( 1 ) THE petitioner is a tenant in the suit property. An eviction pention was filed by the respondent herein against the petitioner herein under section 14 (1) (a) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter to be referred to as, 'the said Act') on account of non-payment of not The petitioner was found in default and an order was passed under Section 5 (1) of the said Act giving time of 30 days to the petitioner to deposit the arrears of rent in order to avail of the statutory benefits under Section 14 (2) of the said Act. The deficient rent was not deposited with the result that an eviction order was passed on 06. 10. 2005. However, considering that the petitioner was running a school in the suit property, time was given up to March. 2006 to vacate the property. ( 2 ) THE petitioner aggrieved by the said order filed an appeal before the additional Rent Control Tribunal (hereinafter to be referred to as, 'the tribunal'), which has been dismissed by the impugned order dated 03. 06. 2006. ( 3 ) THE Tribunal had passed the order dated 06. 09. 2005 and the petitioner was directed to pay or deposit rent @ Rs. 731. 50 w. e. f. December, 1988 or deficient rent, if any. Since this order was not complied with, the order of eviction was passed on 06. 10. 2005. The premises consist of the entire first and second floor of the property bearing No. 178-D (Municipal No. 6659), Kamla Nagar, Delh. The tenancy was created on 13. 07. 1958 at a monthly rent of Rs. 665/- exclusive of electricity and water charges. The allegation against the petitioner was that it had not paid the legally recoverable rent in spite of service of demand notice dated 04. 10. 1998 and there were arrears of rent for the period 01. 09. 1995 to 30. 09. 1998. ( 4 ) THE eviction petition had been contested by the petitioner and it, was stated that the petitioner is a registered society under the Societies registration Act, which is controlled by its parent body S. S. Jain Sabha of rawalpind. It was claimed that relationship of the landlady was with the said entity as a tenant and the demand notice had not been served upon the tenant. It was claimed that relationship of the landlady was with the said entity as a tenant and the demand notice had not been served upon the tenant. It was also stated that the rent was not due at the time of service of notice. The petitioner claimed to have paid the rent for the period 01. 10. 1995 to 31. 05. 1996 on 19. 06. 1996 for the sum of Rs. 5,320/-, though it was not disputed that the cheque was not presented for encashment. Rent for prior period was also alleged to have been paid though not encashed. Evidence was led by both the parties and the trial court found that the relationship of landlord and tenant was established, demand notice was duly served upon the tenant claiming the rent due and the petitioner was in ariars of rent. The demand notice was a composite notice demanding arrears of rent as also revision of rent by 10% and the petitioner was liable to pay rent @rs. 731. 50 w. e. f. December, 1998. ( 5 ) AT the stage when the eviction petition was pending, an order under section 15 (1) of the said Act was passed on 22. 07. 1999 directing the arrears of rent @ Rs. 6657- to be paid or deposited w. e. f. 01. 10. 1995 as also the future rent at the same rate. This order was modified on 06. 09. 2005 for payment of arrears of rent by the petitioners at the increased rate of Rs. 731. 50 w. e. f. December, 1998 for the petitioner to avail of the benefit of the provisions of section 14 (2) of the said Act. ( 6 ) IT is trite to say that the proceedings under Article 227 of the constitution of India cannot be utilised for purposes of re-appraisal of evidence and material and convert such proceedings into a second appeal proceedings. The provision earlier existing in the said Act for a second appeal was consciously deleted by the Legislature. Thus, it is no ground to state that a different conclusion ought to have been arrived at by the trial court and the appellate court on the material before it. ( 7 ) THE appellate court has gone into the evidence in detail and it was held that the tenancy was created in favour of the petitioner. Thus, it is no ground to state that a different conclusion ought to have been arrived at by the trial court and the appellate court on the material before it. ( 7 ) THE appellate court has gone into the evidence in detail and it was held that the tenancy was created in favour of the petitioner. In fact, this issue is not even agitated by learned counsel for the petitioner, ( 8 ) A controversy was raised about the service of demand notice, but the same was proved to have been served. There was no dispute about the last paid rent for Rs. 665/- per month and the respondent was entitled to 10% increase in rent as per the provisions of Section 6-A of the said Act, This notice was duly served demanding the higher rent @ Rs. 731. 50 apart from making the claim about the arrears of rent The question of delivery of cheque has also been examined both by the trial court and the appellate court and it has been found against the petitioner. An important factor, apart from the other evidence produced, is that the petitioner did not even reply to the demand notice claiming that the rent stood paid, nor was the rent tendered thereafter. ( 9 ) IT is not disputed that the order passed on 22. 07. 1999 under Section 15 (1) of the said Act directing payment or deposit of rent @ Rs. 665/- per month w. e. f. 01. 10. 1995 was not challenged in appeal. This order was. however, finally modified at the stage when the order was passed on 06. 09. 2005 under Section 15 (1) of the said Act as enhanced rent was found payable Rs. 731. 50 per month from December, 1993 or deficient amount, if any. There is also no dispute about the legal proposition that on the failure of a tenant to pay this amount, the natural consequence would be an eviction order as the statutory protection under Section 14 (2) of the said Act would not be available. ( 10 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner made a grievance that the order dated 06. 09. 2005 was a composite order under Section 15 (1) and Section 14 (2) of the said Act, which could not have been passed. In fact, this is the grievance also made before the appellate court. ( 10 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner made a grievance that the order dated 06. 09. 2005 was a composite order under Section 15 (1) and Section 14 (2) of the said Act, which could not have been passed. In fact, this is the grievance also made before the appellate court. In this behalf, learned counsel relied upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Globetech engineers v. Ajay Chadha and Aur. , 2002 (64) DRJ 525 (DB) where it was held that the jurisdiction of a Controller to strike off the defence of the tenant under Section 15 (2) of the said Act is to arise only after the eventuality of the non-compliance of the order under Section 15 (1) arises, which is a future event and. thus, a composite order could not be passed as the same would deprive the tenant of a valuable right to contest the eviction petition under section 14 (1) of the said Act. ( 11 ) THE appellate court has noticed the said judgment and the submissions made in that behalf. However, the distinguishing factor in the present case has been noticed as the earlier order passed was followed by another order dated 06. 10. 2005. Thus, it is not in dispute that after passing of the order on 06. 09. 2005 modifying its earlier order under Section 15 (1) of the said Act, the same had not been complied with. It is as a consequence thereof that the eviction order was subsequently passed on 06. 10. 2005 and, thus, any observation made in the order dated 06. 09. 2005 for eviction can be ignored and the order need not be treated as a composite order. ( 12 ) THE main substratum of the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner before this Court was that the petitioner had all intentions of complying with the modified order passed under Section 15 (1) of the said act, but the same did not come to the knowledge of the petitioner till 14. 10. 2005 when the previous counsel supplied the petitioner a certified copy of the order dated 06. 09. 2005. This plea is sought to be supported by the fact that the petitioner tendered rent @ Rs. 665/- per month even for the subsequent period. 10. 2005 when the previous counsel supplied the petitioner a certified copy of the order dated 06. 09. 2005. This plea is sought to be supported by the fact that the petitioner tendered rent @ Rs. 665/- per month even for the subsequent period. ( 13 ) THE appellate court, in my considered view, has also noticed the aforesaid submission and rightly rejected the same. The order dated 06. 09. 2005 was passed in the presence of counsels for both the parties. A copy of the order is stated to have been applied for on 14. 09. 2005 and was made available on 26. 09-2005. The appeal was filed only on 19. 10. 2005. No affidavit of the previous counsel about any delay in supplying the certified copy was filed. Not only that, even assuming the allegation of the petitioner to be correct that the modified order came to its knowledge on 14. 10. 2005. the petitioner did not file any application before the trial court to permit the petitioner to deposit arrears of rent as per the modified order passed under section 15 (1) of the said Act nor was such an application filed before the tribunal. The rent for the months of August, 2005 an September. 2005 was sent by the petitioner through two separate cheques under the cover of the letters dated 12. 09. 2005 and 01. 10. 2005. which were naturally not accepted in the respondent as not being of the requisite amount. The appellate court has drawn a conclusion that the petitioner had come to know about passing of the order dated 06. 09. 2005 and, therefore, had stopped depositing the rent and the rent was tendered to the respondent tenant. ( 14 ) THE petitioner had the option to approach the Rent Controller seeking the exercise of the discretion not to strike off the defence under section 15 (7) of the said Act and to extend the time for deposit of rent, which can be granted in case of a buna fide mistake on the part ofthe tenant or the compliance was beyond the control of the benefit. The petitioner was unable to show that there was any circumstance creating a situation where it was not within if power to deposit the rent. especially when the order was passed in the presence ofthe counsel for the petitioner. The petitioner was unable to show that there was any circumstance creating a situation where it was not within if power to deposit the rent. especially when the order was passed in the presence ofthe counsel for the petitioner. The petitioner did not even seek a permission from the Additional Rent Controller for the said purpose nor was it prayed before the Tribunal. ( 15 ) IT must be appreciated that the provisions of the said Act provides statutory protection to the tenant. In case of non-payment of rent, one further opportunity is granted to clear the arrears. The petitioner having availed of the first benefit and admittedly in default prior to that, committed the second default. ( 16 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner in the end sought to contend that grave prejudice would be caused as the petitioner is running a school. Be that as it may, that cannot give rise to any special equities in favour of the petitioner / tenant prejudicing the rights, which have accrued to the respondent / landlord by default of the petitioner. It is this fact of the school being run which had persuaded the Additional Rent Controller to grant an extended period of time to vacate the premises. It was put to learned counsel for the petitioner that if the petitioner is willing to vacate the tenanted premises and to give an undertaking not to induct any third person and pay the rent regularly, this Court would be inclined to give a longer period of time so that even the current academic year can be protected and notice for that purpose could be issued. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, on instructions stated that the petitioner is not wiling to vacate the premises and is desirous of availing of further legal remedy. Thus, the question of grant of any time to vacate the premises would not arise. ( 17 ) IN my considered view, no case has been made out for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.