JUDGMENT B.D. Agarwal, J. 1. This is the third round of litigation. The earlier suit was filed by the present appellant No. 1, Shri Nambam Mangi Singh. The appellants No. 2 and 3 were the proforma defendants. Respondent No. 5, Smt. Phijam (N) Nungshitombi Devi was the principal Defendant No. 1. The said suit was registered as Title Suit No. 2 of 1989. The suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiffs, which was challenged in the court of District Judge. The appeal was numbered as F.A. No. 1 of 1995. While disposing of the appeal, the suit was remanded back for fresh disposal vide judgment and order dated 16.01.1994. This remand order was assailed in the High Court vide Second Appeal No. 9 of 1996. The High Court approved the order of remand. Accordingly, the suit went back to the original court for fresh disposal. Thereafter, the suit was re-numbered as Original Suit No. 40 of 2000. This time the suit was dismissed on 31.11.2001. However, the trial Court's judgment was set aside in F.A. No. 5 of 2002. The said decree was assailed before this Court in Second Appeal No. 2 of 2002. This Second Appeal was dismissed, upholding the decree in favour of Shri Mangi Singh vide judgment and order dated 14.8.2003. 2. In the third round, the maternal aunts and uncle of the land owner, Inakhunbi Devi, Khomdonbi Devi, Pashot Devi and (L) Jayantakumar Singh instituted the instant suit seeking a decree of rights, title and interest over the same suit land. The suit was registered as Original Suit No. 45 of 2003 in the court of Civil Judge, Sr. Division No. 1, Manipur East. Subsequently, the suit was re-numbered as 19 of 2004. The plaintiffs also prayed for a declaration that the earlier decree passed in favour of Shri Mangi Singh, affirmed in First Civil Appeal No. 5 of 2001 as well as in the Second Appeal No. 2 of 2002, was obtained by committing fraud. In other words, the plaintiffs also prayed for a decree to set aside the earlier decree and consequential relief of perpetual injunction against Shri Mangi Singh. Other defendants of the previous suit were impleaded as proforma defendants. 3. The learned Addl. In other words, the plaintiffs also prayed for a decree to set aside the earlier decree and consequential relief of perpetual injunction against Shri Mangi Singh. Other defendants of the previous suit were impleaded as proforma defendants. 3. The learned Addl. District Judge (FTC), Manipur East has decreed the suit in favour of Smt. Inakhumbi Devi and others and has also decreed that the earlier decree passed in favour of Shri Mangi Singh by the District Judge, Manipur East on 10.4.2002 in First Appeal No. 5 of 2001 and affirmed by the High Court in Second Appeal No. 2 of 2002 were fraudulently obtained. The learned trial judge has further declared that the plaintiffs shall inherit the suit land with the building situated thereon and more particularly described in Schedule A of the plaint under rule of succession laid down in Section 8 read with Clause II, Entry IX of the Schedule of Hindu Succession Act, 1956, (hereinafter the 'H.S. Act' in brief). This judgment and decree is under challenge in the present appeal. 4. I have heard at length, Shri Ch. Robinchandra, learned Counsel for the appellants and Shri A. Nilamani Singh, learned senior counsel, assisted by Shri A. Bimol Singh, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have also perused the impugned judgment; the judgment of the second appeal as well as the records. 5. Before entering into the merits of the appeal, it would be apposite to give a brief history as to how the parties are related to each other and how the cause of action has arisen. The suit land was the acquired property of late Nambam Kunjabihari Singh, S/O (L) N. Parijat Singh. The said Kunjabihari Singh died in the year 1940 leaving behind his widow Apabi Devi and two sons, namely, Jayantakumar Singh and Tamphamani Singh. Tamphamani Singh died in the year 1937 without any survivor. Jayantakumar Singh also died in the year 1987 without leaving any legal heirs. The present appellants are the sisters and nephews/niece of Apabi Devi (mother of Jayantakumar Singh). 6. Jayantakumar Singh's grandfather, Parijat Singh had 5 (five) half-blood brothers through his stepmother. Late N. Paka Singh was one of such half-blood brother. The defendant, Shri Mangi Singh is the son of the said Paka Singh through second wife and defendant Gambhini Devi is the daughter through first wife. 6. Jayantakumar Singh's grandfather, Parijat Singh had 5 (five) half-blood brothers through his stepmother. Late N. Paka Singh was one of such half-blood brother. The defendant, Shri Mangi Singh is the son of the said Paka Singh through second wife and defendant Gambhini Devi is the daughter through first wife. On the other hand, the defendant, Chandani Devi is the daughter of Parijat Singh through first wife. 7. After the death of Kunjabihari Singh, his wife Apabi Devi married another person, namely, Phijam Yaima Singh, sometime in the year 1951-52. Apabi Devi died in the year 1975. Defendant No. 2, Ph. Nungshitombi Devi, is the daughter of the said Apabi Devi, through second husband. In this way, proforma defendant No. 2 is the uterine sister of Jayantakumar Singh. Defendants No. 1, 3 and 4 are the agnates of late Jayantakumar whereas defendant No. 2 is the cognate in relation. In other words, the entire suit/appeal revolves around the question whether the suit property will be inherited by the legal heirs of Jayantakumar through his paternal side or maternal aunts and their legal heirs. 8. Shri Robinchandra Singh, learned Counsel for the appellants, submitted that since Apabi Devi re-married one Phijam Yaima Singh, she lost her all the rights of inheritance in the property left behind by (L) Kunjabihari Singh and his son Jayantakumar Singh. This submission has been made by the learned Counsel for the appellants on the basis of the provisions of the Hindu Widows Re-Marriage Act, 1856 (briefly, 'Re-marriage Act'). According to the learned Counsel, since Apabi Devi re-married before the enactment of Hindu Succession Act in 1956, the provisions of the said law will not be applicable to decide the line of inheritance, more so because Re-marriage Act was repealed only in the year 1983 vide Act No. 24 of 1983. In other words, till the death of Apabi Devi in the year 1975, the Re-marriage Act was still prevailing. According to the learned Counsel for the appellants, under Section 2of Re-marriage Act, all the rights of a widow in her deceased husband's property would seize on her re-marriage before the repeal of Re-Marriage Act. Hence, the sisters, nephews/nieces of Apabi Devi as well as the daughter of Apabi Devi through her second husband (proforma D-2) would not inherit the suit property, which belonged to the son of Apabi Devi. Hence, the sisters, nephews/nieces of Apabi Devi as well as the daughter of Apabi Devi through her second husband (proforma D-2) would not inherit the suit property, which belonged to the son of Apabi Devi. According to the learned Counsel, if the above named legal heirs through the maternal side are excluded, Shri Mangi Singh, being the nearest legal heir of Jayantakumar, would inherit the same property. 9. Learned Counsel for the appellants also submitted that the learned trial judge has committed an error and impropriety in deciding the suit adopting the procedures incorporated in Order X of the Code of Civil Procedure which permits the court to ascertain the allegations made in the pleading without a full-fledged trial. 10. Per contra, Shri Nilamani Singh, learned senior counsel for the respondents submitted that the genealogy of the family tree clearly establishes that the plaintiffs/respondents are the Class-II legal heirs, who are placed in higher status than agnates, namely, Mangi Singh. However, the fact of living of Class-II heirs was suppressed in the earlier suit filed by Shri Mangi Singh. He has also conspicuously evaded to deny this reality in the written statement of the present suit. Learned Counsel also contended that the deceased Jayantakumar did not leave behind any Class-I legal heir nor any legal heir falling in category (I) to (VIII) in the line of legal heirs. Hence, the suit property has devolved upon the respondents, who fall in the category (IX) of Class-II. 11. Referring to Section 8 of the H.S. Act, the learned Counsel submitted that the turn of agnates and cognates will come only if there is no Class-I or Class-II legal heirs of the male deceased. According to the learned Counsel, the principal defendant No. 3 and 4 are also agnates and as such they have been correctly denied the right of inheritance by the trial court. So far the defendant No. 2, Smt. P. (N) Nungshitombi Devi is concerned, she is the uterine sister of the deceased Jayantakumar Singh through the step-father of his mother, Apabi Devi and as such, the defendant No. 2 is also not entitled to inherit the property. I would like to make it clear that this defendant No. 2 had also supported the claim of Shri Mangi Singh in the earlier suit. I would like to make it clear that this defendant No. 2 had also supported the claim of Shri Mangi Singh in the earlier suit. However, during the pendency of the Second Appeal No. 2 of 2002, the said uterine sister of the deceased changed her stand and requested the High Court to allow her to amend her written statement to say that the Shri Mangi Singh would not inherit the property since the maternal aunts and uncle were alive and they being the Class-II legal heirs would inherit the property. This application of Nungshitombi Devi was registered as Misc. Application No. 55 of 2002 and culminated in the judgment of Second Appeal No. 2 of 2002 dated 14.8.2003. 12. Dealing with the Re-marriage Act, Shri Nilamani Singh, learned senior counsel for the respondents submitted that even this law will not help the appellants to inherit the property. In the opinion of the learned senior counsel, even if Apabi Devi (mother of Jayantakumar) lost her limited right on the suit land due to her re-marriage in the year 1951, the property would devolve upon the next heirs of her deceased husband in order of succession laid down in Sec. 8 of the H.S. Act. According to the learned senior counsel, the appellant, Shri Mangi Singh is not the immediate legal heir of the husband of Apabi Devi, namely, Jayantakumar and as such, he would not inherit the property. It was also submitted by the learned Counsel that had Apabi Devi died after her son, the situation would have been different. However, Jayantakumar died in the month of January, 1987 whereas his mother Apabi Devi died in the year 1975 and in this way, Apabi Devi did not get inheritance right. Consequently, her sisters and nephews/nieces (the plaintiffs) are entitled to inherit the property as per rule of succession embodied under Section 8 of the H.S. Act. 13. Before dealing with the rival submissions, I would like to set out two charts (Annexures-A/1 and A/2 in this Judgment) showing the pedigree of the predecessors-in-interests of the suit land. The first chart shows the status of the parties in the present appeal arising out of the Original Suit No. 45 of 2003 arid the second chart shows the status of the parties in the previous suit i.e. O.S. No. 2 of 1989. However, there is no difference in the line of genealogy. The first chart shows the status of the parties in the present appeal arising out of the Original Suit No. 45 of 2003 arid the second chart shows the status of the parties in the previous suit i.e. O.S. No. 2 of 1989. However, there is no difference in the line of genealogy. I would also like to mention here that these charts have been prepared on the basis of the chart of family tree enclosed with the plaint, which was not disputed by the contesting defendants. 14. In the earlier suit, Shri Mangi Singh though impleaded Phijam (N) Nungshitombi Devi as one of the defendants but he had conspicuously left out other sisters and brother of the said Apabi Devi. This has been termed as fraud, allegedly committed by Shri Mangi Singh in obtaining the previous decree. According to the plaintiffs/respondents Shri Mangi Singh had intentionally concealed the fact that Apabi Devi was survived by her sisters and brothers only to stake a false claim that he is nearest legal heir of Jayantakumar. It is also alleged by the plaintiffs/respondents that in the earlier suit, Shri Mangi Singh also falsely claimed that his father Paka Singh and grandfather of Jayantakumar, namely Parijat Singh were brothers in full-blood. 15. A bare look of the pedigree chart shows that the deceased Jayantakumar was the grandson of Parijat Singh through his second wife. Similarly, Paka Singh was the step brother of Parijat Singh, being the son through second wife of their father. It may also be mentioned here that the remaining legal heirs, except Chandani Devi, predeceased Jayantakumar. The said Chandani Devi was made a party both in the earlier suit as well as in the present suit/ appeal. Similarly, the step sister of Shri Mangi Singh, namely, Gambhini Devi was also a party in the earlier suit as well as in the present suit. It appears from the chart that the Paka Singh had 5 (five) brothers. However, Shri Mangi Singh did not implead the remaining uncles in the earlier suit, for the best reasons known to him. I have already said that the sisters and brother of Apabi Devi were also necessary party but they were also conspicuously not impleaded in the earlier suit. However, Shri Mangi Singh did not implead the remaining uncles in the earlier suit, for the best reasons known to him. I have already said that the sisters and brother of Apabi Devi were also necessary party but they were also conspicuously not impleaded in the earlier suit. Hence the finding of the lower court that the earlier suit was obtained on mis-representation and by way of non-impleading of necessary parties is correct and the decree of the earlier suit has rightly been declared as null and void on this count. 16. Few observations made by this Court in Second Appeal No. 2 of 2006 would also give support to the fact that Shri Mangi Singh had obtained the decree on the basis of incorrect statements and that he had distorted his relation with the predecessors-in-interest of the land. Some of the observations are necessary to be reproduced: 41. Now, the next dispute remains to be solved is whether N. Parijat Singh is full-blood brother of Nambam Paka Singh. The defendant/appellant has alleged that they are not full-blood brothers but step-brothers, but as already discussed earlier, there is neither proper pleading nor evidence on record to substantiate this allegation. The contentions of the plaintiff/respondent as per the pleading is that they are full-blood brothers. PW No. 1 is the plaintiff/respondent who has deposed on oath that Nambam Paka Singh and Nambam Parijat Singh are the sons of Nambam Leishang Singh, as discussed above, the property does not belong to Nambam Leishang Singh but belonged to Angom Leishang Singh as per Ext. A/1. Therefore, the plaintiff/respondent also failed to establish satisfactorily the connection of the suit land through genealogy. 43. Concluding therefore, I find that evidence on record could not establish that N. Paka Singh and N. Parijat Singh were full-blood brothers by cogitable and legal evidence. It is only the isolated statement of the plaintiff/respondent which cannot be accepted as the only truth, being oath versus oath, in view of the denial to the that effect on oath by the appellant/defendant. The evidence in this aspect being mutually conflicting and inconsistent in nature, could not be accepted to find and hold whether Paka Singh was the full-brother or half-brother of late N. Parijat Singh. But that will not tilt the balance in favour of the appellant and she will remain evitable in due course, if no better heir is traceable. The evidence in this aspect being mutually conflicting and inconsistent in nature, could not be accepted to find and hold whether Paka Singh was the full-brother or half-brother of late N. Parijat Singh. But that will not tilt the balance in favour of the appellant and she will remain evitable in due course, if no better heir is traceable. 44. Question - (d): Under the facts and circumstances as discussed above, non-impleadment of other probable heirs in class-II is not fatal because materials on record could not conclusively establish-there are any class-II heirs and if so, who exactly are they? And what are their full particulars? Rule 8 of Order 1 of C.P.C. bars suit only in case of non-joinder of necessary party. Here, it is still to be ascertained whether and who are, if at all, the necessary parties left out. Plaintiff has cited accrual of cause of action on the objection raised by defendant No. 1/appellant during mutation case. So, under the present frame of the suit, I think, the objection may not be entertained. If any better agnates ever appear to contest the suit, the matter may be otherwise. 17. Now I shall examine as to who are the next legal heirs of the predecessors-in-interest of the suit land, namely, Jayantakumar. Section 8 of the H.S. Act has laid down the general rules of successions in the case of male Hindus. Since the issue revolves around this provision of law, it would be proper to quote the Section 8 in extenso: 8. General rules of succession in the case of males: The property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the provisions of this Chapter. (a) firstly, upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in Class I of the Schedule; (b) secondly, if there is no heir of class I, then upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in class II of the Schedule; (c) thirdly, if there is no heir of any of the two classes, then upon the agnates of the deceased; and (d) lastly, if there is no agnate, then upon the cognates of the deceased. 18. From the enclosed genealogical chart, it is abundantly clear that Jayantakumar was not survived by any Class-I legal heir. Similarly, no Class-II legal heirs under Entry No. I to VIII are also available. 18. From the enclosed genealogical chart, it is abundantly clear that Jayantakumar was not survived by any Class-I legal heir. Similarly, no Class-II legal heirs under Entry No. I to VIII are also available. Entry No. IX recognizes mother's brother and mother's sister as Class-II legal heirs. In the present case, the plaintiff Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are the mother's sister and the plaintiff/respondent No. 4 are the children of the mother's brother of the deceased. In this way, the appellant Shri Mangi Singh and others do not fall in either category. They could have inherited the property only in absence of Class-I or Class-II legal heirs being agnates and cognates under Clause (c) and (d) of Section 8 of the H.S. Act. 19. Coincidently, the main contesting defendant, namely, Shri Mangi Singh has categorically admitted in his written statement that he is the agnate of late intestate, Jayantakumar. The relevant portion of the said statement is extracted below: It is submitted that the Principal defendant No. 1, Shri Mangi Singh is the sole agnate heir to intestate Jayantakumar Singh upon whom the suit land devolves under the H.S. Act, 1956, as there is neither Class-I nor Class-II heirs. 20. The said appellant has claimed in the written statement that his father Paka Singh and paternal grand-father of Jayantakumar, namely, Parijat Singh were full-blood brothers. This relationship was shown to put the defendant on a higher pedestal of legal heirs. However, in the oral evidence the relationship was slightly diluted. In the oral statement except saying that both Paka Singh and Parijat Singh, being brothers, the defendant did not reiterate that they were full-blood brothers. However, family tree clearly shows that Parijat Singh and Paka Singh were half-blood brothers through different mothers. As such, it stands proved that Shri Mangi Singh is only an agnate of Jayantakumar. Be that as it may the admission of Shri Mangi Singh being the aganate of the deceased clinches the issue and in terms of the rule of succession, embodied under Section 8 of H.S. Act, he is interior in status than the plaintiffs/respondents, who fall in category (b) of Section 8. In fact, the defendant No. 2 has also supported the above lineage of legal heirs. The defendant Nos. 3 and 4 have also not improved the alleged claim of Shri Mangi Singh to inherit the property. In fact, the defendant No. 2 has also supported the above lineage of legal heirs. The defendant Nos. 3 and 4 have also not improved the alleged claim of Shri Mangi Singh to inherit the property. Hence, the findings of the trial court under issue No. 1 are hereby upheld. 21. Regarding the possession of the suit land by the defendant No. 2, namely, Nungshitombi Devi, no argument was advanced in the appeal. This is virtually an admitted position that the defendant No. 2 is occupying the suit land. This uterine sister of the predecessor-in-interest of the suit land is occupying the property being a permissive possessor. Hence, I do not see any infirmity in the finding given under issue No. 2. 22. Now another pertinent question to be addressed by me is whether Apabi Devi lost her inheritance right after her remarriage with one Phijam Yaima Singh in the year 1951. Shri Robinchandra Singh, learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that under Section 2 of the Re-Marriage Act, the said widow of Jayantakumar ceased to inherit the property. Under the said law, the property of such widow vests to the next heirs of her deceased husband. According to the learned Counsel, Mangi Singh, being the nearest legal heir of Jayantakumar after the re-marriage of his mother, is entitled to inherit the suit property. 23. For ready reference, it is necessary to reproduce the Section 2 of the Re-Marriage Act which runs as below: 2. Rights of widow in deceased husband's property to cease on her re-marriage-- All rights and interests which any widow may have in her deceased husband's property by way of maintenance, or by inheritance to her husband or to his lineal successors, or by virtue of any will or testamentary disposition conferring upon her, without express permission to re-marry, only a limited interest in such property, with no power of alienating the same, shall upon her remarriage cease and determine as if she had then died; andthe next heirs of her deceased husband, or other persons entitled to the property on her death, shall thereupon succeed to the same. (Emphasis is mine) 24. Learned Counsel for the appellants also cited the authority of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Velamuri Venkata Siva Prasad v. Kothuri Vengkateswarlu and Ors. (Emphasis is mine) 24. Learned Counsel for the appellants also cited the authority of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Velamuri Venkata Siva Prasad v. Kothuri Vengkateswarlu and Ors. AIR 2000 SC 434 and submitted that the absolute right conferred under Section 14(1) of the H.S. Act will have no effect since Apabi Devi had re-married when the Re-Marriage Act was in force. According to the learned Counsel, the Re-Marriage Act was repealed only in the year 1983 vide Act 24 of 1983 whereas Apabi Devi re-married in the year 1951. 25. On the other hand, according to the learned Counsel for the respondents, remarriage of Apabi Devi has not changed the situation and it has not affected the line of inheritance. According to the learned Counsel for the respondents, it is nobody's case that Apabi Devi was in possession of the suit land or that she had ever inherited any part of the land before her re-marriage or before the death of her son. Hence, inheritance right of other legal heirs remains in the same position. 26. In the case of Vellamurli (supra), the Apex Court has held that though the re-marriage of a widow stands legalized under H.S. Act but on her re-marriage, she forfeits her right over the property if it occasioned before the repeal of Remarriage Act in the year 1983. There cannot be any scope to explain the legal proposition about the loss of inheritance right of a widow on her re-marriage as enunciated by the Apex Court. However, the facts in the cited case are totally different from the case in hand. In the aforesaid case, a Will was also executed by the widow's husband restricting her rights of enjoyment and thereafter, the suit was also compromised in between the parties. 27. Coming to the facts of the case in hand, I find that when Apabi Devi died in the year 1975, her son Jayantakumar, who is the undisputed owner of the suit land, was alive. The said Jayantakumar died only in the year 1987 and as such, there was no question of inheritance of any right over the suit property by his mother, i.e., Apabi Devi either at the time of her re-marriage in the year 1951 or any time prior to her death. The said Jayantakumar died only in the year 1987 and as such, there was no question of inheritance of any right over the suit property by his mother, i.e., Apabi Devi either at the time of her re-marriage in the year 1951 or any time prior to her death. The only other child of Apabi Devi was the daughter, namely, Tamphamani Devi who also died in the year 1937 without leaving behind any heir. In this way, the question of inheritance arose only on the death of Jayantakumar and this Court has to examine as to who is/are the nearest legal heirs of the said Jayantakumar at the time of death. The answer to this question has already been given by the trial court as well as by me in the preceding paragraphs. We have held that the appellants are agnates and cognates whereas, the respondents are Class-II legal heirs of the predecessors-in-interest. In this given situation, there is no effect of re-marriage of Apabi Devi. 28. The above apart, the Re-Marriage Act also says that the next heirs of the deceased husband would inherit the property in the event of re-marriage of a widow. Conspicuously the said Remarriage Act has not laid down the line of succession. Besides this, Section 2 has also not explicitly laid down that the property will devolve only to the legal heirs from the paternal side and that it will not devolve upon legal heirs from the maternal side under any circumstance. Hence, we have to fall back to Section 8 of the H.S. Act to decide the line of inheritance. According to this general rule of succession, the respondents are Class-II legal heirs and better placed than appellants. As such, they have been rightly declared to inherit the property by the lower court. 29. Learned Counsel for the appellants also attempted to take the help of Section 27 of the H.S. Act which disentitles a disqualified person from inheriting the property. Section 27 reads as under: 27. Succession when heir disqualified-- if any person is disqualified from inheriting any property under this Act, it shall devolve if such person had died before intestate. (emphasis is mine) 30. Admittedly, the H.S. Act has not defined such disqualified persons nor Section 27 has also given any list of disqualified persons. Section 27 reads as under: 27. Succession when heir disqualified-- if any person is disqualified from inheriting any property under this Act, it shall devolve if such person had died before intestate. (emphasis is mine) 30. Admittedly, the H.S. Act has not defined such disqualified persons nor Section 27 has also given any list of disqualified persons. Despite such omissions, the disqualification mentioned in Section 27may be inferred from certain disqualifications laid down under Sections 24, 25 and 26 of the H.S. Act. Under Section 24, widow of pre-deceased son, grandson and brothers of the intestate have been prohibited from inheriting the property if they re-married on the date the succession opens. In the present case, the widow, Apabi Devi was the mother of the intestate and as such she does not fall in the list of disqualified person given under Section 24. Similarly, Sections 25 and 26 have disqualified murders and persons who convert to any other religion from inheriting the intestate property. These are also not applicable in the present case. Hence, I hold that neither Section 24 nor Section 27 of the H.S. Act is attracted in the case before me. 31. The last submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants relates to the procedural aspects of the trial. Admittedly, the suit was decided by examining the parties under Order X of the Code of Civil Procedure. Shri Robinchandra, learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that this procedure can be adopted before framing of issues, whereas in the present case, the learned trial Judge adopted the same after framing of issues. 32. No doubt, few issues were framed prior to examining the parties under Order X. At the same time, from the record, I find that the process of framing of issues did not complete since few defendants were impleaded subsequently. Hence, it cannot be said that the learned trial Judge has committed any patent illegality or incurable irregularity. Besides this, no objection was raised by any of the defendants for giving their statements under the said Order. Rather, the statements were given voluntarily. Ironically, the legal heir of defendant No. 3 late Chandani Devi was represented by the learned Counsel himself. Hence, by no stretch of words it can be said that the defendants were taken by surprise. Hence, challenge to the impugned judgment on this score is without any merit. 33. Rather, the statements were given voluntarily. Ironically, the legal heir of defendant No. 3 late Chandani Devi was represented by the learned Counsel himself. Hence, by no stretch of words it can be said that the defendants were taken by surprise. Hence, challenge to the impugned judgment on this score is without any merit. 33. While dealing with procedural infraction of the Code of Civil Procedure, in the case of Pukhraj D. Jain and Ors. v. G. Gopalakrishna AIR 2004 SC 3504 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has given the following observations: It is not for litigant to dictate to the court as to how proceedings are to be conducted, but it is for court to decide what will be the best course to be adopted for an expeditious disposal of the case. 34. It is true that the said observations have been made for alleged noncompliance of Section 10 of Code of Civil Procedure. However, the spirit of the observation is squarely applicable in the present situation. I say so because elaborate depositions of witnesses were recorded in the former suit and the witnesses were also extensively cross-examined earlier. Hence, the trial court has rightly prevented the parties from repeating the same procedure. Hence, the procedure adopted by the court below is approved by me, more particularly, in view of the soothing remarks of the Apex Court. In the result, I hold that the appeal is devoid of any merit. The same is hereby dismissed. The impugned judgments and decree are hereby upheld. However, I leave both parties to bear their own expenses of this appeal. Appeal dismissed.