O R D E R This criminal revision case is preferred by the petitioner-accused against the judgment dated 30-7-2002 passed in Crl.A.No.464 of 2000 by the IV Additional Sessions Judge, Guntur, confirming the judgment dated 28-08-2000 passed in C.C.No.112 of 1999 by the I Additional Munsif Magistrate, Tenali, wherein the petitioner-accused was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and also to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- in default to suffer simple imprisonment for four months for the offence punishable under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and also ordering to pay the said fine amount to PW-1 towards compensation under Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 2. The facts that are necessary for disposal of the criminal revision case are as follows: The sister of the accused was married to the cousin of one Mediboina Srinivasa Rao (hereinafter called as the deceased) and there were disputes between husband and wife. The accused presumed that the deceased is responsible for the quarrels and as such developed grouse against the deceased. It is further alleged that on 16-12-1998 at about 8-30 A.M. when the deceased was going towards Railway Station, Tenali to go to office, on the way i.e., near park at the turning at Pinapadu, the accused due to grouse poured acid on the face of the deceased and beat him with an iron rod. PWs.2 and 3 witnessed the incident. On coming to know the same, PW-1, who is the father of the deceased, rushed to the spot and shifted him to the Hospital. Based on the statement given by PW-1, the Station House Officer, III Town Police Station, Tenali, registered a case in Crime No.221 of 1998 and after completion of investigation laid charge sheet against the accused. On appearance of the accused, the learned Magistrate framed a charge under Section 324 of IPC against the accused, read over and explained to him in Telugu, for which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. To establish its case, the prosecution examined PWs.1 to 7 and got marked Exs.P1 to P12 and on behalf of defence Ex.D1 was marked. On appreciation of both oral and documentary evidence, the learned Magistrate found the petitioner-accused guilty of the offence with which he was charged and accordingly convicted and sentenced him as stated supra. To establish its case, the prosecution examined PWs.1 to 7 and got marked Exs.P1 to P12 and on behalf of defence Ex.D1 was marked. On appreciation of both oral and documentary evidence, the learned Magistrate found the petitioner-accused guilty of the offence with which he was charged and accordingly convicted and sentenced him as stated supra. The learned IV Additional Sessions Judge on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record confirmed the conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner-accused has come up with the present criminal revision case. 3. Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner-accused, learned Additional Public Prosecutor and perused the impugned judgments as well as the other material on record. 4. I find force in the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the alleged statements Exs.P1 and P8 recorded by the Head Constable, who was examined as PW-7 and the learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, who was examined as PW-5 are not the statements within the meaning of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 18-72 (for short, ‘the Act’) and thus they are inadmissible in evidence. Further, when the said statements are eschewed from consideration there is absolutely no other incriminating material to establish that the accused has committed the offence punishable under Section 324 of IPC. 5. No doubt, the prosecution has come up with the theory that the petitioner-accused poured acid on the deceased, and the same was witnessed by PWs.2 and 3. However, the said witnesses, unfortunately, did not support the case of the prosecution and were declared hostile. In fact, there is absolutely nothing in their evidence even to accept and their evidence is not at all helpful to the case of the prosecution. No doubt, PW-1, the father of the deceased stated that his son i.e., the deceased informed him that the petitioner-accused poured acid on account of which the deceased received burn injuries and when PW-7, the Head Constable visited the hospital, the statement of PW-1 i.e., the father was recorded and the same was marked as Ex.P1. On a requisition made by the doctor and the police, PW-5, the learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class visited the hospital and recorded Ex.P8, the statement of the deceased, under Section 164 of the Code. As stated above, the entire case rests on the evidence of PW-1 coupled with Exs.P1 and P8. On a requisition made by the doctor and the police, PW-5, the learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class visited the hospital and recorded Ex.P8, the statement of the deceased, under Section 164 of the Code. As stated above, the entire case rests on the evidence of PW-1 coupled with Exs.P1 and P8. No doubt, PW-1 stated, so many words, but he is not an eyewitness to the incident. Hence, this Court has looked into Exs.P1 and P8. No doubt, if this Court accepts Exs.P1 and P8, as it is, it definitely inspires confidence that the accused alone has committed the said offence. 6. In the light of the contention put forth by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it is to be seen as to whether Exs.P1 and P8 statements fall within the ambit of Section 32 of the Act. Section 32 of the Act is with regard to the statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found etc., which is relevant, and it is extracted hereunder: 32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found etc., is relevant: - Statements, written or verbal, or relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured, without an amount of delay or expense, which, under the circumstances of the case appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases: (1) When it relates to cause of death: — When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person’s death comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the case of his death comes into question. 7. In order to make the statement of a dead person admissible in law, the said statement shall be about the death or as to any of the circumstances of the transactions, which resulted in the said death. 7. In order to make the statement of a dead person admissible in law, the said statement shall be about the death or as to any of the circumstances of the transactions, which resulted in the said death. When once the said documents are looked at in those lines, it is clear that the statement of the father of the deceased, who was examined as PW-1 and the statement of the deceased recorded by the learned Magistrate under Section 164 of the Code can be termed as statements, within the meaning of Section 32 of the Act. In fact, in a judgment reported in INDERPAL v. STATE OF M.P.(1) the Supreme Court has taken the view that such statement would not fall within the purview of Section 32(1) of the Act and the same is reproduced hereunder: “We will consider at first the contention as to whether there is any evidence against the appellant which can be used against him for entering upon a finding that he subjected Damayanti to cruelty as contemplated in Section 498A IPC. P.W.1 - father of the deceased and P.W.8 - mother of the deceased have stated that Damayanti had complained to them of her plight in the house of her husband and particularly about the conduct of appellant. P.W.4 - sister of the deceased and P.W.5 - a relative of the deceased have also spoken more or less in the same line. Exhibit P-7 and Exhibit P-8 are letters said to have been written by Damayanti. In those two letters reference has been made to her life in the house of her in-laws and in one of the letters she said that her husband had subjected her to beating. Apart from the statement attributed to the deceased none of the witnesses had spoken of anything which they had seen directly. The question is whether the statements attributed to the deceased could be used as evidence in this case including the contents of Exhibits P-7 and P-8 (letters). Unless the statement of a dead person would fall within the purview of Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act there is no other provision under which the same can be admitted in evidence. Unless the statement of a dead person would fall within the purview of Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act there is no other provision under which the same can be admitted in evidence. In order to make the statement of a dead person admissible in law (written or verbal) the statement must be as to the cause of her death or as to any of the circumstance of the transactions which resulted in her death, in cases in which the cause of death comes into question. By no stretch of imagination can the statements of Damayanti contained in Exhibit P7 or Exhibit P8 and those quoted by the witnesses be connected with any circumstance of the transaction which resulted in her death. Even that apart, when we are dealing with an offence under Section 498-A IPC disjuncted from the offence under Section 306, IPC the question of her-death is not an issue for consideration and on that premise also Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act will stand at bay so far as these materials are concerned.” 8. In the light of the above, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the prosecution has not produced any legal evidence to establish the guilt of the accused. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that the petitioner accused is entitled to benefit of doubt. 9. In the result, the criminal revision case is allowed and the conviction and sentence imposed on the petitioner-accused in C.C.No.112 of 1999 by the I Additional Munsif Magistrate, Tenali, as confirmed in CrI.A.No.464 of 2000 by the IV Additional Sessions Judge, Guntur, are hereby set aside. The bail bond of the petitioner-accused shall stand cancelled and the fine amount paid by him shall be refunded to him. --X—