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2006 DIGILAW 1255 (JHR)

Ramesh Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand

2006-10-17

M.KARPAGAVINAYAGAM, R.K.MERATHIA

body2006
JUDGMENT 1. On the basis of the charges levelled against the appellant, a Constable, disciplinary authority imposed the punishment of dismissal. Challenging the same, he filed an appeal before the appellate authority, which affirmed the same. Again aggrieved by that, the appellant filed revision before the D.G.P., Government of Jharkhand, who, in turn, dismissed the same. Thereafter, the appellant filed the writ petition. Learned Single Judge, while considering the point raised by the appellant, dismissed the writ petition on the ground that there is no reason to interfere with the impugned orders of the disciplinary authority affirmed by the appellate as well as revisional authorities; hence this appeal. 2. Counsel for the appellant would mainly contend on the basis of the judgment of this Court reported in (Ram Pravesh Pandit and Ors. v. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand)), which has been rendered on the strength of the Supreme Court decision in the case of Captain M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. (1993) 3 SCC 769 that the appellant has been acquitted in respect of the same charge and as such, the finding given by the disciplinary authority, which has been affirmed by the appellate authority holding that the charges have been proved is unjust and the same is liable to be set aside. 3. Counsel for the respondents, while justifying the impugned order and referring the authority AIR 2006 SC 1800 (Commissioner Of Police, New Delhi v. Narender Singh) submits that the enquiry conducted by the disciplinary authority is entirely different from the criminal case. Furthermore, the disciplinary authority gave a finding that the charges have been proved on 16.4.2002 itself and on the other hand, the order of acquittal has been passed by the criminal court only on 29.4.2003. 4. We have carefully considered the submissions made by the counsel for the appellant and the counsel for the respondents. 5. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in para 27 of the said decision AIR 2006 SC 1800 , the scope of. Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries is very limited. According to the Supreme Court, there is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the court must be applied. According to the Supreme Court, there is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the court must be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. It is further held by the Supreme Court that the High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. This Court is only concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and whether according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf. More than that, re-appreciation of the evidence dealt with by the authorities concerned is not permissible under Article 226. It is also brought to the notice of this Court that in the same decision, the Supreme Court observed that the standard of proof required in recording a finding of conviction in a criminal case and in a departmental proceeding are distinct and different. In a criminal case, it is essential to prove a charge beyond all reasonable doubt, but in a departmental proceeding preponderance of probability would serve the purpose. 6. It is now well settled by various decisions of the Supreme Court that if an employee has been acquitted of a criminal charge, the same by itself would not be a ground not to initiate a departmental proceeding against him or to drop the same in the event an order of acquittal is passed. This ratio has been observed by the Supreme Court in the above decision. 7. However, counsel for the appellant would cite the authority of this Court which rendered on the basis of Captain M. Paul Anthony's case that if the evidence let in criminal case as well as in the domestic enquiry is one and same, and the criminal court, acquitted the employee on the same very evidence, the finding to the contrary on the same evidence by the domestic enquiry would be unjust. 8. There is no dispute in the above proposition. 8. There is no dispute in the above proposition. But in this case, the witnesses cited and examined before the Enquiry Officer in departmental proceedings have not been examined before the criminal court. As such, the witness examined before the criminal court and in the departmental proceeding cannot be said to be one and the same. It is also pointed out that the enquiry report has not been served upon the appellant. On the contrary counsel for the respondents submits that the enquiry report has been sent to the appellant at his permanent address, which is available in the service register maintained at the Department. 9. In the above circumstances, we find no reason to hold that the finding rendered by the disciplinary authority, which has been affirmed by the appellate and revisional authorities, which has also been affirmed by the learned Single Judge, is perverse. There is no merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed.