Judgment Satish Kumar Mittal, J. 1. This revision petition has been filed by the State of Punjab for setting aside the order dated 15.4.2004 passed by the Additional District Judge, Chandigarh vide which the appeal filed by the petitioners against the judgment and decree dated 23.4.2002 passed by the Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Chandigarh was dismissed on the ground of limitation. 2. The petitioners filed the aforesaid appeal along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 60 days. The said appeal was filed by the petitioners against the judgment of the Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Chandigarh vide which the award of the Arbitrator was made rule of the Court and a decree was passed against the petitioners with interest. 3. In the application while explaining the delay in filing the appeal, it was contended that the application for obtaining certified copies of the impugned judgment and decree was moved on 24.4.2002 and the same was delivered to the District Attorney on 29.5.2002. According to those certified copies, the appeal was to be filed on 29.6.2002 whereas the appeal was filed on 29.8.2002. In the application, it has been stated that the aforesaid delay had occurred because the file was sent to the office of Chief Engineer, PWD Branch, Patiala on 13.6.2002 for taking the decision regarding filing of the appeal. Thereafter, the Chief Engineer sent the said file to the Superintending Engineer for taking necessary decision. It has been stated that at one point of time, a suggestion came for not filing the appeal, bus. subsequently it was decided that the appeal was to be filed. Then necessary requisition and sanction were sought. It has been stated in this application that the Director, Prosecution and Litigation, Punjab, had granted the sanction for filing the appeal on 26.8.2002, and immediately thereafter the appeal was filed on 29.8.2002. 4. The first Appellate Court framed the issue on the aforesaid application to the effect whether there are sufficient grounds to condone the delay in filing the appeal. After taking evidence on the said issue, the application filed by the petitioners for condonation of delay was dismissed while holding that sufficient reasons have not been established by the Slate in condoning the delay of 60 days in filing the appeal. Hence this revision. 5. After taking evidence on the said issue, the application filed by the petitioners for condonation of delay was dismissed while holding that sufficient reasons have not been established by the Slate in condoning the delay of 60 days in filing the appeal. Hence this revision. 5. I have heard the counsel for the parties and gone through the impugned order passed by the first Appellate Court. In my opinion, the first Appellate Court has adopted a hyper-technical approach on the matter whereas the petitioners have properly explained the delay of two months in filing the appeal. 6. In G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, the Hon ble Apex Court has held that the expression sufficient cause in Section 5 of the Limitation Act must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals should be condoned in the interest of where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is impute Me to the party seeking condonation of the delay. Again in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh, the Hon ble Apex Court has observed that power to condone the delay in approaching the Court has been conferred upon the courts to enable them to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. In this regard, liberal approach is to be preferred in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits, as dismissing of the appeal on technical grounds of limitation would not, in any way, advance the interests of justice. Similarly in another judgment in Vedabai v. Shantram Baburao Patil, the Hon ble Apex Court has observed that a distinction should be made between cases in which delay is inordinate, thus giving rise to question of prejudice to the other side and requiring a more cautious approach, and a case where delay is of-a few days only. Whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor, but in the latter case no such consideration may arise and such a case deserves a liberal approach. Whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor, but in the latter case no such consideration may arise and such a case deserves a liberal approach. In State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao, the Hon ble Apex Court has observed that while dealing with the application for condonation of delay, of the States in filing the appeal, the Court should take into consideration that the government decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on the table for considerable time causing delay, intentional or otherwise, is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression sufficient cause should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every days delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly time barred. In that case, considering these legal principles, the delay of 57 days in filing the State appeal was condoned. 7. In this case, there is a delay of two months in filing the appeal. The explanation in the instant case given by the petitioners for condoning the delay in filing the appeal, in my opinion, is reasonable and satisfactory. In no way it can be said that the delay caused in the instant case was due to gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioners had sufficiently explained the delay in filing the appeal. Thus, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 8. For the reasons above, this revision petition is allowed and the order dated 15.4.2004 passed by the Additional District Judge, Chandigarh, is set aside and delay of 60 days in filing the appeal is condoned. Thus, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 8. For the reasons above, this revision petition is allowed and the order dated 15.4.2004 passed by the Additional District Judge, Chandigarh, is set aside and delay of 60 days in filing the appeal is condoned. Keeping in view the fact that the matter has already been delayed, therefore, the Appellate Court is directed to decide the appeal on merits within a period of six months.