Judgment ( 1. ) KEEPING in view the identical nature of assail and the identic prayer for mitigation of the grievance, this batch of writ petitions was heard analogously and is disposed of by this singular order. For the sake of convenience the facts exposited in W. P. No. 12904/2005 are enumerated herein. ( 2. ) THE petitioner, a village extension organizer working in Jabalpur Co- operative Milk Producers Union Ltd. , stood compulsorily retired after completion of service of 20 years by virtue of the impugned order dated 31-5-2003 by the General Manager of the aforesaid Union, respondent No. 2, vide Annexure P-8 on the foundation that a decision has been taken by the Cooperative Society to compulsorily retire him after taking recourse to Regulation 13 (1) of the M. P. Co-operative Dairy Federation Ltd. , Bhopal (Employees Recruitment, Classification and Conditions of Service) Regulations, 1985 [hereinafter referred to as the Regulations]. ( 3. ) THE facts that have been pleaded in great details in this writ petition need not be adverted to, for we arc only inclined to revert to the constitutional validity of Regulation 13 (1) as that is the challenge in this writ petition. It is unnecessary to emphasise, the order of compulsory retirement as contained in Annexure P-8 has been attacked elementarily on the foundation that the regulation being unconstitutional, as a sequitur, the order of compulsory retirement has to pave the path of vulnerability. Hence, we shall first dwell upon the challenge with regard to the acceptability and defensibility of the Rule in the constitutional backdrop and thereafter if felt requisite, the second assail shall be reverted to. ( 4. ) IT is contended in the writ petition that Regulation 13 (1) of the Regulation is arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, irrational and confers unbridled and uncanalised power on the authority and thereby invites the frown of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. We think it seemly to reproduce the English translation of the same: 13. Compulsory Retirement: (1) The appointing authority is conferred with the power to retire an employee who has completed 20 years of his service without ascribing any reason. For the aforesaid, no claim for special compensation shall be entertained. We think it seemly to reproduce the English translation of the same: 13. Compulsory Retirement: (1) The appointing authority is conferred with the power to retire an employee who has completed 20 years of his service without ascribing any reason. For the aforesaid, no claim for special compensation shall be entertained. The said power can only be exercised when in the opinion of appointing authority it is in the interest of the Federation and it can be done only after issuance of three months prior notice. ( 5. ) QUESTIONING the validity of the said regulation it is submitted by Mr. A. M. Trivedi, learned Senior Counsel being assisted by Mr. Sushil Kumar Mishra that the rule is bereft of guidelines and, therefore, it is unconstitutional. It is contended by him if such power is conferred on the appointing authority it would per se result in arbitrary exercise of power and, therefore, the rule deserves to be stuck down as unconstitutional. The learned Senior Counsel canvassed that an employee in a co-operative society does not get any kind of pension which is available to the employees of the State Government and ergo, the conception of compulsory retirement which is prevalent in the State Government after rendering of service of 20 years, cannot be ushered into in the realm of Co-operative society as it eventually leads an employee on the path of impecuniousity and in the ultimate eventuate renders him jobless. The learned Senior Counsel has further contended that rules are statutory in nature and statutory regulation should not mortgage its conscience to take colour of arbitrariness and once that is done the concepts of fair procedure, reasonableness and the principles engrafted under the Wedensbury Principles get ingloriously and unceremoniously buried. To bolster his submission he has commended us to the decision rendered in the cases of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brajo Nath Ganguly AIR1986 SC 1571 , (1986 )3 Complj1 (SC ), 1986 Lablc1312 , (1986 )II LLJ171 SC , 1986 (1 )SCALE799 , (1986 )3 SCC156 , [1986 ]2 SCR278 , 1986 (2 )SLJ320 (SC ), Dinesh Kumar Sharma v. M. P. Dugdha Mahasangh Sahakari Maryadit and Anr. 1993 MPLJ 786 ; and State of Gujarat v. Umedbhai M. Patel 2001 AIR SCW 862. ( 6. ) MR. 1993 MPLJ 786 ; and State of Gujarat v. Umedbhai M. Patel 2001 AIR SCW 862. ( 6. ) MR. Anoop Nair, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents-Society placing reliance on the return has submitted that the rule is in consonance with the basic service jurisprudence and the employer has the liberty to do away with the service of an employee after expiry of 20 years which is founded on the public interest. The learned Counsel propounded that similar provision has been engrafted under Rule 42 (2) (b) of the M. P. Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1976 (for short the 1976 Rules) and the colossal complaint with regard to arbitrariness and unreasonability is sans substratum. The learned Counsel further submitted that order of compulsory retirement passed against the petitioner can be called in question before the competent authority as envisaged under Section 55 (2) of the M. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. ( 7. ) IT is well settled in law that an employer has the basic right to fix the age of superannuation unless it is totally arbitrary. There is a distinction between retirement and termination. Public interest has the paramount role in the conception of governance in a democratic polity. On a perusal of Regulation 13 (1), it is quite vivid that it does not really deal with termination but retirement. In the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court while dealing with the Clause (ii) of Rule 9 of the Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. Service Discipline and Appeal Rules of 1979 held it as unconstitutional being opposed to public policy and ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution to the extent that it confers upon the Corporation the right to terminate the service of a permanent employee by giving him three months notice in writing or by paying him the equivalent of three months basic pay without holding an inquiry. In the case of Delhi Transport Corporation v. D. T. C. Mazdoor Congress and Ors. AIR1991 SC 101 , (1991 )1 Complj1 (SC ), JT1990 (3 )SC 725 , 1991 Lablc91 , (1991 )I LLJ395 SC , 1991 Supp (1 )SCC600 , [1990 ]supp1 SCR142 , 1991 (1 )SLJ56 (SC ), such a provision was regarded as Henry VIIIth Clause by the Constitution Bench. AIR1991 SC 101 , (1991 )1 Complj1 (SC ), JT1990 (3 )SC 725 , 1991 Lablc91 , (1991 )I LLJ395 SC , 1991 Supp (1 )SCC600 , [1990 ]supp1 SCR142 , 1991 (1 )SLJ56 (SC ), such a provision was regarded as Henry VIIIth Clause by the Constitution Bench. In the case at hand, as it is evincible the rule under assail does not deal with termination. It deals with retirement in public interest. Submission of Mr. Trivedi is that the pari materia rule that forms a part of the 1976 Rules has to be treated differently inasmuch as there is no pension in respect of employees of a co-operative society. It is well settled that a Government servant holds a civil post and enjoys a different status. By no stretch of imagination an employee of the Cooperative Society can claim equality with the Government servant. A Co-operative society is a body corporate. It has been so held in the case of Daman Singh v. State of Punjab AIR1985 SC 973 , (1985 )87 BOMLR290 , [1986 ]60 Compcas1 (SC ), 1985 (1 )SCALE644 , (1985 )2 SCC670 , [1985 ]3 SCR580 , 1985 (17 )UJ1080 (SC ). True it is, the rules that have been framed for co-operative societies have statutory force as has been held by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Dinesh Kumar Sharma (supra ). In that case it was held that though co-operative societies cannot be characterised as a state within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India yet if the officers of the society act in violation of statutory provisions or fail to discharge statutory duty a writ could be issued for enforcement of statutory obligation and public duty. Registrar has been conferred power under Section 55 to frame rules from time to time keeping in view the terms and conditions of the employment in a society or a class of society. Challenge by Mr. Trivedi is that retirement after 20 years of service in public interest when service is not pensionable, offends the equality clause inasmuch as the State Government employees get pension on such retirement and, therefore, in that sphere the rule may be treated to be valid, but in the case of co-operative sector, it cannot be so regarded. ( 8. Trivedi is that retirement after 20 years of service in public interest when service is not pensionable, offends the equality clause inasmuch as the State Government employees get pension on such retirement and, therefore, in that sphere the rule may be treated to be valid, but in the case of co-operative sector, it cannot be so regarded. ( 8. ) THE first argument, if we permit ourselves to say so, has a basic fallacy. Article 14 of the Constitution of India is never attracted in a vacuum. The State Government employees as has been indicated hereinbefore, have a different status because of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. Such status is not conferred on the employees of a co-operative society. To equate an employee of a society with that of a government servant is fundamentally fallacious. Article 14 of the Constitution does not envisage comparison or claim of equality as equals on equal platform. Hence, the argument advanced on the ground of comparison or claim of equality being not tenable, attack on the rule on the marrow of Article 14 of the Constitution is not sustainable. ( 9. ) THE next assail to the rule is that the rule is sans guidelines or bereft of guidance. While dealing with concept of compulsory retirement two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Umedbhai M. Patel (supra), in Paragraph 11 culled out the principles relating to compulsory retirement. We quote with profit: 11. The law relating to compulsory retirement has now crystallized into definite principles, which could be broadly summarised thus: (i) Whenever the service of a public servant are no longer useful to the general administration, the officer can be compulsorily retired for the sake of public interest. (ii) Ordinarily, the order of compulsory retirement is not to be treated as a punishment coming under Article 311 of the Constitution. (iii) For better administration, it is necessary to chop off dead wood, but the order of compulsory retirement can be passed after having due regard to the entire service record of the officer. (iv) Any adverse entries made in the confidential record shall be taken note of and be given due weightage in passing such order. (v) Even uncommunication entries in the confidential record can also be taken into consideration. (iv) Any adverse entries made in the confidential record shall be taken note of and be given due weightage in passing such order. (v) Even uncommunication entries in the confidential record can also be taken into consideration. (vi) The order of compulsory retirement shall not be passed as a short cut to avoid departmental enquiry when such course is more desirable. (vii) If the officer was given a promotion despite adverse entries made in the confidential record, that is a fact in favour of the officer. (viii) Compulsory retirement shall not be imposed as a punitive measure. ( 10. ) THE said guidelines have to be followed as the regulation postulates that the competent authority has to form an opinion that the employee has to be compulsorily retired after completion of 20 years. Additionally it has been provided therein that opinion must relate to the factum that the continuance of the employee is not in the interest of the Federation. Formation of any opinion cannot be subjective. It has to have a base. It has to have a foundation, it has to be objective. It has to be informed by reasons which are cogent and germane, for reason is the heart and soul of an order. Hence, the principles that have been enumerated in the case of Ummedbhai M. Patel (supra) would be attracted to the case of compulsory retirement under Regulation 13 (1) of the Regulations. ( 11. ) IN view of our foregoing analysis, we are not inclined to accept the submission of Mr. A. M. Trivedi, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the rule is ultra vires the Article 14 of the Constitution. ( 12. ) ORDINARILY we would have parted so stating, but, there is relief for quashment of the order of compulsory retirement contained in Annexure P-8. In this context we may fruitfully refer Section 55 (2) of the 1960 Act which reads as under: 55. Registrars power to determine conditions of employment in societies. ( 12. ) ORDINARILY we would have parted so stating, but, there is relief for quashment of the order of compulsory retirement contained in Annexure P-8. In this context we may fruitfully refer Section 55 (2) of the 1960 Act which reads as under: 55. Registrars power to determine conditions of employment in societies. (1) **** **** **** *** (2) Where a dispute, including a dispute regarding terms of employment working conditions and disciplinary action taken by a society, arises between a society and its employees, the Registrar or any officer appointed by him not below the rank of Assistant Registrar shall decide the dispute and his decision shall be binding on the society and its employees: Provided that the Registrar or the officer referred to above shall not entertain the dispute unless presented to him within thirty days from the date of order sought to be impugned: Provided further-that in computing the period of limitation under the foregoing proviso, the time requisite for obtaining copy of the order shall be excluded. ( 13. ) SUBMISSION of Mr. Anoop Nair, learned Counsel for the respondent-Federation is that the said order can be challenged before the Competent Authority under Section 55 (2 ). Mr. Trivedi, learned Senior Counsel submitted that this Court should decide the lis. We refrain from doing so as we are disposed to think that the petitioner has an efficacious alternative remedy. However, it is noticeable that a limitation has been provided to challenge an order of compulsory retirement. ( 14. ) THIS petitioner has visited this Court belatedly challenging the regulation as unconstitutional. In view of the aforesaid, we think it appropriate to afford an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner to call in question the validity of the order of compulsory retirement contained in Annexure P-8 before the competent authority as envisaged under Section 55 (2) of the 1960 Act within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of the order passed today. Mr. Anoop Nair, learned Counsel for the respondents has very fairly conceded that the respondents would not oppose the prayer for condonation of delay. Competent authority will be well advised to decide the matter on merits. An apprehension has been put forth by Mr. Mr. Anoop Nair, learned Counsel for the respondents has very fairly conceded that the respondents would not oppose the prayer for condonation of delay. Competent authority will be well advised to decide the matter on merits. An apprehension has been put forth by Mr. Trivedi, that there may be delay in adjudication and therefore, a direction should be given to the competent authority to decide the matter in quite promptitude. Mr. Nair submitted that the respondents would fully co-operate and would not do anything to procrastinate the matter. In view of the aforesaid we command, the competent authority to decide the dispute within a period of three months from the date of presentation of the application before him. ( 15. ) THE writ petitions are disposed of accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs.