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2006 DIGILAW 1219 (MP)

KAMTA PRASAD v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

2006-11-01

A.K.GOHIL, A.P.SHRIVASTAVA

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GOHIL, J. ( 1 ) THIS is complainant' revision under section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, against the judgment of acquittal dated 18-12-1998 passed by First Additional Sessions judge, Vidisha in Sessions Trial No. 165/ 97 for the offences under Sections 307 and 307/34 of Indian Penal Code. ( 2 ) WE have heard Shri Amit Lahoti, learned counsel for the applicant/complainant, shri M. P. S. Bhadoriya, learned Govt. Advocate for the respondent No. 1 /state and shri S. S. Rajput, learned counsel for the respondents No. 2 and 3. ( 3 ) AT the outset, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that he will not press this revision against respondent No. 2 kanchedi s/o Shankar Lal because he was not named in the FIR and he was not involved in the commission of crime. Therefore, the appeal as against respondent No. 2 is dismissed. ( 4 ) SO far as the case against Bhavsingh s/o Kanchedi Lal is concerned, in the FIR it was the case of complainant injured Kamta prasad that Bhav Singh gave one danda blow in his head. The incident took place on 22-5-97 at 16. 00 hours when Kamta Prasad had picked up some green-mangoes from a tree belonging to Bhav Singh. Bhav Singh objected about collecting the green-mangoes and thereafter gave danda blow, but before the Court Kamta Prasad and other witnesses improved their statements and stated that instead of danda he gave Kulhadi blow on his head from the blunt side of Kulhadi. Trial court found that the complainant gave a false statement and there are material contradictions and discrepancies in the FIR and the statement given before the police. Though Dr. Vinay Pandey (PW 7) has found the injuries in the head from a hard and blunt object, but it was the defence that when he was taking green-mangoes from the tree, he fell down from the tree and received injuries. Considering the prosecution story as well as the Court statement of the witnesses the trial Court found that there is a material contradiction between the statements and found the prosecution case unnatural and held that the prosecution has failed to prove the allegations beyond reasonable doubt. Considering the prosecution story as well as the Court statement of the witnesses the trial Court found that there is a material contradiction between the statements and found the prosecution case unnatural and held that the prosecution has failed to prove the allegations beyond reasonable doubt. Even if it is considered that such a discrepancy, instead of disbelieving on the prosecution witnesses the Court has considered that the witnesses have made material improvement in their statements but we are not hearing the appeal against acquittal. We are hearing the revision of the complainant against acquittal. The scope of revision is very limited. The High Court cannot convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. This power can be exercised only in exceptional cases and it cannot be invoked merely because the lower Court has not appreciated the evidence properly. It is, however, open to the High court to set aside an order of acquittal and direct retrial if there is a case of non-recording of evidence or improper recording of inadmissible evidence and for interfering in revision there must be a gross error of law. In case of P. N. G. Raju v. B. P. Appadu, ( AIR 1975 SC 1854 : (1975 cri LJ 1646), it has been held as under : - "3. Section 439 (1) of the Code of Criminal procedure provides that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court may exercise any of appeal. This provision is made expressly subject to sub-section (4) of section 439 under which nothing contained in the section shall be deemed to authorise a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. Section 439 has been interpreted in several decisions of this court which have taken the view that the revisional jurisdiction, when invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, ought not to be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. (See satyendra Nath Dutta v. Ram Narain, (1975)3 SCC 398 : ( AIR 1975 SC 580 : 1975 Cri LJ 577); Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram (1974) 1 scr 130 : ( AIR 1973 SC 2145 : 1973 Cri LJ 1404); Changanti Kotaiah v. Goginoni venkateshwara Rao. (See satyendra Nath Dutta v. Ram Narain, (1975)3 SCC 398 : ( AIR 1975 SC 580 : 1975 Cri LJ 577); Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram (1974) 1 scr 130 : ( AIR 1973 SC 2145 : 1973 Cri LJ 1404); Changanti Kotaiah v. Goginoni venkateshwara Rao. (1973) 3 SCR 867 : ( AIR 1973 SC 1274 : 1973 Cri LJ 978 ). It is clear from these decisions that the revisional jurisdiction cannot be invoked merely because the lower Court has not appreciated the evidence properly. The High Court has in its judgment referred to the decisions of this court but in applying those decisions it has transgressed the limits of its revisional powers. " ( 5 ) SO far as the question of interference in the findings of facts, the High Court can exercise its power where there are very exceptional grounds for its interference in the interest of justice, or where there are such exceptional grounds, e. g. a misstatement of evidence by the lower Court or by misconstruction or misreading of documentary evidence or wrongly placing the onus of proof on the accused contrary to law of evidence or to prevent a gross and palpable failure of justice or where the lower Court have approached the case from a wrong point of view and the evidence or where the findings of fact are not based on evidence on record and are proved to be wrong from the record itself or where the judgment of this Court is palpably wrong. ( 6 ) WE have considered the legal position and the evidence on record. In fact while making the exaggerated statement from shifting the blow from danda to Kulhadi the trial Court has taken a view that the witnesses are telling a lie and their version is not believable and, therefore, their evidence cannot be accepted. If the trial Court has taken that view in the matter under the aforesaid principle, it cannot be held that this is a fit case where the High Court should interfere in this revision. ( 7 ) THUS, considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find any scope for interference in this revision. Accordingly, this revision fails and is hereby dismissed. Petition dismissed. .