( 1 ) THE present C. R. P. is filed against the order made in I. A. No. 2377/2005 in o. S. No. 1192/2000 on the file of II Additional junior Civil Judge, Warangal which was filed under Order IX Rule 7 C. P. C. to set aside the exparte orders against the petitioners there in and to receive the written statement. ( 2 ) SRI Wasim Ahmed Khan, the learned counsel representing the revision petitioner would maintain that after a long lapse of time when the matter was reopened for the purpose of just producing certain citations, defendants 5 and 6 in the main suit who were set ex parte on 2-8-2002, after a lapse of more than 3 years, had moved an application to set aside the ex parte order and the same was allowed by the learned Judge by imposing some costs. The learned Counsel placed reliance on certain decisions and would maintain that the impugned order cannot be sustained. ( 3 ) PER contra, Sri P. Pankaja Reddy, the learned Counsel representing the contesting respondents would maintain that the learned judge exercised the discretion and in fact there was change of Counsel and that was the reason why this application was filed to set aside the exparte order by D-5 and D-6 and f urther two applications also had been moved which were allowed and as against those orders C. R. P. Nos. 5486/2005 and 5559/2005 had been preferred before this Court. ( 4 ) HEARD the Counsel. ( 5 ) IT is true that the application to set aside exparte order was moved after a long lapse of time. It is also true that defendant No. 7 is none other than the mother of D-5 and D-6. The learned Judge recorded certain reasons and ultimately allowed the application by imposing costs. Strong reliance was placed on thottempudi Ammajiv. It is also true that defendant No. 7 is none other than the mother of D-5 and D-6. The learned Judge recorded certain reasons and ultimately allowed the application by imposing costs. Strong reliance was placed on thottempudi Ammajiv. Convention of Baptist churches of Northern Circars, Visakhapatnam and others while dealing with an application to set aside the exparte order, the facts of the case being that the petitioner there in along with her husband who is a co-defendant engaged one Counsel and her husband died on 11-9-94 and subsequently the petitioner was set ex parte on 19-12-1995 and an application to set aside ex parte order was filed on 12-2-1999 when the entire trial is over and case is posted for arguments and when the only explanation for the delay is that the petitioner did not contact her Advocate after the death of her husband, it was held that the said plea is not tenable and the Court below was right in dismissing the application. The counsel also placed strong reliance upon Pilla reddy v. Thimmaraya Reddy Where in it was held that under Order IX Rule 7 C. P. C. , the court can permit the petitioners to participate in the proceedings from the date they appear and for the said purpose they need not show any good or sufficient cause and even without written statement, they could be permitted to cross-examine the witnesses and also adduce evidence and if they are to be permitted to file written statement, then Order IX Rule 7 C. P. C. contemplates that they should show good cause. The learned Counsel also placed reliance on Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar where in the Apex Court while dealing with the distinction between "good cause" and "sufficient cause" held:"there is no material difference between the facts to be established for satisfying the two tests of "good cause" and "sufficient cause" and there cannot be a "good cause" which is not "sufficient" as affording an explanation for non appearance, norconverselya"sufficient cause" which is not different from "good and sufficient cause" which is used in this context in other statutes. If, on the other hand, there is any difference between the two, it can only be that the requirement of a "good cause" is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause" assuming the applicability of the principle of res judicata that the decisions in the two proceedings, if the Court finds in the proceeding under O. 9 R-7 the lighter burden not discharged, it must a fortiori bar the consideration of the same matter in the later proceeding under O. 9 R-13 where the standard of proof of that matter is, if anything, higher. "the learned Counsel placed reliance on manduva Srinivasa Rao v. Sajana Granites, madras and others wherein it was held as here under:"in the instant case the trial Court made a docket order that on being called some of the defendants were found absent and therefore they were set ex parte. Application under O-9 R-7 to set aside docket order was filed before the trial court by the defendants. Both the senior counsel as well as junior Counsel also filed affidavits before the trial Court stating that the junior Counsel appeared before the trial Court and made a request for grant of time and the juniorcounsel was under the impression that the time was granted for filing written statement. Their affidavits could not however be taken into consideration since they could not be permitted to question the docket order of the trial Court. Since no good reason was shown theirapplication under o. 9 R-7 was liable to be rejected. Since the Counsel had appeared it could not be said that a party should not be punished for fault of his Counsel. "reliance was placed on Om Prakash v. Amarjit singh and another wherein it was held that unless good cause is shown for the earlier non-appearance, the proceedings must continue from the stage at which the later appearance is entered and the party so appearing cannot be relegated to the position he would have occupied if he had appeared at the earlier hearing or hearing i. e. , he has no right to set back the hands of the clock -"the Code is designed to facilitate justice and further its ends, and should not be treated as an enactment providing for punishments and penalties. The Counsel also relied upon Vijay kumar Madan and others v. R. N. Gupta technical Education Society and others where in the Apex Court at para 7 held as here under "power in the Court to impose costs and to put the defendant-applicant on terms is spelled out from the expression "upon such terms as the Court directs as to costs or otherwise". It is settled with the decision of this Court in Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar (M R 1964 SC 993) that on an adjourned hearing in spite of the court having proceeded ex parte earlier the defendant is entitled to appear and participate in the subsequent proceedings as of right. An application under Rule 7 is required to be made only if the defendant wishes the proceedings to be reflected back and reopen the proceedings from the date where from they became ex parte so as to convert the ex parte hearings into bi-parte. While exercising power of putting the defendant on terms under Rule 7 the Court cannot pass an order which would have the effect of placing the defendant in a situation more worse off than what he would have been in if he had not applied under Rule 7. So also the conditions for taking benefit of the order should not be such as would have the effect of decreeing the suit itself. Similarly, the court may not in the garb of exercising power of placing upon terms make an order which probably the Court may not have made in the suit itself. As pointed out in the case of Arjun Singh the purpose of Rule 7 in its essence is to ensure the orderly conduct of the proceedings by penalizing improper dilatoriness calculated merely to prolong the litigation. "there cannot be any doubt or controversy that the application was moved by defendants 5 and 6 at the fag end, that too after the matter was just reopened for the purpose of citing certain decisions before the Court. Though the reason explained also is not convincing, the learned Judge recorded certain reasons and thought of giving an opportunity and accordingly allowed the application imposing some terms. Though the reason explained also is not convincing, the learned Judge recorded certain reasons and thought of giving an opportunity and accordingly allowed the application imposing some terms. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the terms which had been imposed by the learned Judge may not be just and reasonable in as much as at the fag end of the litigation when the matter was just reopened for the purpose of producing certain citations this application had been thought of and also in view of the fact that the mother has been contesting the matter all along, this court is of the considered opinion that opportunity may be given to defendants 5 and 6 to contest the matter by imposing further terms of Rs. 2,000/- (Rs. Two thousand only) to be paid to the plaintiff within a period of four weeks from today, failing which the C. R. P. shall stand allowed. The defendants 5 and 6 are at liberty to make the payment of costs specified supra to the learned Counsel representing the revision petitioner-plaintiff and obtain a receipt and produce the same before the original Court, if the parties are so advised. No costs. C. R. P. Nos. 5486 and 5559 of 2005: ( 6 ) I. A. NO. 2378/2005 in O. S. No. 1192/2000 on the file of II Additional Junior Civil Judge, warangal was filed to reopen the case by receiving the application filed under Order IX rule 7 C. P. C. along with the written statement. The said application was allowed in view of the allowing of the application I. A. No. 2377/2005 in O. S. No. 1192/2000 on the file of the self same Court, with condition and as against the said order C. R. P. No. 5486/2005 was preferred. C. R. P. 5559/2005 was filed as against an order in I. A. No. 2379/2005 in o. S. No. 1192/2000 on the file of the said Court and the said application too was allowed specifying that I. A. No. 2377/2005 was allowed with condition and on allowing the said petition, i. A. No. 2379/2005 be allowed. The said application I. A. No. 2379/2000 was filed under order XVIII Rule 17 C. P. C. to recall P. W. 1 for the purpose of cross-examination. The said application I. A. No. 2379/2000 was filed under order XVIII Rule 17 C. P. C. to recall P. W. 1 for the purpose of cross-examination. ( 7 ) IT is needless to say that the orders to be made in these C. R. P. S. do depend upon the result of C. R. P. No. 5469/2005. In view of the same, in case the conditional order made in the said C. R. P. No. 5469/2005 is complied with, the impugned orders in these two C. R. P. S. , also would stand as they are and if for any reason the default of payment of costs imposed as specified supra had been committed, it is needless to say that automatically the impugned orders in these C. R. P. S. also shall be taken as set aside and the C. R. P. S. would stand allowed. No costs.