JUDGMENT:- By this Revision, the complainant has challenged the order dated 137-2000, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Beed, whereby the respondent/ accused has been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (N.1. Act) and is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default to undergo S.1. for three months. Admittedly, cheque amount is of Rs.79,000/-. After considering the material placed on record, including the hearing given to the accused, the Court has held that the prosecution proved that on 10-1-1997 the accused drew a cheque for payment of Rs.79,000/- to the complainant for the discharge of liability, which had been returned by the Bank unpaid because of an insufficient amount and that the accused failed to pay the said amount to the complainant within the time even after the demand notice. 2. Considering the scheme of the N.1. Act, the civil liability, in a way, is treated as an offence. But treating the same, as an offence, and a punishment itself is not sufficient and will not serve the purpose, if the object and purpose of the N.1. Act is taken note of. The whole idea is to see, in such transaction and/or in a business, transactions especially concerning the instruments under N.1. Act, the person should get his money back as early as possible. I am of the view that mere sentence or conviction or putting the particular accused in a jail will not serve the purpose and object of the N.1. Act. The money paid must be received back by the person within the stipulated time and/or as early as possible. Withholding of the amount under cheque, though agreed upon, will definitely cause injustice to the party concerned. It is expected that a cheque is like a cash, subject to deposit in a Bank. It is further expected that the moment the cheque is deposited, it should be honoured. But if the cheque is dishonored and though demanded and not paid, the proceedings under Section 138 of the N.I. Act need to be invoked. 3. In the present case, the Court has convicted the respondent/accused under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, but awarded sentence to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- only, though the amount of the cheque is Rs.79,000/-. 4. 3. In the present case, the Court has convicted the respondent/accused under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, but awarded sentence to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- only, though the amount of the cheque is Rs.79,000/-. 4. The provision of awarding compensation as contemplated under Section 357(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.c.) and as observed by the Apex Court in K. Bhaskaran Vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan, (1999)7 SCC 510 : [1999 ALL MR (Cri) 1845 (S.C.) : 1999(4) ALL MR 452 (S.C.)] needs to be read with the provisions and scheme of N.I. Act. If the N.I. Act provides the power to the Court to award the fine to the extent of double the amount of the cheque, then there is no reason to award the amount as directed in the present case of Rs.5,000/- as a fine. There was no consideration while passing the order by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate in reference to the compensation. I am of the view that while passing the orders by the Chief Judicial Magistrate in such matters, the concept of compensation and fine needs to be considered for achieving the purpose as contemplated under Sections 138 to 147 of the N.I. Act. 5. The learned advocate appearing for the petitioner has also relied upon a decision ""4 in the case of Suresh Fulchand Bumb Vs. Shantikumar K. Damani, reported in 2004 ALL MR (Cri.) 1218 and submitted that the matter be remanded back to the learned Magistrate, who shall, after hearing both the parties, only on the point of sentence, pass the order accordingly. The learned advocate appearing for the respondent, however, submitted that the rights arising out of the appeal against the impugned order which is pending before the Sessions Court, Beed, be protected. 6. I have already in Criminal Revision Application No.291 of 2005 (dated 137-2006) taken a view that: "(5) The object and purpose of N.I. Act, if taken into consideration, it reflects a basic scheme that the party should get the money back as early as possible. So-called civil liability must be discharged by paying back the money. The order of conviction and sentence though, available under the N.!. Act, is no solution to the fact that the parties or the complainant would entitle to claim refund of the money given basically for commercial purpose or such other purpose to the opponent. So-called civil liability must be discharged by paying back the money. The order of conviction and sentence though, available under the N.!. Act, is no solution to the fact that the parties or the complainant would entitle to claim refund of the money given basically for commercial purpose or such other purpose to the opponent. The conviction of the accused u/ s.138 of N.I. Act is no substitute or solution and/or answer to the return of money as per the cheque. (6) In view of this, the order of J.M.F.C., chalisgaon, is quashed and set aside to the extent f order of sentence and fine. The question of sentence and award of compensation need to be considered by the J.M.F.C. again. The matter is remitted back to the J.M.F.C., Chalisgaon. He should dispose of this matter by giving full opportunity to the parties in this respect. All points in this respect are kept open including statutory rights of the parties." 7. Considering the above reasoning, the rights of the complainant just cannot be overruled, merely because the appeal against the impugned order is pending. There is no provision available to the complainant but to challenge the order of chief Judicial Magistrate by filing the Revision like the present and to point out to the Court that the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate was wrong as contended in the present case. If the complainant failed to invoke the jurisdiction at the earliest point of time, then at the end of the day, the Court may not even enforce with the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, though there was a very less sentence awarded as done in the present case. The impugned order is dated 137-2000. The petitioner has filed the present Revision Application on 16-9-2000, according to me, immediately and rightly so. 8. Even otherwise, there will not be any prejudice or injustice caused to the respondent, if this Revision is allowed, as he will get right of appeal again, so far as sentence part is concerned, and once this order goes, the respondent is definitely entitled to challenge and/or agitate his submissions on merits as the appeal itself is pending on this date. 9. In the result, revision is allowed. The impugned order dated 13-7-2000, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Beed is quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded back. 9. In the result, revision is allowed. The impugned order dated 13-7-2000, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Beed is quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded back. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Beed, shall decide Regular Criminal Case No.572 of 1997 on the ground of sentence, within six weeks from the receipt of the copy of the order, by giving full opportunity to both the parties. It is made clear that this order, in no way, be treated as an interference, with the reasoning recorded while passing the order of sentence of fine, by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Beed, on merits, as the matter is remanded only to the extent of awarding the sentence. Rule is made absolute. No order as to costs. Revision allowed.