JUDGMENT SURYA KANT, J. 1. Writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India has been invoked by the petitioner for quashing of the order of punishment issued on 8th August, 1997 (Annexure P-19) in terms whereof the General Court Martial on 12th July, 1997 awarded following punishments to him:- (i) to take rank and precedent as if his appointment as substantive Captain bore the date the 11th June, 1996; and (ii) to forfeit 3 years past service for the purpose of pension. As a consequential relief, the petitioner also seeks quashing of communication dated 1st May, 1998, (Annexure P-18) whereby he was informed that the Post Confirmation Petition dated 29th July, 1997 submitted against the above mentioned punishments were rejected by the Central Government after consideration as it lacked substance. The petitioner has also sought a writ in the nature of mandamus to direct the respondents to count the complete service for the purpose of pension by treating him in the substantive rank of Captain with effect from 11th June, 1993 and to release all other consequential benefits. 2. The petitioner was commissioned in the Indian Army in the Corps of Electronics and Mechanical Engineering in the year 1988. In May 1993, he was detailed to undergo Electrical Mechanical Degree Course (EMED-61) Part I in the College of Military Engineering at Pune. It is alleged that on July 20, 1994, the petitioner while appearing for Phase Test-II examination for Basic Survey-2 paper, was found in possession of an additional answer sheet containing written statement/material pertaining to the subject. After the examination was over, Major S.N. Akhade, the Invigilator along with Mrs. Jyoti Shukla who was detailed for the examination, were going to report the matter to Staff Officer-2 (Training), when the petitioner snatched the answer sheet from Major S.N. Akhade and ran away. The said answer sheet was allegedly torn off by him. A Court of Inquiry was convened by College of Military Engineering on 25th June, 1994 to investigate the matter and pending inquiry, the petitioner was withdrawn from the course on 10th August, 1994 and was attached to College of Military Engineering. The petitioner was thereafter served with tentative charge sheet on 27th August, 1994 (Annexure P-3) and pursuant thereto Summary of Evidence was recorded at College of Military Engineering in terms of Rule 22 of the Army Rules. The petitioner was thereafter served with tentative charge sheet on 27th August, 1994 (Annexure P-3) and pursuant thereto Summary of Evidence was recorded at College of Military Engineering in terms of Rule 22 of the Army Rules. Meanwhile, the petitioner was posted to 512 Army Base Workshop where the petitioner was served with another tentative charge sheet dated 23rd June, 1995 (Annexure P-5). It may be mentioned here that there is no substantial difference between the nature of allegations as contained in the first tentative charge sheet (Annexure P-3) or the second tentative charge sheet (Annexure P- 5) except a minor variation in the language of second charge. Pursuant to the charge sheet (Annexure P-5), Summary of Evidence was recorded and upon its conclusion, it was recommended that the petitioner be tried by the General Court Martial. The petitioner was accordingly issued the charge sheet dated 31st October, 1996 (Annexure P-11) and the General Court Martial was convened. The petitioner having been found guilty of both the charges, the impugned order dated 8th August, 1997 (Annexure P-19) containing the punishments awarded to him by the General Court Martial on 12th July, 1997, was passed. As stated earlier, the Post Confirmation Petition preferred by the petitioner was also turned down by the Central Govt. 3. It may also be mentioned here that before his Post Confirmation Petition was decided vide order dated 1st May, 1998 (Annexure P- 18) [firstly, vide order dated 31st March, 1998 (Annexure P-17) which was, however, later on superseded by order Annexure P-18], the petitioner approached the High Court of Judicator at Bombay through Writ Petition No.4049 of 1997 which was disposed of vide order dated 30th September, 1997 in the following terms:- “1. Deponent’s appeal against the punishment imposed upon him by the General Court Marshal is pending consideration of the Union of India. In the appeal the deponent has also prayed for stay of the impugned punishment, pending the disposal of the appeal. In the circumstances, deponent cannot justifiably approach this court at this interlocutory stage. Rejected. 2. Proceedings of the appeal are, however, expedited and respondent is directed to dispose of the same expeditiously and in any event within a period of six months from today. Similarly orders in respect of prayer for stay should also be passed expeditiously and be communicated to the deponent. Rejected. 2. Proceedings of the appeal are, however, expedited and respondent is directed to dispose of the same expeditiously and in any event within a period of six months from today. Similarly orders in respect of prayer for stay should also be passed expeditiously and be communicated to the deponent. This be done within a period of 4 weeks from today.” 4. Thereafter, the petitioner is stated to have approached His Excellency the President of India by way of a Petition under Article 72(1)(A) of the Constitution of India (Annexure P-29) but there being no response thereto, he approached the Andhra Pradesh High Court by way of Writ Petition No.9096 of 2003 which was dismissed as withdrawn on 7th August, 2003 with liberty to the petitioner to approach the appropriate order (sic), (Annexure P- 30). It is thereafter that the present petition was filed. 5. The petitioner, who appeared in person and argued at length, has mounted his attack on the validity and propriety of the proceedings of the General Court Martial, inter-alia, on the following grounds/reasons:- (i) the petitioner tried to expose the rampant corruption at the College of military Engineering, Pune and this act of his antagonized the authorities concerned who falsely implicated him in the case of use of unfair means in the examination; (ii) the petitioner had filed a criminal complaint bearing No.MA20/96 containing the allegations of bribery etc. in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate at Pune in which Major General B.A. Kariappa was also a party. in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate at Pune in which Major General B.A. Kariappa was also a party. Major General B.A. Kariappa was thus, debarred from convening the General Court Martial in view of Note-3 under section 109 of the Army Act; (iii) since the allegations against the petitioner were investigated by none else than Major General B.A. Kariappa, the General Court Martial proceedings suffer with mala fide exercise of power, bias and prejudice; (iv) the proceedings are also vitiated for the reason that Summary of Evidence was recorded twice, i.e. firstly at the College of Military Engineering, Pune and secondly at 512, Army Base Workshop; (v) the petitioner was not given ample opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses; (vi) the petitioner was denied opportunity to call defence witnesses despite the fact that he had given the list of witnesses (Annexure P-12) as required under Army Rule 136; (vi) the directions issued by officiating General-Officer-Commanding of Maharashtra and Gujarat Areas to reconsider its decision of refusing the petitioner to call defence witnesses (Annexure P-14) was also overlooked by the General Court Martial (vii) the petitioner was denied the Defending Officer of his choice in terms of rule 95 of the Army Rules as the Defending Officer provided to him was due for promotion and pressurized the petitioner to plead guilty; due to this reason, he had to withdraw the Defending Officer which amounts to denying the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to defend himself; (viii) the General Court Martial acted as a ‘prosecuting agency’ rather than a legally constituted court and sentenced the petitioner even when no iota of evidence was brought on record against him (ix) the sentence awarded to the petitioner is highly excessive, unjust and is actuated by extraneous considerations. 6. On the other hand, Shri Aman Chaudhary, learned counsel representing the respondents, vehemently contested the petitioner’s claim. 6. On the other hand, Shri Aman Chaudhary, learned counsel representing the respondents, vehemently contested the petitioner’s claim. He has not only pressed into service two preliminary objections, namely, (i) lack of territorial jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the writ petition; and (ii) inordinate delay and laches on the part of the petitioner to approach the Court, but has also strenuously argued that the General Court Martial proceedings have been held strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Army Act and the Rules framed thereunder and the scope of judicial review in such like matters being restricted within the limited arena to ensure that no miscarriage of justice takes place, this Court may not act as an appellate or revisional forum over the decision taken by the General Court Martial. 7. Before adverting into merits of the rival contentions, it appears appropriate to deal with the preliminary objections raised on behalf of the respondents. Firstly, Shri Chaudhary, learned counsel, has argued that the incident pertaining to use of unfair means in the examination took place at Pune, the Court of Inquiry was also held at Pune, the petitioner was served with the charge sheets (Annexures P-3, P-5 and P-11) at Pune, the Summary of Evidence was recorded at Pune, the General Court Martial was convened and held at Pune and the impugned order of Punishments (Annexure P-19) was also issued from the Headquarters Southern Command, therefore, neither the cause of action nor part thereof arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. According to Shri Chaudhary, even the Post Confirmation Petition was presented by the petitioner while he was posted at Pune, as noticed by the Mumbai High Court in its order dated 30th September, 1997 (reproduced above). It was contended that the petitioner has a misconception as if his place of posting determines the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court inasmuch as while the petitioner was posted at Secunderabad, he approached the Andhra Pradesh High Court and thereafter he having been posted at Ambala, that the petitioner has approached this Court. It was contended that the petitioner has a misconception as if his place of posting determines the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court inasmuch as while the petitioner was posted at Secunderabad, he approached the Andhra Pradesh High Court and thereafter he having been posted at Ambala, that the petitioner has approached this Court. Reliance has been placed upon a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Rajendra Kumar Mishra v. Union of India and Others, 2005 LAB I.C. 2229 and a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Baldev Singh v. Union of India through Secretary, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi and Ors., (1997-1) PLR 655. 8. On a specific query by the Court to disclose those facts which shall constitute the ‘cause of action’ enabling this Court to take cognizance of the present petition, the petitioner filed an additional affidavit dated 20th September, 2005, paragraph 3 of which reads as follows:- “3. That the General Court Martial against the deponent concluded in the year 1997. The deponent approached the Hon’ble high Court of Mumbai as party in person vide WP No.4049 of 1997. The Hon’ble High Court of Mumbai directed the deponent to avail the remedy available under Army Act Section 164 vide order dated 30 Sep 1997. The deponent filed post confirmation petition. In the meantime the deponent was posted to 39 EME Bn (Tpt) at Pathankot. The deponent moved out on posting to Pathankot. In the year 1998 the post confirmation petition filed by the deponent was disposed off vide order dated 01 May 1998, which was conveyed to the deponent at Pathankot, which lies within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court. The cause of action arose in favour of deponent in Pathankot hence this Hon’ble Court has the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the present case.” 9. The petitioner vide his previous affidavit dated 19th September, 2005 placed documents, Annexures P-27 to P-33, on record and also placed reliance upon (i) judgment of the Apex Court in Dinesh Chandra Gahtori v. Chief of Army Staff and another, (2001)9 SCC 525; and (ii) a single Bench judgment of the Karnataka High Court in Vijaykumar B. Jiragyal v. Chief of the Army Staff, Secunderabad and others, 2005(3) SCT 118. 10. 10. In Dinesh Chander Gahtori’s case (supra), a writ petition was filed by the appellant in the year 1992 challenging the proceedings of a Summary Court Martial. The writ petition was, however, dismissed by the Allahabad High Court in the year 1999 on the ground that “in view of the fact that the Summary Court Martial proceedings were conducted in the State of Punjab and orders were also passed in Punjab by the Western Command..., the said High Court had got no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition.” On an appeal, the aforesaid order of the Allahabad High Court was set aside by the Apex Court observing that:- “4. The writ petition was filed in 1992. The impugned order was passed in 1999. This is a fact that the High Court should have taken into consideration. More importantly, it should have taken into consideration the fact that the Chief of Army Staff may be sued anywhere in the country. Placing reliance only on the cause of action, as the High Court did, was not justified.” 11. In Vijaykumar B. Jiragyal’s case (supra), the learned Single Judge of Karnataka High Court, relying upon the above reproduced judgment of the Apex Court in Dinesh Chander Gahtori’s case (supra), turned down the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction in relation to a petition in which General Court Martial proceedings held at Secunderabad (Andhra Pradesh) were challenged before him. 12. In National Textile Copn. Ltd. v. Haribox Swalram, (2004)9 SCC 786, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that, “the mere fact that the writ petitioner carries on business at Calcutta or that the reply to the correspondence made by it was received at Calcutta, is not an integral part of the cause of action and, therefore, the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.....”. (emphasis applied) 13. In Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and Another, 2004(6) SCC 254, the Apex Court has held that even if a small fraction of the cause of action accrues within its jurisdiction, the High Court will have jurisdiction in the matter though in an appropriate case it may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens. It has also been held that to assume jurisdiction and to entertain writ petition, the High Court would find out as to whether or not the integral facts pleaded in support of the ‘cause of action’ do constitute a cause so as to empower it to decide the dispute and that the entire or a part of such cause arose within its jurisdiction. Their Lordships further observed that:- “27. When an order, however, is passed by a court or tribunal or an executive authority whether under provisions of a statute or otherwise, a part of cause of action arises at that place. Even in a given case, when the original authority is constituted at one place and the appellate authority is constituted at another, a writ petition would be maintainable at both the places. In other words, as order of the appellate authority constitutes a part of cause of action, a writ petition would be maintained in the High Court within whose jurisdiction it is situate having regard to the fact that the order of the appellate authority is also required to be set aside and as the order of the original authority merges with that of the appellate authority.” (emphasis applied) 14. In Union of India & Others v. Adani Exports Ltd. and another, AIR 2002 SC 126, the Apex Court observed that the High Court must be satisfied from the entire facts pleaded in support of the ‘cause of action’ that these facts do constitute a cause so as to empower the Court to decide a dispute which is at least in part, arising within its jurisdiction. Each and every fact pleaded by the party does not ipso-facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the court’s territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. 15. In Rajendra Kumar Mishra’s case (supra), a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in relation to the observations made by the Apex Court in Dinesh Chander Gahtori’s case (supra), held as follows:- “10. 15. In Rajendra Kumar Mishra’s case (supra), a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in relation to the observations made by the Apex Court in Dinesh Chander Gahtori’s case (supra), held as follows:- “10. In our opinion the observation in the aforesaid decision, “The Chief of Army Staff may be sued in any High Court in the country” cannot be construed to mean that the Supreme Court has laid down any absolute proposition that it is open to the petitioner to file a writ petition in any High Court in India. Such an absolute proposition as canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner may lead to conflicting decisions because different petitions can be filed in different High Courts by co- accused in the same case and conflicting decisions can be given.” 16. In Baldev Singh’s case (supra), a Division Bench of this Court, after taking notice of the fact that the Summary Court Martial proceedings were held and concluded at Pune and merely because the petitioner came to be posted at Zirakpur (Punjab), this Court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition challenging the Summary Court proceedings. 17. In Sukhdarshan Singh v. Union of India, 2003(6) SLR 713, a learned Single Judge of this Court held that, “mere receipt of intimation of rejection of appeal by the Chief of the Army Staff by the petitioner at his native village does not constitute a cause of action but it only gives rise to right of action”. 18. From the averments made in the writ petition and additional affidavits which the petitioner has filed subsequently, it is clearly spelt out that the petitioner, in order to meet with the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction of this Court, is dependent upon the following two facts:- 1. At the time of filing of this petition, he was posted at Ambala (Haryana); and 2. The decision on his Post Confirmation Petition was conveyed to him when he was posted at Pathankot (Punjab). 19. From the resume of the case-law, referred to above, there is no escape but to hold that the place of posting of a person has no relevance, whatsoever, with the ‘cause of action’ and such like incident of service will have no nexus with the lis other than the one pertaining to the transfer/posting order itself. 19. From the resume of the case-law, referred to above, there is no escape but to hold that the place of posting of a person has no relevance, whatsoever, with the ‘cause of action’ and such like incident of service will have no nexus with the lis other than the one pertaining to the transfer/posting order itself. The transfer and posting is a fluctuating circumstance and ‘cause of action’ cannot vary with the place of posting. 20. So far as the receipt of communication regarding rejection of the Post Confirmation Petition by the petitioner while he was posted in Pathankot (Punjab) is concerned, in my view, mere communication of the order does not give rise to a part of ‘cause of action’ though it might have given the ‘right to action’. Even the expanded meaning given to the concept of “cause of action” by the Apex Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd.’s case (supra) does not come to the petitioner’s rescue as only the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the Authority which decided his statutory representation, i.e., the Post Confirmation Petition is located, shall have the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. The communication (Annexure P-18) does show that the Post Confirmation Petition moved by the petitioner was decided at Delhi by the Union Govt. 21. Seen from any angle, it is apparent that in so far as the petitioner’s challenge to the General Court Martial proceedings held and concluded at Pune and/or the adjudication of his Post Confirmation Petition is concerned, ‘no cause of action’ or part thereof arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, therefore, this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present petition. 22. For the reasons afore-mentioned, there is no necessity for this Court to return any finding in relation to the second preliminary objection, namely, delay and laches on the part of the petitioner in approaching the Court or his contentions on the merits of the case. 23. Consequently, the Registry is directed to return this petition to the petitioner to enable him to present the same before a Court of competent jurisdiction.