JUDGMENT :- This appeal is directed against order of acquittal recorded by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Parbhani, in Sessions Case No.157/1993 for offence punishable under Sections 498-A and 306 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The alleged incident occurred on July 4th, 1993 in tenanted premises in Ambedkar locality of Parbhani. The respondent was occupying first floor of the house owned by one Shri. Chonde, who is employed in M.S.R.T.C., as a tenant. He used to reside there with his wife-deceased Sheelabai @ Laxmibai. The couple was blissed with a minor son by name Swapnil. The marriage had taken place about five years prior to the incident. 3. Briefly stated, the prosecution case is that the respondent used to illtreat the deceased wife. She was subjected to cruelty and was being harassed for one or another reason. In the morning of July 4th, 1993, the respondent told the wife that he wanted to marry daughter of a neighbour, who belonged to fisherman's community (Koli). On earlier 2-3 occasions, he had brought that woman to his house. The respondent asked the wife to allow him to marry that woman. She did not approve such a request and told him that when she was the wife available in the house, how could 'he think of second marriage. Thereupon, there took place verbal altercation between the spouses. The respondent left the house around 11.00 a.m., leaving deceased Sheelabai @ Laxmibai alone. She was fed up with the harassment of the husband and his insistence for the second marriage. As a result of such cruel treatment and the persistent demand for allowing second marriage by the husband, she doused herself with kerosene and immolated herself with kerosene and immolated herself by setting fire with a lighted match stick. Soon she was engulfed by flames of fire and received 100% burn injuries. She was rushed to the Civil Hospital, Parbhani, by some neighbours. 4. The police station was informed about the incident of burning. Her dying declaration was recorded by Executive Magistrate-P.W.1 P. Ummarayya at about 12.40 p.m. She narrated the incident of quarrel between herself and the husband on account of his insistence for the second marriage with the woman in the neighbourhood. Police Head Constable Karad reached the hospital after a short while and recorded the second dying declaration-cum F.I.R. She narrated the same story to him which was regarded as her report. Police Head Constable Karad reached the hospital after a short while and recorded the second dying declaration-cum F.I.R. She narrated the same story to him which was regarded as her report. Sheelabai @ Laxmibai died as a result of 100% burn in the same noon at about 3.00 p.m. while she was being provided medical treatment. The police prepared inquest panchanama on the dead body. PSI Ghadge, who was attached to Kotwali Police Station carried out certain investigation into the matter. He recorded the statement of the parents of the deceased after preparing spot panchanama and collecting the dying declaration. He also recorded statements of some other witnesses. Consequent upon collection of incriminating material during the investigation, the respondent came to be charge-sheeted for offence punishable under Sections 498-A and 306 of the Indian Penal Code. He was put on trial before the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Parnbahi, after due committal of the case. 5. A charge (Exh.1) was framed against the respondent. Substance of the charge was explained to him. He entered plea of "not guilty". His defence is one of total denial. He did not dispute, however, that deceased Sheelabai @ Laxmibai died as a result of 100% burn injuries sustained by her in the relevant morning. Thus, it is undisputed that deceased Sheelabai @ Laxmibai immolated herself in her residential premises in the morning of July 4th, 1993. 6. The prosecution examined in all eight (8) witnesses in support of the charge. The prosecution mainly relied upon two dying declarations (Exh.4 and Exh.6). The prosecution also relied upon the testimonies of the parents of the deceased. The learned Sessions Court, however, did not accept the case of prosecution, holding that the dying declarations could not inspire confidence and veracity thereof could not be established. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge held that the charge for offence of cruelty and abetment of suicide is not proved against the respondent and as such passed the impugned order of acquittal. 7. Feeling aggrieved, the State has come up in the appeal. 8. On behalf of the State/appellant, learned A.P.P. Shri. Umakant Patil, canvassed before me that there was no substantial reason for deceased Sheelabai @ Laxmibai to commit suicide in the relevant morning and that the dying declaration should have been believed by the court of Session. 7. Feeling aggrieved, the State has come up in the appeal. 8. On behalf of the State/appellant, learned A.P.P. Shri. Umakant Patil, canvassed before me that there was no substantial reason for deceased Sheelabai @ Laxmibai to commit suicide in the relevant morning and that the dying declaration should have been believed by the court of Session. The learned A.P.P. further submits that version of the parents of the deceased Sheelabai @ Laxmibai would be sufficient to infer cruelty meted out at the hands of the respondent to his deceased wife. The learned A.P.P. points out that there was no other person in the house and the deceased had received 100% injuries in the residential premises. It is argued that the reason for committing suicide was persistent attempt of the husband/respondent to seek permission of the wife for performance of the second marriage with a woman in the neighbourhood. The learned A.P.P. submits, therefore, that the impugned order of acquittal is liable to be set aside and that the respondent deserves conviction for the alleged offences. On the other hand, learned counsel Shri. Rathi, appearing for the respondent, has supported the impugned order of acquittal. He relied upon the case of "Rajendra Narayan Mahajan Vs. State of Maharashtra" 2004(2) Bom. C.R. (Cri.) 805 : [2004 ALL MR (Cri) 1586] in support of his contention that the dying declaration could not be relied upon when the testimony of the Doctor could not inspire confidence. He pointed out that both the dying declarations are identical in language and contents. He also referred to case of "Sanju alias Sanjay Singh Sengar Vs. State of M.P." A.I.R. 2002 Supreme Court 1998. In the latter case, the accused told the deceased, "to go and die". The deceased committed suicide after a couple of days. The Supreme Court of India has held that the words uttered by the accused could not be regarded as abetment to the suicide since the same were uttered during the course of quarrel. 9. Before I proceed to scrutinies the evidence adduced by the prosecution, let it be noted that the F.I.R. (Exh.4) and dying declaration (Exh.6) would show that no other reason is stated except and save, the altercation or fracas between the spouses on account of insistence for the second marriage by the respondent. 9. Before I proceed to scrutinies the evidence adduced by the prosecution, let it be noted that the F.I.R. (Exh.4) and dying declaration (Exh.6) would show that no other reason is stated except and save, the altercation or fracas between the spouses on account of insistence for the second marriage by the respondent. Her statement recorded in the very same noon does not show that she was subjected to cruelty on any other previous occasion. No where it has been stated that she was illtreated, harassed or troubled in the past. Parents of the deceased, namely, P.W.6 Namdeo and P.W.7 Kamlabai deposed, however, that the deceased Sheelabai @ Laxmibai used to complain that the husband was giving ill treatment to her. They have tried to show that the deceased used to narrate, during the course of her visits to the maternal home, that she was being troubled by the husband and he used to consume liquor. They further deposed that sister of the accused/respondent also used to trouble her. 10. Apart from the fact that version of P.W.6 Namdeo and P.W.7 Kamalbai suffer from vagueness and that no specific instance of cruelty is stated by either of them, it may be gathered that their versions are conspicuously silent as regards desire of the respondent to perform second marriage with a woman in the neighbourhood of his house. As pointed out earlier, the vague allegations about earlier illtreatment or trouble given to the deceased, which are referred to by her parents, have not been referred in the dying declaration and the F.I.R. Needless to say there is material contradiction in the context of the alleged cruelty meted out to the deceased. The sole reason given for her taking such a drastic step for ending her life is said to be the desire of the respondent to marry another woman in the neighbourhood. Obviously, it will have to be said that the entire prosecution case hinges upon the dying declarations which have been recorded in the relevant noon. 11. The first one is purportedly recorded by P.W.1 P. Ummarayya. According to him, he received a letter from police station on 4th July, 1993 whereby he was requested to attend General (Civil) Hospital, Parbhani for recording of dying declaration of injured Sheelabai @ Laxmibai. He states that he visited the General Hospital and showed the letter to the Medical Officer. The first one is purportedly recorded by P.W.1 P. Ummarayya. According to him, he received a letter from police station on 4th July, 1993 whereby he was requested to attend General (Civil) Hospital, Parbhani for recording of dying declaration of injured Sheelabai @ Laxmibai. He states that he visited the General Hospital and showed the letter to the Medical Officer. The Medical Officer pointed out the injured patient and told him that she was conscious and that he recorded her statement. He recorded her dying declaration as per her version and obtained her thumb impression at the foot thereof. He attested it. He obtained endorsement of the Medical Officer to the effect that the patient was conscious during the course of the recording. He corroborated the recital of dying declaration (Exh.4). Significantly, he admits that some Jail constables and some other persons from Jail Department were present near the patient. He further admits that the Medical Officer did not examine the patient in his presence. It is pertinent to note that the respondent is employee of the jail Department. The record does not show who were the Jail constables and some other persons around the patient at the relevant time. The version of P.W.1 P. Ummarayya does not show that he read over the contents of the dying declaration to the patient after the recording was completed. His version does not show that the Medical Officer was present at time of recording of the dying declaration. Conversely, he categorically states that the Medical Officer went away after showing him the patient in that room. This is something strange. It only implies that P.W.1 P. Ummarayya as well as the Medical Officer were not well aware about the precautionary measure to be taken while recording of the dying declaration. The Medical Officer i.e. P.W.3 Dr. Debadwar states that he has signed the certificate at foot of the dying declaration (Exh.4). He states that the police constable came with the document i.e. dying declaration (Exh.4) to him. He then went to the ward, showed the patient and, therefore, issued the certificate in question. Thus, he was not present through out the relevant period while the dying declaration (Exh.4) was being recorded by P.W.1 P. Ummarayya. He did not produce the relevant case papers. He then went to the ward, showed the patient and, therefore, issued the certificate in question. Thus, he was not present through out the relevant period while the dying declaration (Exh.4) was being recorded by P.W.1 P. Ummarayya. He did not produce the relevant case papers. There is nothing on record to show that the deceased gave history about the incident when she was admitted in the hospital. The dying declaration (Exh.4) shows that it was recorded at 01.05 p.m. The admissions of P.W.1 P. Ummarayya would show, however, that he recorded the dying declaration some where around 12.40 to 12.45 p.m. 12. According to P.W. Karad, Head Constable, B.No.492 the recital of the F.I.R. (Exh.6) were written as dictated by the injured Sheelabai @ Laxmibai. He recorded the F.I.R. at about 12.30 to 12.40 p.m. Thus, both the dying declarations overlap in relation to time. The first dying declaration (Exh.4) purports to show that the respondent had requested the deceased Sheelabai @ Laxmibai to allow him the performance of second marriage with that woman in the neighbourhood. The F.I.R. (Exh.6), however, shows that he had declared that he would bring the woman from fisherman's community in the house and hence there was a quarrel between the spouses. The second dying declaration shows that he abused her and left the house. Her statement in the F.LR. is that due to the talk of the husband she had suffered mental trouble. The first dying declaration (Exh.4) reveals that nobody had extinguished the fire which got extinguished on it's own. This part of the dying declaration (ExhA) is inconsistent with the recitals of the spot panchanama (Exh.11). The spot panchanama reveals that jute cloth pieces (Bondre) used for extinguishing the fire were found at the spot. 13. The testimony of P.W.8 PSI Ghadge reveals that he had inquired with the woman of the fishermen's community about whom there was reference in the dying declaration. He even recorded her statement. However, the statement of the said woman was not filed along with the charge-sheet. In fact, no proper investigation was carried out regarding identity of the said women to whom the respondent desired to marry. It does not stand to reason that a woman who was extensively burnt would not raise any hue and cry while suffering from the burn injuries during the course of such ghastly incident. In fact, no proper investigation was carried out regarding identity of the said women to whom the respondent desired to marry. It does not stand to reason that a woman who was extensively burnt would not raise any hue and cry while suffering from the burn injuries during the course of such ghastly incident. Not a single person from the neighbourhood was called in the witness box. I mean to say, the immediate conduct and revelation of the injured victim was not made available. The investigation was carried out in slip-shop manner. The police did not seize the articles such as stove, match box, the pieces of burn saree and the pieces of Jute cloths etc. from the spot of the incident. The learned Add!. Sessions Judge has discussed the infirmities in the evidence of the prosecution with necessary details. The view taken by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, particularly when the statements in the dying declaration and the F.I.R. suffer from credibility, appears to be reasonable. It is well settled that even when there are two views possible, then also, unless the acquittal is demonstrated to be most improper and illegal, the view taken by the trial court need not be disturbed. In the present case, there are no strong and sufficient reasons to disturb the impugned order of acquittal. 14. In the result, the appeal fails and as such stands dismissed. Appeal dismissed.