JUDGMENT 1. - This is a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for setting aside the order dated 7.6.2003 passed by Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Annopgarh in Criminal Revision No. 136/02, Rameshwarlal v. Subhash Chandra , by which the order of taking ognizance by Additional Judicial Magistrate against the petitioner by order Dated 11.10.2001 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 has been affirmed. 2. Succinctly stated, the facts are that respondent filed a complaint in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Anoopgarh stating that he is proprietor of M/s. "Biharilal Sevasingh Grain Merchant & Commission Agent and had dealings with petitioner Rameshwarlal, who is the proprietor of M/s. Ramdev Trading Company and purchased from him time to time various commodities. In the complaint it was stated that Rameshwarlal came to the shop of Subhash Chandra on 18.8.1993 and for the goods sold to M/s. Ramdev Trading Company gave a Cheque bearing No. CC 525008 drawn on State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur, Anoopgarh Branch for a sum of Rs. 1,40,000/- which on presentation was dishonoured on account of insufficient balance. Thereafter, it is said that a registered notice was sent to the petitioner through post as well as through lawyer on 26.8.1993 but the same was refused by him. On demand also, the due payment was not made by the petitioner and ultimately the respondent filed the complaint in Court for offence under Section 420 and 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and the police filed challan against petitioner on 27.11.1993. The Court took cognizance on the very same day on 27.11.1993. Against that order of taking cognizance, the petitioner filed a revision, which was set aside by the learned Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Raisinghnagar by order dated 26.8.1996 and the case was remitted back to the Judicial Magistrate, Anoopgarh with the direction to pass an order after giving notice and proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Thereafter, the case file was received in the Court of Judicial Magistrate on 13.5.1997, notice was issued on 13.5.1997 and the parties got their witnesses examined. At last, on 11.10.2001 the learned Magistrate took cognizance against petitioner Rameshwarlal on 3.1.2002 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 3. Thereafter, the case file was received in the Court of Judicial Magistrate on 13.5.1997, notice was issued on 13.5.1997 and the parties got their witnesses examined. At last, on 11.10.2001 the learned Magistrate took cognizance against petitioner Rameshwarlal on 3.1.2002 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 3. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner filed a revision petition against said order dated 3.1.2002 taking cognizance against him, which has been decided by the learned Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Anoopgarh vide order dated 7.6.2003 as aforesaid. The learned Court below while dismissing the revision of the petitioner has referred to various decisions of Hon'ble Apex Court as well as High Courts and stated that law is settled that cognizance is not taken into consideration from the date of issuance of the process but after filing of the complaint in the Court when the magistrate proceeds in the matter from that date the cognizance for the offence in the matter is taken into consideration and in the case in hand as the learned Magistrate had passed order on 27.11.1993, thereafter on 13.5.1997 took cognizance and on 28.11.1997 opportunity was allowed for evidence to the parties, the order passed on 11.10.2001 cannot be treated as an order of taking cognizance i but the said order is merely an order of issuing process. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the alleged cheque of Rs. 1,40,000 given by the petitioner on 18.8.1993 was dishonoured on 19.8.1993, thereafter notice was refused on 2.9.1993, on filing the complaint on 8.9.1993 same was forwarded to the police under Section 156(3) and the trial Court took cognizance under Section 420 IPC on 27.11.1993, which was set aside on 26.8.1996 remanding the matter back for recording evidence under Section 200 & 202 Cr.PC. and thereafter the learned trial Court took cognizance under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, therefore, the cognizance taken by the trial court is hopelessly barred. He further contends that the offence under Section 138, Negotiable Instruments Act is a non-cognizable offence and the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance until and unless complaint is filed within limitation and, therefore, the order under challenge is bad in the eye of law and is liable to be set aside. He further contends that the offence under Section 138, Negotiable Instruments Act is a non-cognizable offence and the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance until and unless complaint is filed within limitation and, therefore, the order under challenge is bad in the eye of law and is liable to be set aside. He also contends that the trial Court has not acceded to the prayer and dismissed the revision on the ground that the date of cognizance was 28.11.1997 when the trial Court called the complainant and submitted that cognizance is always taken of the offence and not of the offenders and the same cannot be taken on the date of cognizance. 5. On the other hand, it has been submitted by the learned counsel for respondent that the trial Court has not properly considered the matter taking into consideration the facts of the case and passed the order regarding taking cognizance, and on appeal when the matters were remanded back, again the matters were not considered properly. He submits that the argument of the learned counsel for petitioner that the matter is barred by limitation is not tenable for the simple reason that after remand the time spent during the course of proceedings cannot be considered to mean that the cognizance taken earlier was no cognizance. 6. I have considered the submissions made before me. 7. In the present matter, the points which have been raised relate to taking of cognizance and what should be the date which could safely be presumed the date of cognizance? In this connection, relevant Section is 190 Cr.PC., a perusal thereof indicates that Magistrate is required to apply his mind while taking cognizance. 8. In order to appreciate the matter, the law which has developed on the point may be also seen. 9. In this connection, relevant Section is 190 Cr.PC., a perusal thereof indicates that Magistrate is required to apply his mind while taking cognizance. 8. In order to appreciate the matter, the law which has developed on the point may be also seen. 9. In the case of Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2401 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under: "(1) Magistrate can order investigation under Section 156(3) only at the precognizance stage, that is to say, before taking cognizance under Section 190, 200 and 204 and where a Magistrate decides to take cognizance under the provisions of Chapter 14, he is not entitled in law to order any investigation under Section 156(3) though in cases not falling within the proviso to Section 202 he can order an investigation by the police which would be in the nature of enquiry as contemplated by Section 202 of the Code. (2) Where a Magistrate chooses to take cognizance he can adopt any of the following alternatives; (a) He can peruse the complaint and if satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding, he can straightway issue proceeding, he can straightway issue process to the accused but before he does so he must comply with the requirements of Section 200 and record the evidence of the complainant or his witnesses. (b) The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process and direct an enquiry by any other person or an investigation by the police. (3) In case the Magistrate after considering the statement of the complaint and the witnesses or as a result of the investigation and the enquiry ordered is not satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceedings he can dismiss the complaint." 10. In case of R.R. Chari v. State of U.P., AIR 1951 SC 207 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has explained the meaning of taking cognizance as under: "Taking cognizance does not involve any formal action or indeed action of any kind but occurs as soon as a Magistrate as such applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence." 11. In Narayandas Bhagwandas v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1959 SC 1118 , the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as follows: "As to when cognizance is taken of an offence will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it is impossible to attempt to define what is meant by taking cognizance. Issuing of a search warrant for the purpose of an investigation or of a warrant of arrest for that purpose cannot by themselves be regarded as acts by which cognizance is taken of an offence... It is only when a Magistrate applies his mind for the purpose of proceeding under Section 200 and subsequent sections of Chapter XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure or under Section 204 of XVII of the Code that it can be positively stated that he had applied his mind and, therefore, had taken cognizance. 12. In yet another case of D. Lakhminarayan v. V. Narayana, AIR 1976 SC 1672 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: "The expression "taking cognizance of an offence" by the Magistrate has not been defined in the Code. The ways in which such cognizance can be taken are set out in clause (a), (b), and (c) of Section 190(1). Whether the Magistrate has or has not taken cognizance of the particular case including the mode in which the case is sought to be instituted and the nature of the preliminary action, if any, taken by the Magistrate. Broadly speaking when on receiving a complaint, the Magistrate applies his mind for the purposes of proceeding under Section 200 and the succeeding Section in Chapter XV of the Code of 1973 he is said to have taken cognizance of the offence within the meaning of Section 190 or Section 190(1). If instead of proceeding under Chapter IX he has in the judicial exercise of his discretion, taken action of some other kind, such as issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation or ordering investigation by the police under Section 156(3), he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence. 13. In view of above authoritative pronouncements made by the Hon'ble Apex Court, it becomes absolutely clear that the word "cognizance" means "initiating proceedings judicially". Therefore, it can be said that taking of cognizance is a judicial act. 13. In view of above authoritative pronouncements made by the Hon'ble Apex Court, it becomes absolutely clear that the word "cognizance" means "initiating proceedings judicially". Therefore, it can be said that taking of cognizance is a judicial act. It also becomes clear that while the matters are sent under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. that would not mean that cognizance in the matter has been taken. 14. Now I propose to examine the present matter in the light of principles laid down in the above authorities. 15. In the present case, on 18.9.1993, the complaint was filed in relation to dishonour of cheque given on 18.8.1993 as there was no balance in the bank account. Notice in this regard was sent by the respondent complainant on 29.8.1993, that has been refused on 1.9.1993/2.9.1993 and the cognizance appears to have been taken on 27.11.1993. The order of cognizance was challenged before the learned revisional court and with certain directions particularly giving opportunity of being heard to the parties by the trial court. The file in question was received in the trial Court on 13.5.1997 and on 13.5.1997 itself notices were issued to the respondent and thereafter it appears that on 26.7.2001 and 31.7.2001 statements were recorded under Section 200 and 202 of the Cr.PC. and cognizance was taken on 11.10.2001. Against that order of taking cognizance on 11.10.2001, the revision petition was filed on 3.1.2002 and same was dismissed on 7.6.2003. 16. It is in the above circumstances what has been argued before this Court is that since earlier order of cognizance was set aside, therefore, suosequent order was barred under Section 468(2) of the Cr.PC. The contention of the learned counsel is not tenable for the simple reason that after going through Section 462 to 472, it can be said that the Court can condone the delay caused in filing the case if occasion so arise in a proper case. 17. In the instant case, what appears is that soon after the cheques issued by the petitioner were dishonoured, notice was given to him, thereafter a complaint was filed in time and the Court took cognizance which was challenged in the revisional court. Thus, it does not appear that the complaint filed was either delayed or there was any fault of the complainant. Thus, it does not appear that the complaint filed was either delayed or there was any fault of the complainant. The revisional Court took time in deciding the matter and thereafter the matters were remitted back to the trial Court and when the file reached in the trial Court, on the very same day notices were issued, if that is so, then to say that after setting aside the earlier order of taking cognizance, the Court will have no jurisdiction in the matter to take cognizance, cannot be said to be legally sustainable argument. The time spent during the court proceedings was not in the control of the complainant. In this matter, since the trial Court took cognizance as early as on 27.10.1993 then that is the date which is to be taken into consideration for the purpose of deciding the matter. The petitioner cannot take advantage of the fact that earlier orders of taking cognizance on being challenged were set aside and after remand the trial Court applied its mind and after recording statements under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.PC. took cognizance. The order passed in the circumstances does not attract the provisions of Section 468(2) of the Cr.P.C. The learned trial Court as well as learned revisional Court both have considered this aspect of the matter and in my considered opinion no illegality or irregularity was committed so as to call for interference by this Court. I also do rr. find any abuse of the process in this case amounting to miscarriage of justice. Therefore, the present petition filed under Section 482 Cr.RC. appears to be devoid of merit and same deserves to be dismissed.In the result, the petition stands dismissed. No order as to costs.Petition Dismissed. *******