JUDGMENT :-The order dated 17-12-2004 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-cum-I Additional District Judge, Karimnagar, in a.p.No.594 of 2003 is assailed in this appeal. 2. First respondent filed the O.P. claiming a sum of Rs.l,50,000/- for the injuries sustained by her in an accident that occurred on 21-3-2003. She pleaded that the petitioner was travelling as a pillion rider on a motorcycle driven by one Erukla Kishan; with a view to go to Vemulawada and when they reached Nampally Bus Stage, a vehicle bearing No.AP 15V 5656 (Toyota Qualis) owned by the second respondent and insured with the appellant came in a rash and negligent manner and hit the motorcycle from behind. The first respondent is said to have fallen down and sustained head injury. She was treated in a private hospital and it was pleaded that she incurred a sum of Rs.50,000/towards the treatment. Under different heads, she claimed a sum of Rs.l,50,000/- as compensation. 3. The owner of the vehicle remained ex parte. The O.P. was contested by the appellant herein. It was pleaded that there was no negligence on the part of the driver of the Toyota Qualis and that the accident occurred on account of the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the motorcycle. It was further alleged that there did not exist any insurance coverage for the vehicle as on the date of the accident. The Tribunal held that the accident occurred on account of the rashness and negligence of driver of the vehicle, insured with the appellant, and awarded a sum of Rs.42,000/- as compensation with interest at 9% per annum. It was held that the appellant and the second respondent are jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation. 4. Sri E. Venugopal Reddy, learned Counsel for the appellant, submits that though the insurance coverage was taken for the vehicle in question on 9-1-2003, the cheque issued by the second respondent towards payment of the insurance premium was dishonoured and accordingly the insurance cover was cancelled on 21-1-2003. The learned Counsel further points out that the second respondent took out a fresh policy on 22-3-2003, whereas the accident occurred on 21-3-2003. Placing reliance upon certain precedents, he contends that the Tribunal ought not to have held the appellant liable, to pay the compensation. 5. The learned Counsel further points out that the second respondent took out a fresh policy on 22-3-2003, whereas the accident occurred on 21-3-2003. Placing reliance upon certain precedents, he contends that the Tribunal ought not to have held the appellant liable, to pay the compensation. 5. Sri I Aga Reddy, learned Counsel for the first respondent, on the other hand, submits that though it was pleaded by the appellant that the cheque issued by the second respondent for payment of the insurance premium was dishonoured, there is nothing on record to show that they have notified the cancellation of the policy to the Registering Authority as required under sub-section (4) of Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity the Act) and in that view of the matter, the appellant cannot escape from its liability to pay the compensation. He submits that the Tribunal had examined the matter in the light of settled principles and that the same does not warrant any interference. 6. First respondent pleaded that when she was proceeding to Vemulawada, on motorcycle as a pillion rider, the vehicle owned by the second respondent came from behind and dashed against the motorcycle and she sustained injuries. The second respondent remained ex parte. It was the appellant that pleaded the absence of any negligence on the part of the driver of the vehicle owned by the second respondent. On her behalf, the petitioner deposed to these facts as PW.1. She has also filed an attested copy of the F.I.R. in Crime No.36 of 2003, marked as Ex.A.1 and the certified copy of the charge-sheet, marked as EX.A.3. These two documents, together with the Medical Certificate issued to the petitioner, marked as Ex.A.2, clearly disclosed that the liability for the accident was exclusively with the driver of the Tayota Qualis. The Tribunal examined the rival contentions and ultimately held that the accident occurred on account of the rash and negligence on the part of the driver of the vehicle owned by the second respondent. This Court is not inclined to disturb the finding recorded by the Tribunal, on this aspect. 7. The appellant does not seriously dispute the quantum of compensation. Its effort is only to extricate itself from the liability to pay the compensation on the ground that there did not exist any valid coverage, or policy, as on the date of the accident. 8. 7. The appellant does not seriously dispute the quantum of compensation. Its effort is only to extricate itself from the liability to pay the compensation on the ground that there did not exist any valid coverage, or policy, as on the date of the accident. 8. It is not in dispute that a. policy was taken on 9-1-2003 for the vehicle and that the premium was paid through a cheque on the same day. The accident· occurred on 21-3-2003. The appellant states that the cheque issued by the second respondent was dishonoured and, therefore, she was called upon to make necessary arrangements. It is stated that when proper response did not emanate from the second respondent, the policy was cancelled, through a letter dated 21-1-2003. It is also pleaded that the information as to the cancellation was sent to the Regional Transport Authority on the same day, under Certificate of Posting. On these facts, it is urged that there did not exist any valid policy as on the date of the accident. 9. Section 147 of the Act requires that every motor vehicle must be covered by an insurance policy. The extent of coverage and other details are provided, in that section. There exist the facility, for issuance of covernote at the initial stages, and thereafter, the Insurance Policy, within a stipulated time. The object appears to be, to ensure that the necessary formalities are complied with within the time gap, so provided. In some cases, the policy itself may be issued straightaway, depending on the nature of payment of the premium and other circumstances. 10. The liability of an insurer commences with the issuance of covernote or insurance policy itself, if it is issued straightaway. The Parliament has visualized the contingency of the insurance coverage not materializing into insurance policy, on account of any factors, which may include dishonour of the cheque issued for payment of premium. Sub-section (4) of Section 147 of the Act describes the steps that are required to be taken by the insurer in such a case. The Parliament has visualized the contingency of the insurance coverage not materializing into insurance policy, on account of any factors, which may include dishonour of the cheque issued for payment of premium. Sub-section (4) of Section 147 of the Act describes the steps that are required to be taken by the insurer in such a case. It reads as under: "Section 147(4) Where a covernote issued by the insurer under the provisions of this chapter or the rules made there under is not followed by a policy of insurance within the prescribed time, the insurer shall, within seven days of the expiry of the period of the validity of the covernote, notify the fact to the Registering Authority in whose records the vehicle to which the covernote relates has been registered or to such other authority as the State Government may prescribe." 11. From this, it is clear that in case a situation emerges for cancellation of covernote, the insurer must notify the cancellation thereof, to the Registering Authority i.e., the Regional Transport Officer, within seven days from the date of expiry of the same. It is from the date of such notification, that the liability of the insurer ceases to exist. 12. The term notify, has its own significance. In the Webster Dictionary, the meaning of this word is "to inform, to make known, to give notice, to inform by words or writings, or by any other signs, which are understood". In certain enactments, the term was interpreted as meaning "publication of notification". Since such a clause does not exist in the Act, nor the insurer is empowered to issue such notification, the meaning that can be given to the said term is that, the communication as to the cancellation of the covernote, must reach the Registering Authority. Whatever be the means employed, the obligation of the insurer, comes to an end, only when the facturm of cancellation of the covernote had reached the Registering Authority. In the instant case, the only exercise undertaken by the appellant was that it sent a notice to the Registering Authority, through Certificate of Posting. It was neither pleaded nor proved that the Registering Authority notified the facturm of cancellation of the covernote before the accident had occurred. In the instant case, the only exercise undertaken by the appellant was that it sent a notice to the Registering Authority, through Certificate of Posting. It was neither pleaded nor proved that the Registering Authority notified the facturm of cancellation of the covernote before the accident had occurred. Consequently, it must be held that the covernote or the policy, as the case may be, issued by the appellant was in force as on the date of the accident. 13. The contract of insurance is between the appellant and the second respondent, and the first respondent is not a party to it. If it were to be a contract in the ordinary parlance, the first respondent could not have enforced it once, the plea of the appellant, that it cancelled the contract of insurance is not disputed by the second respondent. The contract assumes a different character, inasmuch as, it came to be executed as a compliance with the requirement under a statute. Section 147 of the Act, is a social security measure, taken by the Parliament. The victims of the accident are beneficiaries under it; on par with the insured, if not on a higher pedestal. Therefore, the absence of any denial by the second respondent as to the cancellation of the policy does not affect the rights of the first respondent. The judgment rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in M Nageswara Rao v. New India Assurance Company Ltd., 2003 (3) ALD 397 = 2004 ACJ 1554 , supports this view. 14. The judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Ayeb Mohammed, 1991 ACJ 650 , relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant is distinguishable in facts. In the case before the Honble Supreme Court, the insurer had taken all the steps, as required under law, in the matter of cancellation of the policy. It was clearly held that the insurer had notified the Registering Authority about the cancellation of the policy. 15. Further, the judgment rendered in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Seema Malhotra, 2001 (2) ALD 68 (SC) = 2001 ACJ 638, is also inapplicable to the facts of this case, since the so called cancellation did not come into force, as on the date of accident. 15. Further, the judgment rendered in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Seema Malhotra, 2001 (2) ALD 68 (SC) = 2001 ACJ 638, is also inapplicable to the facts of this case, since the so called cancellation did not come into force, as on the date of accident. The Tribunal had discussed the matter in a correct perspective and this Court does not find any basis to interfere with the same. 16. The civil miscellaneous appeal is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.