A. K. SHRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) FEELING aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 4- 12- 1995 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, dindori in Sessions Trial No. 52/95, convicting the appellant under Section 302 IPC and sentencing him to suffer life imprisonment and fine of Re. 1/-, in default of payment of fine, further simple imprisonment of seven days, the appellant has knocked the door of this Court by preferring this appeal under section 374 (2) of the Code of criminal Procedure, 1973. ( 2 ) SANS unnecessary details facts lie in a narrow compass. Suffice it to state that the case of prosecution is that on 19-3-1995 at 3. 30 p. m. Chowkidar of village Rahangi, namely, Pachlu lodged the FIR in the Police station Samnapur that in the morning at 9, inder of his village came to his house and told that his Bhaujai (brother's wife) Lilawati (hereinafter referred to as 'the deceased')went to her parents' house at village devalpur and came back in the morning. His brother came to his (Pachlu's) house and told that appellant has killed the deceased by plough. The incident has been witnessed by Pusiabai (PW. 1), who is daughter of the deceased and appellant. ( 3 ) ON the basis of the FIR a case registered against the appellant. The police party arrived at the spot; seized the dead body; prepared requisite Panchnama; sent the dead body for post-mortem; seized ordinary and blood stained earth; recorded the statement of the witnesses; arrested the accused and seized plough which was used as weapon in the commission of the offence. ( 4 ) AFTER completing the investigation change-sheet was submitted in the competent Court, which on its turn committed the case to the Court of Session from where it was received by the trial Court for its trial, ( 5 ) LEARNED trial Judge on going through the charge-sheet framed a charge punishable under section 302 IPC for committing murder of the deceased. Needless to emphasis, accused abjured the guilt and pleaded complete innocence. ( 6 ) IN order to prove its case prosecution examined as many as 7 witnesses and placed exs. P-1 to P-14. the documents on record. ( 7 ) IN his statement recorded under Section 313, cr. P. C. the defence of the accused is of maladroit implication. Needless to emphasis, accused abjured the guilt and pleaded complete innocence. ( 6 ) IN order to prove its case prosecution examined as many as 7 witnesses and placed exs. P-1 to P-14. the documents on record. ( 7 ) IN his statement recorded under Section 313, cr. P. C. the defence of the accused is of maladroit implication. However, he did not choose to examine any witness in support of his defence. ( 8 ) LEARNED trial Judge alter appreciating and marshaling the evidence came to hold that the accused/appellant did commit the offence for which he was charged and eventually convicted him under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to suffer life imprisonment. In this manner the appellant has preferred this appeal assailing the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by trial court. ( 9 ) IT has been vehemently argued by Shri r. A. Robertson, learned counsel for the appellant that in the present case the FIR (Ex. P-11) has not been proved since the author of the FIR, namely. Pachlu has not been examined by the prosecution, it has also been submitted by learned counsel that in the present case only child witness, namely, Pusiabai has been examined as an eyewitness and the prosecution failed to examine any other witness and, therefore, on the basis of solitary evidence of a child witness it will be highly unsafe to convict the appellant. An alternative submission has also been put-forth by him that even if the entire case of the prosecution is taken to be true, no case under Section 302 IPC is made out and at the most the case would rest not beyond Section 304 Part-I, IPC. According to the learned counsel since the appellant is languishing in jail w. e. f. 20-3-1995 and had already suffered sentence of more then 11 years and 6 months, it would be appropriate punishment for the offence which he has committed. ( 10 ) PER contra, Shri Rai, learned Govt. Advocate appearing for the respondent/state argued in support of the impugned judgment. It has also been contended by learned Govt. Advocate that looking to the injuries sustained by the deceased, learned trial Judge did not err in convicting the appellant for the offence punishable under section 302 IPC and hence this appeal sans substance and the same be dismissed. Advocate appearing for the respondent/state argued in support of the impugned judgment. It has also been contended by learned Govt. Advocate that looking to the injuries sustained by the deceased, learned trial Judge did not err in convicting the appellant for the offence punishable under section 302 IPC and hence this appeal sans substance and the same be dismissed. ( 11 ) HAVING heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of the considered view that this appeal deserves to be allowed in part. ( 12 ) WE shall now deal the first submission put forth by learned counsel for the appellant that on account of non-examination of Pachlu, who is the author of the FIR, the document of FIR Ex, P-11 is not proved. Learned counsel has further submitted that in the present case the investigating officer has also not been examined. For this reason also, the FIR cannot be said to be proved. This argument at the first blush appears to be quite attractive, however, on deeper scrutiny it is found to be devoid of any substance. Under the Evidence Act no particular mode of proof has been mentioned in order to prove a document which is not a document which is required to be proved under Section 68 of the said Act. The mode to prove the document is given in Section 67 of the act which reads as under :- "67. Proof of signature and handwriting of person alleged to have signed or written document produced.- If a document is alleged to be signed or to have been written wholly or in part by any person the signature or the handwriting of so much of the document as is alleged to be in that person's handwriting must be proved to be in his handwriting. " On analysing Section 67 of the Evidence act it is gathered that if the documents in question which do not fall into categories of those documents which by law are required to be attested and, therefore, for the proof of these documents Section 68 of the Evidence Act would not apply. It is Section 67 which would apply and Section 67 does not lay down any particular mode of proof for proving that a particular writing or signature is in the hand of a particular person. It is Section 67 which would apply and Section 67 does not lay down any particular mode of proof for proving that a particular writing or signature is in the hand of a particular person. Thus, the signatures may be proved in any one or more of the following modes :-" (i) By calling a person who signed or wrote a document; (ii) By calling a person in whose presence the documents are signed or written; (iii) By calling handwriting expert; (iv) By calling a person acquainted with the handwriting of the person by whom the document is supposed to be signed or written; (v) By comparing in Court, the disputed signatures or handwriting with some admitted signatures or writing; (vi) By proof of an admission by the person who is alleged to have signed or written the document that he signed or write it; (vii) By the statement of a deceased professional scribe, made in the ordinary course of business, that the signature on the document is that of a particular person. A signature is also proved to have been made, if it is shown to have been made at the request of a person by some other person, e. g. by scribe who signed on behalf of the executant; (viii) By other circumstantial evidence. " In this context it will be fruitful to place reliance on the decision of this Court Kishan prasad v. M. P. Government through collector, Vidisha 1983 JLH 474. In the given case in hand, the FIR (Ex. P-11) has been proved by P. W. 7 Arun Kumar, who was a constable of Police Station Samnapur. He has stated that he is well acquainted to the sub-Inspector of Samnapur Police Station as he has worked with him. This witness is acquainted with his signature as well as his handwriting. Thus, under the law FIR (Ex. P-11)has been proved by the evidence of P. W. 7 Arun Kumar. The argument of learned counsel for the appellant that FIR has not been proved, is hereby rejected. Moreover it is well settled in law that FIR is not a substantive piece of evidence and it can be used only for its corroboration and contradiction. The real aim and object of lodging of the FIR and its registration is to set criminal law in motion to investigate a crime. Moreover it is well settled in law that FIR is not a substantive piece of evidence and it can be used only for its corroboration and contradiction. The real aim and object of lodging of the FIR and its registration is to set criminal law in motion to investigate a crime. ( 13 ) WE do not find any merit in the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that apart from a child witness who has seen the incident, the prosecution has failed to examine any other witness to the incident. We have perused the testimony of P. W. 1 pusiabai. It is revealed from her testimony that the incident had taken place inside the house of the deceased and appellant, and at that juncture she (Pusiabai) and her younger sister were present and none else was present in the house. Therefore, the question of examining any other eye-witness does not arise and the argument of learned counsel in that regard is also hereby rejected. ( 14 ) IT has been then argued by learned counsel for appellant that it will be highly unsafe to place reliance on the testimony of a child witness and if the evidence of the child witness is ignored, there remains nothing on record in order to implicate the appellant in the present case. ( 15 ) THE law in regard to the evidence of a child witness is now well settled. If the testimony of a child witness is worth reliable and free from all doubts and is not shaky, there is no law as such that solely on the basis of evidence of a child witness, conviction can not be accorded. The evidence of child witness is relevant under Section 118 of the Evidence Act. According to this section all persons shall be competent to testify unless the Court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them or from giving rational answers to those, questions, by tender years, extreme old age. disease, whether of body or mind, or any other cause of the same kind. On the basis of principle laid down under section 118 of the Evidence Act, we shall examine the testimony of the child witness p. W. 1 Pusiabai who is an eye-witness to the incident. disease, whether of body or mind, or any other cause of the same kind. On the basis of principle laid down under section 118 of the Evidence Act, we shall examine the testimony of the child witness p. W. 1 Pusiabai who is an eye-witness to the incident. On going through the deposition-sheet of this witness it is gathered that learned trial Judge has put certain questions to this witness in order to ascertain whether she has sufficient intelligence to answer those questions and after noticing the manner in which she gave reply to some general question put to her. it was found by learned trial Judge that she is quite competent to give answer to the questions put to her. ( 16 ) THE question still remains whether the testimony of this child witness is worth reliable and whether she has seen the incident or not. On close scrutiny of her testimony it is gathered that the incident had taken place inside the house where appellant, deceased and this witness happen to reside. At the time of incident the deceased (mother of the child witness) was setting fire in the Chulha. Her younger sister Sukhmatia bai was also present there. The appellant who is her father gave blows of plough on the person of the deceased which landed on her head and neck, as a result of which deceased died. On seeing the incident this child witness who was aged 6 years started weeping. She also intervened to stop the quarrel between appellant and deceased and during intervention she also sustained injury on her right hand. She showed the scar of injury to the Court which was found on her right hand and this fact has been mentioned in her deposition sheet. Thereafter this witness came out from her house and narrated the incident to her uncle Inder and grand mother Ramkali Bai who were living separately nearby her house and after narrating the incident to them she again came back to her house. The suggestion put to her that she has been tutored by her grand mother before coming to the Court, has been firmly denied by her. The suggestion put to her that she has been tutored by her grand mother before coming to the Court, has been firmly denied by her. ( 17 ) THE Supreme Court in the case of ratan Singh Dalsukhbhai Nayak v. State of gujarat (2004) 1 SCC 64 : (2004 Cri LJ 19)by placing reliance on earlier decision Dattu ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra, (1997)5 SCC 341 has held that a child witness if found competent to depose to the facts and reliable one such evidence could be the basis of conviction. In other words. even in the absence of oath the evidence of a child witness can be considered under section 118 of the Evidence Act provided that such witness is able to understand the questions and able to give rational answers thereof. The evidence of the child witness and credibility thereof would depend upon the circumstances of each case. The only precaution which the Court should bear in mind while assessing the evidence of a child witness is that the witness must be a reliable one and his/her demeanour must be like any other competent witness and there is no likelihood of being tutored. ( 18 ) WE have already discussed herein-above while marshaling the evidence of above said child witness that she is not a tutored witness. The suggestion in that regard put forth was firmly denied by her. We have already discussed hereinabove that pusiabai (P. W. 1) was found competent to depose the facts and was able to give rational answers to the questions put to her. Indeed learned trial Judge before taking her evidence put certain general questions to her in order to ascertain her intelligence and whether she is able to answer the questions put to her and found that she understands the questions put to her. There is nothing in the testimony of this witness in order to disbelieve her. Indeed the incident had taken place before her and in presence of her younger sister. Thus, according to us, learned trial Judge did not commit any error in placing reliance on the testimony of this child witness. ( 19 ) ON going through the testimony of autopsy surgeon Dr. Amrit Marawi (P. W. 6)and the post-mortem report (Ex. Indeed the incident had taken place before her and in presence of her younger sister. Thus, according to us, learned trial Judge did not commit any error in placing reliance on the testimony of this child witness. ( 19 ) ON going through the testimony of autopsy surgeon Dr. Amrit Marawi (P. W. 6)and the post-mortem report (Ex. P-8) it is gathered that deceased sustained as many as 7 wounds which were placed on her head and neck regions, but no fracture, on any of the bone of the skull was found. Indeed there is no fracture on the person of the deceased. Similarly the doctor did not find any cut of any major blood vessel of the neck. Therefore, there is merit in the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the case would rest under Section 34 Part-I, IPC because there is no previous enmity between the appellant and deceased who are husband and wife. The deceased was cooking the food when the incident had occurred. ( 20 ) FOR the reason stated hereinabove we hold the appellant to be guilty of causing injuries to the deceased, as a result of which she passed away. However, according to us, the present case would fall under Section 304 Part-I IPC. Thus the conviction of appellant is accordingly altered from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part-1, IPC. The appellant is in jail w. e. f. 20-3-1995 and he had already suffered the jail sentence of 11 years and 6 months and this would be appropriate sentence for the offence which he has committed. ( 21 ) RESULTANTLY, this appeal succeeds in part. The conviction of appellant is altered from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part-I, ipc and he is sentenced to the period which he had already undergone. The appellant is in jail, he be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. Order accordingly. .