JUDGMENT B.S. Reddy, C.J. 1. This writ appeal is directed against judgment and order dated May 31, 2005 made in WP(C) No. 6544/1999 by a learned single Judge of this Court whereby and whereunder the learned Judge allowed the writ petition filed by the Respondents herein challenging the order passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 2. The facts have been succinctly noticed by the learned single Judge in the judgment and order and therefore we will not burden this judgment by repeating the same, but, however, the relevant facts for disposal of this appeal shall be noticed. 3. That a charge sheet dated May 21, 1986 was issued by the Respondent Corporation, against the appellant alleging that the appellant had acted in contravention of the orders dated April 28, 1986 and April 29, 1986 issued by the management requiring him to hand over the charge to his reliever. There was further charge of failure to hand over the charge to the reliever' of the appellant and also he had abused misbehaved with his superior. That a domestic enquiry was held in respect of the said charges and at the conclusion of the said enquiry on the basis of the report of the Enquiry Officer, the appellant was dismissed from service vide order dated November 28, 1986 passed by the management. That at the relevant point of time an industrial dispute with regard to claim of, bonus involving the appellant-workman was pending and it is under those circumstances, the respondent employer filed an application before the Central Industrial Tribunal at Calcutta under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for short 'Act', which was registered as Misc. Case No. 9/1988. The Tribunal by its order dated April 26, 1999 held that the domestic enquiry held by the management was not proper and accordingly allowed the parties to lead evidence before it. That by an order dated February 1, 1996 the Tribunal refused to accord approval to the dismissal of the appellant, which was impugned by the management in CR No. 3013/1996 in this Court. This Court vide its order dated November 16, 1998 remitted the matter to the Tribunal for de novo adjudication on the basis of the evidence already adduced during the course of the domestic enquiry. This Court vide its order dated November 16, 1998 remitted the matter to the Tribunal for de novo adjudication on the basis of the evidence already adduced during the course of the domestic enquiry. The Tribunal once again heard the matter and passed the order dated November 18, 1999 once again refusing to accord approval to the order of dismissal of the appellant workman from the services. 4. The said order has been once again impugned by the respondent management in the writ petition. 5. It was contended that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Adjudicator under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act is a limited one in which a full fledged enquiry with regard to jurisdiction or otherwise of the punishment imposed on the workman cannot be gone into. Re-appreciation of the evidence of the Tribunal by the Industrial Adjudicator is impermissible. It was contended that the Industrial Adjudicator cannot go into the proportionality of the punishment since it was always open for the aggrieved workman to invoke the provision of Section 10 of the Act which confers a much wider jurisdiction on the Industrial Tribunal. 6. On behalf of the workman it was urged that the domestic enquiry held against the appellant workman prior to his dismissal from service was vitiated on the ground of non compliance of the principles of natural justice. It was contended that it was open to determine the justifiability or correctness of the punishment imposed on the basis of the evidence available on record. It was also contended that the conclusion reached by the Industrial Tribunal that the dismissal of the appellant workman was not made in accordance with the Standing Orders in force thereby vitiating the punishment imposed on the workman does not suffer from any infirmities requiring interference of this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was also contended that the requirements contained in Section 33(2)(b) of the Act are mandatory and non compliance with the said requirements would vitiate the dismissal order. The contention was that the requirement of payment of one month's wages to the workman was not complied with by the management and the same would vitiate the dismissal order. 7. The learned single Judge upon an elaborate consideration of the matter found no merit in the submissions made for and on behalf of the appellant workman. The contention was that the requirement of payment of one month's wages to the workman was not complied with by the management and the same would vitiate the dismissal order. 7. The learned single Judge upon an elaborate consideration of the matter found no merit in the submissions made for and on behalf of the appellant workman. The learned Judge took the view that the enquiry held under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act is limited in its nature and the Tribunal is required only to find out whether the domestic enquiry held is valid on the touch-stone of the principles of natural justice and the same is found to be valid the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act would be limited to see whether a prima facie case for according approval has been made out or not. The learned Judge found that the conclusion reached by the Tribunal had the effect touching upon the merits of the dismissal order, which does not pertain to the areas of jurisdiction contemplated by Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. 8. In the writ appeal, Sri Dasgupta, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant workman contended that the respondent management failed to comply with the requirement of payment of one month's wages to the appellant workman and this fact alone is sufficient to refuse approval under Section33(2)(b) of the Act. It was further contended that the domestic enquiry is totally vitiated mainly due to violation of the Standing Orders and the same has resulted in non compliance with the mandatory requirement under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. It was submitted that victimization and unfair labour practice alone are not the grounds on which the approval could be refused by the Industrial Adjudicator. It was urged that the learned Judge committed an error in coming to the conclusion as if victimization and unfair labour practice are alone the grounds for refusing to grant approval to the management. The learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent management submitted that the order of the learned single Judge is not vitiated for any reason whatsoever requiring interference of the Writ Appellate Court. The learned senior counsel made an attempt to highlight the distinction between the proceeding under Section 10 of the Act and the proceeding under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. The learned senior counsel made an attempt to highlight the distinction between the proceeding under Section 10 of the Act and the proceeding under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. It was contended that once the domestic enquiry is held to be proper and there is no complaint of victimization and unfair labour practice, the approval is required to be granted by the Industrial Adjudicator and as such approval in no manner would effect the rights of the workman under Section 10 of the Act which confers wider jurisdiction on the Industrial Tribunal to consider the validity of the order passed by the management on merit. 9. We have carefully considered the rival submissions made during the course of hearing of this appeal. So far as the first contention is concerned, the learned Judge having perused the materials available on record found that in the dismissal order it is mentioned that the wages for one month to be collected by the workman from the employer which he refused to do so, therefore, the appellant workman was served with a letter sent under insurance cover of Rs. 1876/- which he received though he has denied the receipt of any payment with the said letter, found that the workman was paid his one month wage. The learned Judge also noticed that even the Tribunal in its impugned order has clearly recorded that the receipt of wages of one month was not disputed by the appellant workman before it. The findings recorded by the learned Judge that the workman received one month's wages as contemplated under Section 33(2)(b) does not suffer from any error. We cannot once again re-appreciate the evidence and substitute the findings recorded by the learned Judge. The learned Judge in fact confirmed the findings recorded by the Tribunal in this regard. 10. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. v. Ram Gopal Sharma and Ors. 2002 (1) LLJ 834 , the learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the requirements of proviso to Section 33(2)(b) are mandatory in its nature and are required to be strictly complied with. 10. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. v. Ram Gopal Sharma and Ors. 2002 (1) LLJ 834 , the learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the requirements of proviso to Section 33(2)(b) are mandatory in its nature and are required to be strictly complied with. The contention was that the enquiry held against the appellant was not in accordance with the Standing Orders as is required under Section 33(2)(b)of the Act and therefore the whole of the enquiry is vitiated and the dismissal order cannot be given effect to. The submission is based on the premise that the management did not offer any opportunity whatsoever to the appellant workman to explain the circumstances alleged against him in the charge sheet. It is not the case of the appellant that he was not given an opportunity to participate in the enquiry. The case set up by him is that before commencement of the enquiry pursuant to the charge sheet an opportunity ought to have been given to submit his reply and only upon consideration of such reply decision ought to have been taken by the management whether to proceed with the domestic enquiry or not. In order to consider this submission, it would be appropriate to refer to the relevant Standing Orders XIV(3) of the Appellant Corporation, which is to the following effect: No order of dismissal shall be made unless the workman concerned is informed in writing of the alleged misconduct and is given an opportunity to explain the circumstances alleged against him. The approval of the Manager of the establishment or where there is no Manager the employer is required to every case of dismissal and when circumstances appear to warrant it, the Manager of the employer may institute independent enquiries before dealing with charges against the workman. 11. The plain reading of the Standing Order does not suggest that an opportunity is required to be given to explain the circumstances alleged against the workman in the charge sheet. The Standing Orders merely prohibits the management that order of dismissal shall not be made unless the workman concerned is informed in writing of the alleged misconduct and is given an opportunity to explain the circumstances alleged against him. The Standing Orders merely prohibits the management that order of dismissal shall not be made unless the workman concerned is informed in writing of the alleged misconduct and is given an opportunity to explain the circumstances alleged against him. It is only mentioned that a fair and adequate opportunity must be provided to the workman in the domestic enquiry and the management would not involve in any act of victimization and unfair labour practice. Standing Order No. XIV (3) merely ensures the compliance of the principles of natural justice. It is not the case of the appellant that he was not given adequate opportunity in the domestic enquiry held against him. In the circumstances, we find it difficult to accept the submission made by the learned Counsel for the appellant. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant made an attempt to contend that the very transfer order which constitutes the very basis for initiating the proceeding against the appellant herein are contrary to Clause XVA of the Standing Order. His submission is based on Clause XVA of the Standing Orders, which is to the following effect: Employee may be transferred due to exigencies of work, from one area to another wherever the Company may be carrying out its operation and from one department or Section to another provided that the pay, grade continuity or conditions of service of the employees are not adversely affected by such transfer and provided also that where an employee is transferred from one job to another that job should be of similar nature such as he is capable of doing. Management will give reasonable notice to the workers concerned in case of such transfers. 13. The submission is totally misconceived since it is not open to the Tribunal to take the facts anterior to that of initiation of the disciplinary proceeding in exercising of its jurisdiction under Section33(2)(b) of the Act. The Tribunal for the purpose of granting/refusing the approval to the order of dismissal is concerned that the validity of the domestic enquiry and not with the reason as to why domestic enquiry has been initiated against the workman. The Tribunal committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the respondent Corporation having admittedly transferred the appellant workman to a purely clerical job has violated the Clause XVA of the Standing Orders. The Tribunal committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the respondent Corporation having admittedly transferred the appellant workman to a purely clerical job has violated the Clause XVA of the Standing Orders. The findings of the Tribunal that the enquiry undertaken by the Industrial Adjudicator in this regard is totally without jurisdiction; may be precisely for that reason even the appellant workman did not urge this contention before the learned single Judge. But a feeble attempt was made to rely upon the findings of the Tribunal in this regard. We find no merit in the submission. 14. In the result, we hold that the learned Single Judge did not commit any error in allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent Corporation. There is no violation of any Standing Orders as contended. It is a fit case where the Tribunal ought to have granted approval under Section 33(2)(b)of the Act. 15. However the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent went into the merit and recorded a categorical finding that all the charges as contained in the charge sheet dated May 21, 1989 stand proved against the appellant workman. The findings so recorded may come in the way of the appellant in case if he chooses to challenge the order of dismissal in a proceeding under Section 10 of the Act. In the circumstances, it is clarified that the observations so made by the learned Single Judge and the observations if any, made in this order of ours shall not come in the way of the appellant workman to avail the remedy under Section 10 of the Act and if any such remedy is availed the same may have to be considered on its own merit uninfluenced by any of the observations made. 16. With the observations as above, this writ appeal shall stand dismissed without any order as to costs. Appeal dismissed