( 1 ) DEFENDANTS 8 and 9 preferredl this Second Appeal, against the judgment and decree, dated 29. 08. 2005, passed by the learned I Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad, in a. S. No. 110 of 2000. That appeal was filed against the judgment and decree, dated 11. 09. 2000, passed by the learned XVIII Junior civil Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad, in O. S. No. 545 of 1991. Defendant No. 9 is the legal representative of defendant No. 7. The suit was filed by the first respondent herein. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as arrayed in the suit. ( 2 ) AN extent of about Ac. 16. 00 of land in Survey Nos. 61 and 62 of Trimulgherry Village, Secunderdbad Cantonment, was jointly purchased by Mohd. Sharifuddin, father of the plaintiff, J. Narisimulu mudiraj and Mohd. Karimullah, through a sale deed, dated 05. 05. 1958. The land was divided into plots and plot Nos. 111/a and 134/a were sold in favour of the 4th defendant, through a sale deed, dated 15. 03. 1959. According to the plaintiff, the extent sold to the 4th defendant is only 600 square yards, whereas the latter started obtaining permission from the authorities under the Urban land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, and undertaking transactions, as though the extent is 1600 square yards. ( 3 ) HE obtained a certified copy of the sale deed, dated 15. 03. 1959, which depicted the extent as 600 square yards only. On the basis of the same, he made complaints before the various authorities against the 4th defendant. The plaintiff further pleaded that defendants 2 and 3, the authorities of the Registration Department, have altered the extent in the registration book, with the collusion of the 4th respondent, through an endorsement, dated 20. 12,1989, from 600 sq. yards, to 1600 sq. yards. The 4th defendant entered into an agreement of sale with defendants 7 and 5, for sale of the suit schedule property and for that purpose, he executed general power of attorney in favour of defendants 5 and 6. On the death of the 71h defendant, the 9lh defendant was brought on record. ( 4 ) THE plaintiff claimed the reliefs of [a) declaration that the total area of plot Nos. On the death of the 71h defendant, the 9lh defendant was brought on record. ( 4 ) THE plaintiff claimed the reliefs of [a) declaration that the total area of plot Nos. 111/a and 134/a sold to the 4fh defenaant is only 600 square yards and not 1600 square yards; b) injunction restraining defendants 4 to 8 and all persons claiming through them, from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff over the area in excess of 600 square yards; and c) declaration that the endorsement dated 20. 12,1989, altering the extent from 600 to 1600 square yards is illegal null and void. ( 5 ) DEFENDANTS 1 to 3 pleaded in their written-statement, that the discrepancy as to extent in the registration book, in relation to the sale deed, dated 15. 03. 1959, was brought to their notice by the 4th defendant and on verification of the contents of the original sale deed, necessary corrections were effected, in accordance with the provisions of law and procedure in vogue. The gist of the contentions of defendants 4 to 9 is that the area of the said two plots is 620 and 979 square yards respectively, as is evident from the document and the receipt issued by the father of the plaintiff and that it is the plaintiff, who manipulated some officials in the Registration Department, to get a certified copy with wrong recitals, as to the extent of the plots. Genesis of the acquisition of the property and the subsequent transfer thereof to other defendants was furnished. Objection was raised as to the maintainability of the suit as well as locus stand! of the plaintiff. Through its judgment, dated 11. 09. 2000, the trial Court dismissed the suit. Aggrieved thereby, the plaintiff filed A. S. No. 110 of 2000. During the pendency of the appeal, defendant No. 4 died and his legal representatives (respondents 8 to 10 herein) were brought on record. ( 6 ) THE appeal was allowed on 19-01-2004. The judgment and decree of the trial court were set aside, and the matter was remanded to the trial court. Even while remanding the matter, the lower appellate court made certain observations, touching upon the merits of the matter. It was directed that Ex. B-6, the sale deed, ex. B-7, the plan, must be sent for examination, to the forensic laboratory, and Ex. Even while remanding the matter, the lower appellate court made certain observations, touching upon the merits of the matter. It was directed that Ex. B-6, the sale deed, ex. B-7, the plan, must be sent for examination, to the forensic laboratory, and Ex. B-8, for examination by hand-writing expert, at the cost of the defendants 10 to 12, the legal representatives of defendant No. 4. The defendants 8 and 9 filed C. M. A. No. 1380 of 2004 before this court. The C. M. A was allowed, through judgment dated 22-09-2004, The judgment of the lower appellate court was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the lower appellate court for fresh consideration and disposal, on merits, in accordance with law. ( 7 ) IN the judgment in C. MANo. 1380 of 2004, it was observed by this court that various questions, such as the locus sfandi of the plaintiff, to file the suit; the question of limitation; the discharge of burden by the plaintiff, etc. , must be dealt with, sri Satyanarayana Prasad, the learned senior counsel appearing for the defendants 8 and 9, submits that the suit fs not maintainable, for more reasons than one. He contends that as long as the sale deed, dated 15. 03. 1959, marked as Ex. B,6 remains unchallenged, the plaintiff is not entitled to seek any relief against the defendants. He contends that the relief of declaration, particularly in the context of the extent of land covered by Ex. B. 6, was impermissible, unless the cancellation of the said document was sought for. He takes objection to the relief of injunction also, since it was neither pleaded nor proved that the plaintiff is in possession of the property concerned. It is also pointed out that a suit is not maintainable, for assailing the endorsement made by defendants 2 and 3, and that even on facts, the said endorsements are true and correct, since it accords with Ex. B. 6. He further contends that when Ex. B. 6 was jointly executed by three vendors, the transaction covered by it, or its contents cannot be assailed by the son of one of the vendors. He contends that the lower appellate court committed several factual mistakes, and had deviated from the settled principles of law, particularly in the context of the burden of proof and application of principles of evidence. He contends that the lower appellate court committed several factual mistakes, and had deviated from the settled principles of law, particularly in the context of the burden of proof and application of principles of evidence. ( 8 ) SRI Vedula Venkata Ramana, the learned counsel for the plaintiff, on the other hand, submits that the fourth defendant had manipulated the record with the assistance and cooperation of defendants 2 and 3, nearly four decades after the registration of the document. He submits that the grievance of the plaintiff is only about the alteration of the contents of the register and the consequences thereof, and that the suit, as presented, is perfectly maintainable. Learned counsel point. s out that the 4th defendant purchased only an extent of 600 square yards and neither he nor the transferees have any right, over any extent, in excess of that. At the initial stage, the trial court framed only one issue, as under: "whether the plaintiff is enlitled for declaration and injunction as prayed for". ( 9 ) THEREAFTER, the trial court recast the issues as under: 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the declaration, of declaring a) that the total area of plot Nos. 134/a and 111 /a sold to defendant No. 4 through registered sale deed document no. 522/1959 is only 600 sq. yards and not 1600 sq. yards? b] Whether the orders passed by 1he second defendant dt. 20-12-1989 of rectifying the area of plot No. l34/a and 111 /a together is 1600 sq. yards, is illegal null and void? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the injunction as prayed for? 3. Whether the petitioner has got focus standi for claiming the above declaration and injunction? 4. Whether the suit is within time? the plaintiff alone deposed as PW-1, and he did not examine any other witnesses. He filed Exs. A-1 to A-63. On behalf of the defendants, DWs 1 to 7 were examined and Exs. B-1 to B-55 were marked. Two more documents were taken on record, as Exs. X-1 and X-2. The trial court answered all the issues, against the plaintiff. the plaintiff alone deposed as PW-1, and he did not examine any other witnesses. He filed Exs. A-1 to A-63. On behalf of the defendants, DWs 1 to 7 were examined and Exs. B-1 to B-55 were marked. Two more documents were taken on record, as Exs. X-1 and X-2. The trial court answered all the issues, against the plaintiff. After remand by this court, the learned 1 Additional Chief Judge, city Civil Court, Secunderabad, allowed A. S. No. 110 of 2000, through judgment dated 29-08-2005, in view of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, the following questions arise for consideration in this second appeal: a) whether the plaintiff had the /ocus standi to file the suit; b) whether the relief of declaration, as to the extent covered by Ex. B-6, was permissible, without seeking any declaration about the validity of the said document; c) whether the plaintiff proved his case for grant of perpetual injunction; d) whether the endorsement dated 20-12-1989, made by defendants 2 and 3, suffer from any illegality or infirmity. e) whether the lower appellate court applied the correct principles of evidence, in granting the relief to the plaintiff; and, The relief claimed by the plaintiff can be divided into three parts, ncmely, a) declaration, that the total area of plots 134/a and 111/a sold to defendant No. 4, through sale deed, dated 15-03-1959, is only 600 sq. yards, and not 1600 yards; b) injunction, restraining defendants 4 to 8 and all persons claiming through them, from interfering with the plaintiffs peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property, over and above 600 sq. yards; and c) declaration, that the orders dated 20-12-1989 passed by defendant No. 2, altering the area from 600 yards to 1600 yards, at pages 122 and 123 of book No. I, Vol. 7, in relation to document No!522 of 1959, is illegal, null and void. ( 10 ) WHILE reliefs (a) and (c) are declaratory in nature, the other is for perpetual injunction. The first part of the relief had a direct bearing upon the extent of property, conveyed through Exs. B-6, the sale deed, dated 15-03-1959. As observed earlier, through Ex. 7, in relation to document No!522 of 1959, is illegal, null and void. ( 10 ) WHILE reliefs (a) and (c) are declaratory in nature, the other is for perpetual injunction. The first part of the relief had a direct bearing upon the extent of property, conveyed through Exs. B-6, the sale deed, dated 15-03-1959. As observed earlier, through Ex. B-6, the father of the plaintiff and 2 other persons, have transferred the property, covered by it, to defendant No,4, The relief sought by the plaintiff, in a way would suggest absence of consensus ad idem as regards the extent, conveyed, through the document. According to the plaintiff, the extent conveyed through ex. B-6 is only 600 sq yards and not 1600. He indirectly admitted that the extent covered by document, as ft stands, is 1600 sq. yards. Acceding to the request of the plaintiff would amount to alternation, modification or correction of the document. In its order in C. M. A. No. 1380 of 2004, this court pointed out that the purport of Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act, needs to be examined in this regard. The lower appellate court expressed its view, on this aspect, as under: ". . . However, this suit is not laid under Section 26, Specific relief Act nor is it the purport of the suit that the suit falls within Section 26, Specific Relief Act. From a plain reading of the section, Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act would appear to apply in cases where the document was executed initially either owning to mistake or owing to fraud. In the present case, the plaintiff is not claiming that Ex. B-6 was executed by his father and two others owing to mistake or fraud. The claim of the plaintiff is that Ex. B-6 sale deed was only for an extent of 600 sq. yds. And that the document was subsequently manipulated to show as if the sale deed was for 1600 sq. yds. Thus there was no question of the impugned document not expressing what the parties intend to express. . . " ( 11 ) IF Ex. B-6 had expressed what the parties intended to, it is ununderstandable, as to where existed the basis for the plaintiff to allege that the extent covered by the document is only 600 sq. yards, and not 1600 sq. yards, as contained in it. . . " ( 11 ) IF Ex. B-6 had expressed what the parties intended to, it is ununderstandable, as to where existed the basis for the plaintiff to allege that the extent covered by the document is only 600 sq. yards, and not 1600 sq. yards, as contained in it. It is also difficult to imagine, as to whether the plaintiff could have sought for a declaration, as he did, touching upon the contents of Ex. B-6, without questioning it, duly providing necessary factual foundation, for the plea. ( 12 ) ASSUMING that the relief claimed by the plaintiff does not squarely fit into the purport of Section 26, this much can be said, that he wanted the terms and conditions, in relation to the transaction covered by Ex. B-6, to be interpreted, in a way, different from what it purports. Even this exercise can be initiated only by a party to the transaction, and not others. It is not in dispute that ex. B-6 is a transaction, between three vendors, on the one hand, and defendant No. 4, on the other hand. The plaintiff claims through one of the vendors, i. e. Mohd. Sharfuddin. Here again, he does not claim to be the exclusive legal representative of his father. The lower appellate court observed that the other two vendors were alive, by the time the suit was filed, and when the plaintiff deposed as a witness (para. 38 ). Thus, out of four persons, connected with Ex. B-6, three persons, viz. two vendors and the vendee were alive, by the date of filing of the suit. If at all, there existed factual and legal basis for assailing the validity, or contents of Ex. B-6, it were only the other two vendors, and all the surviving legal representatives of Sharfuddin that were competent to institute the proceedings. However, the plaintiff alone filed the suit. The lower appellate court had undertaken discussion, separately under the heading, locus. sfand/. The view expressed by it, on this question, reads as under: ". . . It is the claim of the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the plaintiff would lose as much as 1000 sq. yds. of his other property by the false claim of the 4th defendant that 1600 sq. yds. of site was purchased by the 4lh defendant instead of 600 sq. yds. . . It is the claim of the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the plaintiff would lose as much as 1000 sq. yds. of his other property by the false claim of the 4th defendant that 1600 sq. yds. of site was purchased by the 4lh defendant instead of 600 sq. yds. As already observed by me, the plaintiff is directly interested in the property in question, as he is Class-l heir of one of the three vendors under Ex. B-6. I therefore consider that the plaintiff is a person interested in the subject-matter of the property and is entitled to sue. . . " This hardly answers the qustion, as to how a person, who is only a legal heir of one of the three vendors in a document; can maintain the suit, particularly, when the other vendors were very much alive. The objection in this regard, was also put forward by the defendants, in a slightly different form also, i. e. non-joinder of necessary parties. The answer to this objection by the lower appellate court, reads as under: ". . . Assuming that the truth is on the side of the defendants and assuming that the presence of the two other vendors would have established the claim of the defendants, the defendants could have brought the two surviving vendors of ex. B-6 on record. The defendants did not choose to do so, the defendants therefore cannot now turn round and claim that the plaintiff did not implead Iho other vendors of ex. B-6 and the suit therefore is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. . . " ( 13 ) THIJ approach is difficult to countenance. The trial Court proceeded, as though, it is the obligation of the defendants to fill the procedural lacunae, left by the plaintiff. Therefore, it clearly emerges that the plaintiff, who happens to be the son of one of the three venaors, under Ex. B-6, does not have the locus sfandi to file the suit, that too, without impleading the other two vendors, who were alive. ( 14 ) AS regards the second question, it may be noted that the plaintiff wanted a declaration, that the extent covered under Ex. B-6 is 600 sq. yards, and not 1600 sq. yards. It was necessary for him to plead that the figure 1600 sq. yards was mentioned in Ex. ( 14 ) AS regards the second question, it may be noted that the plaintiff wanted a declaration, that the extent covered under Ex. B-6 is 600 sq. yards, and not 1600 sq. yards. It was necessary for him to plead that the figure 1600 sq. yards was mentioned in Ex. B-6 wrongly, if he had competence and standing to do so. No relief was claimed, vis-a-vis Ex. B-6. The trial court repelled the contention of the plaintiff. The premise, on which the lower appellate court proceeded to examine this aspect of the matter, is reflected in paragraph 43 of its judgment. It reads thus: "it is not as though the plaintiff is seeking for a declaration that the property sold was 600 sq. yards". If this were to be so, there did not exist any basis to grant the relief. However, the sentence next to the one, extracted above, makes an interesting reading: "the plaintiff is seeking for a declaration that the 4fh defendant purchased only 600 sq. yds. under Ex. B-6 and for a consequential perpetual injunction against the 41h defendant and persons claiming through him. . . " A1 a different place, the question was framed as under: "the question is whether the property covered by plot nos. 111/aand 134/a admeasures 1600 sq. yards". As though, this uncertainty is not enough, the lower appellate court proceeded to expand Ihe scope of relief, claimed by the plaintiff. In paragraph 21, it was observed, ". . . What the plaintiff claimed is that Ex. B-6 is the true sale deed, barring for the alteration made regarding the extent of the land from 600 sq. yds to 1600 sq. yards by incorporating T before the original extent of 600 sq. yds, making it 1600sq. yds". Para 13 of the plaint, which contains the relief, reads as under; "plaintiff therefore prays for judgment and decree declaring that the total area of Plots Nos. 134/a and 111/a sold to defendanl No. 4 through sale deed dated 15-3-1959 bearing document No 522 of 1959 Book-l, Vol. 7 at pages 122 and 123 registered before the Sub-Registrar, Secunderbad [now Sub-Registrar, Marredpalli, Secunderabad) is only 600 sq. yds. And not 1600 sq. yds". ( 15 ) THE said relief does not find place in the above paragraph. 134/a and 111/a sold to defendanl No. 4 through sale deed dated 15-3-1959 bearing document No 522 of 1959 Book-l, Vol. 7 at pages 122 and 123 registered before the Sub-Registrar, Secunderbad [now Sub-Registrar, Marredpalli, Secunderabad) is only 600 sq. yds. And not 1600 sq. yds". ( 15 ) THE said relief does not find place in the above paragraph. Even assuming that the contents of the plaint support this plea, it touches upon the very correctness of Ex. B-6, and it can be canvassed only by assaiing it, and not otherwise. It is not in dispute that Ex. B-6 discloses the extent, as 1600 sq. yards, and no relief is claimed for alteration of the same. ( 16 ) THE root cause for the present litigation is, the discrepancy that existed, or emerged between the contents, as to Ex. B-6, on the one hand, and the true re- production of the same in the records of the Registration Authority, on the other hand. The sale deed was executed way back in the year 1959. The original document remained as it is. The plaintiff obtained a certified copy of the sale deed in the year 1987, which reflected the extent as 600 sq. yards. On that basis, he initiated action against defendant No. 4, on several fronts. Defendant No. 4, in turn, approached respondents 2 and 3, under the provisions of the Registration Act and the Rules made thereunder, duly producing Ex. B-6. On comparison with the document, respondents 2 and 3 found that the extent mentioned in the registration book, did not rellect the correct picture, and accordingly issued endorsement daled 20-12-1989. Before and after this entire exercise, Ex. B-6 remained as it is, and the alteration, if at all, was in the book, maintained by the Registrars office. It hardly needs any emphasis that the instrument, which brings about, or evidences the transaction of sale; is the sale deed, and the reproduction of the same in the book maintained by the registrars oftice, is to be in the torm of evidence. The intention of the parties is reflected to the recitals in the document. The content of document is supposed to be truly and accurately reproduced in the book, and it is the book, that must conform to, and accord with the document, and not vice versa. The intention of the parties is reflected to the recitals in the document. The content of document is supposed to be truly and accurately reproduced in the book, and it is the book, that must conform to, and accord with the document, and not vice versa. The observation of the lower appellate court, on this aspect, is as under: para-25: As rightly observed by the learned counsel for the defendants, one shall look at other documents in support of the claim of the plaintiff and examine whether the preponderance of evidence is in favour of the situation where the sole deed was 1600 sq. yds. or for 600 sq. yds". (sic)As tong as the plaintiff did not seek any declaration, vis-a-vis the contents of Ex. B-6, much less, did he pay court fee on it the question of granting any relief, which would have a bearing on the interpretation of contents of the said document; does not arise. Therefore, the view expressed by the lower appellate court, on this question; cannot be accepted. ( 17 ) THE third question relates to the relief of perpetual injunction, the basic requirement for granting this relief is, that the plaintiff must plead and prove to the satisfaction of the court, that he is in possession and enjoyment of a specific and identified extent of land, in respect of which, he is claiming the relief. Even if the plaintiff were to have failed to prove title, he was entitled to be granted the relief of injunction, if he had proved his possession over any definite and specific extent of property. The schedule appended to the suit reads as under: "schedule of Property: all that land bearing Plots No. . l34/a and 111/a, totally admeasuring 600 sq. yds. in Survey Nos. 61 and 62 situated at trirnulgherry Village, Securderabad Cantonment, secunderabad and bounded on the: north BY :plotno. l06/a south BY : Hashmathpet Main Road. EAST BY : 30 ft. wide raad. WEST BY : Neighbours land in Survey No. 69/1". The relief of injunction, is not claimed in respect of the suit schedule property. On the other hand, it is in respect of injunction the property, over and above 600 sq. yards covered by plot nos. 111/a and 113/a". The plaintiff was not certain about the property, as regards which, he wanted the decree of perpetual injunction. The relief of injunction, is not claimed in respect of the suit schedule property. On the other hand, it is in respect of injunction the property, over and above 600 sq. yards covered by plot nos. 111/a and 113/a". The plaintiff was not certain about the property, as regards which, he wanted the decree of perpetual injunction. ( 18 ) THIS court desperately searched in the entire plaint, as to the nature of plea, touching on the possession of the property, for which, the relief of injunction was granted. Paragraph 3 gave a detailed account of the manner in which, 1600 sq. yards of land in Sy. Nos. 61 and 62, was acquired; paragraph 4 dealt with the execution of Ex. B-6; paragraph 5 running into, almost 4 pages, related to the circumstances in which, the contents of Book No. l, Vol. ,7 were corrected, through endorsements dated 20-12-1989. Paragraphs 6 and 7 are devoted to the grounds, pleaded by the plaintiff, against the endorsements, it is only in paragraph 8, that a mention is made about it, while summing up the nature of reliefs, claimed in the suit. After mentioning the relief of declaration, it was pleaded, "and consequenlial injunction, restraining the defendants 4 to 3 and all persons claiming through them, in any manner interfering with trie plaintiffs peaceful possess/on and enjoyment of the property over and above 600 sq. yards, covered by plot Nos. 111/a and 134/a". There is no whisper about the nature of possessory rights, or, of the nature of interference by the defendants. ( 19 ) COMING to the evidence part of it, except the plaintiff, no other witness was examined. In his chief-examination, which runs into 8 typed pages, he did not utter a word, about the possession of any definite extent, covered by Ex. B-6, in relation to the suit schedule property, or any interference by the defendants. Let us see, how the lower appellate court granted the relief of perpetual injunction. A finding was recorded to the effect thai the extent covered by Ex. B-6 is only 600 sq. yards. Continuing on the said premise, this is what, the lower appellate court said, ". . . Where it is established that Ex. B-6 covers only 600 sq. yds. A finding was recorded to the effect thai the extent covered by Ex. B-6 is only 600 sq. yards. Continuing on the said premise, this is what, the lower appellate court said, ". . . Where it is established that Ex. B-6 covers only 600 sq. yds. , the rest of the properties shall be considered to be in the possession of the plaintiff in the light of the assertion of the plaintiff and in the absence of the denial of the defendants. The plaintiff therefore would be entitled to a perpetual injunction in so far as the properties beyond 600n sq. yds. covered by Ex. B-6 are concerned". ( 20 ) IT is unfortunate that the final court of fact, while proposing to set aside the decree and judgment of the trial court, did not choose to ensure, whether the basic ingredients, for granting the relief of oerpetual injunction, are satisfied. At the cost of repetition, it needs to be observed, that the suit schedule property reflects 600 sq. yards; whereas the relief of perpetual injunction is, in respect of an area, other than 600 sq. yards. There is no plea in the plaint, as to possession by the plaintiff, arid interference by defendants. The plaintiff did not choose to say a word, about his possession, in his oral evidence. There did not exist any cause of action for the relief of injunction. No other witness was examined. Still, the lower appellate court granted the said relief. The same cannot be sustained in law. ( 21 ) SO far as the endorsement, dated 20. 12. 1989 is concerned, the record discloses that the defendants 2 and 3 noticed the discrepancy, as to the extents in EX. B-6, on the one hand, and the relevant extract in the Register, on the other hand. Section 62 of the Registration Act mandates that whenever a document is presented for registration, the translation shall be enterved in the register of documents, and that the same shall be filed in the registration Office. The provisions of the Act and Rules made thereunder, enable the parties to obtain certified copies of the document. The extract in the Register is required to be the true reflection of the document. The provisions of the Act and Rules made thereunder, enable the parties to obtain certified copies of the document. The extract in the Register is required to be the true reflection of the document. In the event of any discrepancy between the original document and its extract in the Register, the document shall be treated as the basis and necessary corrections are to be carried out in the extract. ( 22 ) IN the instant case, it is not in dispute that Ex. B-6 is the original document and the extent mentioned therein is 1600 sq. yards. On noticing that the extent in the extract in the Registration book is only 600 sq. yards, respondents 2 and 3 carried necessary corrections, after comparison with Ex,b-6. The plaintiff is not able to point out any Jegal or factual defect in such endorsement. Therefore, question No. D a!so deserves to be answered in favour of the defendants. ( 23 ) THIS court was compelled to frame an independent question, touching upon the principles of evidence, after noticing certain aspects in the judgment under appeal. Being the final court of facts, and an appeal being the continuation of the suit the lower appellate court was required to be certain, about the facts of the matter. Many factual errors are not amenable for correction in second appeal, and some times, the parties would be put to irreparable toss. ( 24 ) A serious error, on facts, is noticed, as regards an important aspect. Defendant No. 4 is the person, who purchased the property, and the gravamen of allegation in the entire plant is against him. Apart from the manner in which the plaintiff established his case, the purport of the defence, offered by the 4lh defendant, in the form of his pleading and evidence, assumes great importance. The appellants have claimed their right only through defendant No. 4. The record discloses that defendant No. 4 deposed as DW-3. The lower appellate court had not only taken note of this fact, but also took note of the identity of defendant no. 4, as under: ". . . I cannot but take notice of the fact that the 4th defendant was one of the most leading practitioners in the taxation front in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and before other statutory tax authorities. The 4th defendant deposed as DW. 3". 4, as under: ". . . I cannot but take notice of the fact that the 4th defendant was one of the most leading practitioners in the taxation front in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and before other statutory tax authorities. The 4th defendant deposed as DW. 3". ( 25 ) THIS observation accords with the record. It is rather surprising and unfortunate, that the discussion, at an important stage proceeded, as though the 4th defendant had shied away from deposing as a witness. This is how the discussion proceeds: ". . . There is no scope for the plaintiff to examine the 4th defendant. The 4th defendant althhough he was alive, he did not depose in this case. On the other hand, the General power of Attorney holder in the1 5th defendant deposed as dw. 4. The learned counsel for the plaintiff contended that adverse inference deserves to be drawn against the 4lh defendant for his failure to depose andhisfailure to counter the claim of the plaintiff". ". . . It shall have to be concluded that the 4lh defendant did not choose to give evidence in this case. I am afraid that adverse inference is liable to be drawn against the 4th defendant for his failure to depose before the court since no explanation is forthcoming as to why the defendants did not choose to examine 4th defendant although he was alive for quite sometime after filing of the suit" [emphasis supplied ). ( 26 ) IT is difficult to imagine that a Judge, who was sitting in appeal over the judgment and decree of a trial court, was so callous and indifferent, in his approach. Being the final adjudicator on facts, it was his duty, to ensure that the correct facts are reflected in the judgment. Law grants freedom fo a Judge, to formulate his own opinion, in the process of adjudication, the only limitation being that it must accord with the settled principles. So tar as the statement of facts is concerned, no Judge can claim or enjoy freedom to state them as he wishes, or to deviate from the record. It must not be forgotten that the facts of a case constitute the substratum for adjudication, and any misstatement would certainly have its reflection, on the ultimate adjudication. So tar as the statement of facts is concerned, no Judge can claim or enjoy freedom to state them as he wishes, or to deviate from the record. It must not be forgotten that the facts of a case constitute the substratum for adjudication, and any misstatement would certainly have its reflection, on the ultimate adjudication. Dealing with the parameters of adjudication of a First appeal the Supreme Court held as under: "the appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial courts. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind, and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. " (See Saihosh Hozore v. Purushotham Tiwari, reported in AIR 2000 SC 965] ( 27 ) IN the context of the first appellate court reversing the judgment of the trial court, the Supreme Court observed as under: "while writing a judgment of reversal the appellate court must remain conscious of two principles. Firstly, the findings of fact based on conflicting evidence arrived at by the trial court must weigh with the appellate court, more so when the findings are based on oral evidence recorded by the same presiding Judge who authors the judgment. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial judge. As a matter of law, if the appraisal of the evidence by the trial court suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on conjectures and surmises, the1 appellate court is entitled to interfere with the finding of fact when the appellate court itself commits serious errors of fact, the results are not difficult to imagine. ( 28 ) LET us see, how the principles of evidence were applied, be it, in the context of placing the burden on the parties, to prove their respective cases, or the presumption to be attached to Ex. B-6. ( 28 ) LET us see, how the principles of evidence were applied, be it, in the context of placing the burden on the parties, to prove their respective cases, or the presumption to be attached to Ex. B-6. During the course of trial and arguments, it was contended on behalf of the defendants, that failure of the plaintiff to examine the surviving vendors, must result in an adverse inference against him. However, the lower appellate court proceeded, as though it is the obligation of the defendants to examine the surviving vendors under Ex. B-6. The relevant discussion proceeds as under: (1)he defendants did not choose to examine the surviving vendors under Ex. B-6 to establish that Ex. B-6 covers 1600 sq. yds. The learned counsel for tine plaintiff would appear to contend that adverse inference deserves to be drawn against the defendants for not examining the surviving vendors to support the claim of the defendants that the defendants purchased 1600 sq yds of site. The same parameter applies to the plaintiff also. The plaintiff did not choose to examine the surviving vendors to show thai the property sold was 600 sq. yds. only. Thus the scales are even in this case. No adverse inference deserves to be drawn against either side for non-examination of the other vendors under Ex,b-6. It would appear that the surviving vendors executed the sale deed and washed off their hands, having nothing to do with the property. Therefore the plaintiff has to establish his claim independently. At the same time neither the plaintiff nor the defendants can draw any adverse inference against the other side for the non-examination of the surviving vendors". ( 29 ) FEW paragraphs later, the appellate court observed, on the same aspect, as under: "i may also point out that the same does not hold good so far as the non-examination of the other two vendors of the 4lh defendant since the adverse inference would have to be drawn against both sides for their respective failures in examining the other two vendors. Therefore no adverse inference was drawn against either side regarding the non-examination of the other two vendors of the 4lh defendant. . . Therefore no adverse inference was drawn against either side regarding the non-examination of the other two vendors of the 4lh defendant. . . " (sic) It is true that in Arvmugham v. Sundaramba the Supreme court held that, in the context of examining the matter in a second appeal, the question, relating to the burden of proof, would not be of much significance, if both sides have adduced evidence. However, if it becomes evident, that the whole consideration was contrary to the provisions of Evidence Act, a seal of approval cannot be put upon it. Sections 101 to 103 of that Act squarely place the burden, in the present context, upon the plaintiff. It is he, who approached the court, for a judgment, and it is he, who would fail, if no evidence is adduced, and finally, it is the plaintiff, that wanted the court, to believe the existence of the facts, pleaded by him. Therefore, treating the defendants on par with the plaintiff, and at some places, placing a heavier burden upon the defendants, had resulted in negation of the very concept of burden of proof. ( 30 ) FURTHER, being the son of one of the vendors, the plaintiff was more proximate, to the other surviving two vendors, and more than him, those two persons had a better knowledge about the transaction under Ex. B-6. Failure of the plaintiff to examine the other two vendors squarely attracts illustration (g) of Section 114. The observation made by the lower appellate court runs contrary to this. As regards Ex. B-6, the defendants contended that, being a document of more than 30 years old, a presumption needs to be attached to it. The trial court accepted the plea, and took Ex. B-6 as proved, both as regards execution and contents. In reversing the said finding, the lower appellate court commented as under: para-39: Curiously the trial Court considered that Ex. B-6 was a 30 year old document and needs no proof under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act. The proof under Section 90 is with reference to the execution and attestation of the document and not with reference to the contents of the document, Merely because Ex. B-6 is more than 30 years old document it does not follow that the sae deed was for 1600 sq. yds, and not for 600 sq. yds. The proof under Section 90 is with reference to the execution and attestation of the document and not with reference to the contents of the document, Merely because Ex. B-6 is more than 30 years old document it does not follow that the sae deed was for 1600 sq. yds, and not for 600 sq. yds. The parties are liable to prove the contents of the document by independent evidence. The trial Court is incorrect in holding that Ex. B-6 was a 30 year old document and need not be proved. Regarding the proof of the contents of Ex. B-6, various ancillary circumstances and material is liabie fo be looked into to determine as to the exact extent under Ex,b-6", ( 31 ) HERE again, the view expressed by the lower appellate court is difficult to be accepted. Section 90 of the Evidence Act was taken note of, buf the presumption provided for, under it, was restricted to the execution and attestation. It was observed that notwithstanding the presumption, as to proof of document, attached under Section 90, the proof of contents of the document (Ex. B-6), and other ancillary circumstances, relating to extent; are open to be dealt with. Section 91 of the Evidence Act puts an embargo, on such an exercise. According to that provision, where a transaction or contract are reduced into writing, or required in law, to be reduced to writing, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract, except the document itself, or its secondary evidence. Ex. B-6 does not fall into any of the two exceptions, under that provision. ( 32 ) IT is not in dispute that the extent mentioned in Ex. B-6 is 1600 sq. yards. Not a single witness spoke to the effect that the extent was either tampered. At least, two vendors were very much alive, and they were not examined. The plaintiff was not a party to the document and his allegation as to the discrepancy in the extent, even assuming that the suit was properly constituted, is of no consequence. No other witness was examined by him. Even if there is any doubt, as to the contents and recitals in ex. B-6, as regards the extent, they stood cleared through two successive documents. Ex. B-7 is the plan, attached to the document, Ex. B-6. No other witness was examined by him. Even if there is any doubt, as to the contents and recitals in ex. B-6, as regards the extent, they stood cleared through two successive documents. Ex. B-7 is the plan, attached to the document, Ex. B-6. The two plots 111/a and 134/a put together, constitute a quadrangle, with the length, on the longer side, at 165 and the breadth on the shorter side, at 67. 9". The area would be about 1600 sq. yards. Ex. B-8 is a receipt, executed by the father of the plaintiff, for the receipt of consideration under Ex. B-6. It reads as under: "received with thanks from Mr. MJ. Swamy, hyderabad a cheque for Rs. ,1,300/- on the Andhra Bank Ltd. , hyderabad, tov/ards the cast of plot No. 134/a - measuring 979 yards and plot No. 111/a measuring 620 sq. yards on survey No. 61 and 62 situated at Trimulgerry Village, secunderabad Cantonmemt limits in full settlement. The measurements of the area is subject to verification by the buyer". ( 33 ) THUS, it is evident that the extent of two plots were furnished separately, and both of them constituted 1600 sq. yards. The only ground on which the lower appellate court held that Ex. B-8, as not reliable; is that the totof extent under it, comes to 1599 sq. yards; whereas the extent in Ex. B-6 is shown as 1600 sq. yards. It was commented that the discrepancy of one square yard was riot explained, as though it is the defendants, who have come to the court, seeking a declaration of their file in the (and covered by ex. B-6. ( 34 ) FROM the above discussion, it becomes evident that the judgment rendered by the lower appellate court suffers from glaring factual errors, leading to miscarriage of justice; wrong application of principles of law, and the conclusions are not based on evidence, ( 35 ) THE second appeal is accordingly allowed with costs through out, and the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate court are set aside. .