ORAL JUDGMENT :- By this writ petition, petitioner No., employer and petitioner No. 2- Headmaster/Chief Executive Office challenged the judgment dated 4-4-1994 passed by the School Tribunal in No .. 75 of 1993-A holding that departmental enquiry conducted by the petitioner against present respondent No.2 was not in accordance with law and the quashing and setting aside the order of termination dated 29-4-1993. The Tribunal directed the petitioners to reinstate him with continuity and backward. 2. It is an admitted position that though this Court has issued Rule matter, no interim relief was given and hence the petitioners rein respondent No.2 in service respondent No.2, during the pendency of per has attamed the age of superannuation and has retired on 31-3-2006. 3. I have heard Shri De, learned counsel for the petitioners, Shri T learned AGP for respondent No. 1 and Shri Haq, learned counsel for respondent No.2 in the above background. 4. Shri De, learned counsel states that the School Tribunal has four the petitioner No. 2 could not have functioned as Chief Executive Office departmental enquiry against respondent No.2. He has invited attention provisions of Rules 2(c) of Maharashtra Employees of Private S (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981, (hereinafter referred to as MEPS Rules appoint that. the management is empowered to appoint any person as Executive Officer. In this context, he invites attention to the resolution date 1992 passed by the Managing Committee, appointing petitioner No.2 as Executive Officer. He contends that therefore, School Tribunal was not that the enquiry has been vitiated on that count. He further states that said finding, School Tribunal has not considered the charges and adduced before Enquiry Committee against respondent No.2 on merits. tention that entire application of mind by the School Tribunal is only , to technical requirements and as the School Tribunal has found that technical requirements are not fulfilled, the impugned order has been , therefore, states that if the Court is satisfied that there is no technical the matter, writ petition will have to be allowed or then it will have to ed back in any case for finding out whether the charges are proved. He states the School Tribunal could not have straightway granted reinstatement respondent No.2 in support, he has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab vs. Dr. Harbhajan Singh ported at (1996) 9 see 322. He states the School Tribunal could not have straightway granted reinstatement respondent No.2 in support, he has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab vs. Dr. Harbhajan Singh ported at (1996) 9 see 322. It is his argument that even if the enquiry be vitiated, the management is to be given chance to prove misconduct fore the matter needs to be remanded back either to the departmental i.e. Enquiry Officer or School Tribunal i.e. respondent No.1. He is at as the School Tribunal has not considered the grievance in the appeal the Court should after recording appropriate finding on the arguments , remand the matter back either to School Tribunal or to the employer owners. 5. Shri Haq, learned counsel, on the other hand states that petitioner No.2 Chief Executive Officer and he has not been appointed as Chief J e Officer. He points out that the resolution passed is in violation of Rule ) of MEPS Rules. He further states that in view of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of G.S.P. MandaI vs. lalindar, 2006(2) 748, there is no question of remand of matter back to the School Tribunal to the petitioners to prove misconduct before the School Tribunal. He states that as the employee has retired on 31-3-2006 after attaining the age annuation and as MEPS Act or MEPS Rules do not contain any provision the petitioners to continue with Departmental Enquiry, even after retirement, the employer cannot continue departmental enquiry after 31-3-2006. es upon the judgment of the Honble Apex Court in the case of Bhagirathi . s. Board of Directors, O.S.F.E, reported at (1999) 3 see 666, to substantiate his contention. He argues that in these circumstances, departmental has lapsed and therefore the petition needs to be dismissed. 6. In reply, Shri De, learnd counsel states that the matter was pending the Court of law and the superannuation of employee, therefore, is totally ant. He relies upon the judgment of the Honble Apex Court in the case of kumar Agarwal and anr. vs. Thawar Das (Dead) through LRs., reported at (1999) 7 SCC 303, to contend that the right of the petitioners to prove duct is not lost because of subsequent retirement. 7. He relies upon the judgment of the Honble Apex Court in the case of kumar Agarwal and anr. vs. Thawar Das (Dead) through LRs., reported at (1999) 7 SCC 303, to contend that the right of the petitioners to prove duct is not lost because of subsequent retirement. 7. The reliance upon resolution dated 1-9-1992 by the petitioners to demonstrate that petitioner No.2 was appointed as Chief Executive Officer and ore the application of mind by School Tribunal in this respect is not proper, If not correct. The School Tribunal has considered this issue in paragraph 6 judgment and it has found that petitioner No. 1 i.e. respondent No. 1 in I before it was Secretary and he was therefore Chief Executive Officer and hence he ought to have appointed National/State Awardeel Headmaster member of Enquiry Committee. The perusal of Rule (1)(c) of the MEPS R 1981, shows that the Chief Executive Officer has been defined to mean Secretary, Trustee, Correspondent or a person by whatever name called prove such person has been empowered by Managing Committee to execut decisions. 8. The perusal of resolution dated 1-9-1992 shows that the authorization favour of petitioner No. 2 is only in relation to departmental enquiry arguments respondent No.2. It is, therefore, clear that he is not empowered to ex decisions taken by the management as contemplated by said rules and their he is not Chief Executive Officer. The provisions of Rule 36(1) of the Rules contemplate authorisation by management in favour of Chief Exec Officer. The Resolution dated 1-9-1992, therefore, is not such authoristion management. As has already been stated that authorisation is to be in favor Chief Executive Officer and said authorisation cannot constitute a per authorised as Chief Executive Officer. The arguments of petitioner that resolution dated 1-9-1992, petitioner No. 2 has been made Chief Exec Officer are therefore incorrect. The requirement of Rule 36(1) of MEPS are also very specific. The Chief Executive Officer, who is already function is to be authorised by the management and as such I find that no exception taken to findings recorded by the School Tribunal in this respect. The IDO this finding is reached, it is clear that the order of School Tribunal cannot faulted with. However, then the arguments for remand of matter either ba School Tribunal or to employer fall for consideration. 9. The IDO this finding is reached, it is clear that the order of School Tribunal cannot faulted with. However, then the arguments for remand of matter either ba School Tribunal or to employer fall for consideration. 9. Shri Haq, learned counsel for respondent No.2 has invited attention the Division Bench judgment of this Court in G.S.P. Mandal vs. lalindar (s to demonstrate that such remand is not possible. The perusal of said judge clearly shows that the Division Bench has held that enquiry conducted und provisions of the Act of 1977 is not in any way akin to disciplinary enquiry conducted by the employers against the employees in labour jurisprudence therefore employer is not entitled to lead evidence/additional evidence appellate proceedings under section 9 of the MEPS Act. In view of this verdict of Division Bench, it is clear that the request of the petitioners to remand the back to School Tribunal cannot be entertained. 10. The next argument is to remand the matter back to employer. learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment in State of P vs. Dr. Harbhajan Singh Greasy (supra). The perusal of that judgment re that the Honble Apex Court has found that in matters where depart enquiry is found to be vitiated, relief of reinstatement should not be gr straightway and proper course is to remit the matter back for fresh enquiry the stage the fault or error is committed by the management and to treat delinquent employee to be under deemed suspension during such enquiry perusal of said judgment leaves no manner of doubt that right of employ continue with departmental enquiry after the employee has superannuated not forming subject-matter of scrutiny there and therefore the issue is considered by the Honble Apex Court. 11. The judgment on which learned counsel for respondent No. 2 has liance i.e. Bhagirathi lena vs. Board of Directors. O.S.F.V. (supra) considers this situation. It has been held that after retirement of employee, mental enquiry lapses if there is no specific provision for its constitution after retirement of such employee. In the facts of that case the department proceedings were initiated against the appellant before the Honble court under Regulation 44 of the Orissa Financial State Corporation Staff Regulations, 1975, and charge-sheet was served upon him on 22-7-1992. The could not be completed against him till his retirement which took place -1995. In the facts of that case the department proceedings were initiated against the appellant before the Honble court under Regulation 44 of the Orissa Financial State Corporation Staff Regulations, 1975, and charge-sheet was served upon him on 22-7-1992. The could not be completed against him till his retirement which took place -1995. He was relieved on 1-7-1995 by the employer Corporation by expressly noting that it was without prejudice to the claims of the Corporation. Honble Apex Court in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the judgment has noted that as no specific provision in said Regulation of 1975 for deducting any from the provident fund consequent to any misconduct determined in department enquiry there was no provision for continuance of departmental after superannuation. The Honble Apex Court has, therefore, held that respondent - Corporation had no legal authority to make any reduction in the appellant’s retrial benefits. It has been held that after retirement of employee/appellant on superannuation, there was no authority vested III ration for continuing departmental enquiry even for the purposes of imposing any reduction in retrial benefits payable to the appellant. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioners has invited attention to other Judgment of the Honble Apex Court in Ram Kumar Agarwal and anr. vs. ar Das (Dead) through LRs. (supra). He has contended that as mentioned reserved by the HonbIe Apex Court therein, the right of employer in this must be deemed to have continued and protected because of pending Court. The perusal of said judgment clearly shows that there the Honble Apex . has considered right of appellant to prosecute his appeal under Civil procedure Code though the decree was executed. It appears that though appeal entitled, the appellant could not succeed in getting stay orders and hence the e holder executed decree and in this background the grievance has been conferred. It is clear that the Honble Apex Court has considered statutory right erred by sections 96 and 100 of Civil Procedure Code and has held that merely because the decree is executed, the said right is not taken away because is continued. 13. In the facts of present case, position is otherwise. The provisions of S Act or MEPS Rules do not enable employer to continue with departmental. enquiry after superannuation of employee. Therefore, it is obvious that prayer for remand of matter back to employer also cannot be entertained. 13. In the facts of present case, position is otherwise. The provisions of S Act or MEPS Rules do not enable employer to continue with departmental. enquiry after superannuation of employee. Therefore, it is obvious that prayer for remand of matter back to employer also cannot be entertained. In these circumstances, I find that no case is made out for interference in writ jurisdiction. Write Petition is dismissed accordingly. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs. Writ petition dismissed.