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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2006 DIGILAW 1247 (MP)

Rakesh Yadav v. State of M. P.

2006-11-07

J.K.MAHESHWARI

body2006
ORDER : J.K. Maheskwari, J. This order shall govern the disposal of the following cases: 1. W.P.S 3098/2004 Balkrishna Sharma vs. The State of M.P. 2. W.P.S 3163/2004 Smt. Sandhya and ors. vs. The State of M.P. 3. W.P. 945/2005(S) Babulal Bhatnagar vs. The State of M.P., 4. W.P. 1189/2005(S) Gopal Malviya vs. The State of M.P., 5. W.P. 1502/2005(S) Nayadar Yadav vs. The State of M.P., 6. W.P. 1504/2005(S) Omprakash vs. The State of M.P., 7. W.P. 8945/2003 K.K. Joshi vs. The State of M.P., 8. W.P. 2141/2005(S) Omprakash vs. Municipal Corpn. Ratlam, 9. W.P. 2146/2005(S) Amitkumar Bajpai vs. The State of M.P., 10. W.P. 1534/2003 Jairam vs. The State of M.P., 11. W.P. 4871/2003 R.K. Shivde vs. The State of M.P., 12. W.P. 3515/2005(S) Rajendra and Ors. vs. Krishi Upaj Mandi, 13. W.P. 3572/2005(S) Devilal vs. The State of M.P. 14. W.P. 3760/2005(S) Santoshkumar vs. The State of M.P., 15. W.P. 9107/2003 Shankar Lal vs. The State of M.P., 16. W.P. 6166/2006(S) Radheshyam vs. The State of M.P., 17. W.P. 5336/2006(S) Nandlal vs. State of M.P., 18. W.P. 76/2006(S) Udai Bhanu vs. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, 19. W.P. 77/2006(S) Hari Singh vs. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti 20. W.P. 79/2006(S) Deepak Kumar vs. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, 21. W.P. 171/2006(S) Man Singh and ors. vs. The State of M.P., 22. W.P. 577/2006(S) Sanjay Kumar Soni vs. The State of M.P., 23. W.P. 660/2006(S) Mohd. Shafique Khan vs. The State of M.P., 24. W.P. 687/2006(S) Rajendra Singh vs. The State of M.P., 25. W.P. 878/2006(S) Rup Singh Jamra vs. The State of M.P., 26. W.P. 892/2006(S) Hukumchand Salve vs. The State of M.P., 27. W.P. 958/2006(S) Bisan vs. The State of M.P., 28. W.P. 960/2006(S) Shankar vs. The State of M.P., 29. W.P. 1107/2006(S) Madhusudan Jadhav vs. The State of M.P., 30. W.P. 1219/2006(S) Rajesh Rao Pawar vs. The State of M.P., 31. W.P. 4441/2006(S) Ramesh vs. State of M.P., 32. W.P. 1254/2006(S) Vinod Pandya vs. The State of M.P., 33. W.P. 1358/2006(S) Hiralal vs. The State of M.P., 34. W.P. 1369/2006(S) Mukesh Kumar vs. Municipal Corpn., 35. W.P. 4409/2006(S) Ashok Kumar vs. The State of M.P., 36. W.P. 1494/2006 Tulsiram vs. The State of M.P., 37. W.P. 1597/2006(S) Miss Hemlata Saxena vs. MNS. Cor. Ratlam, 38. W.P. 1598/2006(S) Lakhan Singh vs. The State of M.P., 39. W.P. 1747/2006(S) Govind Prasad vs. The State of M.P., 40. W.P. 1369/2006(S) Mukesh Kumar vs. Municipal Corpn., 35. W.P. 4409/2006(S) Ashok Kumar vs. The State of M.P., 36. W.P. 1494/2006 Tulsiram vs. The State of M.P., 37. W.P. 1597/2006(S) Miss Hemlata Saxena vs. MNS. Cor. Ratlam, 38. W.P. 1598/2006(S) Lakhan Singh vs. The State of M.P., 39. W.P. 1747/2006(S) Govind Prasad vs. The State of M.P., 40. W.P. 1748/2006(S) Ramsingh vs. The State of M.P., 41. W.P. 1758/2006(S) Smt. Keshri Bai vs. The State of M.P., 42. W.P. 1759/2006(S) Amarnath vs. The State of M.P., 43. W.P. 1798/2006(S) Smt. Geeta Bai vs. The State of M.P., 44. W.P. 1889/2006(S) Parmanand Parmar vs. The State of M.P., 45. W.P. 4343/2006(S) Sayyad Zakir Hussain vs. State of M.P., 46. W.P. 1959/2006(S) Omprakash Trivedi vs. The State of M.P., 47. W.P. 2251/2006(S) Nirmala Bai vs. Indore Municipal Corporation, 48. W.P. 2287/2006(S) Irshad Ali vs. The State of M.P., 49. W.P. 2526/2006(S) Basant Kumar Dadore vs. State of M.P., 50. W.P. 3008/2006(S) Ashok Kushwaha vs. The State of M.P., 51. W.P. 3260/2006(S) Mata Prasad Sharma vs. The State of M.P., 52. W.P. 3394/2006(S) Veersingh vs. State of M.P., 53. W.P. 3477/2006(S) Yogendra vs. Municipal Corporation, Ratlam. 2. In all these writ petitions Petitioners have made a prayer to consider their cases for regularisation and to grant relief of regularisation from due date and payment of the minimum salary in the regular scale of pay, with effect from their initial date of appointment. In some of the cases prayer is made to quash the orders of rejection of their representations, passed by the Respondents despite the Court order. In some of the cases regularisation have been sought for in other department i.e. Education Department. In some of the cases the orders of cancellation of regularisation has been challenged asking relief of the quashment of such orders. 3. In all these writ petitions the common questions of law with respect to Petitioners' consideration for regularisation, or to cancel such regularisation, or to extend the benefit of the minimum of the pay-in the scale of the corresponding post on which they ate working is involved. The relief claimed is also the similar. However, for the sake of convenience the facts of W.P. No. 3603/2005(S) is being referred in this order. 4. Petitioners were engaged as daily rated employees in the Culture Department of the State of Madhya Pradesh. Their engagement were, with effect from November/December, 1988. The relief claimed is also the similar. However, for the sake of convenience the facts of W.P. No. 3603/2005(S) is being referred in this order. 4. Petitioners were engaged as daily rated employees in the Culture Department of the State of Madhya Pradesh. Their engagement were, with effect from November/December, 1988. The date of their initial appointment have been specified in the document Annexure P/1. Petitioners have submitted various representations for their regularisation on the respective posts on which they are working. Thereon the letter Annexure P/2 dated 2-4-1996 was communicated to them, indicating that a proposal of creation of 530 posts of Care Takers are pending consideration with the Government. On receiving the sanction of the Government action for regularisation may be taken up. The Respondent No. 3 has also assured for such regularisation to the Chairman, Laghu Vetan Bhogi Karmachari Sangh, Madhya Pradesh, Indore vide Annexure P/3. Thereafter a letter dated 23-3-1996 Annexure P/4 was issued to the Director of the Archeology Department, Bhopal making a request of the regularisation of such employees, but no fruitful result was come out. Again as per Annexure P/5 dated 30-4-1998 a recommendation was made by the Dy. Director of the Archeology Department, Indore to the Govt. praying for Sanction of the posts, but no order has been passed. 5. It is further a case of the Petitioners that their cases ought to have been considered in the light of the policy of regularisation dated 9-1-1990 and 20-6-1996 Annexures P/6 and P/7 issued by the Govt. Petitioners had filed their cases before this Court, whereby in W.P. No. 6082/2003 vide order dated 18-10-2004, direction was issued to consider their cases for regularisation and to decide their representations. Pursuance to such direction the order Annexure P/10 dated 1-6-2005 has been passed communicating them that their regularisation is not permissible. In the present case prayer has also been made to quash the order of rejection of the representation, with the further direction to regularise them or to pay minimum of the pay of the regular scale to the post on which they are working. 6. In the present case prayer has also been made to quash the order of rejection of the representation, with the further direction to regularise them or to pay minimum of the pay of the regular scale to the post on which they are working. 6. In all the petitions the argument of Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners is that because the Government has issued a policy on 9-1-1990 to regularise the daily wages employees who were engaged prior to 31-12-1988, wherein instructions were issued by the Government that, services of the daily wages employees, are required to be regularised by the Govt. However, in the light of the policy dated 9-1-1990 Petitioners, may be regularised, because they were appointed prior to 31-12-1988. It is further a argument of the Petitioners that they have been discriminated because several junior persons have already been regularised by the Respondents, therefore, action of their non-regularisation is in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 7. It is further a case of the Petitioners that, in the light of the policy dated 9-1-1990 and taking into consideration the period of service rendered by them, they deserve consideration for regularisation. However, it is urged that in the light of the policy of the Government as well as on account of discrimination, meted out with them, right accrues, for their regularisation, with effect from the date on which services of juniors have been regularised. In counter to the stand of the Government that the policy of the Government dated 9-1-1990 has been withdrawn by the subsequent circular dated 12-4-2005. It is urged that withdrawal of the aforesaid circular cannot come to rescue because the incumbent juniors have been regularized long back without considering their cases. 8. The another limb of the argument of the Petitioners is that because of all the Petitioners have been appointed prior to 31-12-1988, which is the cutoff date fixed by the Government in the matter of their regularisation, however, in any case if the regularisation is not possible then they deserve consideration for grant of minimum of the pay of the scale to the post on which they are working. In support of their argument they have referred the judgment of the Supreme Court, wherein the benefit of the minimum of the scale of pay has been directed to such employees by applying the principle of equal pay for equal work. 9. The Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners have placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others Vs. Umadevi and Others, AIR 2006 SC 1806 Reliance has also been placed on the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Mineral Exploration Corporation Employees' Union Vs. Mineral Exploration Corporation Limited and Another, (2006) 111 FLR 409 and the State of Punjab and Others Vs. Devinder Singh and Others, (1998) 9 SCC 595 , State of Punjab vs. Talwinder Singh and others, (2003) 11 SCC 776. Relying on the aforesaid judgments, it is urged that in the case of Umadevi (supra) Hon'ble the Supreme Court in para 53 has held that if an employee is engaged on a sanctioned post, may be by irregular appointment, and continued for ten or more years without any interruption then, in such a case, one time measure should be applied by the Union of India, State Governments and the instrumentalities of the State to consider their cases of regularisation. It is further held that the grant of minimum of pay in the scale applicable to the corresponding cadres of the employees should be allowed to such employees. It is further urged that in the case of Mineral Exploration Corporation Employees Union (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has issued the direction relying on the observations as made by the Supreme Court in para 53 of Umadevi's case (supra). Therefore, a direction ought to have been issued to the Government in the light of the aforesaid judgment. At last Learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners have also placed reliance on a judgment rendered by the Main Seat of this Court in W.P. No. 3838/2005(S), Daddi Lal Yadav vs. State of M.P. and others, delivered on 3-8-2006. 10. Therefore, a direction ought to have been issued to the Government in the light of the aforesaid judgment. At last Learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners have also placed reliance on a judgment rendered by the Main Seat of this Court in W.P. No. 3838/2005(S), Daddi Lal Yadav vs. State of M.P. and others, delivered on 3-8-2006. 10. On the other hand learned Additional Advocate General appears on behalf of the State Government submits that a direction as issued by the Main Seat in the case of Daddilal Yadav (supra) squarely covers the controversy involved in the present case and all these cases can be disposed of in the light of the directions as issued by the Main Seat. The Main Seat of this Court has issued the following direction in para 9 of the order: (1) the Petitioners who are appointed before 31-12-1988 or after 13-12-1988 are not entitled for regularization of their services; (2) the Petitioner who have been appointed prior to 31-12-1988 are to be given the salary at the lowest grade of the employees of their cadre in the concerned department within six months; (3) the Petitioners shall be given age relaxation for the period they have rendered the services as and when the vacancies are advertised; (4) the Respondents also to consider whether the benefit of additional marks to be given to the Petitioners for the experience which they possess while filling up of the vacancies as per the rules; (5) the Petitioners, as prayed, are free to approach the labour Court for the purpose of classification in case they are covered under the relevant industrial Law as may be applicable; (6) the Respondents to initiate process for regular recruitment as directed in the case of Umadevi (supra); (7) the Respondents to consider the direction issued by the Apex Court in paragraph 44 of the decision in Umadevi (supra). 11. On the second limb of argument, learned Additional Advocate General has placed reliance on a judgment of Supreme Court delivered by a Bench consisting of two Judges in the case of State of M.P. vs. Yogesh Chandra Dubey and others, reported in JT 2006(8) SC 595. On the basis of the aforesaid judgments it is urged that a direction for the minimum of the scale of pay, on which, Petitioners are working on daily wage cannot be issued. On the basis of the aforesaid judgments it is urged that a direction for the minimum of the scale of pay, on which, Petitioners are working on daily wage cannot be issued. It is further said that although in the case of Umadevi (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has directed to grant the minimum of the pay in a scale corresponding to the post on which the Petitioners are working but in the subsequent judgment of State of M.P. vs. Yogesh Chandra Dubey, it is held that such employees are not entitled for grant of benefit of minimum pay of scale. However, it is urged that in the light of the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Yogesh Chandra Dubey (supra) direction for grant of benefit of minimum of pay scale, cannot be issued. 12. I have heard Learned Counsel appearing for parties and perused the record. On perusal of the record, it is apparent that Petitioners have filed all these petitions claiming the relief of regularisation or to pay minimum of the pay in corresponding scale on the post on which they are working. In some of the cases other ancillary reliefs are sought for like quashing of the orders of cancellation of the regularisation because of non-compliance of principles of natural justice. In some of the cases prayer is made to regularise them because their appointments are on compassionate ground. In some of the cases the regularisation is sought from the back date though they have already been regularised, on the basis of the policy dated 9-1-1990 issued by the Government as well as on the strength of the plea of discrimination of regularisation of the incumbent juniors. It is further said that in some of the cases Petitioners are working on a sanctioned vacant post after following due procedure but on daily wages, therefore, in such cases a direction for their regularisation deserves to be issued. Per contra all those arguments have been refuted by the learned Additional Advocate General. The envil of all those arguments can be considered in the light of the Constitutional Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Umadevi (supra). The relevant extract of the said judgment from paras 12, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 43 and 53 are reproduced here-in-below: 13. The envil of all those arguments can be considered in the light of the Constitutional Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Umadevi (supra). The relevant extract of the said judgment from paras 12, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 43 and 53 are reproduced here-in-below: 13. In spite of this scheme, there may be occasions when the sovereign State or its instrumentalities will have to employ persons, in posts which are temporary, on daily wages, as additional hands or taking them in without following the required procedure, to discharge the duties in respect of the posts that are sanctioned and that are required to be filled in terms of the relevant procedure established by the Constitution or for work in temporary posts or projects that not needed permanently. This right of the Union or of the State Government cannot but be recognised and there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits such engaging of persons temporarily or on daily wages, to meet the needs of the situation. But the fact that such engagements are resorted to, cannot be used to defeat the very scheme of public employment. Nor can a Court say that the Union or the State Governments do not have the right to engage persons in various capacities for a duration or until the work in a particular project is completed. Once this right of the Government is recognised and the mandate of the constitutional requirement for public employment is respected, there cannot be much difficulty in coming to the conclusion that it is ordinarily not proper for the Courts whether acting under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Article 32 of the Constitution, to direct absorption in permanent employment of those who have been engaged without following a due process of selection as envisaged by the constitutional scheme. 14. While answering an objection to the locus standi of the writ Petitioners in challenging the repeated issue of an ordinance by the Governor of Bihar, the exalted position of rule of law in the scheme of things was emphasized. Chief Justice Bhagwati, speaking on behalf of the Constitution Bench in Dr D.C. Wadhwa and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others, AIR 1987 SC 579 stated: 15. Chief Justice Bhagwati, speaking on behalf of the Constitution Bench in Dr D.C. Wadhwa and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others, AIR 1987 SC 579 stated: 15. The rule of law constitutes the core of our Constitution of India and it is the essence of the rule of law that the exercise of the power by the State whether it be the Legislature or the Executive or any other authority should be within the constitutional limitations and if any practice is adopted by the Executive or any other authority should be within the constitutional limitations and if any practice is adopted by the Executive which is in flagrant and systematic violation of its constitutional limitations, Petitioner No. 1 as a member of the public would have sufficient interest to challenge such practice by filing a writ petition and it would be the constitutional duty of this Court to entertain the writ petition and adjudicate upon the validity of such practice. 16. Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a Court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularization, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. Merely because, an employee had continued under cover of an order of Court, which we have described as 'litigious employment' in the earlier part of the judgment, he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it to mould the relief in such a manner that ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an employee who is really not required. The Courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates. 17. The concept of 'equal pay for equal work' is different from the concept of conferring permanency on those who have been appointed on ad hoc basis, temporary basis, or based on no process of selection as envisaged by the Rules. 17. The concept of 'equal pay for equal work' is different from the concept of conferring permanency on those who have been appointed on ad hoc basis, temporary basis, or based on no process of selection as envisaged by the Rules. this Court has in various decisions applied the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' and has laid down the parameters for the application of that principle. The decisions are rested on the concept of equality enshrined in our Constitution in the light of the directive principles in that behalf. But the acceptance of that principle cannot lead to a position where the Court could direct that appointments made without following the due procedure established by law, be deemed permanent or issue directions to treat them as permanent. Doing so, would be negation of the principle of equality of opportunity. The power to make an order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before this Court, would not normally be used for giving the go-by to the procedure established by law in the matter of public employment. Take the situation arising in the cases before us from the State of Karnataka. Therein, after the Dharwad decision, the Government had issued repeated directions and mandatory orders that no temporary or ad hoc employment or engagement be given. Some of the authorities and departments had ignored those directions or defied those directions and had continued to give employment, specifically interdicted by the orders issued by the executive. Some of the appointing officers have even been punished for their defiance. It would not be just or proper to pass an order in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution or in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India permitting those persons engaged, to be absorbed or to be made permanent, based on their appointments or engagements. Complete justice would be justice according to law and though it would be open to this Court to mould the relief, this Court would not grant a relief which would amount to perpetuating an illegality. 18. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual, be regularized or made permanent. Complete justice would be justice according to law and though it would be open to this Court to mould the relief, this Court would not grant a relief which would amount to perpetuating an illegality. 18. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual, be regularized or made permanent. Courts are swayed by the fact that the concerned person has worked for some time and in some cases for a considerable length of time, it is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with eyes open. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain - not at arm's length - since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. If the Court were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the ground that the parties were not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the Court to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only mean that some people who at least get employment temporarily, contractually or casually, would not be getting even that employment when securing of such employment brings at least some succor to them. After all, innumerable citizens of our vast country are in search of employment and one is not compelled to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. In other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. In other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the procedure established, for making regular appointments to available posts in the services of the State. The argument that since one has been working for some time in the post, it will not be just to discontinue him, even though he was aware of the nature of the employment when he first took it up, is not one that would enable the jettisoning of the procedure established by law for public employment and would have to fail when tested on the touchstone of constutionality and equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 19. Learned senior counsel for some of the Respondents argue that on the basis of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the employees, especially of the Commercial Taxes Department, should be directed to be regularized since the decisions in Dharwad (supra), Piara Singh (supra), Jacob and Gujarat Agricultural University and the like, have given rise to an expectation in them that their services would also be regularized. The doctrine can be invoked if the decisions of the Administrative Authority affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either (i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there have been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker that they will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn (see Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions vs. Minister for the Civil Service, 1985 Appeal Cases 37(4), National Buildings Construction Corporation Vs. S. Raghunathan and Others, and Dr. (Mrs.) Chanchal Goyal Vs. State of Rajasthan, (1998) 6 AD 545. S. Raghunathan and Others, and Dr. (Mrs.) Chanchal Goyal Vs. State of Rajasthan, (1998) 6 AD 545. There is no case that any assurance was given by the Government or the concerned department while making the appointment on daily wages that the status conferred on him will not be withdrawn until some rational reason comes into existence for withdrawing it. The very engagement was against the constitutional scheme. Though, the Commissioner of the Commercial Taxes Department sought to get the appointments made permanent, there is no case that at the time of appointment any promise was held out. No such promise could also have been held out in view of the circulars and directives issued by the Government after the Dharwad decision. Though, there is a case that the State had made regularizations in the past of similarly situated employees, the fact remains that such regularizations were done only pursuant to judicial directions, either of the Administrative Tribunal or of the High Court and in some case by this Court. Moreover, the invocation of the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot enable the employees to claim that they must be made permanent or they must be regularized in the service though they had not been selected in terms of the rules for appointment. The fact that in certain cases the Court had directed regularization of the employees involved in those cases cannot be made use of to found a claim based on legitimate expectation. The argument if accepted would also run counter to the constitutional mandate. The argument in that behalf has therefore to be rejected. 20. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognized by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in concerned cases, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in concerned cases, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post. 21. It was then contended that the rights of the employees thus appointed, under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, are violated. It is stated that the State has treated the employees unfairly by employing them on less than minimum wages and extracting work from them for a pretty long period in comparison with those directly recruited who are getting more wages or salaries for doing similar work. The employees before us were engaged on daily wages in the concerned department on a wage that was made known to them. There is no case that the wage agreed upon was not being paid. Those who are working on daily wages formed a class by themselves, they cannot claim that they are discriminated as against those who have been regularly recruited on the basis of the relevant rules. No right can be founded on an employment on daily wages to claim that such employee should be treated on a par with a regularly recruited candidate, and made permanent in employment, even assuming that the principle could be invoked for claiming equal wages for equal work. There is no fundamental right in those who have been employed on daily wages or temporarily or on contractual basis, to claim that they have a right to be absorbed in service. As has been held by this Court, they cannot, be said to be holders of a post, since, a regular appointment could be made only be making appointments consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. As has been held by this Court, they cannot, be said to be holders of a post, since, a regular appointment could be made only be making appointments consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The right to be treated equally with the other employees employed on daily wages, cannot be extended to a claim for equal treatment with those who were regularly employed. That would be treating unequals as equals. It cannot also be relied on to claim a right to be absorbed in service even though they have never been selected in terms of the relevant recruitment rules. The arguments based on Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution are therefore overruled. 22. It is argued that in a country like India where there is so much poverty and unemployment and there is no equality of bargaining power, the action of the State in not making the employees permanent, would be violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. But the very argument indicates that there are so many waiting for employment and an equal opportunity for competing for employment and it is in that context that the Constitution as one of its basic features, has included Articles 14, 16 and 309 so as to ensure that public employment is given only in a fair and equitable manner by giving all those who are qualified, an opportunity to seek employment. In the guise of upholding rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, a set of persons cannot be preferred over a vast majority of people waiting for an opportunity to compete for State employment. The acceptance of the argument on behalf of the Respondents would really negate the rights of the others conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution, assuming that we are in a position to hold that the right to employment is also a right coming within the purview of Article 21 of the Constitution. The argument that Article 23 of the Constitution is breached because the employment on daily wages amounts to forced labour, cannot be accepted. After all, the employees accepted the employment at their own volition and with eyes open as to the nature of their employment. The Governments also revised the minimum wages payable from time to time in the light of all relevant circumstances. After all, the employees accepted the employment at their own volition and with eyes open as to the nature of their employment. The Governments also revised the minimum wages payable from time to time in the light of all relevant circumstances. It also appears to us that importing of these theories to defeat the basic requirement of public employment would defeat the constitutional scheme and the constitutional goal of equality. 23. Normally, what is sought for by such temporary employees when they approach the Court, is the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the employer, the State or its instrumentalities, to absorb them in permanent service or to allow them to continue. In this context, the question arises whether a mandamus could be issued in favour of such persons. At this juncture, it will be proper to refer to the decision of Constitution Bench of this Court in Dr. Rai Shivendra Bahadur vs. The Governing Body of the Nalanda College, (1962) Supp. 2 SCR 144. That case arose out of a refusal to promote the writ Petitioner therein as the Principal of a college. this Court held that in order that a mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that the statute impose a legal duty on the authority and the aggrieved party had a legal right under the statute or rule to enforce it. This classical position continues and a mandamus could not be issued in favour of the employees directing the Government to make them permanent since the employees cannot show that they have an enforceable legal right to be permanently absorbed or that the State has a legal duty to make them permanent. 53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V. Narayanappa (supra), R.N. Nanjundappa (supra), and B.N. Nagrajan (supra), and referred, to in paragraph 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of Courts or of tribunals. The question of regularization of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases above referred to and in the light of this judgment. The question of regularization of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases above referred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularized as a one time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of Courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that regularization, if any already made, but not sub judice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further by-passing of the constitutional requirement and regularizing or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme. 24. After the judgment of Umadevi (supra) and the findings recorded therein and reproduced hereinabove the Hon'ble Supreme Court have again reconsidered it in the subsequent judgment in the case of Minerals Exploration Corporation (supra) in para 24 and 25 and in a concluding paras 38 and 39 a direction for regularisation has been issued relying on para 53 and 12 of the judgment of Umadevi (supra). These paras are reproduced as under: 25. He further submitted that since the Constitution Bench has pronounced the judgment on 10-4-2006 there is no infirmity in the impugned judgment keeping in view the judgment of the Constitution Bench and hence these appeals are liable to be dismissed. 26. He also relied on para 12 of the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Umadevi's case. 12. In spite of this scheme... by the Constitutional scheme. 27. Placing strong reliance on the above paragraph, Mr. V.R. Reddy submitted that the Courts whether acting under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Article 32 of the Constitution, can (sic cannot) direct the absorption in permanent employment of those who have been engaged by the constitutional scheme, cannot at all be countenanced. 28. It shall be proper to regularise the services of the workmen who have worked for several years. 28. It shall be proper to regularise the services of the workmen who have worked for several years. However, the workmen in order to succeed will have to substantiate their claim as per the established principles of law. 29. We feel it just and proper to issue the following directions to the Tribunal which is directed to consider the following directions and pass appropriate orders after affording opportunities to both the parties: 30. The Tribunal is directed to again scrutinise all the records already placed by the Appellant Union and also the records placed by the management and discuss and deliberate with all the parties and ultimately arrive at a conclusion in regard to the genuineness and authenticity of each and every claimant for regularisation. This exercise shall be done within nine months from the date of receipt of this judgment. 31. Subject to the outcome of the fresh enquiry of the award, the Respondent Corporation should absorb them permanently and regularise their services, the persons to be so appointed being limited to the quantum of work which may become available to them on a perennial basis. 32. The Respondent Corporation may absorb on permanent basis only such of those workmen who have not completed the age of superannuation. 33. The Respondent Corporation is not required to absorb on permanent basis such of the workmen who are found medically unfit for such employment. 34. The absorption of the eligible workmen on a regular and permanent basis by the Corporation does not disable the Corporation from utilising their services for any other manual work for the Corporation upon its needs. 35. In the matter of absorption, the persons who have worked for longer period as contingent/ad hoc/temporary workmen shall be preferred to those who have to be in shorter period of work. 36. The workman should have worked for more than 240 days in a year. The conduct and behaviour of the workman should be good. 37. We, therefore, direct the Tribunal to decide the claim of the workmen of the Union strictly in accordance with and in compliance with all the directions given in the judgment by the Constitution Bench in Secy., State of Karnataka vs. Umadevi and in particular, paras 53 and 12 relied on by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Union. 37. We, therefore, direct the Tribunal to decide the claim of the workmen of the Union strictly in accordance with and in compliance with all the directions given in the judgment by the Constitution Bench in Secy., State of Karnataka vs. Umadevi and in particular, paras 53 and 12 relied on by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Union. The Tribunal is directed to dispose of the matter afresh within 9 months from the date of receipt of this judgment without being influenced by any of the observations made by us in this judgment. Both the parties are at liberty to submit and furnish the details in regard to the names of the workmen, nature of the work, pay scales and the wages drawn by them from time to time and the transfers of the workmen made from time to time, from place to place and other necessary and requisite details. The above details shall be submitted within two months from the date of the receipt of this judgment before the Tribunal. 13. In view of the directions as issued by the Supreme Court in both these judgments, laying down law, that it is not open to the executive or to the Court or to direct regularisation on the basis of the policy issued by the Government. The plea of discrimination and violation of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India to claim regularisation has also been rejected on the pretext that the claim of the dally wages employees stand on different footing, therefore, the question of discrimination does not arise. But in para 53 a twinkling light has been left to the irregularly appointed employees to consider the cases for their regularisation by the Union of India, State Governments and instrumentalities of the State; only in those cases in which the employees who were appointed by way of irregular appointment (not illegal) on a vacant sanctioned post having qualification and eligibility and worked continuously for more than ten years, without intervention of the orders of the Court. However, the directions as made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Umadevi (supra) in para 53 for consideration of regularisation to only such category is permissible. 38. However, the directions as made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Umadevi (supra) in para 53 for consideration of regularisation to only such category is permissible. 38. Now coming to the rival submissions with respect to the payment of minimum salary at the lowest rate or minimum of the pay scale of the corresponding scale of the post on which regular employees are working the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Umadevi (supra) in para 46 are reproduced here-in-below: 46. In cases relating to service in the commercial taxes department, the High Court has directed that those engaged on daily wages, be paid wages equal to the salary and allowances that are being paid to the regular employees of their cadre in Government service, with effect from the dates from which they were respectively appointed. The objection taken was to the direction for payment from the dates of engagement. We find that the High Court had clearly gone wrong in directing that these employees be paid salary equal to the salary and allowances that are being paid to the regular employees of their cadre in government service, with effect from the dates from which they were respectively engaged or appointed. It was not open to the High Court to impose such an obligation on the State when the very question before the High Court in the case was whether these employees were entitled to have equal pay for equal work so called and were entitled to any other benefit. They had also been engaged in the teeth of directions not to do so. We are, therefore, of the view that, at best, the Division Bench of the High Court should have directed the wages equal to the salary that are being paid to regular employees be paid to those, daily wage employees with effect from the date of its judgment. Hence, that part of the direction of the Division Bench is modified and it is directed that these daily wage earners be paid wages equal to the salary at the lowest grade of employees of their cadre in the Commercial Taxes Department in Government service, from the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court. Since, they are only daily wage earners, there would be no question of other allowances being paid to them. Since, they are only daily wage earners, there would be no question of other allowances being paid to them. In view of our conclusion, that Courts are not expected to issue directions for making such persons permanent in service, we set aside that part of the direction of the High Court directing the Government to consider their cases for regularization. We also notice that the High Court has not adverted to the aspect as to whether it was regularization or it was giving permanency that was being directed by the High Court. In such a situation, the direction in that regard will stand deleted and the appeals filed by the State would stand allowed to that extent. If sanctioned posts are vacant (they are said to be vacant) the State will take immediate steps for filling those posts by a regular process of selection. But when regular recruitment is undertaken, the Respondents in C.A. Nos. 3595-3612 and those in the Commercial Taxes Department similarly situated, will be allowed to compete, waiving the age restriction imposed for the recruitment and giving some weightage for their having been engaged for work in the Department for a significant period of time. That would be the extent of the exercise of power by this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution to do justice to them. 39. Earlier also Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab and Others Vs. Devinder Singh and Others, (1998) 9 SCC 595 has laid down as under: 3. The short question is whether the High Court was justified in directing the Appellant-State to pay the Respondents-Petitioners before the High Court the salary and allowances as are being paid to the regular employees holding similar posts and whether the Respondents could be held entitled to the payment of difference of the pay scale for the period of last three years from the date of filing of the writ petition. It is not a dispute and cannot be disputed that the Respondents are NMR daily wage Ledger-Keepers/Ledger Clerks. Their contention before the High Court was that they were doing the same work as regular Ledger Clerks who are recruited by the employer. Consequently, they must be paid equal pay on the ground of equal work. It is not a dispute and cannot be disputed that the Respondents are NMR daily wage Ledger-Keepers/Ledger Clerks. Their contention before the High Court was that they were doing the same work as regular Ledger Clerks who are recruited by the employer. Consequently, they must be paid equal pay on the ground of equal work. In our view, the principle of "Equal Pay for Equal Work" can enure to the Respondents to the limited extent that when they were found to have been giving similar work as Ledger Clerks/Ledger-Keepers they could have been paid the minimum of the pay scale of a Ledger-Keeper which was available to regularly appointed Ledger-Keepers/Ledger Clerks. Learned Counsel for the Respondents could not successfully contend that such an order should not have been passed. We, therefore, allow this appeal to the limited extent that though the Respondents are held entitled on the principle of "Equal Pay for Equal Work" to get the salary available to the Ledger Keepers/Ledger Clerks who are regularly recruited, they would be entitled to the minimum of the pay scale of the Ledger-Keepers which may be available to the regularly appointed Ledger-Keepers and they cannot be straightaway paid the running time scale as they were not regularly appointed as Ledger-Keepers/Ledger Clerks. If the Respondents claim to be regularised, it will be open to the Respondents to approach the Appellants for the same which request obviously will be considered by the Appellants on its own merits. The direction issued by the High Court in favour of the Respondents entitling them to get the salary and allowances as regularly appointed employees is set aside and instead it is directed that the Respondents will be entitled to get the minimum of the pay scale available to the Ledger-Keepers/Ledger Clerks with permissible allowances on that basis and the difference between the emoluments already paid to each of the Respondents and those payable to them pursuant to the present order will be payable to the Respondents for a period of three years prior to the filing of the writ petition and thereafter minimum salary in the time scale of Ledger-Keepers/Ledger Clerks with appropriate allowances thereon shall be available to the Respondents so long they work as daily wage Ledger-Keepers/Ledger Clerks. In view of the present order if in case any amount is found to have been paid to the Respondents in excess, it will be adjusted in a phased and reasonable manner so that the Respondents may not be out of pocket to a large extent. No Costs. 40. In State of Punjab vs. Talwinder Singh and others, (2003) 11 SCC 776 the Apex Court has rendered the following directions: 41. The State of Punjab is in appeal against the judgment of the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the State's Letters Patent Appeal and affirming the conclusion and direction of the learned Single Judge. These Respondents have been working as daily wagers under the PWD Public Health Department. They filed the writ petition claiming that they are entitled to get the same scale of pay as their counterparts on regular basis are getting inasmuch as they are discharging the same type of duties and they possess the same prescribed qualifications. The learned Single Judge came to the conclusion on assessment of the duty discharged by those Respondents that they have been discharging similar duties as those of their counterparts in regular employment, but yet instead of applying the principle of equal pay for equal work, namely, prescribing the scale of pay for these daily wagers, directed that they would get the minimum in the scale of pay scale is available for their counterparts in the regular establishment. The learned Single Judge also further directed that they should get this for a period of 3 years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition. The Division Bench has affirmed the aforesaid conclusion and direction of the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench have relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of State of Punjab vs. Devinder Singh (1998) 9 SCC 599 : 1998 SCC LS 1261. The aforesaid decision undoubtedly applies with full force to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Mr. Rajiv Dutta, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State of Punjab, however, contended that the decision of this Court in Devinder Singh has not noticed the earlier decision of a two-Judge Bench in the case of State of Haryana and Others Vs. Mr. Rajiv Dutta, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State of Punjab, however, contended that the decision of this Court in Devinder Singh has not noticed the earlier decision of a two-Judge Bench in the case of State of Haryana and Others Vs. Jasmer Singh and Others, where under this Court, after elaborate discussion of several earlier decision of this Court on a comparison of the duties discharged by the daily-wagers, has come to the conclusion that such daily wagers even cannot claim the minimum of regular pay scale of the regularly employed. This decision obviously has not been brought to the notice of the Court while disposing of Devinder Singh case. But it appears from the judgment in Jasmer Singh case that the Court came to the same conclusion possibly because of the fact that in the matter of discharge of duties by those daily wagers it came to the finding that they do not discharge similar duties as those of the regularly employed people as well as they do not possess the same qualifications as those of the regularly employed people. This being the position and Devinder Singh case squarely covering the case in hand, we are not inclined to refer matter to a larger Bench. On the facts and circumstances of the present case, we see no infirmity with the impugned judgment following the decision of this Court in Devinder Singh granting of minimum in the scale of pay of a regular employee. But the further direction that they will get this relief for a period of 3 years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition cannot be sustained in any view of the matter. We, therefore, set aside that part of the order directing payment at the minimum of regular scale of pay for a period of 3 years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition. This civil appeal is accordingly allowed in part. In view of the disposal of the appeal, there is no necessity to pass any order on the application for modification of the Court's order filed by the State of Punjab. 42. This civil appeal is accordingly allowed in part. In view of the disposal of the appeal, there is no necessity to pass any order on the application for modification of the Court's order filed by the State of Punjab. 42. In view of the above, the argument of learned Additional Advocate General, based on the judgment in the case of Yogesh Chandra Dubey (supra) to deny the benefit of the minimum of the pay scale cannot be sustained for the simple reason that the direction as issued in the case of Umadevi (supra) by the Supreme Court, is of the Constitutional Bench consisting of five Judges and judgment in the case of Yogesh Chandra Dubey is by two Judges Bench. However, the judgment of Yogesh Chandra Dubey cannot overcome to the judgment rendered by the Bench consisting of five Judges in the case of Umadevi (supra). It is further seen from the record that the judgment of the Yogesh Chandra Dubey is subsequent to the judgment of the Umadevi, however, it has not cited nor considered or referred before the Supreme Court. In such circumstances and in the light of the judgment of Umadevi (supra) as well as the earlier judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of Devinder Singh as well as Talwinder Singh (supra) it is apparent that the daily wages earners deserve to be paid the wages equal to the minimum salary of their cadre in the Government service instead to pay them their regular scale of pay. Thus, in view of the foregoing discussion it is to be held that the daily wages employees working from years together on the Collector rate are entitled to get the minimum of the pay on a scale to the corresponding post on which they are working. 43. Now one point is also required to be clarified here that in W.P. No. 3838/2005(S), Daddi Lal Yadav vs. State of M.P. and ors. decided by the Main Seat on 3-8-2006 the observation as made in paras 12 and 53 of the Umadevi's case has not been referred. Therefore, the direction as issued by the Main Seat in the case of Daddi Lal Yadav requires some additional direction in terms of the observations made by the Apex Court in para 53 of the Umadevi (supra). 44. Therefore, the direction as issued by the Main Seat in the case of Daddi Lal Yadav requires some additional direction in terms of the observations made by the Apex Court in para 53 of the Umadevi (supra). 44. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners have made an endavour that in para 53 of Umadevi (supra) direction to adopt one time measure for consideration of regularisation through the Union Government, State Government and instrumentalities thereto have been given, to those employees who have worked for more than ten years. But in the State of Madhya Pradesh the cutoff date for regularisation was fixed 31-12-1988, that should be modified in accordance with the observations as made in para 53 of the judgment in the case of Umadevi (supra). I am not inclined to accept such contention because in the State of Madhya Pradesh cutoff date was fixed by the Government for regularisation of the daily wages employees is 31-12-1988. All the writ petitions have been filed by the employees of the State of Madhya Pradesh for their regularisation in the light of the Government policies or indicating the discrimination with them. However, if the direction of para 53 for consideration of the regularisation of those employees who have worked for more than ten years is accepted then it will give further rise to create confusion and to invite the litigation again among the daily wages employees. However, taking into consideration the fact that one time measure is required to be followed in the State of Madhya Pradesh as per the directions of the Supreme Court in para 53 of Umadevi (supra) but only to those employees who are engaged on daily wages prior to 31-12-1988 and worked more than ten years. 45. Now to resolve the controversy for all the time in the entire State of Madhya Pradesh, in the matter of consideration of the regularisation or regularisation of the daily wages employees or to grant them benefit of the minimum of the pay in a scale corresponding to the post to which they are working; and in view of the foregoing discussion it is to be held that daily wages employees are not entitled for their regularisation in terms of the policy dated 9-1-1990 or on account of discrimination meted out, on account of regularisation of the incumbent juniors. The consideration of regularisation is permissible by one time measure only to those employees who were appointed irregularly and not illegally; on the vacant post prior to 31-12-1988 and possessing qualification or eligibility and continuing without intervention of the orders of the Court. It is to be further held that the daily wages employees who were engaged prior to 31-12-1988 on daily wages are entitled to get the minimum of the pay in a corresponding scale to the post on which they are working in the light of the judgment of Umadevi (supra). At the same time it is to be held here that the daily wages employees, who were appointed without following due process of law are only entitled to get relaxation of their age as well as the weight age/preference while facing the process of fresh selection. The Government must take recourse to fill up the vacant posts through their participation by following due process of selection for their appointment. 46. In some of the cases the orders for regularisation has been issued and subsequently for non-observance of principles of natural justice those orders have been cancelled. Such action of the State Government is not permissible in view of the judgment rendered by the Main Seat of this Court after referring the judgment of Umadevi (supra) in. W.P. No. 5204/2005(S), Bharat Darshan Shrivastava vs. State of M.P. vide order dated 31-8-2006. However, in that view of the matter order of cancellation of regularisation passed by the Government without following principles of natural justice cannot be allowed to stand and such deserves to be quashed. The another reason for quashing of those orders of cancellation for regularisation, is, in the judgment of Umadevi (supra), in para 53, it is held that the employees who have already been regularised then their cases are not required to be reopened. 47. The another reason for quashing of those orders of cancellation for regularisation, is, in the judgment of Umadevi (supra), in para 53, it is held that the employees who have already been regularised then their cases are not required to be reopened. 47. In view of the foregoing discussion all these petitions deserve to be disposed of with the following directions: (i) The daily wages employees, engaged even prior to 31-12-1988 in the State of M.P., are not entitled for their regularisation in the light of the policy dated 9-1-1990 or on the basis of plea of discrimination or otherwise, except who falls within the purview of direction of para (ii) below (ii) The daily wages employees, who were appointed, irregularly (not illegally) prior to 31-12-1988 on a sanctioned vacant post, possessing qualification/eligibility and have continuously worked without intervention of the Court are entitled for their consideration of regularisation in view of the discussion made hereinabove by adopting one time measure. The State Government or the instrumentalities of the State shall take recourse for such employees within a period of six months from today in the light of the observations as made in para 53 in the case of Umadevi (supra). (iii) For remaining other employees who are working on daily wages, and are not covered by the directions of para (ii) hereinabove, the Government is directed to initiate the process of regular selection and recruitment, on the available vacant post as directed by the Supreme Court in the case of Umadevi (supra). (iv) As and when vacancies are filled up by the Government by regular process of selection such daily wages employees, be benefited by the age relaxation to the period to which they have rendered their services, while facing regular process of selection for recruitment by them. (v) The Respondents should also carve out the measure to grant them additional marks/preference in the process of selection, by virtue of their experience of work on the post, while filling up the vacancies in accordance with the provisions of rules. (vi) Petitions filed by Petitioners, challenging the order of cancellation of regularisation, are allowed and the orders of cancellation of regularisation are hereby quashed. (vii) Petitioners given minimum, pay in the corresponding scale to the post or cadre in which they are working in the concerned department, from the date of passing of this order. (vi) Petitions filed by Petitioners, challenging the order of cancellation of regularisation, are allowed and the orders of cancellation of regularisation are hereby quashed. (vii) Petitioners given minimum, pay in the corresponding scale to the post or cadre in which they are working in the concerned department, from the date of passing of this order. Such benefit be extended to them within a period of six months. (viii) Petitioners who want to seek the relief of classification by approaching the Labour Court; are free to take such recourse if they are covered under the provisions of the Industrial Laws or Labour Laws. (ix) All these writ petitions are disposed of with the above directions.