JUDGMENT A. Hazarika, J. 1. Eviction suit being Title (Ejectment) Suit No. 48(T) 1989, based on landlord-tenant relationship, filed by the opposite party landlord, against the petitioner tenant herein, on the ground available under Section 5(1)(c)(e) of the Meghalaya Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as Act 1972) was dismissed vide Judgment and decree dated 24.7.2002 by the learned Assistant to Deputy Commissioner, Shillong and set aside on appeal by the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner, Shillong vide its Judgment and decree dated 26.3.2003 passed in Regular First Appeal (TCA) No. 1 (T) 2002 and hence this revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC in short) read with Section 151 of the CPC and Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 2. The landlord filed the suit under Section 5(1)(c)(e) of the Act 1972 seeking a decree for eviction from the tenanted premises on the ground of bonafide requirement and for default in making the rent lawfully due within the time stipulated under the aforesaid Section. The defendant filed the written statement denying the bonafide requirement of the landlord and default as averred, in the plaint and prayed for dismissal of the suit. 3. The learned Court below has framed as many as eight (8) issues on the pleadings of the parties which are quoted hereunder-- i) Whether the plaintiff has any cause of action against the defendant? ii) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form? iii) Whether the plaintiff requires the house and premises in suit bonafide for dismantling and reconstruction of a four storeyed building as the house rented to the defendant is in a deteriorating condition? iv) Whether the plaintiff received permission from the Shillong Municipal Board to reconstruct a four storeyed building in the premises in suit? v) Whether the plaintiff approached the-defendant requesting him to vacate the house and premises in suit to enable the plaintiff to reconstruct the same? vi) Whether the defendant is a defaulter in payment of rent? vii) Whether the defendant is liable to be evicted from the house and premises in suit? viii) What are the other relief/reliefs the parties are entitled to. 4. During the course of trial the plaintiff had examined four witnesses including herself and exhibited certain documents, where as the defendant has examined three witnesses including himself in support of his case. vii) Whether the defendant is liable to be evicted from the house and premises in suit? viii) What are the other relief/reliefs the parties are entitled to. 4. During the course of trial the plaintiff had examined four witnesses including herself and exhibited certain documents, where as the defendant has examined three witnesses including himself in support of his case. The learned trial Court while deciding the case, answered the issue No. 1,2 and 4 in favour of the plaintiff and decided in negative the other issues resulting in dismissal of the suit. 5. The plaintiff being aggrieved with the aforesaid judgment and decree dated 24.7.2002 passed in Title Suit No. 98(T) 1989 by the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, Shillong preferred an appeal before the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Shillong being RFA(TCA) No. 1 (T) 2000, questioning the legality and validity of the judgment and decree as aforesaid. 6. The learned Appellate Court took up issue No. 3 which relates to bonafide requirement of the house and premises for dismantling and reconstruction of a four storeyed building since the suit premises is in a deteriorating condition. The learned Appellate Court considered the evidence of PWs and DWs and came to a finding that the tenanted premises is situated in a commercial area of Shillong. In regard to the condition of the suit premises it has brought on record that the said house was gutted in fire in the year 1998 and some temporary enforcement was made in the house in question. From the totality of evidence and on reappreciation of the same, the learned Appellate Court answered and decided the issue No. 3 regarding the claim of bonafide requirement of suit premises in favour of appellant landlord, relying on the decisions reported in (Vijay Singh etc. etc. v. Vijaylakshmi Ammal) and AIR 2002 SC 4876 (Shakilulur Rahman v. Syed Mehcli Irpahani) and set aside the findings arrived at by the learned trial Court regarding bonafide requirement. 7. etc. v. Vijaylakshmi Ammal) and AIR 2002 SC 4876 (Shakilulur Rahman v. Syed Mehcli Irpahani) and set aside the findings arrived at by the learned trial Court regarding bonafide requirement. 7. The learned Appellate Court while deciding the issue No. 5 relating to request made to the defendant to vacate the suit premises in order to enable the plaintiff to reconstruct the same, has come to a finding relying on Ext.-3 and Ext.-4 that the learned trial Court had decided the said issue, completely ignoring the existence of Ext.-3, as well as defendant's own admission made to that effect and answered the aforesaid issue in the affirmative by setting aside the findings arrived at by the learned trial Court. 8. The question of the present petitioner being defaulter in payment of rent was settled in issue No. 6. The learned trial Court decided this issue in favour of the petitioner herein by holding that the defendant petitioner was not a defaulter. The learned lower Appellate Court by an elaborate discussion reversed the finding of the learned trial Court by assessing the evidence on record. 9. The said judgment and decree dated 26.3.2003 in RFA(TCA) No. 1 (T) 2002 passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Shillong is under challenge in this revision petition. Questioning the legality and validity of the judgment and decree, Mr. S.P. Roy, learned Counsel, appearing for the petitioner argued that there is no bonafide requirement of the house in question, more so, when the plaintiff has failed to prove that the house is required to reconstruct since the same is in dilapidated condition. The plaintiff having failed to discharge the burden, the burden cannot be shifted on the defendant as has been done by the Appellate Court and on this ground alone the judgment and decree requires interference by this Court in exercise of power under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has further argued that there is no stipulation to pay the rent and there is no due date as alleged by the plaintiff. Since there is no due date requiring the tenant to pay the monthly rent, the Appellate Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in holding that the petitioner is a defaulter and thus require interference by the revisional Court. 11. In support of his argument, Mr. Since there is no due date requiring the tenant to pay the monthly rent, the Appellate Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in holding that the petitioner is a defaulter and thus require interference by the revisional Court. 11. In support of his argument, Mr. S.P. Roy, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner/defendant has referred the following decisions: 1. 1992 (2) GLR 36 : Shri Jatish Chandra Paul and Ors. v. Manju Rani Paul and Ors. 2. 1991 (2) GLJ 185 Shri Tilakchand Bajaj v. Manan Lal Kabra (Dead by Lrs.) 3. 1991 (2) GLR 322 Shri Atul Chandra Kharghoria, Secretary, Govt. Aided Model Commercial Institute, Jorhat v. Shri Lutfur Rahman and Ors. 4. AIR 1999 SC 3152 : Shri T. Sivasubramaniam and Ors. v. Shri Kashinath Pujari and Ors. 5. Modern Tailoring Hall etc. v. H.S. Venkusa and Ors. 6. Ansuyaban Kantilal Bhatt v. Rashiklal Manilal Shah and Anr. 7. Smti. Rajbir Kaur and Anr. v. S. Chokeseri and Co. 8. 1996 (2) GLT 102: Shri Chittaranjan Ghosh v. Abdur Rahman. 9. 1995 (2) GLT 182 : Shri Prasanta Kr. Rose v. Md. Nuruddin. 10. AIR 2001 SC 1206: Kandaswamay v. Board of Management, H.S.I. Said Mosque. 11. 2002 (1) GLT 51 : 2002 (1) GLJ 361 : Shri Tushar Kanti Dey v. Sulata Choudhury and Ors. 12. 1989 (2) GLR 7 : Shri Upendra Chandra Deb Roy v. Smti Subhashini Deb and 2 (two) Ors. 13. (1984) 1 GLR 297 : Bata India Ltd. v. Dr. P.K. Das Pvt. Ltd. 14. Shri Vannattankandy Ibrayi v. Kunhabdulla Hajee. These decisions are cited in support of the various points urged on behalf of the petitioner. They relate principally, albeit, not exclusively to the following points-- a. The question of bonafide requirement. b. The question as to when the rent becomes due. I have gone through these decisions. In my opinion, the facts and circumstances of the cited case are not similar with the present case at hand and the principle laid down in these citations are not applicable in the instant case. The grounds urged herein are also not specifically supported by the decisions cited by the learned Counsel. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to go into the details of the cases referred above. 12. Countering the attack, Mr. The grounds urged herein are also not specifically supported by the decisions cited by the learned Counsel. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to go into the details of the cases referred above. 12. Countering the attack, Mr. G.S. Massar, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the plaintiff/opposite party has submitted that the learned lower Appellate Court did not commit any error of law in deciding the point of bonafide requirement of suit premises and the issue of the defendant/petitioner being defaulter. The learned Counsel has also drawn the attention of this Court to the provisions of Section 5(1)(e) and (4) of the Act and argued that the plaintiff has proved the bonafide requirement of the suit house for reconstruction in order to fetch income, since the house is in a commercial area. The plaintiff has discharged her burden by proving Ext-2, Ext-3 and Ext-4 and once the burden is discharged, it is the burden of the petitioner to rebut the same which the petitioner has miserably failed to discharge in the facts and circumstances of the case. In regard to default, he has drawn the attention of this Court to Ext-1 (1) to Ext.-1(ix), the rent receipts issued to the defendant/opposite party, which would show that the petitioner has failed to prove that he was not a defaulter within the meaning of Section 5(1)(e) and 5(4) of the Act in view of the evidence of P.W.-4, who has deposed that the rent for the month of February 1989 to January 1990 has been paid on 1.2.1990, in Misc Case No. 34(T) of 1990 which is admittedly beyond the stipulated period as provided under the provision of Section 5(4) of the Act and hence this Court in exercise of power under Section 115 of the Code do not require any interference in the facts and circumstances of the case. 13. In support of his submission Mr. Massar has relied upon the following decisions. 1. Panchamal Narayan Shenoy v. Basthi Venkatesha Shenoy. 2. D.L.F. Housing and Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. Sarup Singh and Ors. 3. The Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Ajit Prasad. 4. S.M. Gopal Krishna Chetty v. Ganeshan and Ors. 5. Vijay Singh etc. v. Vijayalakshmi Ammal. 6. (2001) 2 SCC 762 : Lekhraj v. Muni Lal and Ors. 7. AIR 2002 SC 4876 : Shakeelul Rahman v. Syed Mehdi Irpahani. 8. (P) Ltd. v. Sarup Singh and Ors. 3. The Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Ajit Prasad. 4. S.M. Gopal Krishna Chetty v. Ganeshan and Ors. 5. Vijay Singh etc. v. Vijayalakshmi Ammal. 6. (2001) 2 SCC 762 : Lekhraj v. Muni Lal and Ors. 7. AIR 2002 SC 4876 : Shakeelul Rahman v. Syed Mehdi Irpahani. 8. P.S. Pureed Kaka and Ors. v. Shafee Ahmed Saheb. 9. (1984) 1 GLR 297 : Bata India Ltd. v. Dr. P.K. Das Pvt. Ltd. 10. United Commercial Bank and Ors. v. Rekhab Chand Sohanlal. 11. (1997) 1 GLR 33 : Ram Karanji More v. Keshardev Jalan. 12. 7997 (2) GLT 590 : Abdul Matin Choudhury and Ors. v. Nilyananda Dutta Banik. 13. Jhunta Ram @ Suraj Narain v. Surendra Mohan 14. 2000 (1) L LJ 917 : The Bank of Rajasthan v. Manish Agarwal and Anr. 15. (2004) 1 GLR 175 : Rakhal Mandal v. Topa Baruah and Ors. 16. 2006 (1) GLT 479: Sobha Biswas and Ors. v. Ranjit Lodh. There is yet another Full Bench decision of this Court reported in AIR 1969 Gau 66 (Kali Kumar Sen v. Makhan Lal Biswas and Anr.) wherein it has been held that the rent on refusal by the landlord, must be deposited within a fortnight of its becoming due and if the same is not paid within the stipulated period in accordance with Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1955 the tenant is a defaulter and once a defaulter is always a defaulter. 14. Heard the argument advanced by the parties. The existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the parties is not in dispute. The tenanted premises is situated in a commercial area of Bara Bazar, Shillong and the condition of the said house is in a dilapidated condition, which require reconstruction and the landlord proposes to construct a four storeyed building with a basement area in order to earn income than the prevailing one. In order to prove the bonafide requirement and default, it is necessary to go through the relevant paragraphs of the Act 1972 which is quoted hereunder: 5. In order to prove the bonafide requirement and default, it is necessary to go through the relevant paragraphs of the Act 1972 which is quoted hereunder: 5. Bar against passing and execution decree and order for ejectment-- (1) No order or decree for the recovery of possession of any house shall be made or executed by any Court so long as the tenant pays rent to the full extent allowable under this Act and perform the conditions of the tenancy: Provided that nothing in this Sub-section shall apply in a suit or proceedings for eviction of the tenant from the house, (a)… (b)… (c) Where the house is bonafide required by the landlord either for purposes of repairs or rebuilding or for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the house is held or where the landlord can show any other cause which may be deemed satisfactory by the Court, or (d)… or (e) Where the tenant has not paid the rent lawfully due from him in respect of the house within a fortnight of its falling due, or (f)… (2)… (3)… 4. Where the landlord refuses to accept the lawful rent offered by his tenant, the tenant may within-30 days of its becoming due, deposit in court the amount of such rent together with process fees for service of notice upon the landlord, and on receiving such deposit, the court shall cause a notice of the receipt of such deposit to be served on the landlord and the amount of the deposit may thereafter be withdrawn by the landlord on application made by him to the court in that behalf. The tenant who has made such deposit shall not be treated as a defaulter under Clause (e) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of this section. 15. The landlord and tenant did examine few witnesses in support of their respective cases. The landlord in his pleadings, examination-in-chief and cross-examination has proved her cases for reconstruction of the house and premises in order to make a four storeyed commercial building, whereas pleadings, examination-in-chief and cross-examination of the tenant has been a shifting one, more particularly Ext-2, Ext-3 and Ext-4 would show that there was a bonafide requirement of the suit premises and the landlord has discharged her burden, when the tenant has failed to rebut the same. In regard to default, it is an admitted fact that there was no agreement between the parties as to when the rent become due and therefore shall be deemed to be a monthly tenant. If the tenant is a monthly tenant, he is liable to offer the rent within 1st week of the next month and on refusal to accept the same the tenant is at liberty to deposit the same within 30 (thirty) days of its becoming due to the court which is not the casein hand, more particularly, when P.W.- 4 Sheristadar of the court has deposed that the rent for the month of February 1989 to January 1990 had been deposited on 1.2.1990 which amounts to default in depositing the rent in court as per Section 5(4)of the Act. Apart from the above, the landlord has proved Ext-1(1) to Ext-1 (ix), the rent receipt which would show that the rent is payable in the first week of the succeeding month. 16. The rent control legislation in force in Meghalaya would show that the tenant is not evictable if he proves that the house is not bonafide required and he is not a defaulter. The Act protects the tenant from eviction and enacts specifically the ground, on the availability whereof the tenant may be directed to be evicted. It is for the landlord to make out a ground for eviction. The burden of proof lies on him/her. However, the onus shifts on the tenant to discharge his burden. In the instant case the landlord has proved the ground for eviction on two counts i.e., bonafide requirement and on the ground of default and the tenant has failed to rebut the same. 17. I have carefully perused the impugned judgment passed by the learned lower Appellate Court, more specifically, the findings arrived at under issue No. 3 and 6, relating to bonafide requirement and default in payment of rent. While assailing the said findings of the learned lower Appellate Court, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has failed to satisfy this Court that those findings are perverse or without jurisdiction, on which the findings of the lower Appellate Court can be interfered with. No such material has been placed to disagree with the findings of the learned lower Appellate Court. 18. In the result the revision petition being devoid of any merit the same is dismissed. No such material has been placed to disagree with the findings of the learned lower Appellate Court. 18. In the result the revision petition being devoid of any merit the same is dismissed. The Judgment and Decree Passed by the learned lower Appellate Court is affirmed. The defendant/petitioner is allowed three months time from today to remain in possession of the suit premises and he will hand over the vacant possession to the plaintiff/respondent along with all arrear rents before expiry of aforesaid period of three months, failure of which the plaintiff is entitled to put the decree in execution. 19. The parties are left with no costs. Petition dismissed.