ORAL JUDGMENT :- Heard the learned counsel Mr. P. M. Yelnurkar, structed by learned counsel Mr. M. P. Harjule, who appears for the appellant and learned A.G.P. Mrs. P. R. Mane for the respondent. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order passed by the earned 2nd Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division in Review Application No. 93 of 11986 on 31st July, 1987. 2. The appellant was the petitioner and the respondent was opponent in Review Application No. 93 of 1986. The parties, hereinafter, are transferred to their status in Review Application No. 93 of 1986, as petitioner and opponent, respectively. 3. Petitioner had filed Land Acquisition Reference No.1 of 1978 under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act 1894, for short) for enhancement of compensation. This application was -referred to the learned District Judge, Ahmednagar and, in turn, it was made over learned 2nd Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Ahmednagar. It was, as noted have, L.A.R. No.1 of 1978. The learned 2nd Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, .Ahmednagar, after hearing the parties, awarded an amount of Rs. 33,120/- as additional compensation and an amount of Rs. 4,968/- as 15% solatium, totalling to Rs. 38,088/-. Interest at the rate of 4% was directed to be paid to the applicant on the amount of additional compensation from the date on which the possession of the land was taken, till the date of final payment of such amount. Proportionate costs was also awarded by the learned 2nd Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Ahmednagar, by his judgment and award passed on 13th September, 1984 in L.A.R. No.1 of 1978. The petitioner filed Review Application No. 93 of 1986 in the Co learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Ahmednagar seeking review of the passed in L.AR. No. I of 1978. Learned 2nd Joint Civil Judge, Senior Div Ahmednagar, after hearing the parties, partly allowed the Review Applications No. 93 of 1986 and modified the order passed in L.AR. No. I of 1978, learned 2nd Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division maintained the amount additional compensation to the tune of Rs. 33,120/-, however, solatium, rate of 30%, instead of 15%, was awarded. In other words, considering the e Award of 15% solatium, further additional solatium at the rate of 15% directed to be paid to the petitioner. No. I of 1978, learned 2nd Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division maintained the amount additional compensation to the tune of Rs. 33,120/-, however, solatium, rate of 30%, instead of 15%, was awarded. In other words, considering the e Award of 15% solatium, further additional solatium at the rate of 15% directed to be paid to the petitioner. On the amount of this add compensation, the opponent was directed to pay interest at the rate of 9 from the date on which possession of the land was taken, till deposit amount of compensation in the Court, except for the period for which re been paid. In case of depositing the amount of compensation, beyond the of one year, interest at the rate of 15% p.a. for the said period i.e. beyond year, was made permissible. Proportionate costs was also awarded in favour the petitioner by the order passed by the 2nd Joint Civil Judge, Senior Di Ahmednagar on 31st July, 1987 in Review Application No. 93 of 1986. 4. The order passed in Review Application No. 93 of 1986 is challenging filing First Appeal No. 64 of 1991. The first question, in this appeal, is register its maintainability. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that application, filed by the petitioner was partly allowed. He has no aggrieved regarding the part which is accepted and decreed in his favour. However, aggrieved by rejection of part of the review application. According to him, is the proper remedy for such review petitioner whose claim is partly reject relies on a judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Rekha Mukherj Ashis Kumar Das and others, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 427 . Per contra, I AG.P. Mrs. R. R. Mane, for the respondent, submits that the appeal maintainable in case of rejection of part of the review application. Accord her, if review application is allowed, such an order can be challenged opponent in review application. by filing an appeal. Apart from this, the learned counsel for the appellant also submits that, on merits the appellant is entailed the relief. Learned AG.P. Mrs. Mane submits that the order impugned, in this appeal, is legal and proper. She, therefore, seeks dismissal of the appeal. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, following are points, which arise for my consideration: (i) Whether the appeal against part rejection of the application review, is maintainable? Learned AG.P. Mrs. Mane submits that the order impugned, in this appeal, is legal and proper. She, therefore, seeks dismissal of the appeal. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, following are points, which arise for my consideration: (i) Whether the appeal against part rejection of the application review, is maintainable? (ii) Whether the petitioner is entitled to seek component at the 12%, as per the amended sub-section (I-A) of section 23 oft of 1894? (iii) Whether the petitioner is justified in seeking review of the judgment of the reference Court under section 18 of the Act of 1894? 6.My findings to the above points, for the following reasons, are: (i) No. (ii) No. (iii) No. Reasons NO.1: 7. The learned 2nd Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division seems to have L.A.R. No.1 of 1978 by the judgment and award passed on 13th 1984. It was an application filed by the present petitioner under the Act of 1894 for enhancement in the amount of compensation. Since I am dealing with an appeal, against review order, I am not referring to the and area of the lands acquired. Suffice it to note that award n 11, in relation to the acquired lands, was passed by the Special position Officer on 28th March, 1977, it is Award No. LAQ/SR/S of judgment and award passed in L.A.R. No.1 of 1978 can be challenged appeal under section 54 of the Act of 1894. It is provided under of the Act of 1894 that subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil. 1908, applicable to the appeals from original decrees, and ding anything to the contrary in any enactment, for the time being in I shall only be, in any proceedings under this Act, to the High Court ward, or from any part of the Award of the Court. From any decree. the High Court, on such appeal, further remedy of appeal is also made I to the Supreme Court. Undisputedly, in the present case, the award passed. L.A.R. No. 1 of 1978 was not challenged by filing of an appeal under Section of the Act of 1894, by the appellant. 8. The petitioner, however, filed review application under Order 47 Rule 1 of Civil Procedure, in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Senior. Ahmednagar on 18th January, 1986. This review application was as Review Application No. 93 of 1986. 8. The petitioner, however, filed review application under Order 47 Rule 1 of Civil Procedure, in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Senior. Ahmednagar on 18th January, 1986. This review application was as Review Application No. 93 of 1986. In para No.5 of the review on, petitioner sought 30% solatium, on the amount of additional compensation, 12% component, as per amended provision under section 23(1-A) et of 1894 and interest at the rate of 9% p.a. for the first year from the Possession and at the rate of 15%, if such amount is not deposited within from that date till the actual date of payment. Petitioner also sought of the order passed in L.A.R. No. 1 of 1978, on the point of market priced by the Reference Court. In this background, the provision laid down Order 47 Rule 1 needs to be considered. It is provided under Order 47 Rule Code of Civil Procedure that any person feeling himself aggrieved by (i) or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has referred, (ii) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (iii) decision on reference from a Court of Small Causes and, who from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence, which, after the exercise of diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at when the decree was passed, or made. Review also can be sought on the ground of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. Any other respondent reason can be a ground seeking review. Rule 4 of Order 47 empowers to reject the review application, on insufficiency of grounds. Rule 7 of Order 47, present case, is material and, therefore, is reproduced here in below: "7. Order of rejection not appealable. Objections to order granting application. - (1) An order of the Court rejecting the application shall not be appealable; but an order granting an application may be objected to at once by an appeal from the order granting the application or appeal from the decree or order finally passed or made in the suit. Order of rejection not appealable. Objections to order granting application. - (1) An order of the Court rejecting the application shall not be appealable; but an order granting an application may be objected to at once by an appeal from the order granting the application or appeal from the decree or order finally passed or made in the suit. (2) Where the application has been rejected in consequence of the failure of the applicant to appear, he may apply for an order to have the rejected application restored to the file, and, where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that he was prevented by any sufficient cause appearing when such application was called for hearing, the Court order it to be restored to the file upon such terms as to costs or other as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for hearing the same. (3) No order shall be made under sub-rule (2) unless notice of application has been served on the opposite party." Thus, in case of rejection of the application for review, said order to made appealable. However, if review application is allowed by the Court, order can be objected by filing an appeal. Such order also can be challenging an appeal from the decree or order finally passed or made in the suit. Sub-rule of Rule 7 of Order 47, provides a remedy in case of rejection of the Re application in case of failure of the applicant to appear before the Court. In circumstances, application is contemplated seeking restoration of the said application on the file. If it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that applicant was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing, the Court order it to be restored to the file and, thereafter, hear the application and d the same. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 7 of Order 47 has forbidden consideration application filed under sub-rule (2) thereof, unless notice has been served opposite party. 9. Having considered the scheme of Order 47 of the Code of Procedure, in my view, rejection of the review application, is not appealable. In other words, in case review application is rejected, Order 4 not provided further appeal against such an order passed by the Court. 9. Having considered the scheme of Order 47 of the Code of Procedure, in my view, rejection of the review application, is not appealable. In other words, in case review application is rejected, Order 4 not provided further appeal against such an order passed by the Court. In review application is allowed by the Court or earlier decree or order is modified in that contingency, appeal is made available under sub-rule (1) of Rule Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is apropos to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court, relied upon b learned counsel for the appellant in the case of Rekha (supra). The Su Court has referred to section 14, Order 47, Rules 4, 7, 8, sections 96 and 1 the Code of Civil Procedure. According to the learned counsel for the appellant paragraph No. 31 is relevant. He, therefore, submits that if request is for re of partly rejected application, that part of the order can be a subject-matter appeal. The Apex Court in the matter of Rekha (supra) has considered the of review in para No. 17, which is reproduced herein below: "17. The suit filed by the respondents for grant of specific perform of contract was dismissed. The said decree although was appealable in view of the order dated 15-7-2002, the said decree in its en ceased to operate. Order 47 Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code post filing of an application by a person considering himself aggrieved, decree or order from which an appeal is allowed but from which appeal has been preferred, to file an application if he desires to obtain review from a decree passed against him. An appeal during the pendent of the review petition was, therefore, not maintainable. In. terms of , Order 47, Rule 4, the Court may either reject or grant an applIcatioion for review. In case a review is rejected, the order would not be appeal able whereas an order granting an application may be objected to at once by appeal from the order granting the application for in an appeal from the decree or order finally passed or made 10 the Suit. In case a review is rejected, the order would not be appeal able whereas an order granting an application may be objected to at once by appeal from the order granting the application for in an appeal from the decree or order finally passed or made 10 the Suit. Rule 8 of Order 47,, Civil Procedure Code postulates that when an application On for review is granted, a note thereof shall be made in the register and the Court may at once rehear the case or make such order in regard to the rehearing as It thinks fit." 10. Apex Court, ultimately, considering the facts in the. reported judgment provisions of law, held in para No. 35, that the High Court was not Jin holding that the first appeal, filed by the respondents, was able. 10. The Apex Court , ultimately, considering the facts in reported judjment and the provisions laid down under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of civil Procedure in the matter of Sushil Kumar Sen vs. State of Bihar, reported in (1975) 1 SCC 774 . In the matter of Sushil Kumar (supra), the appellant therein was owner of 3.30 Acres of land, which was acquired under the provisions of the Act of 1894. Award was passed 12th October, 1957 and compensation, at the rate of Rs. 14/- per Katha was arded. The appellant was dissatisfied with the A ward and, therefore, filed an application for enhancement under section 18 of the Act of 1894. He claimed pensation at the rate of Rs. 500/- per Katha. The Additional District Judge, ea, by the judgment dated 18th August, 1961, found that the appellant was titled to compensation for the land acquired at the rate of Rs. 200/- per Katha. Modification in the Award was accordingly made in relation to market price and other heads also. On 22nd August, 1961, the respondent therein, the State of Procedure, filed an application for review under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code against the judgment dated 18th August, 1961, on the basis of wand important evidence as regards the market price of the land, which was t available to it in spite of exercise of due diligence. The learned Additional strict Judge allowed the application for review and passed fresh judgment on the September, 1961 reducing the compensation for land from Rs. 200/- to .75/- per Katha. The learned Additional strict Judge allowed the application for review and passed fresh judgment on the September, 1961 reducing the compensation for land from Rs. 200/- to .75/- per Katha. Thereafter, the respondent/State of Bihar filed Appeal No. 81 1962 in the High Court of Patna. It was mentioned in the memorandum of peal that the appeal was being preferred against the decrees dated 18th August, 61, 26th September, 1961. However, the grounds taken in the memorandum of peal, as well as the Court fee paid, would show that the appeal was against the free judgment dated 26th September, 1961 awarding compensation at the rate of Rs. 75/r Katha and not against the decree dated 18th August, 1961 awarding compensation at the rate of Rs. 200/- per Katha. The appellant therein also filed a companion appeal challenging the maintainability of the review petition filed by the respondent before the Additional District Judge, as also the order passed therein, him, allowing the petition. The appeal was decided by the judgment of High court dated 16th February, 1968. The High Court found that the Additional district Judge went wrong in entertaining the review and vacating the judgment decree dated 18th August, 1961 thereby maintained the compensation awarded for the land at the rate of Rs. 75/- per Katha, by the judgment a dated 26th September, 1961 of the Additional District Judge. background, S.L.P. was before the Apex Court. The Apex Court, held of the judgment: "3. The respondent did not file any appeal from the decree dat 18, 1961 awarding compensation for the land acquired at the r 200 per Katha. On the other hand, it sought for a review of the and succeeded in getting the decree vacated. When it filed Appeal No. of 1962, before the High Court, it could not have filed an appeal the decree dated August 18, 1961 passed by the Additional District Judge as at that time that decree had already been superseded by t dated September 26, 1961 passed after review. So the appeal fit. respondent before the High Court could only be an appeal a .decree passed after review. When the High Court came to the c that the Additional District Judge went wrong in allowing the review should have allowed the cross appeal. So the appeal fit. respondent before the High Court could only be an appeal a .decree passed after review. When the High Court came to the c that the Additional District Judge went wrong in allowing the review should have allowed the cross appeal. Since no appeal was pr the respondent against the decree passed on August 18, 1961 compensation for the land at the rate of Rs. 200 per Katha, became final. The respondent made no attempt to file an app that decree when the High Court found that the review was allowed on the basis that the decree revived and came into life again. 11. In view of the aforesaid pronouncements of the Appellant considering the scope of review application, in my view, in the pre appeal filed by the appellant, either under Order 47 of the Code: Procedure or under section 54 of the Act of 1894, is not maintainable. this point No.1 accordingly is recorded against the appellant. POINT NO.2: 12. The learned counsel for the appellant fairly admits that issue entitlement of 12% component under section 23(1-A) is now resolv. Apex Court judgment in the matter of K. S. Paripoornan vs. State of Kerala others, reported in AIR 1995 SC 1012 . The Apex Court, in para judgment, held: "62. How to construe section 23( 1-A) of the Land A (Amendment) Act, 1984 (for short the Amendment Act) a s provision added in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short after 90 years, for striking proper balance, between the acquisition of land for private purpose and the rights of the whose land is acquired is the simple issue but of f consequence both for the State or the acquiring body and by process of law are deprived of their land, interpretative process, which in public welfare measures purpose-oriented, further the legislative objective by taking even to the debates in the House, if necessary, to find out the Legislature intended to remedy or it should resort to unduly restrictive construction by adding or subtracting w otherwise plain and simple language on assumptions retrospectivity drawn from the transitional provision. Even elapsed since the amendment was made yet there are no less than six decisions one of them being Constitution Bench on scope and applicability of the amending provision when it could not be disputed at the law was amended and the Legislature made the changes to delegate the rigour of the owners on account of delays by providing for frame in section II-A, additional compensation under section 23( I-A), enhanced solatium under section 23(2), and equality of compensation for persons affected by same notification under section 28-A. But the convergence has arisen not on the purpose or objective, or the benefit the ,provision intends to confer but on construction arising out of difference approach of interpreting such a provision. Brother Agrawal has opted construction which restricts the operation of section 23(1-A) to the proceedings for acquisition initiated after coming into force of the Amendment Act. This with profound respect to him is not made out her from the language of the provision or from the legislative objective discerned from the Debates in the Lok Sabha. Therefore, despite liberations and discussions it has not been possible to share the views pressed by him, that extended to the landowners whose references ere or are pending under section 18 it would amount to operating the provision retrospectively in respect of past truncations. Nor it has been possible to reconcile to the view that section 30(1), the transitional vision, can be reflected into section 23-A to curtail its ambit and scope and construe it as applicable to notification issued under section 1) after September, 1984." 13. Undisputedly, in the present case, award was passed by the Special Acquisition Officer on 28th March, 1977. The petitioner, therefore, is not seek benefit of section 23(1-A) of the Act of 1894. My finding, on Point No.2 is in the negative and against the appellant. Point NO. 3 : Though I have recorded a finding, regarding maintainability of the against the appellant, I have considered the points framed on merits also, hove. The review Court, while dealing with Review Application No. 93 observed that the order sought to be reviewed was passed in L.A.R. No. dated 13th September, 1984. The review application was filed on 27th 1986. There is no explanation tendered regarding the delay. The review Court, while dealing with Review Application No. 93 observed that the order sought to be reviewed was passed in L.A.R. No. dated 13th September, 1984. The review application was filed on 27th 1986. There is no explanation tendered regarding the delay. The Court below, has rejected the review application on limitation and refused to the merits, In my view, the Court has justifiably recorded a finding on of limitation. Apart from this, in my view, there is no ground for review, in relation to market price of the lands acquired. The finding on therefore, has to be recorded against the appellant and in the negative. 15. In this view of the matter, appeal filed on behalf of the petitioner, deserves to be dismissed and accordingly stands dismissed. Having regard to the fact that appellant suffered a compulsory acquisition of property, I am not inclined to award costs. Parties, therefore, are bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.