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2006 DIGILAW 1173 (MP)

UNION OF INDIA v. DR. V. M. BHAN

2006-10-05

DIPAK MISRA, R.S.JHA

body2006
ORDER Dipak Misra, J. Invoking the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the Petitioners, the Union of India and its functionaries have called in question the sustainability of the order dated 16-3-2005 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench Jabalpur (in short, 'the tribunal') in O.A. No. 38 of 2004. The facts which are requisite to be stated for adjudication of this writ petition are that the sole Respondent was working as Director in the National Research Centre for Weed Science (NRCWS) since 1989. A disciplinary proceeding was initiated against him by issuing a charge-sheet dated 27-10-1997 under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules'). The charge-sheet contained allegations pertaining to the years 1989 and 1990. The delinquent employee filed a reply controverting the allegations against him on 9-11-1997. The disciplinary authority appointed an enquiry officer who found that the officer concerned was not guilty of the charges. The disciplinary authority disagreed with the report submitted by the enquiry officer and the same ensued in issuance of notice to show cause dated 13-15-1-2003 and during the said period the Respondent attained the age of superannuation. Eventually, the disciplinary authority by order dated 29-9-2003 imposed the punishment of 15% cut in pension by invoking Rule 9 of the Rules. The said order was issued as per the advise rendered by the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC). The Respondent being dissatisfied with and aggrieved by the aforesaid order approached the tribunal for quashing of the same. It was contended before the tribunal that the charge-sheet was issued after expiry of 8 years inasmuch as the allegations related to the year 1989-90. It was also highlighted that an explanation was called for in the year 1992 but no action was taken. The initiation of the enquiry was assailed on the ground of delay and laches. It was also urged before the tribunal that when the enquiry officer has exonerated the applicant therein from the charges, an obligation was cast on the disciplinary authority to write a note of dissent with reasons but on a perusal of the order passed by the disciplinary authority, it is clear as crystal that the same really does not reflect the reasons for dissent and there has been total mechanical approach. It was also put forth before the tribunal that the advice of the CVC was not supplied to the Respondent though the same was utilized for the purposes of imposing the punishment. Additionally, it was canvassed that the Petitioner filed his reply on receipt of the note of dissent along with the show cause from the disciplinary authority and he had urged in categorical and clear cut terms how the findings of the enquiry officer were absolutely correct and do not deserve to be unsettled in any manner by the disciplinary authority. But the disciplinary authority did not discuss the same in the final order of punishment except making a passing remark that he had considered the show cause submitted by the Petitioner, though Rule 15(2-A) mandates for recording of reasons before formation of opinion. The stand of the Respondent before the tribunal was combated by the present Petitioner by filing a counter affidavit pleading, inter alia, that non-supply of report of CVC did not vitiate the proceeding in any manner as the same is in the realm of procedure. It was also put forth that delay was due to the dilatory tactics adopted by original Petitioner and hence, he cannot take advantage of the same. The tribunal upon hearing the parties and taking note of the impugned order of punishment and placing reliance on the decision rendered in the case of State Bank of India and others Vs. D.C. Aggarwal and another, came to hold that there has been violation of fair procedure and therefore, the order of punishment was sensitively susceptible. Being of this view, the tribunal lanceted the impugned order of punishment dated 29-9-2003. We have heard Mr. S. Dharmadhikari, Learned Counsel for the Petitioners and Mr. Sujoy Paul, Learned Counsel for the Respondent. It is contended by Mr. Dharmadhikari that the order passed by the tribunal is vulnerable inasmuch as non supply of advise of CVC would not entail in annihilation of the impugned order since the delinquent officer had not been able to show that any prejudice has been caused to him because of the same. It is his further submission that the disciplinary authority had indicated the reasons in its note of disagreement and hence, attack to the effect that the same had been passed in a mechanical manner is sans substance. Finally submitted Mr. It is his further submission that the disciplinary authority had indicated the reasons in its note of disagreement and hence, attack to the effect that the same had been passed in a mechanical manner is sans substance. Finally submitted Mr. S. Dharmadhikari that if any procedural irregularity is found in conducting of the proceeding, the tribunal would have been well advised to remit the matter for a fresh enquiry, and should not have quashed the order in entirety. To bolster his submission Learned Counsel has placed reliance on the decision rendered in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. S. Balakrishnan, . Mr. Paul, resisting the aforesaid submissions, argued that the order passed by the tribunal is absolutely impeccable inasmuch as it has adverted to the cumulative effect of the violation of procedure which goes to very root of the matter. It is further canvassed by him that on a bare look on the orders passed by the disciplinary authority, one relating to disagreement and the other pertaining to imposition of punishment, it would be vivid that there has been consideration of certain materials which were not supplied to the delinquent officer and hence, the order of punishment is per se not tenable. It is further put forth by Mr. Paul that when rules require certain things to be done in a particular manner the same ought to have been done in the prescribed and appropriate manner and the requirement of the rule cannot be stated to have been complied with by couching the order by borrowing few words or phrase from the rule itself. Submission of Mr. Paul is that the decision rendered in the case of S. Balakrishanan (supra) is distinguishable since it deals with the supply of enquiry report and resultant prejudice whereas in the case at hand there are many other facets which cumulatively increment the factum that there has been non application of mind, violation of fair procedure, non adherence to the concept of natural justice which in the ultimate eventuate tantamount to causation of prejudice. To appreciate the submission raised, we have bestowed our anxious consideration and carefully perused the order of the tribunal. We have also perused the order of disciplinary authority passed on two occasions, taken note of the charge-sheet and the enquiry report. To appreciate the submission raised, we have bestowed our anxious consideration and carefully perused the order of the tribunal. We have also perused the order of disciplinary authority passed on two occasions, taken note of the charge-sheet and the enquiry report. It is not disputed before us that the charges levelled against the Petitioner relate to two spectrums; that the incumbent while functioning as Director of National Research for Weed Science, committed irregularities in the selection/appointment of three posts of SSG/Driver as Chairman of DPC/appointing authority and second, he appointed one Balwant Rai as the Assistant Administrative Officer at the centre in 1989 on permanent transfer basis in violation of the prescribed recruitment rules for Assistant Administrative Officers in the ICAR system. It is not disputed that the disciplinary authority concurred with the finding of the enquiry officer in respect of charge No. 2. As far as the charge No. 1 is concerned, the enquiry officer had exonerated the delinquent officer on the ground that he was not under an obligation to consider the case of the candidate whose names had been supplied by the employment exchange and had the authority to consider the names of the other applicants whose names had been sent by other agencies including government agency. It was also opined by the enquiry officer that the same was done not in violation of the Employment Exchange (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959 as well as the advertisement. The enquiry officer had arrived at the aforesaid conclusion placing reliance on the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. N. Hargopal and Others, . The disciplinary authority disagreed with order dated 29-9-2003. We have carefully perused the reasons for disagreement. On a scrutiny of the same, it is luminescent that the disciplinary authority has really not indicated any reason to meet out the reasons ascribed by the enquiry officer. He has reproduced the charges in a different language. It is needless to emphasise, a note of disagreement has to have reasons of substance which really can be regarded as heart and soul of the order. We are unable to find so. It is worth noting here that after the note of disagreement was sent to the Petitioner, he filed his reply in support of the enquiry report. It is needless to emphasise, a note of disagreement has to have reasons of substance which really can be regarded as heart and soul of the order. We are unable to find so. It is worth noting here that after the note of disagreement was sent to the Petitioner, he filed his reply in support of the enquiry report. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority passed an order on the same on 15-1-2003. The disciplinary authority, as is discernible from the impugned order dated 29-9-2003, has passed the order of punishment. The relevant conclusion is reproduced below: Whereas the case was referred to the CVC for its advice vide Council's letter dated 8-7-2003. The Commission vide its O.M. dt. 28-8-2003 has advised the Council for imposition of a penalty of suitable cut in pension of Dr. Bhan. Now, Therefore, having regard to the findings of the Inquiry Officer, submissions of the Charged Officer, advice of the CVC, and other circumstances and facts of the case, the President, ICAR is satisfied that good and sufficient reasons exist for imposing the penalty of fifteen percent cut in pension. Accordingly, the penalty of fifteen percent cut in pension is hereby imposed on Dr. V.M. Bhan, Director (Rtd.), NRCWS, Jabalpur. In this context, Mr. Paul has invited our attention to the Rule 15 (2-A) of the Rules. The said rule reads as under: (2-A) The Disciplinary Authority shall consider the representation, if any, submitted by the Government servant and record its findings before proceeding further in the matter as specified in sub-rules (3) and (4). On a perusal of the said rule, it is clear as day that the disciplinary authority has not considered the representation properly. What he has mentioned is that he has taken note of the submission of the officer. The same cannot be regarded as real consideration. That apart, the rule also mandates that on consideration of the representation, the disciplinary authority shall record his finding as specified in sub-rules (3) and (4) of the said Rule. The same is totally absent in the present case. Quite apart from the above, the advice of the CVC was not supplied to the Petitioner. Though the same has been made the basis of imposition of punishment. The same is totally absent in the present case. Quite apart from the above, the advice of the CVC was not supplied to the Petitioner. Though the same has been made the basis of imposition of punishment. In the case of D.C. Agrawal (supra) a two Judge Bench of the Apex Court while taking note of the fact that the advice of the C.V.C. was made the base/basis of order of punishment expressed the view that taking action against an employee on confidential document which is the foundation of order exhibits misapprehension comprehensive about the procedure that is required to be followed by the disciplinary authority. Submission of Mr. Dharmadhikari is that if the decision rendered in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad, Vs. Karunakar, etc. etc., which has been followed in the case of S. Balakrishnan (supra), it is imperative on the part of the delinquent officer to show that such non supply has caused prejudice. It is contended by him that in the absence of any prejudice, the order of disciplinary authority is not liable to be treated as pregnable. At this juncture, we are only inclined to state that in the case of S. Balakrishnan (supra) it was the enquiry report which was the subject-matter of issue. In the case of D.C. Agrawal (supra), it was C.V.C report which formed the foundation. Additionally, Their Lordships considered that it was the CVC report, which formed the foundation of punishment. While saying so, we may not be understood to have held that in every non supply case of C.V.C. report, the order of punishment would be liable to be set aside. We have only narrated the facts of each case to show the distinction. In the instant case as there are three factors which emerge to nullify the order of disciplinary authority. To enumerate; the disciplinary authority did not indicate, as is discernible, adequate appropriate reasons in the note of disagreement except reproducing the charges in a different manner, the disciplinary authority after issuing note of disagreement along with enquiry report and upon receipt of the explanation preferred by the delinquent did not proceed as envisaged in Rule 15 (2-A) of the Rules and only mentioned in the impugned order of imposing penalty in a laconic and cryptic manner and the reply/explanation submitted by the delinquent officer that (i) the C.V.C report was not forwarded to the Petitioner. The cumulative effect of all this, we are disposed to think is that it tantamounts to non-compliance of fair procedure and violation of rules as prevalent in the field and also violation of principle of natural justice. We would be failing in our duty if we do not deal with the contention of Mr. Dharmadhikari as there is violation of procedure as felt to the tribunal as well as to this Court, the matter should be remitted to the departmental authority to proceed from the appropriate stage. Ordinarily, we would have done so but in the present case, the delinquent officer was proceeded in respect of two charges and the charges were found not to have been proved by the enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority only recorded the note of dissent in respect of charge No. 1, second, the proceeding was initiated after eight years in respect of allegations pertaining to the year 1989 and the delay has really not been dealt with by the department and third, the statement that delinquent officer had adopted dilatory tactics is not acceptable as nothing has been brought on record to show how he so did, fourth, the delinquent officer has been superannuated on 13-12-1998 and the charges that are levelled against him, as is understood by us, relate to a kind of irregularity, if any and there is no allegation of any kind of fiscal irregularity and further employees who had been appointed on the basis of said advertisement are still in service. Hence, we are constrained to repel the prayer of Mr. S. Dharmadhikari. In the result, we give the stamp of approval to the order passed by the tribunal which ensues in the inevitable result of dismissal of the writ petition which we direct. There shall be no order as to costs.