JUDGMENT :-Second Appeal No.1385 of 2003 and C.R.P.No.6317 of 2005 are interrelated with each other. Hence, they are disposed of through common judgment. Except for some minor variations, the parties are common to the proceedings. For the sake of convenience, they are referred to, as arrayed in the second appeal. 2. The relevant facts may, briefly, be stated as under : 3. Posina Tammayya had three sons, namely, Venkata Rayudu, Satyanarayana and Suryanarayana. The third son is possessed of lands, in various survey numbers. Substantial extent thereof is said to have been leased, in favour of respondents to 7. As regards 90 cents of land in R.S.No.242/2 of Apparaopet Village, the 1st appellant herein, who is one of the grandsons of Venkata Rayudu, brother of Suryanarayana, filed O.S. No.36 of 1985 in the Court of Principal District Munsif, Tadepalligudem, against the respondents herein, for the relief of declaration of title and recovery of possession. The suit was presented in the name of Posina Suryanarayana, together with LA.No.178 of 1985, with a prayer to permit the 1st appellant, to represent Suryanarayana, on the ground that he is of unsound mind. 4. In the pliant, it was pleaded that in an extent of about 100 Sq. yards, in the suit schedule property, one Mr. Satyanarayana Raju, the father of the 6th respondent and husband of the 7th respondent, was permitted to raise a thatched shed, and in the remaining land, the 1st appellant was tethering his buffaloes. It was alleged that Satyanarayana Raju, who was also a tenant, in respect of other lands belonging to Suryanarayana; trespassed into the suit schedule property, and after the death of Satyanarayana Raju, the respondents herein are continuing in illegal and unlawful possession of the suit schedule property. During the pendency of the suit, Suryanarayana died, on 1-3-1985. The appellants 2 and 3 came on record, stating that under a Will, dated 20-11-1980 (Ex.A-5), Suryanarayana had bequeathed the suit schedule property in favour of them and the 1st appellant. 5. On behalf of the respondents, a serious objection was raised, as to the very maintainability of the suit, which was presented by the alleged next friend of the plaintiff. They pleaded that the suit schedule property and other lands held by Suryanarayana, were reclaimed by the respondents and their ancestors, and that the suit schedule property was sold long back, in favour of Satyanarayana Raju. They pleaded that the suit schedule property and other lands held by Suryanarayana, were reclaimed by the respondents and their ancestors, and that the suit schedule property was sold long back, in favour of Satyanarayana Raju. The genuinity of the Will, and the entitlement of the appellants, was seriously disputed. 6. The trial Court decreed the suit, through judgment dated 9-7-1996. Aggrieved thereby, the respondents filed A.S.No.23 of 1996 in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Tadepalligudem. The appeal was allowed, on 22-7-2003, and the decree passed by the trial Court was set aside. The second appeal is filed against the judgment and decree in A.S.No.23 of 1996. 7. The appellants 1 and 2 in the second appeal filed AT.C. No.131 of 1996 before the Tenancy Tribunal-cum-Principal Junior Civil Judge, Kovvur, against the respondents in the second appeal, and some others, with a prayer to fix fair rent, in respect of the petition schedule property. It was pleaded that the land was leased out long back by Posina Suryanarayana, and the said property was bequeathed to them under a Will dated 20-11-1980. After referring to certain proceedings that ensued between late Suryanarayana and his lessees, the appellants 1 and 2 sought for enhancement of rent from Rs.100/- to Rs.7,500/- per acre, per annum. 8. The respondents resisted the petition on several grounds. They disputed the genuinity and validity of the Will. According to them, the land was reclaimed by them, and for the past 30 years, there was no crop. It· was also pleaded that the petition schedule property was submerged for most of the time, and that the crops are washed away. It was alleged that the rent for the entire land was enhanced to Rs.5,000/-, and that the same was being paid to their landlords. 9. The Tenancy Tribunal allowed the AT.C., and enhanced the rent from Rs.100/- to Rs.5,100/-, per acre, per annum, through judgment dated 1-7-2002. The respondents filed AT.A. No.55 of 2002 before the Tenancy Appellate Tribunal-cum District Judge, West-Godavari, at Eluru. The appeal was dismissed on 22-8-2005. C.R.P.No.6317 of 2006 arises out of it. 10. 9. The Tenancy Tribunal allowed the AT.C., and enhanced the rent from Rs.100/- to Rs.5,100/-, per acre, per annum, through judgment dated 1-7-2002. The respondents filed AT.A. No.55 of 2002 before the Tenancy Appellate Tribunal-cum District Judge, West-Godavari, at Eluru. The appeal was dismissed on 22-8-2005. C.R.P.No.6317 of 2006 arises out of it. 10. Sri A. Ramalingeswara Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants submits that whatever may have been the controversy, as regards the entitlement of the 1st appellant to file the suit as the next mend of the original plaintiff, Suryanarayana; it ceased to exist with the death of the plaintiff, on 1-3-1985. He submits that in view of the Will executed by the plaintiff, during his lifetime, the appellants became entitled to the relief in the suit. He contends that the Lower Appellate Court committed error in undertaking extensive discussion, as to the maintainability of the suit. He further submits that once the respondents have pleaded oral sale of the property, there was no basis for the Lower Appellate Court in examining the plea of adverse possession advanced on their behalf. He contends that the trial Court decreed the suit being satisfied on several grounds, but recorded a vague and imperfect finding on the validity of Will Ex.A-5; whereas the Lower Appellate Court did not deal with Ex.A-5, at all. According to the learned Counsel, the whole controversy in the entire proceedings revolves around the validity of Ex.A-5, but the Courts below did not consider the same in the proper perspective. He supports the orders passed by the Tenancy Appellate Tribunal, in the matter of fixation of fair rent. 11. Sri MR.S. Srinivas and Sri Subba Reddy, learned Counsel, have appeared for the respondents in the second appeal, and petitioners in the C.R.P. They plead that the appellants miserably failed to prove that Suryanarayana was of unsound mind, and in that view of the matter, the very institution of the suit was untenable. They further contend that, admittedly the appellants are not the immediate legal heirs of late Suryanarayana; and that several others, who are more closely related to him, are alive even now. They further contend that, admittedly the appellants are not the immediate legal heirs of late Suryanarayana; and that several others, who are more closely related to him, are alive even now. According to the learned Counsel, the validity of the Will, Ex.A-5, could not have been considered, unless all the legal heirs of late Suryanarayana were impleaded in the proceedings, and thereby, the suit and A TC filed by the appellants cannot be sustained in law. They also submit that having suffered a finding in the trial Court, in relation to Ex.A-5, adverse to their interests, the appellants did not choose to file any cross-objections in A.S.No.23 of 1996, and thereby, they have permitted the said finding, to become final. It is urged that it is not open to the appellants to raise any ground, as to the validity of the Will, at this stage. 12. As regards the fixation of fair rent, learned Counsel point out that the sole basis for the appellants herein to seek fixation of fair rent was the Will dated 20-11-1980, and once that was held not proved, there does not exist any basis for fixation of fair rent. 13. The suit was filed by the 1st appellant alone, as next friend of Suryanarayana, alleging that the latter was of unsound mind. He filed I.A. No.178 of 1985 under Order 32 Rule 1 C.P.C. The I.A. was allowed ex parte. The respondents herein filed I.A.No.283 of 1985 to set aside the order passed in I.A.No.l78 of 1985. In the meanwhile, Suryanarayana died. For this, or other related reasons, the trial Court allowed I.A.No.283 of 1985, on 19-7-1988. Basing their claims on a Will, dated 20-11-1980, the appellants herein came on record and they continued the suit. 14. The trial Court framed several issues, touching on the entitlement of the parties over the suit schedule property. Though Suryanarayana died in the year 1985 itself, the trial Court has chosen to frame additional issues on 24-8-1994, touching on the right of the 1st appellant, to represent Suryanarayana, as a next friend. Another additional issue was, about the validity and enforceability of the Will, dated 20-11-1980. 15. On behalf of the appellants PWs.1 to 6 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-10 were marked. On behalf of the respondents DWs.1 to 3 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-16 were marked. Another additional issue was, about the validity and enforceability of the Will, dated 20-11-1980. 15. On behalf of the appellants PWs.1 to 6 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-10 were marked. On behalf of the respondents DWs.1 to 3 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-16 were marked. In the ATC, on behalf of the appellants, PWs.1 to 3 were examined, and Exs.A-1 and A-2 were marked, and on behalf of the respondents RWs.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-4 were marked. Ex.C-1, the Report of the Commissioner, was also taken on record. 16. The trial Court devoted major portion of its discussion to additional issues 1 to 3, which related to the permissibility of filing the suit by a next friend, though, even by the time the issues were framed; the original plaintiff died. The issues, as to whether late Suryanarayana was the owner of the suit schedule property, and whether the respondents have trespassed into the land, were answered in favour of the appellants. Accordingly, the suit for declaration and mandatory injunction was decreed. On the additional issues, framed about the validity of Ex.A-5, the trial Court recorded a finding against the appellants, on the sole ground that Suryanarayana cannot be said to have been of sound mind by the time the Will was executed. No other factor was taken into account, while recording this finding. 17. In the appeal preferred by the respondents, the Lower Appellate Court had also fumed a point, about the maintainability of the suit by the next friend, and here again, the discussion ran into several typed pages. No point was framed by the Lower Appellate Court about the validity of the Will. On finding that there existed several other relations, of Suryanarayana, and that they were not made parties to the suit, the Lower Appellate Court reversed the decree passed by the trial Court. It made several observations on the merits of the matter also. 18. There existed a serious controversy as to whether the original plaintiff was of unsound mind, or whether the 1st appellant herein was entitled to represent the plaintiff, as his next friend. However, with the death of the original plaintiff, and grant of permission to the appellants herein to come on record as legal representatives; the said controversy paled into insignificance. There existed a serious controversy as to whether the original plaintiff was of unsound mind, or whether the 1st appellant herein was entitled to represent the plaintiff, as his next friend. However, with the death of the original plaintiff, and grant of permission to the appellants herein to come on record as legal representatives; the said controversy paled into insignificance. For all practical purposes, the suit has to be treated as the one, filed by the appellants herein, on the strength of a Will. The trial Court committed an error in decreeing the suit, even after holding that EX.A~5 was not genuine and valid. With the said finding, the whole basis for the suit disappeared. The reason is that the appellants based their claim on the Will alone. They were not the legal representatives, in the strict sense, of late Suryanarayana, but are the sons of one of his nephews. Four more nephews and a niece of Suryanarayana were alive, by the time the suit was filed, or by the time he died. 19. In view of this glaring illegality, the Lower Appellate Court ought to have remanded the suit to the trial Court, for fresh consideration on merits, with a direction that the appellants must implead the other legal representatives also. Instead, it proceeded to discuss several points, in detail, which did not have a direct bearing. 20. The contention advanced on behalf of the respondents, that the finding recorded by the trial Court, as to the validity of EX.A-5 has become final against the appellants, on the ground that the latter did not file cross-objections; cannot be accepted. It is too well known that whenever a decree is passed in a suit, three courses of action can be contemplated : The aggrieved party can prefer the appeal under Section 96 C.P.C. Secondly, the other party, if he suffered the decree, in a limited extent, can file cross-objections, instead of independent appeal. Thirdly, if a party did not suffer in terms of grant of relief, but feels aggrieved by any findings recorded by the trial Court, it shall be open to him, to attack such findings, in the appeal preferred against him, while supporting the decree in his favour. Rule 22 of Order 41 deals with the second and third aspects, referred to above. Rule 22 of Order 41 deals with the second and third aspects, referred to above. It reads as under : Order 41 Rule 22 : "Upon hearing respondent may object to decree as if he had preferred a separate appeal :-( 1) Any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, may not only support the decree [but may also state that the finding against him in the Court below in respect of any issue ought to have been in his favour; and may also take any cross-objection to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal provided he has filed such objection in the Appellate Court within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal, or within such further time as the appellate Court may see fit to allow. [Explanation.-A respondent aggrieved by a finding of the Court in the judgment on which the decree appealed against is based may, under this rule, file cross-objection in respect of the decree insofar as it is based on that finding, notwithstanding that by reason of the decision of the Court on any other finding which is sufficient for the decision of the suit, the decree, is, wholly or in part, in favour of that respondent.] (2) Form of objection and provisions applicable thereto.-Such cross-objection shall be in the form of a memorandum, and the provisions of Rule 1, so far as they relate to the form and contents of the Memorandum of Appeal, shall apply thereto. (3) [xxx] (4) Where, in any case in which any respondent has under this rule filed a Memorandum of Objection, the original appeal is withdrawn or is dismissed for default, the objection so filed may nevertheless be heard and determined after such notice to the other parties as the Court thinks fit. (5) The provisions relating to appeals by indigent persons shall, so far as they can be made applicable, apply to ail objection under this rule". Amendment carried to this Rule, in 1976 was mostly on adding emphasis, than to introduce any new phenomenon. (5) The provisions relating to appeals by indigent persons shall, so far as they can be made applicable, apply to ail objection under this rule". Amendment carried to this Rule, in 1976 was mostly on adding emphasis, than to introduce any new phenomenon. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 22 maintains a clear distinction between the attack on a mere finding, even while supporting the decree, on the one hand, and filing of cross-objections, to the extent the appealed decree is against the respondent, in an appeal, on the other hand. In respect of these two courses of action, distinct terms are used. While in the former case, the respondent is extended the facility to "state that the finding against him ... ought to have been in his favour", in the latter, he is required to "take any cross-objection". Statement, that a particular finding ought to have been in his favour, can be made by the respondent, during the course of arguments in the appeal, whereas cross-objections are to be presented in a prescribed form, almost akin to Memorandum of Appeal. This is amply made clear by sub-rule (2). Indirectly, it mandates that, requirements as to limitation, Court fee, must be complied. 21. A close reading of explanation to sub-rule (1) reveals that the necessity to file cross-objection by a respondent arises, if only he had any grievance against the decree. If the whole of the decree is in his favour, and his grievance is only as to a finding by the trial Court, on an issue, the necessity to file cross-objection does not arise. The situation Play be demonstrated with the following illustration : 22. A files a suit against B for recovery of a sum of Rs.50,000/-, said to have been paid under two receipts for Rs.30,000/- and Rs.20,000/-, as advance, under an agreement of sale. B disputes the very agreement of sale as well as the receipt of the amount. Assume a contingency where the trial Court finds that the receipt of amount by B is proved, but the plea as to agreement of sale is not proved; and ultimately the suit is decreed for Rs.50,000/-. In the appeal preferred by B, A can attack the finding recorded by the trial Court, about the agreement of sale. The same can be done by advancing his contention during the course of argument in the appeal. In the appeal preferred by B, A can attack the finding recorded by the trial Court, about the agreement of sale. The same can be done by advancing his contention during the course of argument in the appeal. Imagine another eventuality, where the suit is decreed only for a sum of Rs.30,000/-, on finding that the payment of Rs.20,000/- is not proved. In the appeal preferred by B, against the decree, A can claim the balance of Rs.20,000/-, only by filing cross-objections. He cannot be extended such a relief, in the absence of cross-objections. 23. A cursory reading of explanation to sub-rule (1) of Rule 22, would leave an impression that even a finding in a judgment can be challenged by respondent in an appeal, only by way of cross-objections. However, on a close analysis of the provision, it emerges that the cross-objections must be "in respect of a decree, insofar as it is based on that finding", as distinguished from a finding, which did not lead to denial of any relief. Any doubt that remains, in this regard, is clarified through sub-rule (2) of Rule 22. This provision insists that the cross-objections must be in the form of a Memorandum of Appeal, but is silent as to the form in which the statement against a mere finding must be presented. The inescapable conclusion is that while cross-objections must be presented in a prescribed form, the Statement of Objections on mere finding can be made, during the· course of arguments, in the appeal. There is plethora of decisions to the effect that a cross-objection cannot be maintained, unless any relief is claimed (See Smt. Shazadi Begum v. Vinod Kumar, AIR 1978 MP 20 ; Budhan. v. Lala Harbans Lal and others, AIR 1973 All. 63 and Panna Lal v. State of Bombay and others, AIR 1963 SC 1516 ). 24. The consequence of lapses in availing the facility extended under Rule 22, is discernable only in the case of the cross-objections. The reason is that, no particular form is prescribed for stating that a finding, recorded by the trial Court, against the respondent, in an appeal, ought to have been in his favour. As observed earlier, such statement can be made during the course of arguments. The reason is that, no particular form is prescribed for stating that a finding, recorded by the trial Court, against the respondent, in an appeal, ought to have been in his favour. As observed earlier, such statement can be made during the course of arguments. Cross-objections, on the other hand, are required to be in the same form, as the Memorandum of Appeal, including the requirement to pay Court fee, limitation, etc. unless the cross-objections are filed, the respondent, in an appeal, cannot be permitted to seek any relief, over and above what was granted to him by the trial Court. 25. The proposition that the statement, in relation to a finding recorded by a trial Court against the respondent, in an appeal, need not be stated in any particular form; derives support from another important provision. Rule 33 of Order 41 is almost the repository of the power of an appellate Court. It reads as under : Order 41 Rule 33 : Power of Court of Appeal :- The appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection [and may, where there have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees:] [Provided that the appellate Court shall not make any order under Section 35-A, in pursuance of any objection on which the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order.] 26. The appellate Court is conferred with the power to pass any decree, as could have been passed by the trial Court, or make further decree, as the situation may warrant, notwithstanding the fact that the appeal is against the part of the decree, or that the respondents may not have filed any appeal or objection. The appellate Court is conferred with the power to pass any decree, as could have been passed by the trial Court, or make further decree, as the situation may warrant, notwithstanding the fact that the appeal is against the part of the decree, or that the respondents may not have filed any appeal or objection. In Virdhachalam Pillai v. Chaldean Bank, AIR 1964 SC 1425 , the Supreme Court observed, as under: "Para 32 : Learned Counsel for the appellant raised a short preliminary objection that the learned Judges of the High Court, having categorically found that there was an antecedent debt which was discharged by the suit-mortgage loan only to the extent of Rs.59,000/- and odd and there being no appeal by the Bank against the finding that the balance of Rs.80,000/- had not gone in discharge of an antecedent debt, the respondent was precluded from putting forward a contention that the entire sum of Rs.80,000/- covered by Exs. A and B went for the discharge of antecedent debts. We do not see any substance in this objection, because the respondent is entitled to canvass the correctness of findings against it in order to support the decree that has been passed against the appellant." Similarly, in Panna Lal v. State of Bombay, AIR 1963 SC 1516 , it was pointed out as under: "Para-12: Even a bare reading of Order 41 Rule 33 is sufficient to convince anyone that the wide wording, was intended to empower the appellate Court to make whatever order it thinks fit, not only as between the appellant and the respondent but also as between a respondent and a respondent. It empowers the appellate Court not only to give or refuse relief to the appellant by allowing or dismissing the appeal but also to give such other relief to any of the respondents as "the case may require". 27. The plausible limitation for the power of an appellate Court can be that, it cannot grant a greater relief, than what is claimed by the appellant in the appeal, or by the respondent through a cross-objection. While sustaining or varying the relief in the appeal, the appellate Court can certainly differ with the reasoning assigned by the trial Court and for this purpose, it is not necessary that there must have been any formal application or memorandum by the respondent. 28. While sustaining or varying the relief in the appeal, the appellate Court can certainly differ with the reasoning assigned by the trial Court and for this purpose, it is not necessary that there must have been any formal application or memorandum by the respondent. 28. Reverting to the facts of the present case, it is no doubt true that the trial Court while decreeing the suit, filed by the appellants herein, held that the Will, Ex.A-5, is not genuine. Since the suit, as a whole, was decreed, the appellants did not have any necessity, or occasion to file any cross-objection. It is represented that in A.S.No.23 of 1996, the appellants have advanced their contentions, touching on Ex.A-5. However, the Lower Appellate Court did not advert to the said aspect, obviously, it allowed the appeal on some other ground. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the finding recorded by the trial Court on Ex.A-5 has become final. 29. For the foregoing reasons, the second appeal is allowed, and the judgment and decree rendered by the Court of Principal District Munsif, Tadepalligudem, in O.S.No.36 of 1985, and the judgment and decree in A.S.No.23 of 1996 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Tadepalligudem, are set aside, and the matter is remanded to the trial Court for fresh consideration and disposal, with specific reference to the validity of the Will, EX.A-5. 30. Since the finding on EX.A-5 had a direct bearing on the AT.C. No.131 of 1996, the C.R.P. is also allowed, and the order passed by the Tenancy Tribunal-cum-Principal Junior Civil Judge, Kovvur, as well as the one, in AT.A. No.55 of 2002, passed by the Tenancy Appellate Tribunal-cum-District Judge, West-Godavari at Eluru, are set aside. The AT.C. No.131 of 1996 is remanded to the Tenancy Tribunal, for fresh disposal. It is directed that the nature of relief granted in this, shall depend upon the finding that may be recorded by the Court of Principal District Munsif, Tadepalligudem, in O.S. No.36 of 1985 on EX.A-5 thereof. 31. There shall be no order as to costs.