( 1 ) APPELLANTS, who are the husband and children of the Shali Bai (deceased), filed a claim petition under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, seeking compensation of Rs. 4,00,000/-, alleging that when the deceased was proceeding as a pillion rider on a TVS Champ moped being driven by one D. Renuka, the lorry belonging to the second respondent and insured with the third respondent being driven by the first respondent in a rash and negligent manner dashed the said tvs Champ from behind, resulting in the death of the deceased who was earning rs. 5,000/- p. m. from all sources. ( 2 ) FIRST respondent chose to remain ex parte. ( 3 ) SECOND respondent filed his counter denying the rash and negligent driving on the part of his driver and alleging that the accident occurred due to sudden crossing of the road by the driver of the tvs Champ and alleging contributory negligence on the part of the driver of the tvs Champ. ( 4 ) THIRD respondent filed its counter putting the appellants proof of the averments in the petition. ( 5 ) IN support of their claim, appellants examined the first appellant as P. W. I and two other witnesses as P. Ws. 2 and 3 and marked Exs. A. 1 to A. 9. No evidence either oral and documentary was adduced on behalf of the second respondent. Third respondent did not adduce any oral evidence but marked Ex. B. l by consent. ( 6 ) THE Tribunal held that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the first respondent and awarded rs. 96,000/- as compensation to the appellants. Dissatisfied with the compensation awarded to them, the claimants preferred this appeal. ( 7 ) SINCE the appeal is by the claimants seeking higher compensation and since the second respondent did not prefer any cross-objections or cross-appeal questioning the finding of the Tribunal that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the first respondent, the only point for consideration is to what compensation are the appellants entitled to. ( 7 ) SINCE the appeal is by the claimants seeking higher compensation and since the second respondent did not prefer any cross-objections or cross-appeal questioning the finding of the Tribunal that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the first respondent, the only point for consideration is to what compensation are the appellants entitled to. ( 8 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is too meager in view of the ratio in Utla brahmarambha v. Brunda Satyanarayana, 2003 (6) ALD (NOC) 119, and so the value of the services that were being rendered to the appellants by the deceased have to be computed at Rs. 3,000/- p. m. There is no representation on behalf of the second respondent though served. ( 9 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the third respondent is that since the Tribunal gave cogent reasons for its conclusion that the appellants are entitled only to Rs. 96,000/- and since there is no reliable evidence on record to show that the deceased was earning Rs. 5,000/- per month, the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is reasonable. Relying on United India insurance Co. Ltd. , Shimla v. Tilak Singh and others, 2006 (3) ALD 75 (SC), he contended that the third respondent is not liable to pay any compensation to the appellants because the deceased admittedly was a pillion rider. ( 10 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the third respondent that third respondent is not liable to pay any compensation in view of the ratio in tilak Singh's case (supra), cannot be accepted, because that case relates to liability of the insurer of the scooter for the accident caused by the driver of scooter resulting in injuries to the pillion rider. In this case, it is the lorry belonging to the second respondent, which was insured by the third respondent, that caused the accident resulting in the death of the deceased, who is a third party, vis-a-vis the lorry insured by the 3rd respondent. Ex. B. 1 admittedly covers the risk of the third party. It is well known that 'third party' , in insurance parlance means a party, who is not using the vehicle involved in the accident at the time of the accident. Ex. B. 1 admittedly covers the risk of the third party. It is well known that 'third party' , in insurance parlance means a party, who is not using the vehicle involved in the accident at the time of the accident. Since the deceased was proceeding on a TVS champ as a pillion rider and as that TVS champ was hit by the lorry belonging to the second respondent, third respondent certainly is liable to pay the compensation payable to the appellants for the death of the deceased in the accident caused by the lorry of the 2nd respondent, the insured. ( 11 ) THOUGH the appellants claim that the deceased was earning Rs. 2,000/- p. m. from pearless agency; Rs. 2,000/- p. m. by giving training in tailoring to students and rs. 1,000/- p. m. from fair price shop business and thus was earning a total sum of rs. 5,000/- p. m. , in column No. 6 of the claim petition, relating to the monthly income of the deceased, they did not mention any figure and kept it blank. That is one circumstance against the appellants. The evidence of the first appellant as P. W. I is that he is working as an Attender in Food Inspector's office, Karimnagar and that the deceased who was aged about 35 years was working as peerless agent and was also running a fair price shop and was also doing tailoring and earning about Rs. 5,000/- to rs. 6,000/- p. m. Apart from the other documents, Ex. A. 8, Income Certificate issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Karimnagar, was produced by him to show that the deceased was earning Rs. 22,000/- p. a. During cross-examination by the second respondent, he denied the suggestion that the deceased was only attending to household chores and was not an earning member in the family and that Exs. A6 and a. 8 were brought into existence for the purpose of the case. ( 12 ) THE evidence of P. W. 2 is not relevant for deciding the point for consideration because he did not speak anything of the income of the deceased. ( 13 ) P. W. 3 is examined to state that she is working as a maidservant in the house of P. W. 1 on a monthly salary of rs. 500/ -. ( 13 ) P. W. 3 is examined to state that she is working as a maidservant in the house of P. W. 1 on a monthly salary of rs. 500/ -. During cross-examination by the court, she stated that she has six children and her youngest daughter is aged 18 years and that her husband is the driver of a lorry and that she does not know the avocation of P. W. 1 and does not know the names of the three younger daughters of the deceased and cannot say the age of the deceased, and that the youngest daughter of the deceased is aged about 7 months at the time of the death of the deceased and that she cannot say in which locality the house of the deceased is located but the name of the locality is known as Karkhanagadda near junior College. During cross-examination by the second respondent, she denied the suggestion that she is not working as a maidservant in the house of P. W. 1. ( 14 ) IN my considered opinion P. W. 3 is a witness brought up for the purpose of this case because she was unable to give the names of the children whom she was looking after. The evidence of P. W. I shows that he is an Attender in the Office of the Food Inspector at Karimnagar. So his salary would have been around Rs. 3,000/- because the basic salary of a Class-IV employee in the State Government during the accounting year 1994-95 was 1375-25- 1475-30-1625-40-1825-50-2075-60-2375. Since the accident occurred on 4-10-1994. e. , during the accounting year 1994-95, it is difficult to believe that an Attender would engage any maidservant for looking after his children. If the deceased was really earning Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. 6,000/- p. m. as contended by the appellants, her income should have been more than Rs. 60,000/- per year. As per Income-Tax Act, persons whose annual income was more than rs. 30,000/- per year during the accounting year 1993-94. e. assessment year 1994-95, were liable to pay income tax. So if the deceased really was earning more than rs. 60,000/- during that year, she would have filed a return of income showing her income as more than Rs. 60,000/- per year and paid income tax. 30,000/- per year during the accounting year 1993-94. e. assessment year 1994-95, were liable to pay income tax. So if the deceased really was earning more than rs. 60,000/- during that year, she would have filed a return of income showing her income as more than Rs. 60,000/- per year and paid income tax. No document is produced by the appellants to show the income being received by the deceased as an agent of Peerless, which should be evidenced by documents. Ex. A. 7, dated 31-7-1993 shows that the deceased, as temporary licence holder, was permitted to lift the essential commodities of fair price shop for two months. So the contention that the deceased was earning Rs. 1,000/- p. m. from the fair price shop cannot be believed or accepted, because no document except ex. A. 7 is produced to show that she was permitted to carry on business subsequently or prior thereto. Ex. A. 8, Certificate said to have been issued by the Mandal Revenue officer, shows that the deceased was earning rs. 22,000/- as wages (~j5 ^ ^ = ^-~ ) admittedly, the deceased was not an employee anywhere. Had the person who issued Ex. A. 8 been examined by the appellants, respondents would have had an opportunity to cross-examine him to find out on what basis, and what material, he stated in Ex. A. 8 that the deceased was earning Rs. 22,000/- p. a. 'as wages', when even according to the appellants she is not a wage earner. Therefore, the Tribunal rightly disbelieved Ex. A. 8 and I also do not wish to rely on it for the above reasons. ( 15 ) THE next contention of the learned counsel for the appellants relates to the services to the appellants being evaluated at a minimum amount of Rs. 3,000/- p. m. It is no doubt true that in Utla brahmarambha 's case (supra), the Division bench applying the analogy in Latha wadhwa v. State of Bihar, 2001 (8) SCC 197 , held that pecuniary loss on account of the death of the mother should be fixed at rs. 3,000/- p. m. or Rs. 3,000/- p. m. It is no doubt true that in Utla brahmarambha 's case (supra), the Division bench applying the analogy in Latha wadhwa v. State of Bihar, 2001 (8) SCC 197 , held that pecuniary loss on account of the death of the mother should be fixed at rs. 3,000/- p. m. or Rs. 36,000/- p. a. Latha wadhwa's case (supra), referred to and relied on by the Division Bench in the above decision arose out of a writ petition filed before the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for ordering prosecution of the officers of the Tata Iron and Steel Company and their agents and servants for the fire engulfed in the VIP pandal and its surrounding area, resulting in the death of a number of officers and other employees of that Company. In Para 1 at page 202 of that reported judgment it is stated that the Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent Company in that writ petition stated that notwithstanding the several objections taken in the counter-affidavit the company does not wish to treat the litigation as an adversarial one and left the matter to be decided by the Court according to law. Keeping in view the status of the officers etc. , of the Company, whose wives died in the accident, the contribution of the deceased housewives in that fire accident was fixed by the Apex Court at rs. 3000/- p. m. ( 16 ) IN this case first appellant, admittedly, was an Attender in the Food inspector Office. A Class IV employee in government of Andhra Pradesh as stated earlier was under the pay scale of 1375-25- 1475-30-1625-40-1825-50-2075-60-2375 during 1994. The Dearness Allowance was 11. 55% upto 30-6-1994 and was 17. 05% from 1-7-1994. So the take home salary of the first appellant must have been far less than Rs. 3,000/- p. m. by the date of death of the deceased. ( 17 ) THE ages of appellants 2 to 7 are shown as 14 years, 9 years, 7 years, 6 years, 3 years and 6 months in the claim petition. The date of birth of the deceased, as disclosed from Ex. A. 3 is 20-11-1960. 3,000/- p. m. by the date of death of the deceased. ( 17 ) THE ages of appellants 2 to 7 are shown as 14 years, 9 years, 7 years, 6 years, 3 years and 6 months in the claim petition. The date of birth of the deceased, as disclosed from Ex. A. 3 is 20-11-1960. If the age of the second appellant, given in the claim petition is correct and if second appellant was aged 14 years by the date of filing of the claim petition, she must have born in 1982. e. when the deceased was aged about 22 years. Thereafter, she gave birth to five more children. e. appellants 3 to 7. 7th appellant is said to be months old baby by the date of filing of the claim petition. Court can take judicial notice of the fact that pregnant women do not generally undertake heavy work and take rest for some months prior to and after child birth. So the deceased undertaking the entire work in the house during the pregnancy and before and after child birth as alleged cannot be believed or accepted. Death of mother causes anguish to the children. No other person however affectionate they may be towards the children can substitute their mother. But that fact per se cannot be a ground for fixing the contribution of the deceased to appellant at Rs. 3,000/- p. m. that too when the income of the first appellant. e. her husband by the date of her death was not even Rs. 3,000/- p. m. Love and affection of mother, no doubt, cannot be measured in terms of money. But that does not mean that claimants should be given a windfall due to the death of their mother in an accident, by treating the value of her love and affection to the members of her family at more than the income of her husband. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the loss of affection etc. and services of the deceased to the appellants can be evaluated at Rs. 12,000/- p. a. ( 18 ) SINCE the accident took place prior to the coming into force of Act 54 of 1994, amending the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and since the deceased was aged about 34 years at the time of her death, the multiplier can be taken as 15'. 12,000/- p. a. ( 18 ) SINCE the accident took place prior to the coming into force of Act 54 of 1994, amending the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and since the deceased was aged about 34 years at the time of her death, the multiplier can be taken as 15'. So the pecuniary damages payable to the appellants would come to Rs. 1,80,000/- (12,000 x 15 ). ( 19 ) IN Y. Varalakshmi v. M. Nageswara Rao, 1988 (1) ALT 337, it is held that the claimants in every case of a fatal motor accident case are entitled to minimum compensation of Rs. 15,000/- towards non-pecuniary damages. So the appellants are also entitled to Rs. 15,000/- towards non-pecuniary damages. ( 20 ) SINCE the first appellant lost his wife, he is entitled to loss of consortium of rs. 5,000/ -. ( 21 ) THUS appellants are entitled to rs. 1,80,000/- + Rs. 15,000/- + Rs. 5,000/- = rs. 2,00,000/- as compensation for the death of the deceased. The point is answered accordingly. ( 22 ) IN the result, the appeal is allowed in part and an award is passed for rs. 2,00,000/- with interest at 12% p. a. on rs. 96,000/- from the date of petition till the date of deposit as awarded by the tribunal and with interest at 9% p. a. , on rs. 1,04,000/-, awarded in this Court, from this date till the date of deposit into the court with proportionate costs in the tribunal. Rest of the claim of appellants is dismissed without costs. From out of the said amount, appellants 2 to 7 are each entitled to Rs. 28,000/- and interest thereon. First appellant is entitled to Rs. 32,000/- and interest thereon. Parties are directed to bear their own costs in this appeal. - .