Judgment :- This writ petition is filed for a direction to the respondents to pay the, salary of the petitioner on par with the teacher who is paid his pay out of the Government aid. The case of the petitioner is that the petitioner was appointed as a teacher in the second respondent school which is Management aided school. Originally, the petitioner was appointed as a Typist on 2.12.1992 and thereafter she was appointed as a relieving teacher on 3.3.1993 on a consolidated pay of Rs. 800/- per month and a fresh appointment has been issued. During this entire period, she has been working as a relieving teacher in the second respondent school upto 30.4.1998. It is admitted that after 30.4.1998, the petitioner has not worked in the second respondent school. 2. According to the petitioner, it is because the third respondent became the Headmaster, she was unable to continue as a relieving teacher in the second respondent school. In any event, as it is submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the petitioner is claiming only her salary on par with the other teachers of the aided school for the period of service rendered by her. 3. The second respondent has filed a counter affidavit. The second respondent while admitting that the petitioner was appointed as a relieving teacher has stated that, the said appointment was purely based on the contract between the petitioner and the second respondent and a consolidated pay had been fixed and the appointment was never made in accordance with the Tamil Nadu (Recognized) Private Schools Regulation Act. Inasmuch as the petitioner was appointed in accordance with the Tamil Nadu Recognized Private Schools Regulation Act, there was no question of equating the petitioner's service to that of other regularly appointed teachers of aided schools. As the salary amounts have been paid by the second respondent without getting permission from the Government, the petitioner is not entitled for the relief claimed for. 4. Mr. K. Shanmughakani, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that even though the petitioner is called as a relieving teacher, which means that the petitioner relieving of some regularly appointed teacher and she was doing infact the regularly appointed teacher's work. 4. Mr. K. Shanmughakani, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that even though the petitioner is called as a relieving teacher, which means that the petitioner relieving of some regularly appointed teacher and she was doing infact the regularly appointed teacher's work. In view of the same, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, by applying equal pay for equal work, the petitioner is entitled for the salary on par with the other teachers employed on the aided pattern. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would rely upon the judgment of the Supreme Court K. Krishnamacharyulu and others v. Sri Venkateswara Hindu College of Engineering and another AIR 1998 SC 295 : 1997 (3) SCC 571 wherein the Supreme Court has held that the element of public interest requires to regulate conditions of service of those employees on par with Government employees. Such employees are entitled to parity of pay scales as per the executive instructions of the Government. Therefore, the appellants in that case were held to seek for enforcement of Article 226 of the Constitution of India under the concept of equal pay for equal work. 6. As stated in the affidavit filed by the petitioner in support of the writ petition, Mr. K. Shanmughakani, the learned counsel, has stated that though the petitioner was working as a relieving teacher, in fact, the petitioner was doing the actual work of a regular teacher and on certain occasions, the work was more than that of a regular teacher. It is further the case of the petitioner that inasmuch as the petitioner has been working within the sanctioned strength allocated by the Educational Authority to the second respondent school, the petitioner should be paid equal pay for equal work as that of the other equally placed teachers in the aided schools. 7. In such circumstances, instead of receiving a consolidated pay, the petitioner has statutory right to claim equal pay for equal work. 8. On the other hand, Mr. 7. In such circumstances, instead of receiving a consolidated pay, the petitioner has statutory right to claim equal pay for equal work. 8. On the other hand, Mr. S. Thangasivan, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent, by referring to Rule 15(3) of the Tamil Nadu Recognized Schools Regulation Rules, stated that the Act contemplates that in respect of a regular vacancy, fully qualified candidates should be appointed on a regular basis and in respect of temporary vacancy like leave vacancy, deputation for training or suspension of a teacher, a certified teacher or other person may be appointed for a specific period. It is also the contention of the counsel for the second respondent that in such cases, prior permission of the authority shall be obtained. In the present case, since the second respondent has not obtained any prior permission from the authority, such appointment can be treated only as a contract appointment by the authorities and not under the Tamil Nadu Private Schools Regulation Act, 1974. 9. Therefore, according to the learned counsel appearing for the second respondent, the petitioner should be treated as a contract employee and as per the terms of the contract, the petitioner was paid a salary of Rs. 800/-per month. Therefore, it is not open to the petitioner to claim any right of appointment as a regular teacher. 10. Learned counsel would also submit that since the appointment is covered by the contract and since the petitioner's appointment cannot be equated to that of a regular teacher, the question of equal pay for equal work does not-arise. Learned counsel has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mahendra L. Jain and others v. Indore Development Authority and others 2005 (3) SLJ 71. In that case, while deciding the question of equal pay for equal work, the Supreme Court has held that the appellants having been employed on daily wages, were not holding any post and the post was not sanctioned. Therefore, the petitioners were not entitled for equal pay for equal work. Learned counsel relied upon the said judgment to show that the appointments of the appellants therein were held, void ab initio, as being opposed to public policy and also violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 11. Heard both sides and also perused the records. Learned counsel relied upon the said judgment to show that the appointments of the appellants therein were held, void ab initio, as being opposed to public policy and also violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 11. Heard both sides and also perused the records. It is relevant to point out, at the outset, that the petitioner's appointment would show that she has been appointed as relieving teacher on a consolidated pay scale of Rs. 800/- per month. Therefore, on the face of it, the question is whether the said appointment is in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and whether the second respondent being a private school, the appointing authority is the school committee constituted as per the act has appointed her and the salary has been paid by the Government. In the present case, admittedly, the petitioner was not appointed by the school committee and the salary was not fixed or paid by the Government, even though the petitioner was appointed within the sanctioned strength of the vacancy in which she was appointed in respect of a vacancy of a permanent nature. Even though the second respondent would refer to Rule 15(3) of the Act to show that appointments in such leave vacancy can be made subject to prior permission of the educational authorities, a reference to the Rule 15 (3) would show that no such requirement or prior permission from the Educational Authority is required for the purpose of making such temporary appointment. Therefore, it cannot be stated that such temporary appointment shall be made only with the prior permission of the educational authorities. The said Rule 15(3) of the Act also refers to Form VII-B which contemplates an agreement between the management and the teacher in case of appointment in a temporary vacancy. In relation to the appointment of teachers who are regular appointments as per the Act, the agreement to be entered into between the management and the teacher is contained in Form VII-A. Form VII-A in respect of regularly appointed teachers relating to the payment of salary reads as follows: "That the said teacher shall be paid a sum of Rs……..monthly in the scale of…..with effect from……… and the other allow­ances granted by Government, from time to time. Such teacher shall be entitled to incre­ments indicated in the scale." However, the relevant clause in Form VIIB which is applicable to temporary teachers like that of the petitioner states as follows: "That the said teacher shall be paid a sum of Rs…………...monthly as pay and other allow­ances with effect from the date of his/her taking charge as such teacher." Therefore, there is a difference between a regularly appointed teacher And the teacher appointed in a leave vacancy, temporary vacancy, etc. Not only that, the regularly appointed teacher is entitled for increments and also the salary paid by the Government, but in respect of temporary vacancy appointed teachers, like that of the petitioner, it is only a consolidated amount as decided by the management and as agreed which is payable and it has nothing to do with the fixation of the salary by the Government. Therefore, on the face of it, it is clear that the petitioner cannot be equated to the regularly appointed teachers appointed in aided private schools. Therefore, the claim of equality of the petitioner with other teachers regularly appointed, does not arise. In the absence of the same, the question of equal pay for equal work is not applicable. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the second respondent has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mahendra L. Jain v Indore Development Authority (supra) wherein it is held that in case where an appointment has been made in a particular manner, but however that manner was not valid, there was no question of violation under the Constitution of India. The relevant portion of the judgment of the Supreme Court reads as follows: "The posts of Sub-Engineers in which the appellants were appointed, it is nobody's case, were sanctioned ones. Concededly, the respondent authority before making any appointment neither intimated the Employment Exchange about the existing vacancies, if any, nor issued any advertisement in relation thereto. Indisputably, the conditions precedent for appointment of the officers and servants of the authority, as contained in the Services Rules had not been complied with. Concededly, the respondent authority before making any appointment neither intimated the Employment Exchange about the existing vacancies, if any, nor issued any advertisement in relation thereto. Indisputably, the conditions precedent for appointment of the officers and servants of the authority, as contained in the Services Rules had not been complied with. The appointments of the appellants were, therefore, void ab initio being opposed to public policy as also violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.” While it is true that the counsel for the petitioner relied upon the Supreme Court judgment in K. Krishnamacharyulu v. Sri Venkateswara Hindu College of Engineering (supra), the Supreme Court in that judgment has decided the question of equal pay for equal work in the case of Government employees as compared to non-Government employees. 13. Therefore, in my considered view and in the facts and circumstances of the case, the above said judgment is of no help to the petitioner in the case on hand. In view of the said legal position and the factual situation, I am of the considered view that petitioner is not entitled for pay on par with that of other teachers of aided schools appointed, having regard to the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Private Schools Regulations Act. Hence, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.