JUDGMENT Dilip Kumar Sinha, J. 1. The present Cr. Appeal is directed against the order of conviction passed by the Sessions Judge, Godda in Sessions Trial No. 44/1994 on 9.5.1995 against the appellant for the charge under Section 376 I.P.C. and the appellant was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years. 2. The brief fact of the case as it stands narrated in the statement (Ext. 2) of the prosecutrix Bijli Devi (P.W.3) was that while she had been to the river side in the evening of 10.10.1993 watching her catties. Catties grazing, at about 6 p.m., the appellant co-villager all of a sudden caught hold her from behind and pushed with his knees on her back by holding her shoulders, as a result of which she fell down on the ground and raised objection. She further narrated that the appellant climbed on her body, gagged her mouth with the help of his towel and after removing her Sari & Petticoat committed rape on her When she resisted, it is alleged that, he slapped her. After ejaculation he threatened not to convey the incident to else otherwise she would be killed. She further narrated that after escape of the appellant she raised alarm but there was none in the Bahiyar (field) to listen her. She returned back to her matrimonial home and narrated the occurrence to her mother-in-law, co-sister, Nanad and to her husband who came later on in the evening, so she could not go to the police station on the same evening. She further narrated that when her husband approached the appellant to enquire about, he was abused by him. She sustained pain in different organs of her body on account of scuffle and also sustained simple injury with the broken bangle. The police on her statement registered Patthargama PS. Case No. 112 of 1993 and after investigation submitted charge-sheet for the offence under Section 376 I.P.C. The charge against the appellant accordingly was framed under Section 376 I.P.C. to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 3. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the occurrence as alleged took place on 10.10.1993 but the statement of the prosecutrix Bijli Devi was recorded at the police station on 11.10.1993 at about 11 a.m. and inordinate delay in lodging the F.I.R. was not explained. 3. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the occurrence as alleged took place on 10.10.1993 but the statement of the prosecutrix Bijli Devi was recorded at the police station on 11.10.1993 at about 11 a.m. and inordinate delay in lodging the F.I.R. was not explained. An inference can be drawn that the case was lodged at the police station after due deliberation and consultation with malice intention against the appellant and on this score alone the conviction of the appellant is not sustainable. 4. The learned Counsel relied on the decision. The Apex Court in Rajeevan v. State of Kerala followed the principle as laid down by the Supreme Court in Thulia Kali v. The State of Tamil Nadu reported in 1972 CriLJ 1296 wherein it was held, Delay in lodging the first information report quite often results in embellishment which is a creature of afterthought. On account of delay, the report not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, danger creeps in of the introduction of coloured version, exaggerated account or concocted story as a result of deliberation and consultation. It is, therefore, essential that the delay in lodging of the first information report should be satisfactorily explained. 5. In the instant case as already stated the occurrence as alleged took place on 10.10.1993 much after 4 p.m. as the prosecutrix narrated that she had proceeded from her home with catties at about 4 p.m. towards the river where she got her catties to drink water and thereafter she moved her catties on the river bank and she started keeping watch on the catties but in the meantime, it is alleged that the appellant suddenly appeared from behind and ravished her. Her husband returned from Dumaria Hat at about 7 p.m. to whom she narrated the occurrence and prior to that she had already disclosed the incident to her in- laws. She further explained that her husband then went to the appellant to enquire but he was abused there. Her husband returned from Dumaria Hat at about 7 p.m. to whom she narrated the occurrence and prior to that she had already disclosed the incident to her in- laws. She further explained that her husband then went to the appellant to enquire but he was abused there. The prosecutrix narrated the account of the delay in lodging the F.I.R. at Patthergama Police Station which was at the distance of 4 k.m. from her village home and the F.I.R. was lodged at about 11 a.m. The prosecutrix and her husband have explained the cause of delay in their deposition before the trial court and I find that the explanation of the delay is without embellishment and spontaneity has not been broken. Therefore, it cannot be said that she lodged the case against the appellant after due deliberation and consultation. 6. Advancing his argument learned Counsel submitted that the prosecutrix Bijli Devi in her statement before the police had narrated that there was none there to listen her alarm, However, her father-in-law P.W. 1 Chamru Yadav in his cross-examination before the trial court admitted that the villagers returned with their catties while Bijli Devi was returning but she did not convey the occurrence to any one. 7. From careful perusal of the statement of P.W. 1 under cross-examination I find that his daughter-in-law (prosecutrix) had been to the field with the cattle at about 8-10 a.m. and the catties returned at the time of sunset. The villagers also returned with their catties. The witnesses nowhere narrated before the trial court that his daughter-in-law returned to her village home with the villagers and therefore, points raised is nothing but an error of record which is not sustainable. 8. Learned Counsel pointed out that Bijli Devi was examined by Dr. Lilly Singh (P.W. 6) but her finding that the possibility of rape on Bijli Devi could not be ruled out is based upon speculation as she has admitted in paragraph No. 8 under cross-examination. Her private part was not examined by the said witness so as to ascertain as to whether rape was committed on her or not. I find from the record of the trial court that Dr. Lilly Singh (P.W. 6) had examined Bijli Devi on 12.10.1993 at about 9 a.m. and she found the following injuries on her person: (i) Inverted tringular bruise with' scab formation on left cheek. I find from the record of the trial court that Dr. Lilly Singh (P.W. 6) had examined Bijli Devi on 12.10.1993 at about 9 a.m. and she found the following injuries on her person: (i) Inverted tringular bruise with' scab formation on left cheek. (ii) Circular redish bluish bruise on chin. (iii) Circular bruise on left forearm, (iv) Several faint lenear scratches on both scapular region with scab formation. (v) Complain of pain in lower abdomen. P.W. 6 Dr. Lilly Singh arrived at the conclusion on the basis of such injuries that the possibility of rape on Bijli Devi could not be ruled out. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that Bijli Devi was a married woman at the relevant time of alleged occurrence and she was having a child. She admitted having sex with her husband in the preceding night of her medical examination. The important thing which attracts my attention is that the injury report of the prosecutrix Bijli Devi (Ext. 1) bears the corresponding injury as per her statement before the police, first point in time. The torn Sari and Petticoat of the prosecutrix were seized by the police to which seizure list was prepared (Ext. 3) and the I.O. P.W 8 Rakesh Kumar Brahmchari having visited the place of occurrence after institution of the case found the pointed land, alleged to be the place of occurrence containing dragging mark. On the objective finding he admitted that no broken bangle was found from the place of occurrence. The place of occurrence was situated at the distance of about 1/2 k.m. from the village of the prosecutrix towards south. 9. The prosecutrix Bijli Devi (P.W. 3) has categorically narrated the occurrence in the trial court supporting her previous statement before the police and she identified the accused/appellant in the dock that none other than the appellant committed rape on her. She admitted, under cross-examination that the appellant Gunadhar Yadav was the son of the distantly related cousin sister of her husband and in that manner the appellant was her nephew (Bhanja) from the point of view of the relation which exists in the village. Her statement was recorded as also under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and in that statement she consistently narrated the occurrence that the appellant ravished her by gagging her mouth with cloths. 10. Her statement was recorded as also under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and in that statement she consistently narrated the occurrence that the appellant ravished her by gagging her mouth with cloths. 10. I further find that P.W. 1 Chamru Yadav and P.W. 2 Bhim Yadav (husband) have categorically supported the version of the prosecutrix having derived information from her. P.W. 4 Baidhnath Yadav, P.W. 5 Ramcharitar Yadav and P.W. 7 Chanchali Devi were tendered on behalf of the prosecution but nothing material could be obtained in their cross-examination by the defence to demolish the prosecution case. However, the Investigating Officer P.W.8 Rakesh Kumar Brahmchari corroborated that P.W. 7 Chanchali Devi had claimed having seen the appellant running away from the place of occurrence but she did not stick to her earlier version in the trial court. 11. From the facts emerged from the statements of the prosecution witnesses, referred to hereinabove, I come to conclusion that the learned Sessions Judge, Godda has rightly convicted the appellant for the charge under Section 376 I.P.C. The evidence of the prosecutrix before the trial court is consistent from the very beginning as recorded by the police and recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. which inspire confidence and there is no reason to disbelieve her such versions. She sustained certain injuries in course of commission of rape and I find corresponding injuries in her injury report (Ext. 1). The judgment passed by the Sessions Judge, Godda inflicting conviction of the appellant for the charge under Section 376 is well discussed, based upon reasoning and I do not find any ground to interfere therein. 12. As regards the sentence awarded to the appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years the learned Counsel argued for its modification on the ground that the occurrence as alleged took place on 10.10.93 some 13 years ago and the judgment was delivered in the month of May, 1995. In this manner the appeal before this Court remained pending for more than 10 years and at the relevant time of judgment the age of the appellant was assessed about 25 years. The appellant was in his quite young age and by that time a male child was born to him. His young wife suffered the agony and pain of severance from Her husband for no fault of her. The appellant was in his quite young age and by that time a male child was born to him. His young wife suffered the agony and pain of severance from Her husband for no fault of her. No previous conviction of the appellant was reported and it would be evident that he came from a very poor socio economic background. The learned Counsel submitted that the sentence awarded to him needs modification for the period of 18 months already spent in the judicial custody during his trial. Taking the considered view on the point of modification of sentence to the appellant, though I hold that the sentence for the period already undergone by the appellant would not be an adequate sentence proportionate to the gravity of his conviction under Section 376 I.P.C. But having been satisfied with the grounds shown by the learned Counsel, 5(five) years rigorous imprisonment under the facts and circumstances to the appellant would meet the ends of justice. 13. With aforesaid modification in sentence affirming and upholding the conviction of the appellant Gunadhar Yadav under Section 376 I.P.C, this Criminal Appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.