MOHAMMAD KOYAs case (16 SUPRA) wherein the Apex Court held that the presumption under Section 7 of the Press and registration of Books Act, 1867 is not applicable to the Chief Editor of the newspaper who is not shown to be its editor as defined under section 1 (1) of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867. He also relied upon another decision of the Apex Court in k. M. MATHEWs CASE (6 SUPRA) in Criminal Appeal No. 701 of 1998 on the file of the Apex Court wherein the Apex Court held that though the Sections 7, 1 (1), 5, and 8-A of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 clearly show that there could be a presumption against the Editor whose name is printed in the newspaper to the effect that he is the Editor of such publication and that he is responsible for selecting the matter for publication and that similar presumption cannot be drawn against the Chief Editor, Resident editor or Managing Editor, nevertheless, the complainant can still allege and prove that they had knowledge and they were responsible for the publication of the defamatory news item and that even the presumption under Section 7 is a rebuttable presumption and the same could be proved otherwise and that by itself indicates that somebody other than the Editor can also be held responsible for selecting the matter for publication in a newspaper. The learned counsel also invited my attention to the decision of this Court in GIRISH sanghis CASE (18 SUPRA) in Criminal Petition No. 1045 of 1998 wherein it is held that in the complaint for defamation against the Chief Editor of the newspaper, it has to be specifically averred and shown that the defamatory matter has been published with his knowledge and that presumption under Section 7 cannot be invoked against him. He also relied upon a decision of this Court in Criminal petition Nos. 2821 and 3016 of 1999 in M. SIVA RAMA murthys case (17 SUPRA) wherein this Court held that presumption can be raised only in respect of the Editor and not Chief Editor. ( 27 ) AS against the said contention, the learned senior counsel for the complainant contended that the latest decision of the Apex Court in K. M. MATHEWs CASE (6 SUPRA) in Criminal Appeal No. 701 of 1998 on the file of the Apex Court cited supra does not come to the aid of the accused in this case and on the other hand it supports the case of the complainant. In the cited decision it is held that the Chief editor is not immune for prosecution under Section 499 I. P. C. and that the complainant can allege and prove that the Chief Editor had knowledge and is responsible for the publication of the defamatory news item and that in the instant case the editors name is not printed on the paper and that no separate reply was given on behalf of A-1 to the notice issued by the complainant and that in the common reply given on behalf of the accused, it is nowhere stated that A-1 had no knowledge of the publication though the complainant alleged in the notice that all the accused with the common intention published the impugned news item and therefore the Courts below rightly held that a-1 is also liable for punishment under Section 500 I. P. C. In HAJI C. H. MOHAMMAD KOYAs CASE (16 SUPRA), the Apex Court considered the object of Press and Registration of books Act and observed as follows:"the object of the Press Act was to regulate printing presses and newspapers in order to preserve copies of newspaper and books. Moreover, in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and uncertainties of liabilities, it was considered necessary to choose one of the persons from the staff and make him liable for all the articles or matters published in the paper so that any person aggrieved may sue only the person so named under the provisions of the Press Act and is relieved from the necessity of making a fishing or roving enquiry about persons who may have been individually responsible for the offending matters published in the paper. " ( 28 ) THE Apex Court further held that where a persons name is printed in the newspaper as its editor as required by Section 5 (1), section 7 of the Act raises a rebuttable presumption only against such editor and the said Editor can rebut such presumption by showing that he had nothing to do with the publication of the editorial or the news reports, but where a person is not shown in the paper to be its editor no such presumption under Section 7 of the press Act can be drawn but it must be held that he has no concern with the publishing of the article. ( 29 ) IN the latest decision, the Apex Court in K. M. MATHEWs case (6 SUPRA) held that there is no statutory immunity against managing Editor, Resident Editor or Chief Editor against any prosecution for the alleged publication of any matter in the newspaper over which these persons exercise control and that though Sections 7, 1 (1), 5, 8-A of the Act shows that there could be a presumption against the Editor whose name is printed in the newspaper to the effect that he is the Editor of such publication and that he is responsible for selecting the matter for publication, a similar presumption cannot be drawn against the chief editor, resident editor or managing editor, nevertheless, the complainant can still allege and prove that they had knowledge and they were responsible for the publication of the defamatory news item. ( 30 ) FROM the above said authorities, it is clear that that no presumption can be drawn under Section 7 of the Act against the chief Editor, but at the same time, the complainant can make specific allegation that the Chief Editor had knowledge of the news item and he is responsible for publication, and prove the same in order to secure conviction against the Chief Editor also as there is no statutory immunity from prosecution available for the Chief Editor. Now it has to be seen whether in the instant case the prosecution has made such specific allegation in the complaint and if so, whether the complainant adduced evidence to prove the said allegation. For this purpose, it is useful to extract the relevant portion in the complaint and also the evidence. The relevant portion in the complaint is the following:"the complainant submits that the first accused as the Editor, the second accused as the Printer and Publisher, the third accused as the author and the fourth accused as the owner of the newspaper vartha had the common object and intention to defame kalaniali and Sri Ramoji Rao and in furtherance of their object and intention, have deliberately caused the publication of the libelous news item and as such all the accused have committed the offence of defamation, as defined under Section 499, punishable under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code. " ( 31 ) THE only witness who spoke about the allegations made in the complaint is PW-1, the complainant. " ( 31 ) THE only witness who spoke about the allegations made in the complaint is PW-1, the complainant. The relevant portion in his evidence is the following:"the motive could be to damage the reputation of Kalanjali and the parent group of Eanadu, Margadarshi, Eanadu as is well known, has been a great success in the newspaper field with an average circulation that touched 5. 58 lakhs as at the end of December, 1995. The accused company who started a rival newspaper vartha could not come up as a potential rival to Eanadu, in this vital field, naturally effected by a situation like this, it appears to me that they (accused) have launched on a vilification missions aimed at the reputation and all that have been gone in favour of Eanadu. The A-1 as editor in chief of Vartha, the A-3 as reporter of this libelous item reported, A-2 for having published this item, A-4 for circulating among the public including those coming under the territorial jurisdiction of this court, I request this Court to award appropriate punishment under the relevant section. " ( 32 ) AS seen from the above said extracts, it is clear that there is no specific allegation made against A-1 to the effect that A-1 had knowledge about the publication and he is responsible for the selection and publication of the said news item in the newspaper dated 11. 08. 1996. The learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge in paragraph 42 of the judgment though observed that a presumption similar to the one in the case of editor cannot be drawn against the chief editor, nevertheless it can still be alleged and proved that he had knowledge and therefore responsible for the publication, failed to properly appreciate the averment made in the complaint and also the evidence adduced in support of the averments made in the complaint. The learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge observed that A-1 alone is named as Editor-in-Chief in the declaration Ex. The learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge observed that A-1 alone is named as Editor-in-Chief in the declaration Ex. P-21 and in the absence of anything to show that there was any other editor in control of the selection of the matter published in the newspaper, it has to be necessarily inferred that A-1 was the person who controlled the selection of the matter and that simply because A-1 was described as editor-in-chief, there is no statutory immunity against him, as laid down by the Apex Court in K. M. MATHEWs CASE (6 SUPRA ). The learned Judge failed to note that in a criminal case no such inference can be drawn. When statutory presumption is not available, it is not open for the Court to draw inference that Chief Editor had knowledge and he controlled the selection of the matter. The learned Judge though held that presumption is not available against the Chief Editor, yet, drew presumption in the form of inference and such drawing of inference is against the law laid down by the Apex Court k. M. MATHEWs CASE (6 SUPRA ). The learned Judge observed that in the notice Ex. P26 itself it was specifically alleged by the complainant that A-l was the Editor in chief that he had knowledge about the publication and it was deliberately published in premeditate intention to defame Kalanjali, in the reply notice Ex. P-27 which is given on behalf of the accused there is no denial of knowledge. The learned judge failed to note that there is no specific allegation against A-1 in the notice. Even otherwise, merely because A-1 did not give separate reply denying knowledge it does not absolve the complainant to plead and prove the same in order to secure conviction against the Chief editor. In a criminal case from the failure to give reply to the notice, no inference can be drawn against the accused in the absence of statutory presumption. Such an inference is permissible only in civil cases and not in criminal cases. In criminal cases, the complainant has to make specific allegation and then prove the same beyond reasonable doubt by adducing evidence. Here in the instant case, there is no specific allegation to the effect that A-1 had knowledge of the publication and he was responsible for the selection of the said article for publication of the same. In criminal cases, the complainant has to make specific allegation and then prove the same beyond reasonable doubt by adducing evidence. Here in the instant case, there is no specific allegation to the effect that A-1 had knowledge of the publication and he was responsible for the selection of the said article for publication of the same. Further, it is not as if nobody claimed responsibility for selection and publication of the said news item as was the case before the Apex Court in K. M. MATHEWs CASE (6 SUPRA) wherein the Apex Court observed that the editor not coming forward to admit responsibility for selecting the alleged defamatory matter published and in such circumstances, the complaint against Chief Editor is held maintainable. On that ground, the criminal appeals filed on behalf of the Chief Editor were dismissed. The said criminal appeals before the Apex Court arose out of petitions filed under Section 482 Cr. P. C. to quash the prosecution against them. Here in the instant case, this is a criminal appeal filed against conviction imposed after the trial of the case. Further, in the instant case, A-3 who is examined as DW-1 owned the responsibility for preparation and selection of the news item. It was elicited in the cross-examination of A-3 who is examined as DW-1 that he joined in vartha as a Chief of the news bureau and as the chief of bureau he was assigning work to the other staff members of the bureau and also writing some special stories of important public nature whenever situation warrants and as chief of the bureau he was assigning work to his team of reporters and also monitoring their work besides doing special stories as his own. He admitted that he is the person responsible for publication of the impugned news item. It is not as if nobody came forward to take the responsibility for the publication of the item in order to draw presumption against the editor or chief editor. In fact, as per the above decision of the Apex Court k. M. MATHEWs CASE (6 SUPRA) even the statutory presumption against the editor is rebuttable presumption and that is the reason why the Apex Court observed that such rebuttability itself indicates mat somebody other than the editor can also be responsible for selecting the matter for publication in newspaper. In fact, as per the above decision of the Apex Court k. M. MATHEWs CASE (6 SUPRA) even the statutory presumption against the editor is rebuttable presumption and that is the reason why the Apex Court observed that such rebuttability itself indicates mat somebody other than the editor can also be responsible for selecting the matter for publication in newspaper. Further in HAJI c. H. MOHAMMAD KOYAs CASE (16 SUPRA) the Apex Court discussed about the object of the Press Act and observed that to avoid multiplicity of suits and uncertainties of liabilities, it was considered necessary to choose one of the persons from the staff and make him liable for all the articles or matters published in the paper so that any person aggrieved may sue only the person so named under the provisions of the Press Act and is relieved from the necessity of making a fishing or roving enquiry about persons who may have been individually responsible for the offending matters published in the paper. From the above said observations of the Apex Court in HAJI c. H. MOHAMMAD KOYAs CASE (16 SUPRA) and also in k. M. MATHEWS CASE (6 SUPRA) it is clear that when the person connected with the newspaper owned up the responsibility for selection and publication of the same, the chief editor cannot be made liable in the absence of proof to the effect that the chief editor had knowledge about the news item and he was responsible for selection of the said item for publication in the newspaper. In the cross-examination of DW-1 it was not elicited that the impugned news item went to the knowledge of the chief editor before publication. It is not even elicited that al the news items to be published will be selected by the chief editor. It is simply elicited that A-1 is his immediate superior. Merely because A-1 is immediate superior to A-3, it cannot be said that the chief editor A-1 had knowledge about the impugned news item before publication. It is not as if A-3 is only a reporter. Because in the cross-examination it was elicited from DW-1 that he was the chief of bureau and he was assigning work to his team of reporters and also monitoring their work besides doing special stories as his own. It is not as if A-3 is only a reporter. Because in the cross-examination it was elicited from DW-1 that he was the chief of bureau and he was assigning work to his team of reporters and also monitoring their work besides doing special stories as his own. Under those circumstances, I am of the considered view that the complainant failed to make specific allegation regarding the alleged knowledge of A-1 and also failed to adduce any evidence in this regard to the effect that he had knowledge and was responsible for the publication of impugned news item. The learned Judge failed to take these circumstances into consideration and he mainly relied upon the failure of separate reply given bya-1 denying knowledge and drew inference against A-1. The said approach of the learned Judge is not in accordance with the norms laid down by the Apex Court and hence the said finding of the learned Judge is liable to be set aside and a-1 is to be found not guilty of any of the charges framed against him. The conviction and sentence passed against him for the offence punishable under Section 500 I. P. C. is liable to be set aside. Thus, this point is found against the complainant. ( 33 ) AS seen from the complaint A-2 is described as editor and publisher of the newspaper of Vartha as on the date of publication of the impugned news item. In the evidence also it is stated that A-2 is the publisher and printer of Vartha daily newspaper. Nothing was elicited in the cross-examination of PW-1 that A-2 is not the printer and publisher of Vartha. A-2 is convicted for the offence punishable under Section 501 I. P. C. As per Section 501 IPC whoever prints or engraves any matter, knowing or having good reasons to believe that such matter is defamatory of any person, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. It is not disputed that A-2 is the printer. It is found supra that the news item published is per se defamatory. Therefore, I do not find any illegality in the conviction recorded by the learned Magistrate. It is not disputed that A-2 is the printer. It is found supra that the news item published is per se defamatory. Therefore, I do not find any illegality in the conviction recorded by the learned Magistrate. The complainants counsel contended that the learned Judge erred in acquitting A-2 for the offence punishable under Sections 500 and 502 I. P. C. I find no force in such contention. Section 502 I. P. C. I find no force in such contention, deals with sale of printed or engraved substance containing defamatory matter. A-2 in the capacity of printer and publisher cannot be made liable for the offence punishable under Section 502 I. P. C. and also for the offence punishable under Section 500 I. P. C. In my considered view, the learned Judge rightly acquitted A-2 for the offences punishable under sections 500 and 502 I. P. C. I find no reason to set aside the acquittal in this regard as the reasons given by the learned Judge cannot be said to be perverse. Thus, these points are held accordingly. ( 34 ) AS it is found in points 1 and 2 that the news item is per se defamatory and the news item does not fall under exceptions 1 and 9, i have no hesitation to hold that A-3 who is responsible for publication of the impugned news item, he is liable for prosecution for the offence punishable under Section 500 I. P. C. So far as A-1 is concerned, in view of the finding on point No. 4, the conviction and sentence passed against him are liable to be set aside. The complainant contended that A-3 ought to have been convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 501 and 502 I. P. C. also. The learned Judge set aside the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial Court for the offences punishable under Sections 501 and 502 i. P. C. on the ground that Sections 501 and 502 I. P. C. are applicable only to printer and publisher and also the owner of the paper. I agree with the finding of the learned Judge. I find no perversity in the reasons given by the learned Judge in support of his finding that A-1 and A-3 cannot be convicted for the offences punishable under sections 501 and 502 I. P. C. Thus, these issues are held accordingly. I agree with the finding of the learned Judge. I find no perversity in the reasons given by the learned Judge in support of his finding that A-1 and A-3 cannot be convicted for the offences punishable under sections 501 and 502 I. P. C. Thus, these issues are held accordingly. ( 35 ) THE learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge set aside the sentence of imprisonment imposed against A-1 and A-3 for the offence punishable under Section 500 I. P. C. and restricted the sentence only to fine and similarly the learned Judge set aside the sentence imposed by the trial Court against A-2 for the offence punishable under Section 501 I. P. C. and restricted the sentence only to fine. Aggrieved by the same, the complainant filed two separate appeals for restoration of the sentences imposed by the trial Court. So far as A-1 is concerned, it is found supra in point No. 4 that the conviction imposed against A-1 in respect of any of the charges framed against him, are not sustainable in law, the question of enhancing of sentence does not arise. So far as a-2 and A-3 are concerned, though the trial Court had imposed sentence of rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months and also fine, the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge set aside the sentence of imprisonment and confined the sentence only to fine. The learned metropolitan Sessions Judge in paragraph 43 of its judgment observed that the offences are punishable only with simple imprisonment and therefore imposition of rigorous imprisonment by the trial Court is irregular. The learned Judge further observed that in fact, there is no malice or illwill shown to be existing behind the publication and that though proof of malice is not required to bring home the guilt of the accused under Section 499 I. P. C. , the absence of malicious intention makes considerable difference as a mitigating circumstance in the matter of awarding of punishment and that this appears to be a case of over stepping the limits in the process of investigative journalism and not taking the necessary precautions required to be taken and that under those circumstances, it is held that imposition of sentence of imprisonment is not called for and the ends of justice will be met by imposing sentence of payment of fine. I do not find any perversity in the reasons given by the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge for confining the sentence to fine by setting aside the sentence of imprisonment. The learned counsel relied upon the two decisions in mohammad NAZIRs CASE (3 SUPRA) and CHAMAN lals CAE (5 SUPRA) wherein it is held that the sentence for the offences punishable under Sections 500 502 I. P. C. should be severe. But, the facts of those cases are not similar to the facts of this case. In cassidy v. DAILY MIRRO NEWSPAPERS LTDs CASE (2 SUPRA) the facts are that at a time when Hindu-Mamomedan differences were very acute a Mahomedan editor published an article under the guise of rumour containing defamatory matter against the complainant who was of perfectly good character, perfectly good reputation, respected in the town in which he lived, a man of position and a man very closely identified with the activities of Hindu religion and in that article he was charged with having poisoned his own son and of having done that because the son had wished to become a convert to Islam. On such facts the Allahabad High Court held that the said article is false and it was published with a view to create communal disturbance and therefore sentence of imprisonment is warranted. In CHAMAN LALs CASE (5 SUPRA) the Apex Court refused to accede to the request of reduction of sentence from three months to two months. The facts of that case are that the accused therein wrote a letter attributing unchastity to a woman, the complainant therein and that illicit intimacy was attributed to her with several persons without any basis and under those circumstances, the apex Court refused to reduce the sentence of imprisonment. But, in the instant case, it is found that there is no malice on the part of the accused in publishing the news item. It is also not disputed that the two icons were seized suspecting that they are of antique value and it is also not disputed that the matter is referred to the Archaeological survey of India which in turn referred it to the expert committee as per the directions of the Delhi High Court and that the said committee is yet to give the finding regarding the antiquity or otherwise of those items. Taking all the circumstances into consideration, the learned metropolitan Sessions Judge considered that this is not a case, which warrants sentence of imprisonment and that the fine would meets the ends of justice. I entirely agree with the finding of the learned metropolitan Sessions Judge and I find no reason to enhance the sentence imposed by the Metropolitan Sessions Judge. I find no reason to interfere with the reasoned order passed by the learned metropolitan Sessions Judge regarding the sentence imposed against a-2 and A-3. Thus, this point is found against the complainant. ( 36 ) IN THE RESULT, the judgment of the learned Metropolitan sessions Judge is set aside only to the extent of the conviction and sentence imposed against A-1 and in all other respects, the judgment of the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge is confirmed. Consequently, Crl. R. C. No. 861 of 2003 is allowed in part and the conviction and sentence passed against A-1 is set aside and is partly dismissed confirming the conviction and sentence passed against A-3. Crl. R. C. No. 737 of 2003 filed on behalf of A-2 and A-4 is dismissed and the conviction and sentence passed against them by the metropolitan Sessions Judge are confirmed. Crl. A. Nos. 583 of 2003 and 586 of, 2003 filed against the order of acquittal are dismissed. Crl. R. C. Nos. 809 and 859 of 2003 filed on behalf of the complainant for enhancement of sentence were also dismissed.