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2006 DIGILAW 1235 (PAT)

Laxmi Devi v. Amarnath Dubey

2006-12-12

BARIN GHOSH, MADHAVENDRA SARAN

body2006
Judgment Barin Ghosh, J. 1. The husband of the appellant presented a petition for divorce on 11th March, 1987. In the petition, divorce was sought on three grounds, namely, adultery, cruelty and desertion. After service of summons, appellant did not enter appearance. The suit was accordingly fixed fa ex parte hearing. At that stage, appellant appeared and applied for recalling of the order directing ex parte hearing. At the instance of the appellant, the order fa ex parte hearing was recalled and thereupon appellant filed a written statement denying the material allegations contained in the plaint. Subsequent thereto it does not appear that the appellant contested the suit. The suit was decreed ultimately ex parte. 2. The appellant did not apply for setting aside of the ex parte decree instead preferred a First Appeal. The First Appeal was heard ex parte when no one appeared on behalf of the husband respondent. A learned Single Judge of this Court while dealing with the First Appeal felt that the adultery by the appellant had been condoned by the respondent. The learned Judge, however, felt that there is nothing to show that either cruelty or desertion had been condoned. Accordingly, the learned Judge refused to interfere with the judgment and decree of the trial court. 3. In the present Letters Patent Appeal, the learned counsel appearing in support of the appeal submitted that inasmuch as adultery was condoned, there was no available ground upon which a decree for divorce could be sustained. It was submitted that according to the own showing of the respondent husband, the appellant allegedly deserted on 17th December, 1986 whereas the petition for divorce was presented on 11th March, 1987, and accordingly there was no continuous desertion for two years immediately before presentation of the application for divorce and, as such, the ground of desertion was not available for obtaining a decree for divorce. 4. It was also contended that the one and the only instance of cruelty was adoption of violent attitude followed by assault when the respondent protested going of the appellant with Md. Akhtar to cinema before the couple had shifted their residence to Mohalla Chandbad, and accordingly that incident of cruelty also stands condoned. 5. In the plaint it was contended by the respondent that in March, 1982 the couple lived only for a week together and thereupon she went back to her fathers place. Akhtar to cinema before the couple had shifted their residence to Mohalla Chandbad, and accordingly that incident of cruelty also stands condoned. 5. In the plaint it was contended by the respondent that in March, 1982 the couple lived only for a week together and thereupon she went back to her fathers place. It was contended that the appellant came back in November, 1983 when she was pregnant. It was stated that such adultery was concealed in order to save family prestige. It was stated that the couple then started living at Hajipur in a rented house at Mohalla Bagmali. It was also stated that at the outer verandah of the same house, Md. Akhtar had a tailoring shop. It was stated that the appellant developed illicit relationship with Md. Akhtar and both of them were found in compromising position on several occasions. It was contended that at the request of the respondent, appellant assured that she would correct herself but despite such assurance she eloped with Md. Akhtar and remained with him for three days. It was stated that such action on the part of the appellant was also condoned but despite such condonation she continued to go to cinemas with Md. Akhtar. It was stated that at this stage on protest she became violent and thereupon assaulted the respondent. It was stated that the respondent at this stage shifted his residence to Mohalla Chandbad in the month of November, 1986 where, once again, she invited Md. Akhtar, who used to visit her there and she could not give up her bad habits and ultimately she left the house with her son and never came back. 6. In the evidence, the husband respondent repeated what he had stated in the petition, which was corroborated by other witnesses. He, however, contended that while leaving for the house of her parents, appellant was accompanied by Md. Akhtar. 7. The question iscan it be said that the adultery with Md. Akhtar was condoned? 8. It is true that the first adultery which, according to the case of the respondent, brought in a male child was completely condoned. It is also true that adultery with Md. Akhtar. 7. The question iscan it be said that the adultery with Md. Akhtar was condoned? 8. It is true that the first adultery which, according to the case of the respondent, brought in a male child was completely condoned. It is also true that adultery with Md. Akhtar during the time of stay of the couple at Mohalla Bagmali was also condoned, but neither the pleadings nor the evidence on record show that adultery committed while the couple was staying in Mohalla Chandbad was condoned. In fact, the case as was made out, was that the first adultery which brought in a male child was totally forgotten. The couple, thereafter, decided to reside at Mohalla Bagmali but when unfortunately the appellant developed some relationship with Md. Akhtar, a tailor, who was occupying the outer verandah of the same house where the couple was staying. In order to get rid of Md. Akhtar, the respondent shifted his residence to Mohalla Chandbad but his effort went in vain for the appellant opened the doors for Md. Akhtar even at Mohalla Chandbad. Therefore, we are of the view that the adultery that was committed by the appellant while the couple was residing in Mohalla Chandbad gave rise to institution of the suit for divorce, and this adultery, as would be evidenced from the records, cannot be said to have been condoned by the respondent. 9. It is true that the ground for desertion was not available, but if the story as made out and sought to be proved is correct, a clear case of mental cruelty had been made out. At the same time, it is also true that such cruelty upto the stage of shifting the residence to Mohalla Chandbad had been condoned, but despite such shifting, the manner in which the appellant started behaving, gave rise to such mental cruelty which prompted institution of the suit for divorce, and that appears to have not been condoned by the respondent. 10. In those circumstances, for the reasons as above, we would not interfere with the judgment and order under appeal in this Letters Patent Appeal. The appeal accordingly fails and the same is dismissed.