BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J. ( 1 ) IN this Revision Petition it is, inter alia, prayed that orders of the Metropolitan Magistrate dated 26. 4. 2004 and the learned additional Sessions Judge dated 21. 8. 2004 be set aside. It is also, however, prayed that the petitioner/accused be discharged in the above case. Although, the prayer is not happily worded, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that he is actually aggrieved by the order dated 4. 2. 2004 passed by the learned Metropolitan magistrate whereby the petitioner was summoned. ( 2 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that on 10. 1. 2003 the learned Metropolitan Magistrate took cognizance of the offence under Section 39 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910. However, on that date, he directed the issuance of summons in respect of the accused persons who had been put up in Column No. 4 of the charge-sheet. Insofar as the present petitioner is concerned, he did not direct issuance of any summons but noted the following: "investigation against accused Suresh Kumar Garg put in Column No. 2 is still on. " thereafter, on 4. 2. 2003, without any supplementary challan being filed under section 173 (8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the learned Metropolitan magistrate directed issuance of summons in respect of the present petitioner also indicating that there was sufficient ground for summoning him. ( 3 ) BEING aggrieved by the order dated 4. 2. 2003, the petitioner moved an application for recalling the same. He pointed out that at that point of time, the decision of the Supreme Court in Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal and Others, v (2004) SLT 353=iii (2004) CCR 176 (SC)= 2004 7 SCC 338 had not come. As such, the application for recalling of the summoning order was maintainable at that time. Anyhow, the said application was dismissed by the learned Metropolitan magistrate on 26. 4. 2004. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the application for recall of the summoning orders, the petitioner preferred a Revision Petition before the Sessions Court which also came to be dismissed by an order dated 21. 8. 2004. In the meanwhile, the decision in Adalat Prasad's case (supra) has come which indicates that, in any event, the Magistrate would not have any power to recall the summoning order. 8. 2004. In the meanwhile, the decision in Adalat Prasad's case (supra) has come which indicates that, in any event, the Magistrate would not have any power to recall the summoning order. It is in this context, that the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that now he is directly challenging the order dated 4. 2. 2003 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate whereby the petitioner was directed to be summoned. ( 4 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner took two grounds. The first ground was that after cognizance was taken and the accused had been summoned by virtue of the order dated 10. 1. 2003, there was no occasion for the learned Metropolitan magistrate to summon the present petitioner on 4. 2. 2003 as the stage of Section 204 cr. P. C. had already been crossed. The second ground taken by him was that, in any event, the summoning order was bad because the present petitioner was specifically not summoned by virtue of the order dated 10. 1. 2003 on the premise that investigation in respect of him was continuing. But, without waiting for any supplementary challan under Section 173 (8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and without having any further material before him, the learned Metropolitan magistrate on 4. 2. 2003 summoned the accused/petitioner. According to the learned Counsel this clearly indicates that the learned Metropolitan Magistrate had erred inasmuch as on the same set of facts, he had earlier decided not to summon and later on, without any further development, he decided to summon the present petitioner. ( 5 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner also drew my attention to the order dated 19. 5. 2003 which is a bail order in respect of the present petitioner. In that order it is recorded that the IO had not been able to collect any documentary evidence of the present petitioner having any interest in Jadgamba Ice Factory at the relevant time. He submitted that the entire case of theft of electricity was said to have been committed by the said Jagdamba Ice Factory and, therefore, the petitioner not being connected with it could not be an accused. He submitted that the entire case of theft of electricity was said to have been committed by the said Jagdamba Ice Factory and, therefore, the petitioner not being connected with it could not be an accused. ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel for the State submitted that the present application ought to be dismissed inasmuch as after taking cognizance, it is always open to the magistrate to issue summons to different accused at different stages and there is no bar for this procedure being adopted. He submitted this on the strength of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Swil Ltd. v. State of Delhi and another, V (2001) SLT 787=iii (2001) CCR 177 (SC)= (2001) 6 SCC 670 . The supreme Court in that case categorically observed as under:"there is no bar under Section 190, Cr. P. C. that once the process is issued against some accused, on the next date, the Magistrate cannot issue process to some other person against whom there is some material on record, but his name is not included as accused in the charge sheet. "therefore, the learned Counsel for the State submitted that it was clearly open to the learned Metropolitan Magistrate to have summoned the petitioner on a subsequent date after he had taken cognizance of offence on 10. 1. 2003. ( 7 ) I am of the view that insofar as the first ground taken by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is concerned, the same is not tenable. Once cognizance is taken, summoning of the accused can be done at different stages. It has been so held by the Supreme Court in Swil's case (supra ). It is settled law that the cognizance is taken of the offence and not of the offenders. Once the cognizance is taken then process is to be issued under Section 204, Cr. P. C. and this can be issued at different stages against different accused on application of mind by the Magistrate. ( 8 ) HOWEVER, insofar as the second ground raised by the Counsel for the petitioner is concerned, I find that there is some merit in it. There is no material on record to show that any additional material came before the learned Metropolitan magistrate between 10. 1. 2003 and 4. 2. 2003, the two terminal dates during which the learned Metropolitan Magistrate altered his mindset. On 10. 1. There is no material on record to show that any additional material came before the learned Metropolitan magistrate between 10. 1. 2003 and 4. 2. 2003, the two terminal dates during which the learned Metropolitan Magistrate altered his mindset. On 10. 1. 2003 he had chosen not to summon the present petitioner but on 4. 2. 2003 he found on the same set of facts that the present petitioner could be summoned and, therefore, directed his summoning. There is no supplementary challan filed in this case as admitted by the learned Counsel for the State. It was, of course, open to the learned Magistrate to have said that on 10. 1. 2003 when he deferred the issuance of summons on the ground that investigation was continuing, he was misled by the prosecution and subsequently on his coming to know that no such investigation was pending insofar as the present petitioner was concerned, he examined material on record and found it sufficient for issuing the orders of summons against the present petitioner. But he did not do so. Therefore, insofar as this Court is concerned, it is not clear as to why the learned Magistrate changed his mind. ( 9 ) IN these circumstances, the order dated 4. 2. 2003 to the extent that it summoned the present petitioner, is set aside. The matter is sent back to the learned magistrate for considering the question of summoning the petitioner on the material on record. Ordered accordingly.