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2006 DIGILAW 1156 (AP)

PATCHA VENKATARAMA RAO v. INDIAN OIL CORP. LTD.

2006-09-19

L.NARASIMHA REDDY

body2006
( 1 ) THE petitioner was a dealer of the respondent from the year 1996 onwards, to vend petroleum products at Tadepalligudem. The outlet was shifted to a different site, acquired by the petitioner, through a sale deed dated 22-10-2001 (Ex. A-1 ). He executed a lease deed in favour of the respondent, on 17-04-2002 (Ex. A-3 ). Certain disputes arose, as regards the manner of conducting the business by the petitioner. A show-cause notice dated 14-07-2005 (Ex. A-9) was issued by the respondent, and ultimately through an order dated 27-02-2006 (Ex. A-10) the respondent terminated the dealership of the petitioner. ( 2 ) O. S. NO. L 17 of 2006 was filed by the petitioner in the Court of additional Senior Civil Judge, Eluru, against the respondent, for a declaration, that there does not exist any privity of contract between himself and the respondent; and for perpetual injunction, restraining the respondent and its agents from interfering with the plaint schedule property, except for the limited purpose of removing the infrastructure, relating to the outlet. He has also filed i. A. No. 670 of 2006 under Order 39 Rule 1 C. P. C. , for the relief of temporary injunction. Through its order dated 05-06-2006, the trial court dismissed the I. A. Thereupon, the petitioner filed C. M. A. No. 29 of 2004 fn the Court of I Additional District and Sessions Judge, west-Godavari, at Eluru. The appeal was dismissed on 10-07-2006. Hence this C. R. P. , under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Sri M. V. S. Suresh Kumar learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is in possession of the suit schedule property as a dealer and owner, and once the dealership was terminated, he was entitled to remain in possession of the same. He contends that the lease deed, Ex. A-3, that was executed by the petitioner in favour of the respondent was in the limited context of doing business as dealer, and with the cancellation of the dealership, the transaction of lease becomes irrelevant and redundant. ( 3 ) SRI P. V. Sanjay Kumar learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that the lease of the suit schedule property on the one hand, and dealership, on the other are totally different transactions, altogether. ( 3 ) SRI P. V. Sanjay Kumar learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that the lease of the suit schedule property on the one hand, and dealership, on the other are totally different transactions, altogether. He contends that as long as the dealership was in force, the petitioner was using the premises as a licensee, and the legal possession of the property continued with the respondent, as a lessee. ( 4 ) IT is not necessary to refer to the manner in which the petitioner became the dealer of the respondent, or the circumstances that led to the cancellation of the dealership. The undisputed facts are that the petitioner acquired a site in the year 2001, for shifting of the petroleum outlet and executed a lease deed dated 17-04-2002, in favour of the respondent, marked as ex. A-3. The petitioner continued to run the outlet as a dealer till termination, through an order dated 27-02-2006, marked as ex. A-10. According to the petitioner, there does not exist any privity of contract for other relationship, with the termination of the dealership, and sought for necessary reliefs in the suit, and an order of temporary injunction in the LA. The Courts below have undertaken extensive discussion, touching on various aspects, and declined any relief to the petitioner at this stage. ( 5 ) THE petitioner does not dispute that he leased the suit schedule property in favour of the respondent, under Ex. A-3. Notwithstanding his being the owner of the property, the possession had passed on to the respondent under the lease deed. The net result is that, the title, in respect of the suit schedule property, vested in the petitioner, and the possession, with the respondent. ( 6 ) IT is no doubt true that the petitioner was running the petroleum outlet in the very premises. This, however, does not mean that he had legal possession over the property. He was operating the premises, only as a licensee of the respondent. It is well settled principle of law that the possession of an immovable property never passes to, or vests in a licensee. The licensor continues to hold the possession, and the facility extended to a licensee, to operate from the premises, is very limited and restricted in nature. He was operating the premises, only as a licensee of the respondent. It is well settled principle of law that the possession of an immovable property never passes to, or vests in a licensee. The licensor continues to hold the possession, and the facility extended to a licensee, to operate from the premises, is very limited and restricted in nature. The petitioner parted with the possession of the property by executing a lease deed in favour of the respondent. The possession did not return to him, on the basis of the dealership-cum-licence, granted by the respondent to him. When the licence did not confer any rights of possession, upon him over the property, the cancellation thereof does not improve the situation. Both during the subsistence of licence and cancellation thereof, the possession of the site continued to be with the respondent, as lessee. The petitioner can recover the possession of the property, only when the lease is terminated in accordance with law. ( 7 ) ONCE it has emerged that the possession of the property is with the respondent, the question of granting any temporary injunction, in favour of the petitioner; does not arise. This C. R. P is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.