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2006 DIGILAW 1200 (AP)

Kurella Naga Druva Vudaya Bhaskara Rao v. Galla Janikamma @ Macharamma

2006-09-27

C.Y.SOMAYAJULU

body2006
JUDGMENT Defendant in a suit for recovery of possession of Acs.3-90 cents in Survey NO.100 of Rajanagaram of Rajahmundry, which hereinafter would be referred to as 'the suit land', is the appellant. 2. The case, in brief, of the respondent is that, as the appellant and her husband are closely related, she, at the instance of the appellant, had purchased the suit land under EX.A-1 registered sale deed from its owner and paid the consideration payable by her to her vendor through her husband and her brother and was put in possession thereof and later she entrusted the management of the suit land to the appellant as he promised to manage the same on her behalf. Appellant, who was sending the rentals from the suit land and was paying taxes for some years, informed her in 1971 that inasmuch as leasing out the suit land to tenants may create problems in future, he himself would cultivate the same and pay 40 bags of paddy per annum to her and started cultivating the same till the end of 1977. Later, as differences cropped up between him and her husband in connection with the settlement deed executed by Smt. Mahalakshmamma and her husband Veeraraju, appellant stopped paying rent. So, she got issued a registered notice through her advocate asking the appellant to vacate the suit land after paying the arrears due to her for which he sent reply with false and untenable allegations, disputing her title to the suit land. So the appellant who became a trespasser is liable to be evicted from the suit land. 3. The case, in brief, of the appellant as disclosed from his written statement as amended is that he never managed suit land on behalf of the respondent and never let it out to anybody on her behalf and has been in possession thereof in his own right from several decades, and thereby perfected his title thereto by adverse possession. The suit land in fact was purchased by Mahalakshmamma for her own benefit benami in the name of respondent. That is so is also evident from the settlement deed executed by the respondent in favour of Mahalakshmamma, which could not be registered due to certain circumstances. The suit land in fact was purchased by Mahalakshmamma for her own benefit benami in the name of respondent. That is so is also evident from the settlement deed executed by the respondent in favour of Mahalakshmamma, which could not be registered due to certain circumstances. Since the respondent who is not the owner of the suit land did not seek declaration of her title to the suit land, and as her case is that he is the tenant of the suit land, the proper forum for seeking recovery of possession is the Tenancy Court but not Civil Court and so the suit has to be dismissed. 4. After the appellant was given leave to amend his written statement, respondent filed her rejoinder contending that the appellant who took some signatures of hers on blank papers must have brought into existence the settlement deed in favour of Mahalakshmamma. 5. On the basis of the pleadings, the trial Court framed four issues and two additional issues for trial. Respondent examined her husband as P.W.1, her brother as P.W.2 and her vendor as P.W.3 and marked Exs.A-1 to A-5. On his behalf, appellant examined himself as D.W.1, a person said to be a tenant of the suit land as D.W.2 and persons said to the present at the time of execution of Ex. B-2 settlement deed by the respondent in favour of Mahalakshmamma as D.Ws.3 and 4, the Village Munsif of Rajanagaram as D.W.5 and some of the ryots as D.Ws.6 to 8 and marked Exs.B-1 to B-36. After considering the evidence on record the trial Court held on issues 1 and 2, relating to the questions whether the respondent is entitled to seek recovery of possession of the suit land and whether the appellant acquired title to the suit land by adverse possession, against the appellant; on issue NO.3 relating to profits, held that they would be determined on a separate application; on additional issues relating to the questions whether the agreement dated 18-4-1959 (Ex. B-2) is true, valid and binding on the respondent and whether Ex. B-2 agreement dated 18-4-1959 is forged and fabricated as contended by the respondent, held that the Ex. B-2 is a false and invalid document, and consequently held on issue NO.4 relating to the relief, that respondent is entitled to recover possession of the suit land from the appellant. Hence, this appeal by the defendant. B-2 agreement dated 18-4-1959 is forged and fabricated as contended by the respondent, held that the Ex. B-2 is a false and invalid document, and consequently held on issue NO.4 relating to the relief, that respondent is entitled to recover possession of the suit land from the appellant. Hence, this appeal by the defendant. 6. Heard Sri V.L.N.G.K. Murthy on behalf of the Counsel for appellant and Sri V. Parabrahma Shastry on behalf of Counsel for respondent. 7. The main contention of Sri V.L.N.G.K. Murthy is, since the respondent failed to seek declaration of her title to the suit land and took a specific plea that she leased out the suit land to the appellant, the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, 1956 (1956 Act), come into play and so the Tenancy Court only, but not the civil Court, that can grant the relief of possession sought by the respondent. He placed strong reliance on Firm of Illuri Subbayya Chetty and Sons v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1964 SC 322 , Raja Ram Kumar v. Union of India AIR 1988 SC 752 , Sultan v. Ganesh (3) AIR 1988 SC 716 , Saraswati v. Lachanna (1994) 1 SCC 611 , S. Venkatramaiah v. K. Venkataswamy AIR 1976 A.P. 402 = 1976 (1) An.W.R.17 (S.N.) (F. B.), B. Viswanadham v. S.L.N. Swamyvaru Temple 1981 (1) APLJ 357 , R. Raghava Rao v. Tenancy Tahsildar, Tanuku W.G. District 1976 (1) APLJ 156 , Gadde Veerraju v. Godde Sattemma 1988 (1) AP LJ 280, and Section 17 of the 1956 Act in support of the said contention. He also relied on Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur AIR 1965 SC 1923 , where it is held that merely because a person claims to have a permanent and heritable interest in a land, asserting that he is owner thereof, it does not amount to his denying landlord's title, and contended that the remedy, if any, of the respondent is to go before the Tenancy Court for recovery of possession of the suit land, and further contended that since the respondent did not go into the witness box, in spite of the respondent filing I.A. No. 629 of 1986 seeking a direction from the Court to examine herself as a witness, an adverse inference has to be drawn against her for her absence from the witness box and in any event since the husband of the respondent as P.W.1 admitted that he did not show the suit land in Ex. B-3 declaration filed by him under A.P. Act 1 of 1975 though he disclosed his other lands which are in possession of tenants, an inference can be drawn that he did not include the suit land in Ex. B-3 declaration because the respondent is not its owner, and contended that since the suit land admittedly is a rain fed land, no ordinary prudent person would agree to pay 40 bags of paddy per year as rent there for and since evidence regarding permissive possession is lacking, and since the voluminous documentary evidence adduced by the appellant clearly establishes his long standing possession over the suit land, the trial Court was in error in decreeing the suit. Placing reliance on Chandrasekharaswami v. Nainarammal AIR 1919 Madras 1135, and Brahmayya v. Sundaramma AIR (35) 1948 Mad. 275 (FB), he contended that by virtue of Section 117 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, though Section 106 of that Act may not apply to leases for agriculture purposes, since Sections 105 to 116 in its Chapter V are equity oriented, principles laid down in those sections can be applied to agricultural leases also. 8. 275 (FB), he contended that by virtue of Section 117 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, though Section 106 of that Act may not apply to leases for agriculture purposes, since Sections 105 to 116 in its Chapter V are equity oriented, principles laid down in those sections can be applied to agricultural leases also. 8. The contention of Sri V. Parabrahma Shastry is that since the appellant in EX.A-3 reply clearly and in equivocal terms denied the title of the respondent to the suit land and set up a title thereto in himself, and since the Tribunal constituted under the 1956 Act cannot go into and decide the complicated questions of title, proper forum for seeking the relief of recovery of possession, in circumstances, like this is, only a civil Court and as there is no total ouster of the jurisdiction of the civil Court in such cases Civil Court does no (sic.) jurisdiction to entertain the suit and relied on Firm of Illuri Subbayya Chetty and Son's case (supra), Dayaram, v. Dawalatshah AIR 1971 SC 681 , Mahendrada Ramayya v. Mahendrada Govindu 1966 (1) AnW.R. 352, M.C.S. Prasad Rao v. R. Lakshmayya 1966 (1) An.W.R. 241, D. Venkata Reddy v. B. Bhushi Reddy AIR 1971 A.P 87 = 1970 (2) ALT 237, Magiti Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi AIR 1962 SC 547 , Official Trustee, W.B. v. Sachindra Nath Chatterjee AIR 1969 SC 823 , Church of North India v. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai AIR 2005 SC 2544 = 2005 (4) SCJ 594 , Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya v. Anil Panjwani 2003 (4) ALD 10 (SC) = AIR 2003 SC 2508, Dwaraka Prasad Agarwal v. Ramesh Chandra Agarwala AIR 2003 SC 2696 , Abbanna v. Seshagir Rao AIR 1963 A.P 208 , Chigurupati Venkatasubbiah v. Ravi Punnayya 1957 (2) An.W.R. 204, Satyapramoda Thirthaswamulavaru v. Mula Gunnayya AIR 1982 A.P 24 , Vechalapu Ramulu v. V. Appala Naidu 1969 (2) ALT 303 , Abdul v. Bhawani AIR 1966 SC 1718 and Mohammed Khaja v. Jada Narsimlu 1959 (3) An.W.R. 61, in support of his contention. 9. The point for consideration is whether the respondent is entitled to recover possession of the suit land from the appellant through a civil Court? 10. Before considering the merits of the contentions raised, I feel it relevant to refer to the decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the parties. 11. 9. The point for consideration is whether the respondent is entitled to recover possession of the suit land from the appellant through a civil Court? 10. Before considering the merits of the contentions raised, I feel it relevant to refer to the decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the parties. 11. In Firm of Illuri Subbayya Chettyand Sons's case (supra), the point for consideration before the Apex Court was whether a suit for recovery of money, said to have been illegally recovered as sales tax under the provisions of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939, is maintainable against the State. The Apex Court, after considering the provisions of the said Act, held that the view taken by the High Court that the scheme of the Act should be deemed to have excluded the jurisdiction of the civil Court is correct and dismissed the appeals but observed: "In dealing with the question whether Civil Court's jurisdiction to entertain a suit is barred or not, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that there is a general presumption that there must be a remedy in the ordinary civil Courts to a citizen claiming that an amount has been recovered from him illegally and that such a remedy can be held to be barred only on very clear and unmistakable indications to the contrary. The exclusion of the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to entertain civil causes will not be assumed unless the relevant statute contains an express provision to that effect, or leads to a necessary and inevitable implication of that nature. The mere fact that a special statute provides for certain remedies may not by itself necessarily exclude the jurisdiction of the civil Courts to deal with a case brought before it in respect of some of the matters covered by the said stand." 12. In Raja Ram Kumar's case (supra), it is held: "Generally speaking, the broad guiding considerations for determining whether Civil Court jurisdiction is excluded are that wherever a right, not pre-existing in common law, is created by a statute and that statute itself provided a machinery for the enforcement of the right, both the right and the remedy having been created uno flatu and a finality is intended to the result of the statutory proceedings, then, even in the absence of an exclusionary provision the Civil Courts' jurisdiction is impliedly barred. If however, a right pre-existing in common law is recognized by the statue and a new statutory remedy for its enforcement provided, without expressly excluding the Civil Court's jurisdiction, then both the common-law and the statutory remedies might become concurrent remedies leaving open an element of election to the persons of inherence." Basing on the said observation, the contention of Sri V.L.N.G.K. Murthy is that since 1956 Act is a self contained Code and lays down the procedure and the forum for obtaining the relief of recovery of possession of the land from tenant by a landlord, jurisdiction of the Civil Court to grant the relief of recovery of possession of the land from a tenant to the landlord is impliedly ousted. 13. In Sultan's case (supra), it is held: "In this view, the defendant in appeal before the Supreme Court could not claim protection of the Rent Act since he relied on title on basis of adverse possession and had never raised the plea before the lower Courts that he was entitled to protection under the Rent Act. Since the suit was not for eviction but was for possession based on title from the very beginning, the defendant could not also claim protection under Section 13-A of the Rent Act in respect of non-payment of rent." (underlining mine) 14. In Saraswati’s case (supra), it is held that bar of Civil Court's jurisdiction cannot be inferred where statute does not create a right or, after creating the right, does not provide a forum for adjudication of any dispute arising out of such right. 15. In S. Venkatramaiah's case (supra), a Full Bench of this Court held that a suit for a relief which the Settlement Officer cannot grant is not barred merely because it incidentally involves the adjudication of questions within the competence of the Settlement Officer and the Estates Abolition Tribunal, but if the relief claimed in the suit is but a camouflage for obtaining a determination of the rights which are required to be decided by the Settlement Officer and the Estates Abolition Tribunal, the suit must be held to be barred. It is held that plaint determines the forum, and that the defendant may show that the plaint is a mere camouflage to circumvent the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal, and if the Court is satisfied that the allegations in the plaint and the reliefs sought do not bring the action within the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal, and if the defendant is unable to show that the action is a mere camouflage, the jurisdiction of the civil Court cannot be said to be excluded, merely because the defence raised may involve adjudication of• some matters within the competence of the Special Tribunal. 16. In B. Viswanadham's case (supra), tenants filed a suit in respect of the land said to be in their possession alleging that their landlord is trying to evict them forcibly without filing an application to the Tahsildar. On the ground that the substance of the plaint in that case falls clearly within the terms of Sections 13 and 16 of the 1956 Act and as that Act i.e., 1956 Act provide~ a special forum for the enforcement of rights between a landlord and a tenant, that forum alone, but not the civil Court, should determine the rights and liabilities of the parties, and the allegations in the plaint alone must be taken into account for deciding whether the civil Court has jurisdiction to deal with the case and if not the plaint has to be returned for presentation to proper Court. 17. In R.Raghava Rao's case (supra), a person claiming to be a tenant filed an application before the Tahsildar for declaring him as a cultivating tenant of his landlord and sought an injunction restraining the landlord from interfering with his possession alleging that his landlord is trying to forcibly evict him from the land in his possession as cultivating tenant without taking recourse to Section 13 of the 1956 Act. The landlord opposed the application contending that the land in dispute is under his personal cultivation and so the Tenancy Tahsildar has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for declaration and injunction. The landlord opposed the application contending that the land in dispute is under his personal cultivation and so the Tenancy Tahsildar has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for declaration and injunction. Order of the Tahsildar granting an injunction was challenged by way of a writ petition which came up for hearing before a Division Bench, which held that inasmuch as Section 13 of the 1956 Act confers upon the cultivating tenant a right not to be evicted except by application made to the Tahsildar and upon the grounds specified in that section, the Tenancy Tahsildar is competent to entertain the application, as the jurisdiction of the Court or Tribunal has to be decided on the averments in the petition only. 18. In Gadde Veerraju's case (supra), it is held that the petition under Section 13 of 1956 Act pre-supposes the existence of certain facts, which have to be established, for getting relief and till those facts are held to have been established by the Tahsildar the landlord is not entitled to relief. 19. In Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan's case (supra), it is held that merely because a person claims to have permanent and heritable interest in a land, asserting that he is owner thereof, it does not amount to his denying his landlord's title. 20. In Dayaram's case (supra), it is held that Civil Court is competent to try disputed questions with regard to title to compensation payable under M.P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act. 21. In Mahendrada Ramayya's case (supra), it is held that jurisdiction, with reference to the subject-matter of a claim, depends upon the averments made in the plaint and not upon those which may ultimately be found to be true, and the allegations made in the written statement of the defendant cannot decide the forum of a suit, and the substance of the plaint only but not its external form, has to be looked into for finding out if the suit is cognizable by a civil Court or by the Tenancy Court and if the allegations made in the plaint are found to be untrue the suit has to be dismissed, not because of lack of jurisdiction but because the allegations on which the suit was based are not established. It is pertinent to note that in the case it was held that the suit as framed is cognizable only by the Civil Court, although the relief of recovery of possession which is one of the reliefs sought is cognizable by the Tenancy Court. 22. The ratio in M.C.S. Prasad Rao's case (supra), is that the order of eviction passed by the Tenancy Court on the ground of default in payment of rent by the tenant does not operate as res judicata in a suit for recovery of rent filed by the landlord as the question whether the tenant is a defaulter or not does not fall within the exclusives jurisdiction of the Tenancy Court. 23. The ratio in D. Venkata Reddy's case (supra), is that inasmuch as a decision by Tahsildar under the 1956 Act is neither conclusive nor final, the 1956 Act does not oust the jurisdiction of a Civil Court to entertain proceedings in which the question of jural relationship of landlord and tenant arises. 24. In Magiti Sasamal’s case (supra), the Apex Court was considering the provisions of Section 7(1) of Orissa Tenants Protection Act. 25. In Sachindra Nath Chatterjee's case (supra), it was held that before a Court can be held to have jurisdiction to decide a particular matter it must not only have jurisdiction to try the suit brought but must also have the authority to pass the orders sought for and it is not sufficient that it has some jurisdiction in relation to the subject matter of the suit and its jurisdiction must include the power to hear and decide the questions at issue, and the authority to hear and decide the particular controversy that has arisen between the parties. 26. In Church of North India's case (supra), the Apex Court after referring to the case law on the subject held that a plea of bar to jurisdiction of a Civil Court must be considered having regard to the contentions raised in the plaint, and for that purpose the averments disclosing the cause of action and the relief sought for therein must be considered in their entirety, and the Court may not be justified in determining the question, one way or the other, only having regard to the reliefs claimed de hors the factual averments made in the plaint. 27. 27. In Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya's case (supra), the apex Court considered the question whether under the provisions of the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 the Tribunal constituted under that Act alone has the exclusive jurisdiction in respect of the purchase made by the plaintiff of a plot allotted to his vendor by a co-operative society, and if the suit filed for a declaration of title, restoration of possession and injunction against the defendant encroacher, who is not a member of the co-operative society is not maintainable in a Civil Court and held that the suit is maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 75 of the said Act read with Section 9 of CPC. 28. In Dwaraka Prasad Agarwal's case (supra), also the Apex Court held that Section 9 CPC confers jurisdiction of a civil Court to determine all disputes of civil nature unless the same is barred under a statute either expressly or by necessary implication and that bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court requires strict interpretation, and the Court would normally lean in favour of construction which would uphold retention of jurisdiction of the civil Court and that the burden of proof in this behalf will be on the party who asserts that the civil Court's jurisdiction is ousted. 29. In Abbanna's case (supra), it was held that a suit for recovery of arrears of rent against a shikmidar is maintainable in a Civil Court in spite of the Hyddrabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950. 30. In Chigurupati Venkatasubbiah's case (supra), the dispute was with regard to land covered by the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, and it was held that a Civil Court can take cognizance of suits in which the title to the holding forming part of an estate under that Act is put in issue and as the relief of possession and mesne profits cannot be granted by the Settlement Officer under that Act as those reliefs being beyond his competence, and are exclusively within the purview of Civil Courts, the jurisdiction of Civil Courts is not excluded even in cases where special forms could not grant certain prayers, as the plaintiff in a suit cannot be made to split up the cause of action and seek redress partly in a Civil Court and partly before a Special Tribunal. The same principle was laid down in Satyapramoda Thirthaswamulavaru's case (supra), where it is held that in cases where a part of the relief claimed only can be granted by a Tenancy Court, Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit for all the reliefs including the reliefs that can be granted by the Tenancy Court. 31. The ration in Veehalapu Ramulu's case (supra), is that in order to determine the question of jurisdiction of the Civil Court, the nature of the suit has to be determined in the first instance and the substance of the plaint as per the averments in the plaint, the cause of action alleged and the reliefs claimed therein. In that case it is held that inasmuch as the relief claimed in the suit is recovery of possession and the amount due as damages for use and occupation, after declaring the occupancy rights of the plaintiff, suit in the civil Court is maintainable in law because the Civil Court can by ignoring the relief of declaration of occupancy rights, grant the relief of possession and recovery of amounts as damages for use and occupation. 32. The ratio in Abdul's case (supra), is that the party who sets up a plea of lack of the jurisdiction of Civil Court has to establish his contention and that statutes ousting jurisdiction of Civil Courts must be strictly construed. 33. In Mohammed Khaja's case (supra), it was held that a suit for eviction from agricultural land, on the basis of trespass, is maintainable in Civil Courts in spite of the provisions of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950. 34. 33. In Mohammed Khaja's case (supra), it was held that a suit for eviction from agricultural land, on the basis of trespass, is maintainable in Civil Courts in spite of the provisions of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950. 34. The specific case of the respondent is that she purchased the suit land at the instance of the appellant, who is closely related to her husband, and that appellant was looking after the management of the suit land till 1971 by leasing it out to others, and during 1971 he informed her that as third party tenants may create complications he himself would cultivate the suit land as her tenant and pay rents and used to pay the rents till 1978 and stopped paying rents thereafter because disputes cropped up between him and her husband subsequent to the death of Mahalakshmamma and when she got a notice issued demanding payment of rents he, in his reply notice, not only denied the tenancy but denied her title also and set up the title in himself and so he should be deemed to be a trespasser and is liable to be evicted. In para-11 of his written statement appellant alleged- "This suit is not maintainable for two reasons, (1) As the plaintiff pleads landlord and tenant relationship and if it is true if there are sufficient grounds for eviction the proper course then should be to file eviction petition before the Tenancy Court and this Court will not have jurisdiction to entertain this suit. Secondly, when this defendant denies the plaintiff's title and asserts title in himself. The suit for eviction and for possession without obtaining declaration of title is not maintainable. Hence, the suit is liable to be dismissed." From the averments in the plaint it is clear that though the case of the respondent is that she let out the suit land to the appellant, inasmuch as he denied her title to the suit land in his reply notice and claimed that he perfected his title to the suit land by adverse possession, he should be treated as a trespasser and so she is entitled to recover possession of the suit land from the appellant on the strength of her title. So, it is clear that respondent is seeking recovery of possession of the suit land based on her title, but not on the basis of the tenancy, which is denied by the appellant prior to the filing of the suit. The case would have been different had the respondent filed the suit on the basis of tenancy and had not the appellant denied her title to the suit land in his written statement. 35. Here I feel it relevant to extract Sections 16 and 17 of the 1956 Act. Section 16- Adjudication of disputes:(1) Any dispute arising under this Act between a landlord and a cultivating tenant, including any question relating to the determination of fair rent or the eviction of a cultivating tenant shall, on application by the landlord or the cultivating tenant, as the case may be, decided by the Tahsildar after making an enquiry in the manner prescribed. (2) Against any order passed by the Tahsildar under sub-section (1) an appeal shall lie to the Revenue Divisional Officer within thirty days of the passing of the order; and the decision of the Revenue Divisional Officer on such appeal shall be final. Section 17 Act to override contracts and other laws: The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent there with contained in any pre-existing law, custom, usage, agreement or decree or order of a Court." So, for a dispute to fall within the jurisdiction of the Tahsildar mentioned in Section 16, it must be a dispute which arose under that Act, and must be a 'dispute' between a 'landlord' and a 'cultivating tenant'. When the appellant disputed the tenancy between him and the respondent and had also denied her title to the suit land, no purpose would be served by the respondent approaching the Tenancy Tribunal constituted under 1956 Act, because that Tribunal cannot decide the question of title nor can it order delivery of possession of land when question of title of the landlord is denied or disputed. So, in view of the ratio in Mahendrada Ramayya's case (supra), D. Venkata Reddy's case (supra), Sachindra Nath Chatterjee's case (supra) and Church of North India's case (supra), the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit. 36. So, in view of the ratio in Mahendrada Ramayya's case (supra), D. Venkata Reddy's case (supra), Sachindra Nath Chatterjee's case (supra) and Church of North India's case (supra), the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit. 36. Since the case of the appellant is that he perfected his title to the suit land by adverse possession, in view of Article 65 of the Limitation Act, if the respondent is able to establish that she has title to the suit land, the burden to establish that he perfected his title to the suit land by adverse possession would be on the appellant. 37. EX.A-1 is the sale deed under which the respondent purchased the suit land from P.W.3. From a reading of the written statement of the appellant and the questions put to P.W.3 during cross-examination it is clear that the case of the appellant is that Mahalakshmamma purchased the suit land benami in the name of the respondent, because the suggestion put to P. WS.1 and 3 during cross-examination is that the sale consideration for purchase of the suit land under EX.A-1 was paid by Mahalakshmamma but not the plaintiff. By relying on Ex. B-2 the appellant wants to establish that respondent is a benamidar, but not the real owner of the suit land, and that Mahalakshmamma was its real owner. The genuineness of Ex. B-2 which is dated 18-4-1959 is doubtful because the stamps used therefor were purchased in the name of Challa Mahalakshmamma on 6-10-1961. Though the signatures of the respondent and her husband (P.W.1) therein are admitted, the contention of the respondent is that Ex. B-2 was filled up on a blank stamp paper on which she and her husband (P.W.1) affixed their signatures. That contention appears to be true because the stamp paper is dated 6-10-1961, but the document is dated 18-4-1959. When stamps are purchased in 1961, the document could not have been executed in 1959 i.e., two years prior to purchase of the stamps. So, it is clear that the document is antedated. 38. In my considered opinion, it is not really necessary to go into the question whether Ex. B-2 was executed by respondent and her husband Veerraju or if it was filled in subsequently on blank stamp papers containing the signatures of the respondent and her husband (P. W.1) for deciding this case, because the recitals in Ex. 38. In my considered opinion, it is not really necessary to go into the question whether Ex. B-2 was executed by respondent and her husband Veerraju or if it was filled in subsequently on blank stamp papers containing the signatures of the respondent and her husband (P. W.1) for deciding this case, because the recitals in Ex. B-2 read: Telugu matter (Omitted) So, as per the recitals in Ex. B-2, it is clear that right to enjoy the suit land during her lifetime only was intended to be given by the respondent to Mahalakshmamma thereunder but nothing more. In fact, neither Mahalakshmamma during her lifetime nor any of her heirs after her death put forth any claim to the suit land subsequent to her death. Appellant, admittedly, is not a heir to the estate of Mahalakshmamma. So, appellant cannot have any benefit in this suit by establishing that Mahalakshmamma supplied the consideration for the respondent to purchase the suit land under EX.A-1. The motive for Mahalakshmamma purchasing the suit land benami in the name of the respondent is not established. So, even assuming that Ex. B-2 is true, at best Ex. B-2 shows that Mahalakshmamma purchased the suit land with her money with an intention to enjoy it during her lifetime and thereafter the respondent has to enjoy the suit land as the absolute owner. 39. After purchase of the stamps used for Ex. B-2, Mahalakshmamma, who is closely related to the appellant, gifted the vested remainder in some of her properties to the appellant under the original of EX.A-5 (registered settlement deed dated 10-10-1961). One of the items gifted under original of EX.A-5 is AC.0-17 cents out of AC.0-67 cents in S.No. 102/1. Its boundaries are mentioned as- East - Land of Galla Janakamma South - Land of Vadlamudi Somaraju West- Land of Akunuri Satyanarayana North- Land of Degula Chittemma The evidence on record shows that the suit land (whose boundaries are not mentioned in Ex.A-1) is adjacent to the aforesaid AC.0-17 cents in S.No.1 02/1 and that there is a bore will in he said land of AC.-0-75 cents. Since the vested remainder in Ac.0-17 cents. Since the vested remainder in Ac.0-17 cents. Since the vested remainder in AC.0-17 cents out of AC.0-67 cents in S.No.1 02/1, which is adjacent to the suit land, was gifted by Mahalakshmamma to the appellant under the original of EX.A-5 reserving a life estate in herself and her husband, and since the appellant, admittedly, was managing the lands belonging to Mahalakshmamma during her lifetime, though there is no independent evidence regarding the lease of the suit land to the appellant by the respondent, since his possession over the suit land is admitted, how appellant could have come into possession of the suit land has to be decided, on the basis of the evidence on record. 40. Since respondent, admittedly did not involve herself personally either in purchasing or managing the suit land and was acting through P.Ws.1 and 2, her not coming into the witness box is not much of consequence. So, no adverse inference need be drawn against her, as she cannot throw any light on the point for consideration in this case. Question of drawing adverse inference against a party, for his or her failure to go into the witness box arises only when some facts in dispute are in the personal knowledge of that party. In fact, as per Section 120 of Evidence Act, the spouse of a party is a competent witness. So, by examining her husband, who acted on her behalf, as P.W.1, respondent sufficiently discharged the onus that lay on her. So I am not able to agree with the contention that an adverse inference has to be drawn against the respondent for her failure to go into the witness box. 41. So, by examining her husband, who acted on her behalf, as P.W.1, respondent sufficiently discharged the onus that lay on her. So I am not able to agree with the contention that an adverse inference has to be drawn against the respondent for her failure to go into the witness box. 41. Merely because the husband of the respondent did not disclose the suit land in the declaration filed by him under the provisions of A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 (1973 Act), it cannot per se be presumed that she has no title to the suit land, because nondisclosure of all the lands owned by a declarant under 1973 Act would only entail penal action as per Section 24 of that Act which reads- "If any person, who is liable to furnish a declaration under this Act willfully and without reasonable cause or excuse, fails to furnish the declaration within the period prescribed or specified therefor by or under this Act or furnishes any declaration which he knows or has reason to believe to be false, incorrect or incomplete, he shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees or with both. But such non-disclosure does not have the effect of divesting the title in the undisclosed lands of the persons on whose behalf the declaration is filed under the provisions of the 1973 Act. Significantly the appellant who wants to take advantage of the failure of P.W.1 showing the suit land in the declaration filed by him, for reasons best known to him, failed to produce the declaration filed by him under the 1973 Act, which he should have filed because Mahalakshmamma gifted Acs.3-86 cents in S.No.38/1; Acs.5-92 cents in S.No.209; Acs.5-92 cents in S.No.210/2; AcsA-77 cents in S.No.210/3; AC.0-60 cents in S.No.213/5; AC.1-30 cents in S.NoA1/3; AC.0-54 cents in S.No.211/6; AC.0-10 cents out of AC.0-67 cents in S.No.102/1 to him under the original of EX.A-5, with some conditions, reserving life estate in herself and her husband. As per EX.B-24 the above said lands are in patta Nos.15, 128, 266 and 206. By 1973 Mahalakshmamma admittedly was alive. EX.B-24 passbook of the appellant shows that he was in possession of Acs. 5-14 cents of wet land; Acs.21-97 cents of dry land also apart from the suit land. As per EX.B-24 the above said lands are in patta Nos.15, 128, 266 and 206. By 1973 Mahalakshmamma admittedly was alive. EX.B-24 passbook of the appellant shows that he was in possession of Acs. 5-14 cents of wet land; Acs.21-97 cents of dry land also apart from the suit land. Thus, the total extent of land in his possession was Acs.9-04 cents of wet land and Acs.21-97 cents of dry land. As per Section 8 of the 1973 Act any person whose holding exceeds the 'specified limit' has to file a declaration under that Act. 'Specified limit' as per Explanation III of Section 8 of the said Act is 10 acres of wet land or 25 acres of dry land (2.5 acres of dry land is equal to one acre of wet land). Since appellant did not produce certified copy of the declaration filed by him under 1973 Act it has to be presumed that he also did not file a declaration under the said Act. So, like a pot calling the kettle black, appellant cannot take any advantage from the failure of the husband of the respondent (P.W.1) disclosing the suit land in his declaration filed under' 1973 Act, in support of his contention that respondent has no title to the suit land." 42. Mere possession of a property for over 12 years per 5e, without animus, is not sufficient to succeed in the plea of adverse possession of such land. Such possession must be hostile possession denying the title of the true owner. See Venkatachalaiah v. Nanjundaiah AIR 1992 Kar. 270 , (at page 273), Suraj Mal v. Ram Singh AIR 1986 SC 1889 , (at page 1894) and Sudha v. Swapne5war AIR 1972 Ori. 145 . Very recently the Apex Court in T. Anjappa v. Samalingappa 2006 AI R SCW 4368, held that if the person claiming adverse possession is not sure who the true owner is, question of his being in hostile possession and question of his denying the title of true owner does not arise. Keeping the above position of law in view the evidence on record has to be considered to find out if the appellant perfected his title to the suit land by adverse possession. 43. Keeping the above position of law in view the evidence on record has to be considered to find out if the appellant perfected his title to the suit land by adverse possession. 43. The specific case of the respondent, and the evidence of P.W.1 also, is that from out of the sale consideration of Rs.1 0,000/fixed under EX.A-1, an amount of Rs.3,500/was paid on 1-1-1957 and the balance amount was paid on 11-4-1957. The evidence of P.W.2, brother of the plaintiff, is that he paid Rs.3,500/- on 1-1-1957 and the balance of Rs.6,500/- was paid at the time of registration of EX.A-1. The evidence of P.W.3, the vendor of the suit land under EX.A-1, is that she received Rs.3,500/- on 1-1-1957 and gave possession of the suit land to the respondent on that date and that she received Rs.6,500/- and registered EX.A-1. For that reason and since Ex. B-2 does not further the case of the appellant relating to Mahalakshmamma purchasing the suit property for her benefit benami in the name of the respondent, it cannot but be said that respondent is the owner of the suit property by virtue of EX.A-1. 44. The case of the appellant is that he entered into possession of the suit land, which was vacant and uncultivable, for the first time during 1957 Sankranthi on his own accord, and that none inducted him into its possession. Probably because respondent purchased the suit land under EX.A-1 in 1957 January, appellant might have chosen 1957 Sankranthi as the date of his entry into the suit land. During cross-examination, he admitted that he was looking after the welfare of Mahalakshmamma and also was looking after her land affairs and was paying taxes to her lands and apart from the land given to him under the settlement deed he was having Acs. 6-62 cents, and that he paid tax under EX.8-4 on behalf of Machina Satyanarayana (husband of P.W.3 i.e., vendor under Ex.A-1) and that Mahalakshmamma purchased the suit land and even by the time of purchase by Mahalakshmamma he was in possession of the suit land and that Mahalakshmamma never paid taxes to the suit land and that he alone paid the tax. He admitted that EX.B-12 (tax receipt dated 30-6-1973) shows that the tax was paid by Mahalakshmamma and that EX.B-27 (tax receipt dated 21-1-1960) shows that he paid tax on behalf of P.W.3's husband, his mother (P. Bhagyavatamma), his grandmother (K. Seetharamamma) and Mahalakshmamma and admitted that he was the Sarpanch of Rajanagaram (in whose hamlet the suit land is situate) from 1971 to 1980 and stated: "I have no intention of trespassing into others lands illegally and I have to intention to enjoy the property adverse to the interests of its owner." "Challa Mahalakshmamma treated me very affectionately and gave her properties to me. Even before my marriage, P.W.1 is related to me. After I completed my education, I stayed at Ganagudem and pursued my studies. I do not know whether Machina Satyanarayana was enjoying the suit land as an owner and doing cultivation. It is not true to say that 1957, I advised the plaintiff to purchase the suit land. I do not know after the death of Machina Satyanarayana, the plaintiff purchased the suit land from the widow of Satyanarayana and sons under EX.A-1. I do not know if the plaintiff paid the consideration of Rs.3,500/- in part on 1-1-57 and obtained possession of it from the vendors under EX.A-1. I do not know if at the time of registration of the Ex.A-1, the balance of the sale consideration of Rs.6,500/was paid to the vendor's vendor Meenavilli Musalayya. I came to know that Mahalakshmamma sent the balance of sale consideration of EX.A-1 through P W.2." From the above evidence of D.W.1 and EX.A-5 and Ex.B-24, it can easily be inferred that the appellant was managing the properties of Mahalakshmamma. In view of that fact respondent must have requested the appellant to manage the suit land also on her behalf and the appellant who might have been under the impression that Mahalakshmamma purchased the suit land benami in the name of the respondent, took a plea and gave evidence that the suit land was purchased by Mahalakshmamma under EX.A-1. In fact, EX.B-27 and EX.B-12 show that appellant paid land revenue to the suit land and other lands on behalf of Mahalakshmamma, who reserved a life interest in the properties covered by the original of Ex.A-5, in herself and her husband. In fact, EX.B-27 and EX.B-12 show that appellant paid land revenue to the suit land and other lands on behalf of Mahalakshmamma, who reserved a life interest in the properties covered by the original of Ex.A-5, in herself and her husband. The fact that the appellant paid land revenue in respect of the suit land, on behalf of Mahalakshmamma, clearly shows that he did not entertain any idea to prescribe title to the suit land by adverse possession. Therefore, his possession over the suit land, at least up to the date of payment of land revenue under EX.B-12 i.e., 1973 can only be permissive possession. 45. The evidence of D.W.2 is that about 10 to 15 years prior to his giving evidence he took Acs.2-00 out of the suit land on lease and cultivated that land on crop share basis and raised paddy. D.Ws.3 and 4 are examined to prove Ex. B-2. D.W.5 is the Village Munsif who collected taxes from the appellant. His evidence is not much of help because the land revenue receipts issued by him do not establish the plea of adverse possession set up by the appellant. That apart he admitted that there is relationship between him and the wife of the appellant. So, it is easy to see that he gives evidence to help the appellant only. 46. D.Ws.6, 7 and 8 are examined to show that the appellant was cultivating the suit land by drawing water from their lands, but not from the bore well in the land of Mahalakshmamma, as the suit land was higher in level than the land of Mahalakshmamma. Their evidence cannot be believed or accepted because D.W.7, during cross-examination, clearly admitted that bore water can be pumped out to any height irrespective of the level. Even otherwise also the evidence of D.Ws.6, 7 and 8 looks artificial and clearly shows that they are trying to help the appellant, who was the Sarpanch of their village. 47. That EX.B-24 (ryotwari passbook) was obtained subsequent to the filing of the suit in 1979 is clear from the evidence of the appellant, because he, who gave evidence in 1986, stated that he obtained ryotwari passbook for the lands in his possession about 3 or 4 years back, and that he does not know the exact year in which he obtained the same. It is well known that a document, which comes into existence subsequent to the filing of the suit, cannot be taken into consideration for deciding the rights of the parties to the suit. The name of the appellant does not, admittedly, find place either in the adangals or in the revenue registers as the pattedar in respect of the suit land. So, it is clear that EX.B-24 ryotwari passbook was obtained by the appellant by exercising his influence as Sarpanch over the revenue officials. By affixing the rubber stamp of the State Bank of India to EX.B-24 the appellant made a futile attempt to pass off EX.B-24 as a true and genuine document, as he, during cross-examination, admitted that he did not borrow any amount from the State Bank of India and that he does not now how the rubber stamp of State Bank of India is appearing on EX.B-24. For the above reasons, EX.B-24 is of no help to the appellant 48. One of the contentions of Sri V.L.N.G.K. Murthy is that respondent nor getting her name mutated in the revenue registers is a point against her. I am not able to agree with the said contention. EX.A-1 shows that relevant declarations etc., for mutation of the name of the purchaser were filed at the time of registration. So, it is for the concerned officials to take steps for mutation of the name of the purchaser in the concerned record. If they fail to perform their duty of mutating the name of the respondent, respondent does not lose her title to the property purchased by her under a registered sale deed, because it is well known that entries in the revenue registers by themselves would not either confer title to the person whose name is mutated therein as pattedar or divest the title of the real owner of the property due to mutation of the name of another person as pattedar in the revenue registers. So, if the respondent is able to establish that she acquired title to the suit land by way of purchase under a registered sale deed, she would not lose her title thereto merely due to the failure of the revenue officials to mutate her name as the pattedar of the suit land in the relevant revenue registers. 49. So, if the respondent is able to establish that she acquired title to the suit land by way of purchase under a registered sale deed, she would not lose her title thereto merely due to the failure of the revenue officials to mutate her name as the pattedar of the suit land in the relevant revenue registers. 49. Since the suit is for recovery of possession of the suit land it is covered by Section 5 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which lays down that a person entitled to possession of specific immovable property may recover it in the manner provided by the CPC. Since the suit is based on title, if plaintiff is able to establish her title to the suit land merely because she did not specifically seek a declaration of her title to the suit land, her prayer for recovery of possession thereof cannot be negatived, because declaration of title, in all cases, is not a condition precedent for ordering delivery of possession to the person who has title thereto. In fact, Court fee payable for recovery of possession either as a consequential relief of declaration of title to immovable property, or for a suit for delivery of possession of immovable property simpliciter, is the same. In fact, in Vechalapu Ramulu's case (supra), a Division Bench of this Court held that relief of possession and recovery of amounts can be granted by the civil Court ignoring the relief of declaration of occupancy rights. So, I am unable to accept the contention of Sri V.L.N.G.K. Murthy that the suit for 231 recovery of possession simpliciter without the relief of declaration of title is not maintainable. 50. In my considered opinion, B. Viswanadham's case (supra) and R.Raghava Rao's case (supra), relied on by V.L.N.G.K. Murthy in support of his contention that civil suit for recovery of possession of the suit land is not maintainable, are not of help to decide this case, because those cases were instituted by tenants in Civil Court seeking a decree of perpetual injunction restraining the landlords from interfering with their possession, alleging that their landlords are trying to evict them by force. Since the plaintiffs in those suits admitted tenancy and since the Tenancy Court has jurisdiction to grant the relief of injunction restraining the landlord from forcible dispossession of his tenant, it was held that Civil Court is not competent to try those suits, on the ground that the jurisdiction of the forum will have to be decided only on the basis of the averments in the plaint or the petition but not on the basis of the plea taken in the written statement or counter. In fact, that is the ratio in Mahendrada Ramayya's case (supra) and Church of North India's case (supra), relied on by Sri V.Parabrahma Sastry. In the circumstances of this case, had the respondent approached the Tribunal under 1956 Act, on the basis that the appellant is her tenant, in view of EX.A-3 reply and his written statement also, appellant would have, possibly, taken a stand that as he is not the tenant of the respondent in respect of the suit land, and as he perfected his title to the suit land by adverse possession, the petition before the Tribunal is not maintainable. Since the Tribunal under 1956 Act is not competent to decide the question of title or prescription by adverse possession and damages for use and occupation in respect of the land recovery of which is sought by the landlord, the Tribunal would have, in any event, driven the respondent to a Civil Court for want of jurisdiction to decide the question of adverse possession and for recovery of damages for use and occupation. So as observed in Chigurupati Venkatasubbiah's case (supra), it is not necessary for the respondent to approach different for a in respect of the same cause of action and so she certainly can invoke the jurisdiction of the Civil Court for the reliefs sought by her in the plaint. 51. Now, I would consider the contention of Sri V.L.N.G.K. Murthy that though the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act do not apply to leases for agricultural purposes by virtue of Section 117 of the Transfer of Property Act, the rules in Section 106 and the other sections i.e., Sections 105 to 116 in Chapter V of the Transfer of Property Act have to be imported to agricultural leases and so the suit filed without issuing a notice to quit is not maintainable. In Brahmayya's case (supra), a Full Bench of the Madras High Court held in para-21 of its judgment that inasmuch as no point was taken in the written statement that the tenancy is not duly determined, the plaintiff therein was entitled to an order for ejection even at the date when the suit was instituted. In this case also no plea was taken by the appellant that the tenancy is not duly determined. In fact, the appellant denied tenancy and set up the title in himself. A specific issue i.e., issue No.2, whether the appellant perfected his title to the suit land by adverse possession, is framed and both sides adduced evidence on that aspect. So, question of issuance of notice to quit does not arise, because tenancy, even if it was there, would automatically came to an end on the tenant denying the title of the landlord, in view of Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act. In fact a Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Pushpa Sharma v. Gopal Lal AIR 1986 Raj. 187 , held that even in a suit for eviction in a Civil Court based on the relationship between landlord and tenant, based on the grounds available under Section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 also, a decree for possession can be granted in favour of the plaintiff on the basis of his title. In that case the defendant set up a title in himself and led evidence on the basis of the issue relating to the title of the plaintiff. In this case also appellant denied tenancy and set up title in himself, even before the respondent filed the suit, in his EX.A-3 reply. So, the respondent filed the suit for his eviction treating him as a trespasser on the ground that he denied her title to the suit land in EX.A-3. Appellant led evidence in support of his plea that he acquired title to the suit land by adverse possession. A trespasser is not entitled to a notice to quit. If the relationship of landlord and tenant is admitted, in view of the provisions of the 1956 Act, if the conditions required for ejection of the tenant are satisfied, the landlord can initiate proceedings under that Act for recovery of possession of the leased land even without issuing a notice to quit. If the relationship of landlord and tenant is admitted, in view of the provisions of the 1956 Act, if the conditions required for ejection of the tenant are satisfied, the landlord can initiate proceedings under that Act for recovery of possession of the leased land even without issuing a notice to quit. See D. Subba Rao v. S. Dharmakunta AIR 1971 A.P 262 . Therefore, I am not able to agree with the above contention of Sri V.L.N.G.K. Murthy. 52. As stated earlier, the Tribunal constituted under 1956 Act has no jurisdiction to decide the question relating to adverse possession set up by the person whose eviction is sought before it as tenant of the land sought to be recovered possession of by a petitioner-landlord. So, when the person in possession denies his status as tenant and sets up a title in himself by adverse possession, the owner of the said property need not approach the Tenancy Court in the first instance and seek a direction from the Tribunal that inasmuch as it is lacking jurisdiction to decide the question relating to adverse possession, he should approach the Civil Court for appropriate relief, for him to maintain a suit in a Civil Court, because the provisions of the 1956 Act would come into operation only when existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant is admitted or established, but not otherwise. If the person, against whom eviction is sought, claims adverse possession and denies tenancy even before initiation of any proceedings, Civil Court only will have jurisdiction to grant the relief of recovery of possession and mesne profits. 53. Since respondent is held to be the owner of the suit land and since the appellant failed to establish his title by adverse possession, appellant whose status is that of a trespasser vis-a-vis the appellant is liable to be evicted and so the respondent is entitled to a decree for possession of the suit land. As ordered by the trial Court mesne profits will be determined in separate proceedings. The point is answered accordingly. 54. Since both parties are related to each other and since they did not come to Court with true facts, they are directed to bear their own costs in the appeal. 55. Hence, the appeal is dismissed. In the circumstances stated above, parties are directed to bear their own costs in this appeal.