Judgment :- K.N. Basha, J. The revision petitioner has come forward with the revision challenging the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cuddalore, in C.M.P. No. 291/2006 in Special Case No. 2/2006 dated 24.5.2006 dismissing the petition filed by the petitioners under Section 91 of the Cr.P.C. to send for the final report in D.S. 123/PUB/HQ/2002, and authorisation under Section 17 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 given to Thiru Ambikapathy, Inspector of Police, Vigilance and anti corruption, Cuddalore. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the revision petitioner has raised legal points and the document sought for production by filing a petition under Section 91 is very essential and vital to decide the entire allegation in respect of this case. It is also further argued and contended effectively by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner that there are sufficient grounds raised in this matter for consideration of the decision of this Court. 3. I have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner and I have also perused the petition filed before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, the grounds raised in the petition and also the entire impugned order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. 4. A perusal of the order clearly shows that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Debendranath Padhi AIR 2005 SC 359 : 2005 (1) SCC 568 , wherein it has been mentioned that if any document is necessary or desirable for the defence of the accused, the question of invoking Section 91 at the initial stage of framing of charge would not arise, since the defence of the accused is not relevant at that stage. 5. Thelearned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that he will also be able to produce some other decisions of the Apex Court in respect of that point namely at what stage the petition under Section 91 could be filed before trial Court. Therefore, I am of the view that the matter has to be gone into in respect of the revision petition challenging the impugned order and therefore I have admitted the Criminal Revision Petition and ordered notice to the respondents returnable in two weeks. 6. But the revision petitioner has also come forward with an application in Crl. Therefore, I am of the view that the matter has to be gone into in respect of the revision petition challenging the impugned order and therefore I have admitted the Criminal Revision Petition and ordered notice to the respondents returnable in two weeks. 6. But the revision petitioner has also come forward with an application in Crl. M.P. No. 3470 of 2006 seeking stay of all further proceedings pending disposal of this criminal revision petition and further proceedings in Lower Court in No. S.C. No. 2/2006. 7. It is relevant to consider that Section 19(3)(c) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1998 reads as follows: “No Court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no Court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings.” 8. It is held by the Supreme Court in Satya Narayana Sharma v. State of Rajasthan AIR 2001 SC 2856 : 2002 SCC (Cr.) 39 that, (a) “that no Court should stay the proceedings under the Act on any ground and (b) that no Court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings. The latter part of clause (c) of Section 19(3) as stated in (b) above is identical to Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. which deals with the revisional power of the Court. If Section 19 was only to deal with revisional powers then the portion set out in (b) above would have been sufficient. The legislature has, therefore, by adding the words “no Court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground” clearly indicated that no stay could be granted by use of any power on any ground. This therefore, would apply even where a Court is exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Further Section 482 Cr.P.C. starts with the words “Nothing in this Code”. Thus the inherent power can be exercised even if there was a contrary provision in the Cr.P.C. Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. does not provde that inherent jurisdiction can be exercised notwithstanding any other provision contained in any other enactment. Thus if an enactment contains a specific bar then inherent jurisdiction cannot be exercised to get over that bar.” 9. Thus the inherent power can be exercised even if there was a contrary provision in the Cr.P.C. Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. does not provde that inherent jurisdiction can be exercised notwithstanding any other provision contained in any other enactment. Thus if an enactment contains a specific bar then inherent jurisdiction cannot be exercised to get over that bar.” 9. After placing reliance on the Section 19(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the Supreme Court held that, “Thus in cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, there can be no stay of trials. This does not mean that proceedings under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be adapted. In appropriate cases proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is entertained, there can be no stay of trials under the said Act. It is then for the party to convince the Court concerned to expedite the hearing of that petition. However, merely because the Court concerned is not in a position to take up the petition for hearing would be no ground for staying the trial even temporarily.” 10. In this decision, the Apex Court, as categorically held by the Judgment of two Hon’ble Judges that Section 19(3)(c) makes it clear that no Court shall stay the proceedings under the Act on any ground. 11. In view of the settled principle of law laid down by the Apex Court as stated above, I am of the considered view that the stay petition is not at all maintainable and therefore the same is dismissed.