JUDGMENT Respondent filed the suit against the revision petitioners for recovery of money in which they filed their written statement on 01-07-1997 contesting the claim. After trial of the suit was taken up, revision petitioner filed a petition seeking permission of the Court to file additional written statement making a counter claim, which was allowed by the trial Court by its order dated 13-11-03. Questioning the said order respondent preferred CRP No. 6251 of 2003 to this Court. By the order dated 10-12-2004, a learned Single Judge of this Court, while setting aside the order of the trial Court, remitted the case to the trial Court for fresh disposal on the question of limitation and pecuniary jurisdiction for considering the maintainability of the counter-claim. After remand the trial Court dismissed the petition by the order under revision on the ground of limitation, without going into the question of pecuniary jurisdiction. Hence, this revision. 2. The main contention of Sri Koka Raghava Rao, learned senior counsel appearing for the revision petitioners is that since the order of remand directed the trial Court to give a finding on the pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the claim made in the counter-claim and since the trial Court failed to give such a finding the petition may again be remanded to the trial Court to give specific finding on the point of jurisdiction. His next contention is that the trial court was in error in holding that the counter-claim is barred by time by overlooking the fact that limitation is a mixed question of law and fact and so it cannot be decided without evidence being adduced and strongly relied on Smt. Shanti Rani Das Dewanjee v. Dinesh Chandra Day (Died) by LRs; Mahendra Kumar and another v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others; Indian Bank, Warangal Branch v. Srinivasa Timber Depot, Warangal and others; and Jagmohan Chawla and another v. Dera Radha Swami Satsang and others in support of his contention. 3. 3. The contention of Sri Alluri Krishnam Raju learned counsel for the respondent is that since the counter claim is in the nature of a plaint and since the Court , while considering the maintainability of the counterclaim, looks into the allegations in the counter and rejects it if it is barred by any of the provisions contemplated by Rule 11 of Order 7 CPC, the trial Court rightly held that the claim is barred by time and so there are no grounds to interfere with the order under revision. 4. As rightly contended by Sri Raghava Rao, a counter-claim cannot be rejected merely on the ground that the cause of action therefor is different from the cause of action on which the plaintiff made the claim, as it is well known that a counter-claim can also be made on a different cause of action which accrued to the defendant after the institution of the suit by the plaintiff subject to the proviso that such cause of action must have accrued before the time fixed for filing of the written statement expires. See Mahendra Kumar case (2 supra) and Jagmohan Chawla (4 supra) relied on by Sri Koka Raghava Rao, learned senior counsel. Rule 6-A of Order 8 CPC also clearly lays down that the counter claim should be in respect of a cause of action accruing to the defendant against the plaintiff either before or after filing of the suit, “but before the defendant has delivered his defence or before the time limit has expired”.(emphasis applied) 5. Taking support from the observations in Srinivasa Timber Depot case (3 supra), where the question relating to limitation was kept open, Sri Raghava Rao contended that inasmuch as limitation is a mixed question of law and fact question of limitation may be left open to be decided after trial and the counterclaim may be ordered to be received. Since complete facts in Srinivasa Timber Depot case (3 supra) are not known from the reported decision that decision is not of much help to the revision petitioner. In Shanti Rani Das Dewanjee case (1 supra) as the suit was instituted on 15-07-1982 and the counterclaim was presented on 22-6-1985 it was held that the cause of action for the counter claim ex-facie was not barred by limitation. 6. As stated earlier the written statement in this case was filed in 1997. In Shanti Rani Das Dewanjee case (1 supra) as the suit was instituted on 15-07-1982 and the counterclaim was presented on 22-6-1985 it was held that the cause of action for the counter claim ex-facie was not barred by limitation. 6. As stated earlier the written statement in this case was filed in 1997. The counter claim intended to be made by the revision petitioners does not contain the cause of action paragraph. The averments in the counter claim do not give an indication as to when the cause of action, to make the claim mentioned therein, had accrued to the revision petitioners. The counter-claim is for recovery of money said to have been deposited by the revision petitioners with the respondent-bank. As per Article 22 of Limitation Act, 1963, limitation for recovery of the money ‘deposited’ is three years from the date of demand. The date of demand for return of the money deposited is not mentioned in the counterclaim. If the revision petitioners had actually made a demand for payment of the money deposited by them and if that date of demand was prior to their filing of the written statement, the counter claim made in 2002 i.e. more than four years after accrual of the cause of action, is clearly barred by time. If there is no demand for payment of money deposited there is no cause of action. If the cause of action accrues after filing of the written statement, application under Order 8 Rule 6-A is not maintainable. So in any event, the petition for receiving the counter claim cannot be entertained. 7. I am unable to agree with the contention of Sri Raghava Rao that the Court has to decide only the question whether the revision petitioners can be granted leave to file their counter claim or not, but not the question relating to the maintainability or otherwise of the counter claim as it can be decided subsequently. Since the claim made in counter claim is akin to a plaint, provisions of Order 7 apply thereto. In view of Rule 11 of Order 7 C.P.C., which enables the Court rejecting the plaint if there is no cause of action or if the claim is barred by limitation, the Court at the threshold itself can give a finding whether the counter claim, prima-facie, is entertainable or is barred by limitation. In view of Rule 11 of Order 7 C.P.C., which enables the Court rejecting the plaint if there is no cause of action or if the claim is barred by limitation, the Court at the threshold itself can give a finding whether the counter claim, prima-facie, is entertainable or is barred by limitation. It need not wait till evidence is taken. If the counter-claim does not disclose cause of action or if the counter-claim prima facie is barred by time, the court need not entertain the same. In Saleem Bhai and others v. Maharashtra and others relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent the apex Court held that while deciding a petition under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC the court has to go by the allegations made in the plaint and the decision cannot be postponed till the defendants file their written statement. 8. Though the object of Rule 6-A of Order 8 C.P.C is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings counter-claim cannot be entertained by court merely on that ground only, when the essential ingredients of Order 8 Rule 6-A CPC are not satisfied. 9. Since a court of Senior Civil Judge has jurisdiction to entertain suits up to Rs. 10,00,000/- and since the value of the counter claim is 9,99,999/- the counter claim proposed to be made is within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial Court. So the petition need not be remitted to trial Court for deciding the question of territorial jurisdiction. 10. For the above reasons, I find no merits in this revision and hence is dismissed with costs. Since the revision is dismissed C.M.P.No.5769 of 2006 is also dismissed as unnecessary.