R. M. S. KHANDEPARKAR, J: - Heard the learned Counsel for the parties. 2. This appeal arises from judgment dated 2 - 9 - 1993 passed in Writ Petition No.416/ 89. The said Writ Petition was filed by the appellant against the order dated 7 - 1 - 1988 passed by the Rent Controller holding that the appellant was in arrears of rent and that he was required to make payment of those arrears within the period of one month from the date of the said order. 3. The impugned order is sought to be challenged on the ground that the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge and the lower authority regarding habitual default in payment of rent is contrary to the materials on record and the fact that there was implied agreement between the parties revealed from the conduct of the parties in respect of payment of rent being permissible at the intervals of 3 to 4 months. Secondly, that the learned Single Judge and the authorities below failed to take into consideration the fact that the appellant was depositing the rent with the income - tax department consequent to the necessary order in that regard on account of default in payment of income - tax by the respondent. Thirdly, that the ground as regards the habitual default in payment of rent was specifically abandoned by the respondent by filing Pursis in the course of the proceedings before the Rent Controller. Reliance is sought to be placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Rashik Lal and others Vs. Shah Gokuldas Waghajibhai reported in 1989 Mh.L.J. 207 and Mangalbhai & others. Vs. Dr. Radhyshyam reported in AIR 1993 S.C. 806 in support of contention regarding the approach to be adopted while analysing the materials on record in relation to the plea by the landlord about the habitual default on the part of the tenant. The fourth ground of challenge relates to failure on the part of the authorities and the learned Single Judge to consider the fact that there was a dispute regarding the quantum of rent. 4. The fourth ground of challenge relates to failure on the part of the authorities and the learned Single Judge to consider the fact that there was a dispute regarding the quantum of rent. 4. On the other hand, it is the contention of the respondent that there was no implied agreement as alleged nor there was any plea raised in that regard and the appellant is not entitled to raise such plea in L.P.A. Secondly, it was undisputed fact that the induction of the appellant in the suit premises was under an agreement and on the expiry of initial period of written agreement, the appellant undisputedly continued to pay the rent in terms of the said agreement and that, therefore, there is no scope to presume about any implied agreement contrary to the terms of the agreement which discloses liability of the tenant to pay monthly rent in advance. Thirdly, at no point of time in the proceedings there was any plea of abandonment of any of the ground for eviction so raised by the appellant and in any case even assuming that there was Pursis filed on behalf of the landlord seeking to abandon any ground, the same was never acted upon and parties proceeded with the matter on the basis that the eviction was sought on the said ground and having led evidence, the authorities adjudicated the matter with reference to the issue based on such ground. Attention is also drawn to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of National Textile Corporation (8M) Limited Vs. Devraj Chandrabali Pai reported in 2006(1) Bom.C.R.765 : [2006(1) ALL MR 494]. 5. The appellant has also sought to rely upon certain documents particularly the order dated 30 - 12 - 1975 by the Resident Deputy Collector and Rent Controller having appellate powers which was passed in the matter between the parties as well as the unreported judgment dated 17 - 11 - 1978 in Special Civil Application No.1331/73 delivered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the matter arising between the parties in relation to the suit property itself. 6. 6. The first point which arises for consideration is whether there was any novation of agreement between the parties for payment of rent at the interval of 3 to 4 months and that, therefore, payment of rent at such intervals by the appellant to the respondent does not amount to habitual default in payment of rent by the appellant in the case at hand. 7. It is not in dispute and it is clearly revealed from the records and the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as by the authorities below that the appellant was inducted in the suit premises under agreement executed on 31 - 12 - 1953 and the agreement was for a period of 11 months. Undisputedly, on expiry of the initial period of 11 months, no fresh agreement in writing was executed between the parties. However, the appellant continued to pay the rent as per the said agreement even after the expiry of the period of initial 11 months of lease. It is also not in dispute that in terms of the said agreement the rent was required to be paid every month and in advance. The inevitable conclusion which follows from these undisputed facts is that the agreement between the parties in relation to the mode of payment of rent was in accordance with the initial agreement dated 3112 - 1953 and it never underwent any change as such. Being so, as far as the agreement between the parties in relation to the payment of rent is concerned, the contention which is sought to be raised on behalf of the appellant that there was implied agreement for payment of rent at the interval of 3 to 4 months cannot be accepted. Even otherwise, as rightly submitted on behalf of the respondent, we do not find any plea to that effect having been raised by the appellant before the original authority or at any point of time any such plea was sought to be introduced by way of amendment in the pleadings by the appellant. It is well - settled law that the party is not entitled to raise any plea either in the Writ Petition or appeal arising from the Writ Petition which requires adjudication without placing on record the factual basis by way of amendment to the pleadings. It is well - settled law that the party is not entitled to raise any plea either in the Writ Petition or appeal arising from the Writ Petition which requires adjudication without placing on record the factual basis by way of amendment to the pleadings. Once it is undisputed that no such plea was raised before the original authority nor at any point of time efforts were made to raise such plea by way of amendment to the pleadings, it is too late for the appellant to raise any such plea in this appeal. 8. It is, however, sought to be contended that though there was no specific plea in that regard raised by the appellant either before the original authority or before the lower appellate authority, fact remains that the findings on record disclose that there was payment of rent at intervals of 3 to 4 months and such rent was accepted by the landlord/ respondent without any reservation or without any protest for making such payment at such intervals. There was no insistence on the part of the respondent that the payment should be made in advance and every month. Undoubtedly, it appears that the fact that actual payment of rent was made periodically with the gap of 3 to 4 months and not in advance for every month has not been disputed by the respondent at any point of time. But, at the same time, there is a categorical statement by the appellant in the course of evidence as well as in the pleadings that the payment of rent was always in terms of the agreement dated 31 - 121953 and the agreement required payment of rent every month in advance. Being so, merely because the payment had been delayed for 2 or 3 months on every occasion of the payment of rent, that by itself cannot be sufficient to presume that there was an implied agreement contrary to the terms of the agreement dated 31 - 12 - 1953 more particularly when there is a categorical statement and plea raised by none other than the appellant himself that the payment of rent in terms of the said agreement dated 31 - 12 - 1953 was required to be in advance. It is well - settled that no amount of evidence contrary to the plea of the parties is admissible, and even if is placed on record, the same cannot be looked into nor it can enure to the benefit of the party to contend contrary to the specific plea raised in the pleading. 9. At this stage, it is also worthwhile to take note of the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Om Prakash Gupta Vs. Ranbir B. Gupta reported in 2002 AIR SCW 278. Undoubtedly, it was in relation to the subsequent events, however, the principle therein will also apply to the cases of any additional plea to be raised by the party. It was specifically held therein that the party is entitled to raise the plea regarding subsequent events. However, such plea can be raised only upon amendment being carried out in that regard to the pleadings and not otherwise. Same law will apply in case of any additional plea even on the basis of the facts which have occurred prior to the initiation of the proceedings to the appeal. 10. The learned Advocate for the appellant, however, has drawn our attention to the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Special Civil Application No.1331/73 dated 17 - 11 - 1978 between the same parties and in relation to the same suit premises and which pertain to the litigation between the parties earlier to the present litigation. While contending that the respondents are in habit of instituting proceedings after proceedings against the appellant, it was sought to be contended that the same is clearly from various observations made in the said judgment and further that the plea regarding the appellant being habitual defaulter merely on the ground of payment of rent at intervals was specifically rejected. Considering the same it was sought to be argued that the said finding coupled with the conduct of the parties clearly reveal that there was a change in the mode of payment of rent and the said fact was clearly accepted by this Court in the said decision and the said decision being binding upon the parties, it cannot be contended on behalf of the respondent that there was a habitual default on the part of the appellant merely because the rent was paid periodically and not every month. There is no doubt that the learned Single Judge while disposing the said Writ Petition had found the appellant to be not habitual defaulter merely because the payment of rent was made periodically. That by itself, however, will not come to the help of the appellant to contend that there was any change or novation of contract between the parties in relation to the terms pertaining to the payment of rent unless there was specific plea raised in that regard before the lower authority and opportunity being given to the respondent to meet the said case in reply to the said plea. The findings arrived at in the said decision dated 17 - 11 - 1978 were in relation to the facts which were placed before the Court in the said case. The said finding cannot be construed to mean that there was any change in the terms of the agreement between the parties in relation to the mode of payment of rent, more particularly in the absence of any such plea in the present proceedings. Indeed, there is no finding in the said judgment that there was any change in the terms of the agreement or that there was an ratio of the decision is to be understood with reference to the facts of the case, the questions which arise for determination and the decision arrived at by the Court in relation to the facts and the question on consideration of rival contentions on behalf of the parties. Even slight change in facts in two cases would make a lot of difference and ratio laid down on the basis of the facts in one case cannot be blindly applied to another case disclosing different set of facts. The law in this regard is well - settled. Considering the facts in which the decision was delivered by the Apex Court in Rashik Lal's case and as those facts being not similar to the facts of the case at hand, the said ruling is of no help to the appellants in the case in hand. 12. In Mangalbhai's case, there was a clear finding that the tenants therein were paying the rent in advance and that, therefore, there was no case of tenant being habitually in arrears as contemplated in Clause 13(3)(ii) of the C.P. & Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949. 12. In Mangalbhai's case, there was a clear finding that the tenants therein were paying the rent in advance and that, therefore, there was no case of tenant being habitually in arrears as contemplated in Clause 13(3)(ii) of the C.P. & Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949. The Apex Court had clearly observed that: "Admittedly, even on the date of filing such application there were no arrears of rent due against the appellants and in those circumstances, both the Rent Controller as . well as the Resident Deputy Collector were right in holding that the tenants/appellants cannot be considered as habitual defaulters in the payment of rent." Apparently, therefore, on facts the decision is clearly distinguishable and can be of no help to the appellant in the case at hand. The first ground of challenge, therefore, is devoid of substance. 13. The second point which arises for consideration is whether the deposit of rent amount with the income - tax department would disclose absence of default in payment of rent by the appellant? 14. Undisputedly, the appellant has led evidence in support of the plea raised by the appellant that the rent amount was periodically deposited with the income - tax department consequent to the order in that regard issued by the income - tax department on account of failure on the part of the respondent to discharge their income - tax liability. The evidence on record, therefore, duly confirmed by the findings arrived at by the authorities below, discloses that the appellant had been depositing the rent amount with the income - tax department. However, neither the records nor the assessment of evidence on record and finding arrived at based on such assessment by the fact finding authorities as well as by the learned Single Judge disclose that the total amount as was payable in terms of the agreement between the parties had been deposited by the appellant with the income - tax department. However, neither the records nor the assessment of evidence on record and finding arrived at based on such assessment by the fact finding authorities as well as by the learned Single Judge disclose that the total amount as was payable in terms of the agreement between the parties had been deposited by the appellant with the income - tax department. Attention was sought to be drawn to a statement of the respondent in the course of cross - examination before the trial Court to the effect that there was a clear admission by the respondent that the appellant had been depositing the rent amount with the income - tax department pursuant to the orders to that effect by the income - tax department and failure on the part of the respondent to clear their income - tax liability. Admission of the fact about the deposit of the rent is different from the fact about the discharge of the whole of the rent liability to be established by the tenant. It cannot be disputed that it is for the tenant to establish that the rent has been paid in accordance with the terms of the agreement to the landlord. Merely because the landlord accepts the fact that there was a deposit of rent by the appellant with the income - tax department, that by itself will not amount to discharge the burden by the tenant in relation to the factum of payment of rent as well as the quantum of payment of rent. Undisputedly, the eviction proceedings were initiated on account of default in payment of rent and also for recovery of arrears of rent. Being so, when a claim relates to the money amount, it is not sufficient merely to deny the liability but it is necessary to disclose how much liability has been discharged and in what manner. Undoubtedly, the appellant attempted to establish the manner in which the liability was sought to be discharged. However, the appellant failed to establish that the entire liability was discharged in relation to the quantum of payment of rent. Undisputedly, there is no evidence placed on record which could disclose that the entire liability in respect of the payment of rent and the arrears as well as about the monthly rent were paid by the appellant to the respondent in terms of the agreement between the parties. Undisputedly, there is no evidence placed on record which could disclose that the entire liability in respect of the payment of rent and the arrears as well as about the monthly rent were paid by the appellant to the respondent in terms of the agreement between the parties. Being so, mere proof regarding deposit of some rent amount with the income - tax department will not be a proof regarding discharge of entire liability of payment of rent. Second ground of challenge also, therefore, fails. 15. The third point which arises for consideration is as to whether the respondent had abandoned the ground in relation to arrears of rent. Indeed, the records before the lower authority discloses an endorsement by the Rent Controller having been made on 8 - 9 - 1986 that the parties by their respective Counsel had filed a Pursis stating that the applicant (landlord) did not want to claim his case under Clause 13(i) for arrears of rent and his case under Clause 13(3)(ii) only be considered. It is pertinent to note that the evidence of the party was recorded much after the said endorsement dated 8 - 9 - 1986 and it is not disputed that such evidence included the facts relating to arrears and default of rent. The same was followed by judgment by the lower authority as well as by the appellate authority. Both the judgments referred to the factum of arrears and default of rent. Neither the evidence by the parties nor the judgments of the lower authority or the appellate authority makes reference to the said endorsement or to the alleged point of abandonment of the plea regarding the arrears of rent. In other words, though the Advocate for the respondent at one point of time filed Pursis indicating intention to abandon the plea regarding arrears of rent, the respondents on their part never abandoned the said plea nor the appellant understood the respondent to have abandoned such plea at any point of time. In other words, the parties proceeded with the dispute before the lower authority as well as before the appellate authority with the understanding that the same relates to the claim for arrears of rent as well as the issue regarding habitual default in payment of rent and no part of the plea in respect of either of these grounds was ever abandoned by the respondent. Obviously, the appellant is not entitled to claim any benefit from the endorsement dated 8 - 9 - 1986 to contend that there was abandonment of the plea regarding arrears of rent. Once the parties having clearly understood the case of each other and which included the issue regarding the arrears of rent and having proceeded to lead evidence on the said issue invited the decision of the original authority as well as the appellate authority on the said issue, it is too late for the appellant to raise the point in relation to the endorsement which was made by the Rent Controller on 89 - 1986 in the records pertaining to the case. That apart, whether such endorsement was with the knowledge of the respondents themselves or not would also be required to be considered in the set of facts where such attention is sought to be drawn to the said endorsement. If really such endorsement was made with the knowledge of the respondents at the time when such endorsement was made, it was but natural that the appellant would have taken advantage of the said endorsement at the stage of recording of evidence itself. It is a matter of record that the evidence was recorded much after the date on which the said endorsement was made and yet there was not even the question posed to the respondent in the cross - examination regarding even the intention on the part of the respondent to abandon the plea regarding arrears of rent. Being so, the third ground of challenge also fails. 16. The fourth ground of challenge relates to failure on the part of the authorities and the learned Single Judge to consider the fact that there was a dispute regarding the quantum of rent and the fair rent was fixed by he lower authority on 22 - 7 - 1972 at the rate of Rs.90/ - which was sought to be increased by he appellate Court by order dated 31 - 1 - 1979. However, in the Writ Petition the order of the lower authority was confirmed by the High Court under its order dated 12 - 6 - 1984. However, in the Writ Petition the order of the lower authority was confirmed by the High Court under its order dated 12 - 6 - 1984. Considering the fact that during the said period there was a dispute regarding the quantum of rent payable, the authorities below and the teamed Single Judge ought to have considered that the tenant could not have been accused of default in payment of rent. On the other hand, it is sought to be contended on behalf of the respondents that there was a specific order by the lower authority that even during the pendency of the proceedings for fixation of the fair rent, rent shall be paid or deposited at the rate of Rs.90/ - per month and even then the appellant failed to pay the same and persisted to pay only Rs.40/ - per month and that too in the manner stated above. It is undisputed fact that the fair rent proceedings were initiated in September, 1967 and the interim order was passed directing the appellant to payor deposit monthly rent of Rs.90/ - under order dated 22 - 7 - 1969. Undisputedly, the period regarding default in payment of rent is from 1967 to 1979. It is also not in dispute that the rent which was sought to be sent by money orders and refused by the respondent to be accepted was at the rate of Rs.40/ - per month and not at the rate of Rs.90/ - per month. In the background of the facts quoted, the appellants have failed to establish the exact quantum of amount of rent stated to have been deposited with the income - tax department and the money order being sent at the rate of Rs.40/- per month and that too in the face of the order by the authority to deposit the rent at the rate of Rs.90/-, obviously discloses that the appellant had not complied with the order regarding the fair rent to be paid by the appellant during the pendency of the proceedings commenced from September, 1967 and culminated by the order of this Court passed on 12-6-1984. The lower authority had confirmed the monthly fair rent to be Rs.90/- by its order dated 22-7-1972, though it was sought to be increased by appellate authority on 31-1-1979. The lower authority had confirmed the monthly fair rent to be Rs.90/- by its order dated 22-7-1972, though it was sought to be increased by appellate authority on 31-1-1979. Considering all these facts, therefore, no fault can be found for rejecting the contention on behalf of the appellant that pendency of the fair rent proceedings would be sufficient to disclose absence of arrears or absence of default in payment of rent. It is not mere pendency of the fair rent proceedings that can come to the advantage of the tenant to dislodge or non-suit the landlord in a proceedings initiated for eviction of the tenant on the ground of default in payment of rent. It is necessary for the tenant, especially in such cases, to prove that the tenant has duly complied with the order directing payment of interim fair rent fixed by the Court. Having failed to establish the same, no fault can be found with the impugned order in relation to the plea raised by the appellant based on the pendency of the fair rent proceedings. 17. It is also pointed out that in spite of giving opportunity to pay arrears within specified period of one month by the lower authority as well as by the appellate authority, the appellant did not deposit or pay such arrears within the specified period. This conduct on the part of the appellant also reveals that he is not entitled for any leniency to be shown in the matter. 18. As far as the decision of the Division Bench in National Textiles Corporation's case is concerned, undoubtedly, that would have been sufficient to reject the appeal in liminae as being not maintainable. However, after having heard the entire matter on merits at length, we found it not appropriate to non-suit the appellant on the said ground and, therefore, we have considered the matter on merits. 19. In the result, therefore, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. At this stage, the learned Advocate for the appellant prays for stay of the order passed today which is objected to by the learned Advocate for the respondent. However, we are inclined to grant the stay for a period of eight weeks. Order accordingly. At this stage, the learned Advocate for the appellant prays for stay of the order passed today which is objected to by the learned Advocate for the respondent. However, we are inclined to grant the stay for a period of eight weeks. Order accordingly. Meanwhile, the appellant shall maintain status-quo in relation to the suit premises and shall not induct any third party nor shall create any third party interests therein. Appeal dismissed.